

He certainly had. In fact, "I'm not sorry that I paid out bribes—in fact I'm not finished yet. I spend money now and will spend even more. By the power of God, I may even spend my life for your souls."

Reading the *Confession*, the modern reader might well think of a modern-day preacher or bishop in Africa or Asia reacting to charges that he had betrayed the financial or doctrinal standards prevailing in London or Los Angeles. Yes, of course, the modern-day critics might say, you have all these followers. But how sincere are their conversions? What kind of Christianity is this, anyway? Aren't you just preaching a new kind of syncretism? Ah, if only you'd had more systematic exposure to a good higher education when you were young. Anyway, do you *really* feel that missions are still justified, with all their imperialist connotations? Don't you understand that we don't live in the days of the Roman Empire any more—I'm sorry, I mean the British and French empires?

Though it is always sad to note the loss of historical documents and sources, it is somewhat pleasant to record that we have no surviving copies of the learned polemics against Patrick. Those writings, and their authors, have faded into oblivion, while the response of the embattled missionary leader on the borderlands is one of the most famous documents surviving from that age. A contemporary Catholic thinker, Virgilio Elizondo, has enunciated his "Galilee Principle," which asserts, "what human beings reject, God chooses as his very own." He could have been thinking of that "unlearned sinner," Patrick of Armagh.

Equally contemporary in its way is the *Letter to the Soldiers of Coroticus*, which challenges a Christian state that has dared to make war on fellow believers. Even the title of the letter proclaims Patrick's rage and contempt. He should have written to his "fellow Romans," but instead, "Notice I don't call you 'my fellow Romans'—No, your crimes have made you citizens of Hell. You live like the worst barbarians,

including your Pictish friends. ... Your hands drip with the blood of the innocent Christians you have murdered—the very Christians I nourished and brought to God." Calling someone a "barbarian" today is less than polite; in the British Isles in 450, it meant reading someone out of the human race. As for the murdered Irish Christians, they would dwell in paradise, and "rule over wicked kings."

Patrick had probably never heard of St. Augustine, a man who lived a generation or two before his time, but the questions he was asking would have been very familiar to the African saint. What exactly makes a Christian state, a Christian ruler? The question is well summarized by the 20th-century Anglican poet and theologian Charles Williams, who explored the conflict between Christians and pagans in his Arthurian epic cycle *The Region Of The Summer Stars*. In one poem, a Dark Age Pope asks in his prayers:

Where is the difference between us?
What does the line along the rivers
define?
Causes and catapults they have and
we have,
And the death of a brave beauty is
mutual everywhere.

Causes and catapults, civilizing missions, and cruise missiles. When does a Christian state rule, or fight, in a way that means it has ceased to be Christian? The questions are still valid.

Philip Freeman's book can be thoroughly recommended as a fascinating story of a truly great figure we can know as intimately as perhaps anyone else who lived in that dreadful era. But readers should take caution: if they are not careful, they will move beyond the realm of distant antiquity and will find themselves asking distinctly modern questions. ■

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[*The Just War: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in Our Time*, Peter S. Temes, Ivan R. Dee, 217 pages]

The Rules of War

By David Gordon

PRESIDENT BUSH'S INVASION of Iraq has forced Americans to confront issues of war and peace with an urgent concern unmatched since the height of the Cold War. Under what conditions does the policy of an unfriendly government become a threat that justifies preemptive war? Do we have a duty to spread democracy and "human rights" to the world?

Faced with such quandaries, we are perplexed; but good news lies at hand. Peter Temes is here to help. As he several times informs us, he has taught classes on "Moral Principles of War" at Harvard and other august institutions. Our author formerly headed the Great Books Foundation, and he proposes to survey the teachings of philosophy and religion for the guidance they may offer. Temes devotes most attention to the Catholic doctrine of just war, the most influential body of thinking on the subject, but he discusses Jewish and Islamic views as well.

