

Party, what happens is anyone's guess. The only thing that can be safely predicted is a purge of the glib globalism that understands little about economics, nothing about national wealth, and less than nothing about comparative labor productivity.

One conceivable replacement for this false faith, and the one I favor, would be some root-canal Republicanism. Take a severe recession. Cut spending. Balance the budget. Secure the borders. Do your homework. Eat your spinach. Take it like a man. Such a program would set credible and serious, if modest, goals for itself. But it is difficult to rally popular passion for such a platform.

Another course, however improbable, would be the adoption of a model based loosely on Japanese and other East Asian success stories. In this respect, the death of the dollar may serve as the economic complement to 9/11, making the hitherto impossible suddenly unstoppable. In broad strokes, a coercive reconstruction of the American economy along East Asian lines is not particularly difficult to understand. Consumers would not be allowed to overspend—they would say good-bye to construction of new subdivisions, large SUVs, and mailboxes full of credit-card offerings. Workers would be forced to save—the carrot of tax cuts on savings and investment would be reinforced by the stick of mandatory savings plans such as those in Singapore. Business would be required to invest in hard industries—the low-interest money now directed toward consumption would be redirected to sectors such as advanced materials, electronic components, and energy. None of these steps would be popular, but collectively they would short-circuit a dollar-driven collapse in U.S. power.

The post-war success of the New Bureaucrats in Japan suggests that such a model requires independent power

centers willing and able to force such a model upon the country. This scenario is plausible in the U.S. in the near future because we have such power centers: the uniformed military brass, the politically savvy leadership of what remains of advanced manufacturing, and the brilliant, ruthless, young Republican legal minds now flowing into the security establishment. These are among the few remaining sources of competence and effectiveness within the American political system. They may be the only ones.

The general trends are all moving in the direction of transforming Republicans into the security party—not just the party of national security but also the party of economic security. As Mor-

gan Stanley's Andrew Xie emphasized, the death of the dollar requires radical action if America is to remain a superpower. Based on the results of the 2002 election—when Republicans ran on military security—economic security might be a political winner. Conceivably, it might be more popular with voters than a return to traditional fiscal conservatism because it would subordinate the pain we face to national purpose. Might it be the secret destiny of Republican Party to become the political arm of a military-manufacturing-security complex like the one President Eisenhower warned of 40 years ago? ■

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In Praise of Free Love

Rethinking the sexual revolution

By Sam Torode

TO MANY PEOPLE TODAY, fertility is a disaster waiting to happen. Getting pregnant is like contracting a disease—thankfully, there's a pill to vaccinate against it. When accidents happen, men have it fairly easy. But it's no fun being a woman. What's desirable is to be free—to be like a man, able to enjoy sex all the time without getting pregnant.

This attitude is expressed well in a 1964 ad for Enovid, the first contraceptive pill:

From the beginning, woman has been a vassal to the temporal demands of the cyclic mechanism of her reproductive system. Now, to a degree heretofore unknown, she is permitted ... suspension of

cyclic function and procreative potential. This new method of control is symbolized in an illustration from ancient Greek mythology: Andromeda freed from her chains.

Most women seem to agree with this assessment: in America, nearly 80 percent of women born after 1945 have gone on the Pill at some point in their lives. Recognizing the scale of this revolution, the *Economist* named the Pill the greatest scientific advance of the 20th century.

But is the history of contraceptive advances really a story of liberation for women? Or is it a story of women's increasing bondage to pharmaceutical corporations and to men who want sex without responsibility?

According to the promoters of contraception, a woman is a slave to her cycle, and freedom comes from the mechanical control of fertility. As Margaret Sanger said in 1920, "Science must make woman the owner, the mistress of herself. Science, the only possible savior of mankind, must put it in the power of woman to decide for herself whether she will or will not become a mother."

Contrast this with the wisdom literature of ancient Egypt and Israel, which offers another perspective on fertility. In a hymn to Aton, Pharaoh Amenhotep IV sings,

All the beasts are content with their pasturage;

Trees and plants are flourishing. ...

Creator of the seed in women,

Thou who makest fluid into man,

Who maintainest the son in the womb of his mother. ...

How manifold it is, what thou hast made!

In Amenhotep's view, fertility—both of the earth and of our bodies—is a mystery, a gift to be received joyfully. The Hebrew Scriptures agree:

Blessed are all who fear the Lord, who walk in his ways. You will eat the fruit of your labor; blessings and prosperity will be yours.

Your wife will be like a fruitful vine within your house; your sons will be like olive shoots around your table. (Psalm 128:1-3)

In the ancient view, a human being is not a machine but a person—a unity of soul and body. The wisdom of the past would caution us against artificially suppressing any part of the person—including her fertility.

Health is wholeness. It involves being connected, living in harmony with our

bodies, our environment, and our fellow human beings. Industrialism, however, tends toward division. Applied to sexuality, industrialism has fostered a separation between sex and fertility, which, in turn, has led to a separation between sex and marriage.

"Until recently," writes Wendell Berry, "there was no division between sexuality and fertility, because none was possible. This division was made possible by modern technology, which subjected human fertility, like the fertility of the earth, to a new kind of will: the technological will, which may not *necessarily* oppose the moral will, but which has not only tended to do so, but has tended to replace it."

