

Sir Robert Baden-Powell was a military intelligence officer who in 1899 published *Aids to Scouting*, a reconnaissance manual for soldiers operating solo behind enemy lines. The Boer War allowed him to battle-test his theories; during the 217-day siege of Mafeking, Baden-Powell organized underage British troops into an effective cadet corps that freed up more seasoned troops for combat.

Hailed as a hero back in England, Baden-Powell discovered his recon manual had become a runaway best-seller among boys. Concerned, as were many in that earnest, innocent age, that Britain's imperial affluence was coddling youth into soft, tame weaklings, he set about researching a sequel focused on general nature-craft, *Scouting for Boys*. Socialite friends of his owned barren Brownsea Island in Poole Harbor off Dorset's southern coast,

where at an encampment exactly 100 years ago this August, ten working-class boys and ten public-school boys formed the first Boy Scout troop, with electrifying results. Within three years, scouting had surged into a movement of tens of thousands in more than a score of nations—a fertile cross between a paramilitary and the German back-to-nature group *Wandervogel*.

What is now happening to the Boy Scouts tracks is what has happened to boyhood, and to manhood for that matter, over the century past. The fatal weakness has advanced apace. As the ranks of the “brave, clean, and reverent” are depleted, the social environment grows more and more depraved, which in turn further stunts the growth of “good scouts.”

The situation is not unlike that faced by other species on the verge of extinction. You can catalogue them and even keep their gametes on ice in zoo banks, but if the habitat that once made sense and use of their genetic heritage is gone, they can no longer be said to exist. Rilke's “Panther”—which describes a once mighty beast caged—springs to mind:

The easy motion of his supple stride,
which turns about the very smallest circle,
is like a dance of strength about a center
in which a mighty will stands stupefied.

On Sept. 11, 2001, the one hijacked plane that did not find its mark was brought down by a band of ordinary men armed only with the heroism of despair. When the state goes off its rocker, as it periodically does, the “little platoons” of civil society alone can set our lives in vital order once again. The boys who will grow into the men to lead these heroic platoons are indeed dangerous—and endangered. ■

Marian Kester Coombs writes from Crofton, Md.

[*Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror*, Ian Shapiro, Princeton University Press, 208 pages]

Containing the Bush Doctrine

By Michael C. Desch

IAN SHAPIRO, the Sterling professor of political science at Yale University and director of the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, is a man skeptical of doctrinaire thinking, whether in the academy or in government. In *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*, a groundbreaking book he wrote with his colleague Donald Greene in 1994, Shapiro challenged the overly ambitious claims of proponents of this approach who attempted to reduce political science to the assumptions of economics and the logic of mathematics.

In his latest book, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror*, Shapiro turns his critical eye from dogmatic thinking in the ivory tower to the Bush administration's doctrine of unilateral and offensive war against world terrorism. He rejects the president's claim that the war on terror can only be won by going on the attack, hunting down terrorists around the globe, toppling the dictators and rogue regimes that abet them, and implanting democracies in their place. Rather, he argues that the Cold War strategy of containment, suitably updated, not only provides a better strategy for winning the war, but is also more compatible with our own democratic values and institutions here at home.

This is a reasonable argument—particularly in light of the fact that the Bush administration's approach is clearly not succeeding in Iraq. The much-touted surge seems thus far to be producing only a surge in American casualties. Afghanistan, which once seemed the poster child for the Bush Doctrine, now

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teeters on the brink of chaos, with the Taliban resurgent and our NATO allies increasingly skittish. The Taliban's old ally al-Qaeda—incomprehensibly still led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri almost six years after 9/11—remains active around the world, from the caves of the Hindu Kush to the streets of Londonistan. Furthermore, you do not have to be a doctrinaire libertarian to fear that the Bush administration's methods in the war on terror seriously impinge on our liberties.

It's clearly time for a new strategy—or more accurately, a return to a tried and true approach—and Shapiro's call for a greater realism in American foreign policy in the "long war" is worth heeding. Containment, in Shapiro's formulation, is an approach to protecting American national security that, first, does not depend upon U.S. military supremacy, but rather relies on the combined power of allies and the natural advantages of staying on the defense. Second, a containment policy would be discriminant, not global, in the assessment of what interests we need to actively defend. Shapiro makes a compelling case that such a strategy is more likely to succeed in managing the threat from international terrorism without alienating the rest of the world through unilateralism and undermining our democratic political system at home. Given the sensibility of his proposal and how few fellow travelers we have in the campaign to steer American foreign policy in a more sensible direction, I ought to rest content with a fulsome endorsement of the book.

But because Shapiro aims both to analyze the sources of the Bush Doctrine as well as nudge the next administration in a different direction, it is important to ask whether his diagnosis of the problem—Republican intellectual hegemony due to a the Democrats' lack of ideas—is sound and his prescription—a Democratic president animated by a new approach—is feasible. On both counts, I am skeptical.

The root of the problem, in Shapiro's reading, is that after 9/11 only the Bush

administration and its neoconservative allies offered a coherent worldview that both explained why the attacks on the United States occurred—"they hate us because we're free"—and provided the core idea for future policies to prevent a repetition of them—"go on the offensive to spread democracy in the Middle East."

In Shapiro's view, the Democrats suffered from a complete intellectual deficit. As late as the 2004 presidential campaign, when it was already clear to many Americans that the Bush approach to Iraq was failing, the best that Democratic candidate John Kerry could offer was a tactical critique—that we should have waited for another Security Council resolution so we could have waged the campaign against Saddam's tyranny multilaterally—rather than a fundamentally different approach to the war on terror.