Our wide-ranging author by no means confines himself to religious thinkers. Secular philosophers such as Kant have not escaped Temes's scrutiny. He also does not limit himself to an exposition of the thought of the various writers he covers. He endeavors, with what results we shall soon discover, to portray the historical background against which his subjects wrote.

Having considered the wisdom of the past, Temes is then in position to guide us to a new synthesis. He proposes new criteria of just war that significantly modify the traditional doctrine. Temes's project could hardly be more important and timely. With what success has he carried out his ambitious task?

Readers of this book will soon discover the sad answer to our query. Temes rightly discerns that the principle of “double effect” lies at the heart of the just-war tradition developed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas and continued by later Catholic writers. The principle can probably best be explained through an example. Suppose a nation, at war for a just cause, wishes to bomb the enemy’s arsenal. Unfortunately, civilians live near the arsenal, and the bombing will kill some of them. Does this make the bombings morally impermissible?

TEMES’S MISUNDERSTANDING OF JUST-WAR THEORY LEADS HIM TO CONTRIVE AN EXPLANATION FOR A PROBLEM THAT DOES NOT EXIST.

Not necessarily. To aim directly at the death of innocents is absolutely forbidden, according to the traditional view, but here killing the civilians is not the goal of the bombers. Quite the contrary, bombing the arsenal could proceed just as well, if not better, if the civilians were absent from the scene. Their deaths are a foreseen consequence of the bombing, but are not something directly sought. The principle of double effect allows such killings, under severe restrictions. The bad foreseen consequence, for example, must be proportional to the good sought. Double effect will not permit you to hit someone’s head with a hammer to swat a fly, nor to risk the lives of civilians based on idle speculation about weapons of mass destruction.

Agree with it or not, the principle is quite straightforward, but Temes botches it in a manner that is remarkable to behold. “More to the point,” he tells us, “Augustine finessed the obvious contradiction between means and ends: he allowed that evil might not be evil if in service to grace—a concept that came to be known as the idea of ‘double effect’ in the vocabulary of Just War philosophy.”

Temes has things exactly backwards. The principle of double effect does *not*

allow the use of bad means to attain good ends. The whole point of the principle is that the action that you intend does not use the foreseen bad consequence as a means. In the example just given, bombing the arsenal does not take place through killing the civilians.

Because he lacks an elementary grasp of double effect, Temes ascribes to Augustine and Aquinas a contradiction that exists only in his own mind. Our author is aware that the just-war theorists deny that they favor the use of evil means to achieve good, but he knows

better than they the implications of their doctrine.

The just-war writers, he holds, were concerned with how man gets to heaven. They accordingly did not want to admit that they condoned the use of evil means. Temes, lacking an interest in salvation, can be realistic. “So in some cases war is not a sin, Augustine and Aquinas say, because if a war meets the criteria of Just War, it is not only the pursuit of peace but a peaceful pursuit. Recall, though, that both Augustine and Aquinas were talking about war within the larger context of Christianity. The Christian goal of all human behavior was to live good lives, and to go to heaven.” Temes’s misunderstanding of just-war theory leads him to contrive an explanation for a problem that does not exist.

One must, though, give Temes credit: his distortion of religion is not confined to Catholic writers. He is an equal-opportunity bumbler. In his view, the Oral Law in Judaism is an instrument for rabbis to control the laity. “The very idea of the oral Torah creates special privilege and authority for the rabbi. Any Jewish man ... may study the Torah and other religious texts and become expert in Jewish ideas. But the rabbis have something more, something secret that

only they know as keepers of the whispered knowledge given to Moses and passed from generation to generation among the rabbinate. ... They know what others don’t; debate can be pursued only so far; a challenge to a rabbi can be credible only to a point.” Amazingly, Temes appears not to know that the Oral Law has been fully available in writing for over 1500 years. (He does refer to “the written essence of the oral Torah” but fails to see its implications for his contention.)