"For the care or control of fertility," Berry continues, "we have allowed a technology of chemicals and devices to replace entirely the cultural means of ceremonial forms, disciplines, and restraints." It was through these cultural, or ecological, means that our ancestors harnessed and preserved sexual energy. These include the upholding of marriage as the proper context for sex and the discipline of periodic abstinence for the spacing of children.

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A woman, with her cycle of fertility, is not a forest to be cleared or a mountain to be strip-mined. She is like a garden, yielding her fruits to the patience and care of the loving husbandman. Neither are children pests to be warded off with chemicals. Instead, they are a crowning gift of marriage, the visible fruits of a love too strong to be contained in just two bodies.

Even Gandhi believed that self-con-

trol was the only means of limiting fertility in accordance with human dignity. He writes in his autobiography,

The existence of the world depends on the reproductive act and since the world is God's domain, and a reflection of his power, this act must be subject to controls, the purpose of which is the continuation of life on earth. The man who understands this will strive at all costs to master his senses, arm himself with the knowledge that is necessary to the physical and spiritual welfare of his posterity, and transmit this knowledge to the future, for its benefit.

As Gandhi recognized, real sexual freedom doesn't come from contraceptives. It comes from honoring and guarding our sexuality, and situating it in the context of a loving marriage that's open to procreation.

Romantic love involves total self-abandonment. For a romance to flourish, year after year, it needs the promise of life-long fidelity and a commitment to something bigger than itself—a commitment to the raising up of children. Para-

doxically, we can only experience the freedom of love when we give ourselves away.

We've had a sexual revolution. What's needed now is a revolution of love. ■

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Who Is Playing Leviathan Now?

Finding Thomas Hobbes in bombed-out Baghdad

By Paul Gottfried

A BY NOW DEEPLY ingrained neoconservative practice consists of tracing back one's own wooden views to long-dead political theorists. That way it is possible to claim a pedigree for what otherwise might not hold our attention. For example, Michael Ledeen, in *Machiavelli on Modern Leadership*, has written a defense of Machiavelli's "iron rules" of statecraft, which is really a vindication of Ledeen's democratic imperialism. If Machiavelli had lived only a few centuries later, we are led to believe, he would have sided with Lincoln's war against slavery and would have happily signed up for Wilson's crusade to make the world safe for democracy. In a similar vein, George Will, in *Statecraft and Soulcraft*, brings up Aristotle and Burke to endorse an American welfare state. In *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea*, Irving Kristol puts the ancient Stagirite to like use, in a demonstration of what might be called "Straussianism Lite." Even more recently, British historian Paul Johnson reached for his own usable classic when in *National Review* last fall he appealed to the spirit of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651). Johnson was arguing for an American invasion of Iraq—or any place that may conceivably need "a constabulary enjoying full powers and global reach."

According to Johnson, "[T]he world is now too small and the weapons of the malefactors too devastating" for us to live without a "world policeman." Johnson builds his case by quoting Hobbes selectively, about the need for a sover-

eign, or what Johnson calls a "giant authority figure," to prevent the war of all against all. Whether Americans like it or not, their country is the "only constitutional Leviathan we have," and unlike Hobbes's autocratic sovereign, our president is a "constitutional ruler with an educated people of nearly 300 million behind him." That, according to Johnson, is why the terrorists attacked us, and why "the opponents of order throughout the world are so noisily opposed to Leviathan's protecting himself."

Johnson's references to Hobbes are no more than rhetorical flourishes. Sovereign states and individual sovereigns, as understood by Hobbes, do not function as global policemen but belong to particular commonwealths. The reason Hobbes in *Leviathan* treats the Catholic Church as the "kingdom of darkness" is the right claimed by its clergy to influence ethically those living outside of a Catholic commonwealth. For Hobbes, there were no acceptable arbiters of conscience or order outside of established sovereign states. And though one might become sovereign "by acquisition," by conquering a territory, someone who managed this would have to go on ruling and protecting his subjects (in return for their obedience). The Hobbesian conqueror, far from being a "world policeman," was expected to rule his own commonwealth and to contend with malefactors there. The Leviathan is not a free-floating metaphor but a term applied to a post-medieval conception of a multiplicity of states.

Leviathan, the great sea monster featured in the Book of Job, is made identical with the members of the state system that took shape in early modern Europe. One catches an echo of this Hobbesian view in the title that Hans Morgenthau gave to his textbook on international relations, *Politics Among Nations*. Morgenthau knew that he was writing as the political world that Hobbes had helped conceptualize was fading away. And he properly feared that a war of empires, linked to expansionist ideologies, would take its place.

There is another problem with extrapolating from Hobbes's notion of the state to justify an American global mission. As Michael Oakeshott demonstrates in his famous extended introduction to *Leviathan*, what Hobbes is doing is describing a civil association adapted to his view of human nature. The state, as Hobbes explains, is "a work of art," indeed "an artificial man made for the protection and salvation of the natural man to whom it is superior in power." Necessitating this "artifice" is the fact that human beings, as far as Hobbes could analyze their constant features, were restless in their desire of power and their "love of contention from competition." They were also, as far as Hobbes could figure out the human brain, matter in motion; and to whatever extent human perceptions matched up (or seemed to), that was the result of linguistic conventions and of what the French Hobbes scholar Raymond Polin calls "*raisonnement calculateur*," the