Shapiro attributes the Democrats' supine stance *vis-à-vis* the Bush Doctrine to three factors. First, given the shock of 9/11 and the sense of siege gripping the country, he believes the Democrats were wary of challenging the wartime commander in chief. Second, since the Democratic Party has been, at least since George McGovern, the party of anti-militarism, Shapiro argues, rea-

ness after 9/11 and in the run up to the Iraq War, but his portrayal of the Democrats as a strategic *tabula rasa* is misleading. The problem is not that the Democrats lacked an overall strategy for the global war on terror but rather that they had one that differed surprisingly little from the Bush Doctrine.

Shapiro points to six characteristics of the Bush Doctrine that he thinks mark it as a radical departure from "prior American national security policy." These include its global reach, its unilateral orientation, its embrace of preemptive war, its commitment to regime change, its stark "you're either with us or against us" view of the world, and its pessimistic outlook towards the future. I think that Shapiro overstates the distinctiveness of many of these elements from what came before.

As Tony Smith documents in his fine book *America's Mission*, our country has always viewed itself as having a duty to mankind, not only to our own citizens. Similarly, unilateralism is not unique to the Bush administration. Even Woodrow Wilson, the godfather of the League of Nations, acted unilaterally in the Western Hemisphere on many occasions. Nor is preemptive war a new weapon in the U.S. arsenal, as historian

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sonably, that many Democrats were unwilling to think seriously about strategy and other things military. Finally, Shapiro argues that the rise of the Democratic Leadership Council, which played a key role in Bill Clinton's successful triangulation strategy in the 1990s, led the party to think that effective tactics could substitute for sound principles in the struggle for the White House.

Shapiro is correct that these factors contributed to the Democrats' weak-

Marc Trachtenberg documents in his recent article in *Security Studies*, and suspicion of neutralism was bipartisan during the Cold War. Furthermore, a commitment to regime change has actually been a consistent thread running through much of American post-Cold War foreign policy and best demonstrates the continuity of the Bush Doctrine with the foreign policy of previous administrations.

In both the Clinton and Bush eras, there has been a consensus around the

notion that spreading democracy is the key to ensuring America's security, and therefore democracy promotion should be the centerpiece of American foreign policy. A colleague of mine who worked for both the Clinton and Bush administrations (and had a hand in drafting the key foreign-policy statements of both, "The National Security Strategy of the United States") regularly reminds critics of the Bush Doctrine of this fact. There is, to be sure, a subtle tactical difference: the Clinton administration leaned toward a more multilateral bent, while the Bush administration has been more willing to go it alone if necessary. But this should not obscure the fact that for many Democrats, Bush's emphasis on democracy promotion was music to their ears. The problem, in a nutshell, was not the dearth of ideas in the Democratic Party after 9/11; rather, it was that the Democrats were enthralled by the same set of ideas as many Republicans, and in some cases—for example, with "democratic peace theory"—they were the first to turn these ideas into policy.

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In important respects, regime change had been the Democratic strategy for post-Cold War American foreign policy since the early 1990s. For example, beginning soon after the first Gulf War and continuing through the 2000 presidential campaign, it was Al Gore whose voice was among the loudest in calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and regime change in Iraq. As mentioned earlier, in the 2004 presidential campaign, Kerry did not offer a fundamentally different strategy for waging the war terror because he simply did not have one. Not surprisingly, in outlining his foreign-policy philosophy in April,

Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama returned to familiar themes: "I dismiss the cynics who say that this new century cannot be another when, in the words of President Franklin Roosevelt, we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good."

This is not just a matter of quibbling about the intellectual paternity of the Bush Doctrine. It cuts to the heart of whether Shapiro is right that a change of party in 2008 will herald a significant change in course for the nation. Shapiro thinks that if the Democratic Party adopts a principled foreign-policy agenda, it is possible that containment can become the heart of America's strategy for the global war on terror. But unless the Democratic Party also gives up its commitment to regime change and global transformation (the logical implications of democratic peace theory), it is unlikely to embrace containment. Containment, which has historically been linked with the realist approach to American foreign policy, requires a very different view of how

the world works than that which the Democratic and Republican parties have had since the end of the Cold War. In order to return to the containment approach, the next president—whether Democrat or Republican—will have to undertake a much more radical intellectual reorientation than I fear Shapiro recognizes. ■

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[Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction, Thomas K. McCraw, Belknap/Harvard University Press, 719 pages]

Ambivalent Prophet of Capitalism

By Daniel McCarthy

WHEN THE HARVARD economist Joseph Schumpeter was writing what would become his best-known work, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, in the 1930s, capitalism appeared to be living on borrowed time. Already in 1921, the one-time muckraker Lincoln Steffens had spoken for advanced opinion in saying, after returning from a trip to the USSR, "I have been over into the future, and it works." The worldwide depression of the next decade seemed to prove the point. Capitalism was due for the dustbin; the future belonged to socialism, just as Marx had predicted. Even John Maynard Keynes, by his own lights a defender of capitalism, agreed that it was an economic system grown old and feeble, in need of managed care. His was a vision of "capitalism in the oxygen tent," as Schumpeter put it.

On the surface, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* might seem inspired by the dour spirit of the times. Schumpeter began the second section of his book by asking, "Can capitalism survive?" and promptly answered, "No. I do not think it can." That was what he wrote, but it wasn't what he meant. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* is a book rich in deliberate irony—Schumpeter's reaction to the monolithic pessimism of Keynesianism and socialism. Not that he was at all sure that capitalism would indeed survive. He was quite serious in those passages of the book that warned of capitalism's suicidal tendencies—its creation of a hostile class of intellectuals and its corrosive effects on