Protestant thinkers fare no better. Temes, with a great show of indignation, informs us that Reinhold Niebuhr favored a nuclear first strike against Russia. Temes cites no text in support of this astonishing claim. Suffice it to say that Niebuhr, always in agony over real and imagined ambiguities, was no more than a critical supporter of American policy during the Cold War.

I must not be unfair to Temes: he distorts the views of secular as well as religious thinkers. He wrongly claims that Kant favored world government. In fact, as Kant makes clear in his *Perpetual Peace*, he supported a federation of free

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and independent states. He opposed a unified world political regime as likely to lead to despotism.

Temes as a historian of thought is, shall we say, somewhat lacking; but perhaps he is better as an original thinker. Except for his work on Leibniz, Bertrand Russell is not a reliable source on the views of past thinkers, but he was a major philosopher nonetheless.

Our hopes are soon disappointed. Temes wishes to revise the traditional just-war criteria, but his changes hardly strike one as improvements. He places greatest stress on his demand that the reason for a war must be "about the future, not about the past." If a nation goes to war—perish the thought—to regain lost territory, it has in the view of our author sinned grievously. Such matters are of mere historical interest, and they do not justify taking life. Instead, a just war must attempt to right a moral wrong.

Thus, Abraham Lincoln was wrong to use force to compel the Southern states to rejoin the Union. How can a mere constitutional issue justify violence? Matters changed entirely, though, once Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. What could be more just than a

crusade against slavery? "Abraham Lincoln, Marx correctly observed, had discovered the moral logic of the Civil War as its new purpose, rather than the merely constitutional. Lincoln had first portrayed the essence of the war as the preservation of the nation, but midway through ... his rhetoric moved from the state-engineering notion that a house divided against itself cannot stand to the belated moral clarity of the Emancipation Proclamation."

IF SLAVERY IS A MORAL WRONG, THEN WOULD NOT A FOREIGN POWER HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED IN INVADING THE UNITED STATES TO BRING SLAVERY TO AN END?

Our inaccurate author has here outdone himself. He appears not to know that Lincoln's House Divided speech was a protest against slavery. But this is by the way. Turning to Temes's principal contention, is it not vulnerable to a fatal counterexample? If righting a moral wrong suffices to justify a war, and slavery is a moral wrong, then would not a foreign power have been justified in invading the United States to bring slavery to an end?

One of Temes's students at Harvard raised exactly this difficulty, and his response to it is revealing of his mindset. "A student challenged my proposition that respect for life was a higher good than national sovereignty. In that case, he said, I'd be forced to support an invasion of the United States, by, as an example, France in 1830 if their invasion sought to free American slaves. Well, of course I would have to support that, I replied, and I assumed that everyone

around the table would as well. Yet few agreed with me, though I still hold this opinion firmly."

Our author does not disappoint those curious about how his version of moral fanaticism applies to the Iraq War. He thinks, commendably, that the actual conduct of the war has "failed to meet the test" of justice. American military operations have not protected adequately the lives of Iraqi civilians. But a war to depose Saddam Hussein was just, so long as its aim was to overthrow a tyrant rather than, sordidly, to advance American interests. "So we can quickly answer the question of whether some kind of war against Saddam was just—the answer is yes, just as a war against the Nazi leadership of Germany was just ... all in the name of coming to the aid of millions of innocents suffering under the misrule of their own nation's leaders."

Temes's utter subordination of our country's national integrity to vague moral crusading is as repellent as his philosophical and historical errors are amusing. To Scott's enquiry, "Breathes there the man with soul so dead, who never to himself hath said, This is mine own, my native land," Temes would no doubt respond, "You bet: right here." ■

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"You missed 247 calls. Your cat has learned how to use the speed-dial button and she sounds hungry!"

American Gigolo



So there's always a first time. If John Kerry wins in November, he will be the premiere president of this great country of ours to be also a gigolo.

