

at the Exchequer, various persons named and many others unknown, "some of them arrayed in female clothes, with swords, bows, clubs and other harness" seized him and beat his servant, so that he lost his servant's service. Formal allegation of jurisdiction was unnecessary.

On the whole Mr. Baildon's volume contains little that can be called new, but much that is highly interesting and valuable. Every case deserved to be printed. Mr. Baildon's own work is excellently done; his introduction is a first-rate piece of work and will be found of great help both to the lay reader and to the student and teacher of English institutions. The Selden Society has given us no more acceptable volume than this.

MELVILLE M. BIGELOW.

*A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in connection therewith from MDIX to MDCLX.*

With an Introduction treating of the Preceding Period. By M. OPPENHEIM. (London and New York: John Lane. 1896. Pp. xiii, 411.)

THE word administration, to whatever subject applied, is a large term, embracing very numerous and often divergent details. This is no less true of naval affairs than of others, and a History of Naval Administration, extending as this does over several centuries preceding the definite and limited period named on the title-page, necessarily includes the mention of so many different matters as to produce at first sight the impression of a set of statistics and of miscellaneous information to which unity of idea is scarcely to be imparted. Nevertheless, naval administration lies at the bottom of naval efficiency. Due credit can scarcely be given to the warriors upon the sea, or due allowance for their shortcomings made, unless there be some previous understanding of the difficulties under which they have labored, owing to the faulty administration of the governments behind them.

To a naval officer this will be perhaps the most instructive feature of Mr. Oppenheim's comprehensive and meritorious work, the production of which, he tells us in the introduction, has required five years, for the accumulation and digestion of the material. The subject itself, it is to be feared, is only incidentally of much interest, except to a limited class of readers. Nevertheless, independent of its own importance, there are scattered profusely throughout the work indications of historical insight, suggestions of the reasons and bearings of things, and not a few incidents of an anecdotal character, which will repay any one who reads, either for a particular purpose or for general knowledge of the subject.

Of the four hundred pages the author has taken for his treatment, forty-four, one-tenth, are allotted to an outline sketch of naval administration prior to 1509, when the main subject begins with the accession of Henry VIII. This monarch first gave to the royal navy the place in the statesman's scheme, required by the insular position of Great Britain, and by the contemporary conditions, which he clearly recognized; and he also,

just before death removed his own guiding hand, constituted for the new service a system of administration, from which derive by direct descent, though with occasional admixture of other elements, the methods now in vogue. "There is very much less difference," says Mr. Oppenheim, "between the great and complex administration of to-day and the Navy Board of 24th April, 1546, than between the Board of 24th April and what existed the day before. Within the twenty-four hours the old system had been swept away and replaced; its successor has altered in form, but not in principle." Henry VIII. died in January, 1547.

Prior to the Norman Conquest the English navy lacked consecutive existence. "It was essentially a coast-defence force," the author tells us, "mustered temporarily to answer momentary needs." Under such a condition, administration was necessarily spasmodic, not only in practice, but even in idea. With the conquest came the condition that the English Channel separated the two parts of the dominions of one sovereign, to the due administration and control of which command of the water was decisively necessary. The idea of a permanent naval force thence naturally arose, but its first form was not that of a permanent national force devoted exclusively to naval purposes. It was rather that of a permanent arrangement, by which the ordinary shipping of the kingdom, on emergency, could be at once available, by recognized institutions, to serve the king's purposes. "For nearly two centuries this duty was mainly performed by the men of the Cinque Ports who, in return for certain privileges and exemptions, were bound, at any moment, to place fifty-seven ships at the service of the crown for fifteen days free of cost, and for as much longer time as the king required them, at the customary rate of pay." The analogy of this system to the underlying idea of feudalism is readily apparent. It is probable also that the inadequacy of the galley, the prevalent war-ship of the Mediterranean, to the weather conditions of northern seas, prevented the development of a purely military naval force according to the idea of the age, and so retarded the differentiation of ships of war from ships of burden.

The first sign of naval administration under this system is found in the reign of John, "in the official action of William of Wrotham, a cleric, and the first known 'keeper of the king's ships.'" The "king's ships" in this sense were then properly so styled, being the personal property of the sovereign, used either for his own purposes, or, when otherwise idle, hired at times to merchants for commercial voyages. The office of keeper of the ships probably derives from before John, under whom it first appears. From it descends the secretaryship of the admiralty, now the oldest administrative employment in the British navy.