The dictionary defines "gigolo" as a man supported by a woman in return for his sexual attentions and companionship. It might sound rough for John Kerry, but it's right to the point. Let's face it. The 44th president (maybe) is as close to a gigolo as I can think of, and I have known many. In fact, my best friend and best man for my first marriage to the beautiful French countess Cristina de Caraman, was the numero uno gigolo of his time, the fabled Porfirio Rubirosa.

Mind you, being a gigolo is no picnic. The "little woman," as the ultimate provider, has the last word. None of this "I am the man of the house" stuff applies. She who pays the bills decides, and if you don't believe me, become a fly on the wall of the Kerry household. Teresa got her moolah the old-fashioned way, she married into it, and so has Kerry. Even in his first marriage, to Julia Thorn, he was number two in the providing stakes.

In the United States, the word gigolo has lousy connotations. A man who lives off his wife is looked down upon by hard-working Americans used to making their own way. In decadent Europe, it's almost a compliment. Blenheim Palace was rescued earlier in the past century when the then Duke of Marlborough came over here and married the beautiful Consuelo Vanderbilt. She got a historic title, and he got a new roof for his palace and walking around cash. Alas, the union did not work out. They seldom do. Marlborough took Consuelo for

granted, a glorified cash machine. She walked. But the roof is still there, as are the trust funds for his descendants.

My friend Alexander Hesketh, ex-whip in the House of Lords before Tony Blair turned that wonderful upper house into a Tony's cronies yes-chamber, dines out on his grandfather's trip aboard his yacht to San Francisco. Old Lord Hesketh was desperate. His finances were in worse shape than his yacht, which sunk of dry-rot in the San Francisco harbor just as the wedding to a rich American heiress was sealed. Alexander and his brother are still enjoying the fruits of that particular merger.

Most gigolos I have known have been great charmers. Charm goes with the territory. Manliness, too. In America gigolos are seen as effete walkers of old ladies, but once upon a time, especially in the old continent, gigolos had not only to be good dancers, but also tough guys. Most of them were good athletes, polo players, race car drivers, and tennis players. Golfers made lousy gigolos. Too much time on the links. Rubi was a terrific polo player, a very competent racing driver, and a hell of a boxer. We used to work our polo ponies in the morning, have lunch in town (Paris), and then box a few rounds before dinner. He married three very rich ladies, Flor Trujillo, Doris Duke, and Barbara Hutton, took their money and spent it on beautiful, young, but poor women. (He also got a Dakota airplane, 80 suits, and a string of polo ponies.)

Like Kerry, Rubi picked up small bills

and left the big ones to the wife. Unlike Kerry, however, Rubi was a straight shooter. He openly sang "I'm a Gigolo," a popular French song of the time and admitted that he took from the rich and spent it on the poor. He was known never to lie to a man and never to tell the truth to a woman. Hear, hear! Kerry is the opposite. He has told more whoppers and flipped-flopped on more issues than any of the liars inside the Beltway, yet I somehow envision him telling the truth to women. "You must understand, dear Teresa, I love you madly but I cannot keep you in the style dear John did, so unless you're prepared to live like me, searching and searching for a place to live, however uncomfortably, we should not keep seeing each other..." Or words to that effect.

And of course it worked. An \$8 million Idaho chalet on five acres; a \$12 million Nantucket waterfront beach house; a \$6 million Washington, D.C. 23-room townhouse; a \$14 million, 90 acre Pennsylvania colonial compound; and a \$12 million Beacon Hill, Boston mansion just for starters. Not to mention the Gulfstream jet and other accessories those who were not born into them yearn for. Kerry's lies, and they are almost Clintonesque, are very significant in the context of his lifestyle. He will do and say anything to get his way, to hell with principles and standards.

Both Kerry and Clinton learned to lie early and often, and have continued the practice because it has served both men very well. When Clinton was elected, I was the first to refer to him not by his name but as the draft-dodger. If Kerry wins the prize, he will be known in this space as the gigolo, or Mr. Flip-Flop. Better yet, the flip-flop gigolo. ■