The growing power of France through the progressive consolidation of the kingdom, and the union to it of Brittany, with its long Channel sea-coast and useful harbors, made invasion from England far less possible in the days of Henry VIII. than it had been in the previous century. To Henry's own ambition, to make England an effective factor in Continental affairs, was opposed the aggressive policy of his contemporary,

Francis I., who fortified his Channel ports and brought fleets thither from the Mediterranean to contest the command of the sea. Able as Henry undoubtedly was, the maintenance of a standing navy was thus imposed upon him by necessity as much as recognized, antecedently, by his intelligence, as the natural and proper means by which the power of England could be exerted most effectively. Personally he was interested in ships, in nautical affairs. Under these influences the navy during his reign was so greatly enlarged that it may almost be called a new creation.

The increase in numbers, and the more extensive and prolonged services performed, demanded a more elaborate and elastic administration than that of a single official, under whom were gradually accumulating, by necessity, subordinates or associates, who may have been nominally dependent upon him, but were outgrowing the control of one man, and yet were independent one of another. Speaking of the clerk of the ships in the early part of Henry's reign, the author says, "although the chief administrative officer, he was now by no means the only one, though it is not easy to define the exact duties and responsibilities of his associates." Associates in such positions tend to independence; independence to anarchy. It is the natural tendency of what is now known as a bureau system. Henry VIII. applied to it as a remedy the constitution of a board. The evils of that system are also familiar. It is slow, discursive, and to a certain extent eludes personal responsibility; but properly organized, so that there cannot be a tie, it promotes unity and continuity of action, and obviates hasty and contradictory movements made by men who owe no allegiance to each other, but only to a common head, who may have less knowledge and less character than any one of them. For good or for bad it has been the administrative system of the British navy since the reign of Henry VIII.

It is impossible to go into the infinite details given by Mr. Oppenheim, upon which must be judged the general success and integrity of that administration since Henry's day, and up to the Restoration, where the present work ends. The personal character of the sovereign, or of his prime minister, in that day, was reflected necessarily in the constitution of the Navy Board. That varying constitution of the board, the imperfect moral standards of the day, the recurring financial embarrassments of the state, which forced officials to pay themselves by speculation, all cloud the issue as to the merits of the system itself. Upon the whole, its justification as a system may be rested upon the success which attended it under the Long Parliament, and in the early days of the Protectorate. Men's principles were then strung up under the lofty ideas of the struggle against tyranny; fit men were chosen under the pressure of stern necessity; money was sufficient through constant confiscation of the property of malcontents. The navy thrived; the flag was seen and respected in every sea; the seamen were, comparatively, healthy, contented and disciplined. For details the reader must be referred to the work, sure that, amid much dry detail, he will find much of interest. One forgotten fact may be cited as showing the good and bad results of naval admini-

stration. In the reign of Charles I., Turkish—or Barbary—pirates swept the English Channel, not only capturing vessels, but landing on the coasts, carrying off men, women and children. Under the Commonwealth, “complaints of piracy, in the strict sense, are very few, and there is not a single reference to the presence of a Turk in the narrow seas.”

A. T. MAHAN.

*Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu.* Par GABRIEL HANOTAUX. Tome II., Première Partie. Le Chemin du Pouvoir; Le premier Ministère (1614-1617). (Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie. 1896. Pp. 199.)

M. HANOTAUX belongs to the distinguished Frenchmen who have won laurels both in politics and literature. As secretary for foreign affairs he has displayed a sagacity which shows that he has not studied in vain the career of a great diplomat like Cardinal Richelieu. To literature M. Hanotau has made but one contribution, his History of Richelieu, the second volume of which has just appeared, and this has already secured for him a seat in the French Academy. Possibly his success as a diplomat has somewhat assisted in his prompt reception as an academician, for the Immortals are not averse to receiving among their number those who occupy prominent political positions. Yet the merits of the work well entitled M. Hanotau to be admitted into the body which is supposed to contain the most eminent of French writers.

The size of the present work may possibly discourage those who wish to absorb their historical knowledge in the most condensed form. M. Hanotau has already completed one portly tome, which covered Richelieu's early life, together with a masterly review of the political and social condition of France at the beginning of his career. The present publication contains apparently only half of the second volume, and it extends to the close of Richelieu's brief and somewhat inglorious ministry under Mary de' Medici. If the work is continued with the same ample proportions, several volumes will be required for the seventeen eventful years during which Richelieu controlled the destinies of the French people. Yet the career of the great cardinal was so influential in the development of the French government, it was so filled with dramatic interest, so connected with great crises in European history, that it deserves to be examined with a degree of care which only historical students would bestow on less important periods.

Of the manner in which M. Hanotau has done his work there is little to criticise. When his labors are completed the history of a great man will have been fitly told. This is high praise and it is just praise.

The present volume begins with the States-General of 1614, the last session of that body until 1789. Richelieu, the bishop of Luçon, was naturally selected as one of the deputies of the clergy, and had the opportunity, for which he greatly longed, to show himself on the field of politics. M. Hanotau has a taste for pictorial delineation; it is an art