

to the successive prevalence of the new Tories over their temporary allies by the accession of Shelburne to the premiership on the death of Rockingham and by the decisive victory of Pitt over Fox. These events and the subsequent reform, whereby Pitt embodied in the government of England the constitutional and economic ideas of Chatham and Smith, occupy the first half of this volume. In the second, the narrative passes largely to other than domestic affairs, to Pitt's colonial policy, and to the share of England, under his guidance, in the European diplomacy which culminated in the struggle with France. In both portions of the volume Professor Salomon displays in his narrative the freshness and virility of the investigator. His search for new material has been careful; and he is able to report, in this respect, good results. At the same time, he warns against the heresy that unprinted material must necessarily supersede the printed. Printed material indeed, if sufficiently neglected, becomes a mine for the historian. As a case in point, Professor Salomon cites the English Parliamentary Debates, too little regarded even in England; and he remarks well that the biographer of an English statesman, if he neglect these debates merely because they are printed and easily accessible, will forego the very material which any other biographer would covet. Professor Salomon himself has given them all the attention and weight due in the case of Pitt, whose life centred, to a degree unusual with English statesmen, in Westminster. In this and other points, the author, who is not a stranger to England, has shown an insight, and possibly a sympathy which have drawn upon him the censure, by at least one of his countrymen, that he is no longer a cold critic of English institutions. By English readers the fault, if it exist, will be lightly forgiven.

H. M. BOWMAN.

Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-1807. By F. LORRAINE PETRE.
(London and New York: John Lane Company. 1906. Pp. xxiii, 339.)

It is a pleasure to take up a volume with such excellent paper and type: the manufacture of the book calls for especial praise. Its author has found in English no detailed work on this campaign, which he feels "could not be less interesting than . . . Austerlitz and Jena"; and he has filled the gap by patient study, though his list of authorities is not exhaustive. The book begins with a chapter on the state of Europe in 1805 and 1806, with a crisp sketch of the armies, the leaders and the lieutenants on both sides, and gives a careful description of the topographical features of the difficult theatre of war—its marshes and forests, its mud and snow, its summer heat and winter tempests. Then follow the several operations, from that beginning in November and culminating in the battles of Pultusk and Golymin at Christmastide, 1806, through the butchery of Eylau in February and its succeeding winter quarters, the siege of Danzig, and the "final triumph" at Heils-

berg and Friedland in June, 1807, followed by the Treaty of Tilsit. At the end are three maps of the theatre of war, on two sheets, and seven battle-plans on a third sheet.

The style is simple and direct, with abundant foot-notes, the matter in some of which might be incorporated in the text, to save interruption of the narration by the reader. The detail is considerable, but not too great for a work dealing with a single campaign. There is much comparison as to numbers engaged; no item in military history is so elusive as this, the archive records being often wrong. The manoeuvres are intelligently described; but Napoleon's lapses from the skilful management he had shown in former campaigns might be more accentuated. There is little to criticize in the Austerlitz and Jena campaigns; there are many points of criticism in the Polish. Up to this date, for instance, Napoleon had made it a maxim to assemble his army out of reach of the enemy and then fall in mass upon him. In the Polish campaign he practically opened by a concentric operation, such as he had always superciliously criticized in his opponents, and one in which battle might be expected to occur before concentration; and as generally happens, the several bodies did not co-operate, and despite claims of victory, were practically beaten in detail. Had his opponent been of the first force, Napoleon might have been driven into an excentric retreat, to his great loss. Again, in the last part of the campaign, the emperor moved by his left to cut Bennigsen off from Königsberg, when the Napoleonic manoeuvre would have been to move by his right to cut him off from his Russian base, and force him back on the sea. Or again, after Friedland, it would have been easy, despite the losses and exhaustion, to seize Tapiau and thus control Bennigsen's real line of retreat, for Königsberg was at best only a secondary base. These lapses are all mentioned by the author; but to the ordinary student, a fuller comparison with other campaigns, or the discussion of strong or weak points would prove interesting.

In Bennigsen, Napoleon had an enterprising and able antagonist; but like most of the others, one who was afraid to push home when once started. His two attacks on the French were well timed and executed; but when success was in his grasp he paused, and Napoleon, with his wonderful ability to divine what was doing and sense of the proper moment to strike, seized the initiative.

When you weigh, against the almost perfect conduct of the Ulm-Austerlitz, or the Jena campaign, the false concentric operation on Golymin and Pultusk, the venturesome, useless and costly attack at Heilsberg, the wrong strategic manoeuvre on Friedland, one must conclude that despite many truly Napoleonic features, this Polish campaign exhibits less skill than some of the others; and that while of marked interest it is chiefly so for its astonishing trials of fortitude between the French and Russians, and as a proof that even this great captain was liable at times to be less than himself.

We close Mr. Petre's book with the feeling that he has done a good piece of work, filling a needed gap; and we welcome his forthcoming volume on "1806", in which, however, he will find more predecessors. In all European languages military history is prominent. Among us English-speaking peoples it is deficient, mainly because we have practised war only at intervals, and not constantly, as have the Continental nations. With our growing world-policy and the Monroe Doctrine we may in the not distant future need more military knowledge than we now possess; to create a military cult is worth while; and all good books on campaigns worth study should prove acceptable. We hope Mr. Petre has entered the arena in earnest.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk. Door P. J. BLOK. Zevende Deel. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff. 1907. Pp. iii, 545.)

DR. P. J. BLOK, the professor of Dutch history at the Leiden University, is successor to Robert Fruin. He issued the first volume of his *Geschiedenis* in 1892, when at Groningen. Of his seven volumes, three have been put into English, bringing the story to the end of the Truce, 1621. Of this final volume, No. VII., Book XI. covers in six chapters the "French Period", that is, from the organization of the Batavian Republic to Waterloo and the return of the Prince of Orange. Book XII. covers in four chapters the period of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands to the secession of Belgium in 1830, and the time to 1839. The author's original plan, outlined in his preface to volume I., is thus symmetrically carried out. No other work in the Dutch language occupies a place equal to Blok's, in comprehensiveness united with fresh and scientific treatment of sources. Before becoming historian, he delved long and patiently in the archives of his own and of other countries.

Dr. Blok begins volume VII. by picturing in sprightly vein the great convention at the Hague in 1796, when the Unitaries and the Federalists met for debate and organization of the Batavian Republic. This assembly was over-rich in dangerous radicals. Returning patriots wanted the model of a French Republic followed closely, but Schimmelpenninck happily presaged the desires of the best men of both parties. Friesland and Zeeland were at that time strongly provincial or federalist, while Holland, Utrecht, and Overijssel favored the Unitary idea of centralized power. Along with the undoubted evils of French rule, order and much uniformity were brought in. The immensely diverse and foolish customs along with privileges were abolished, the archives centralized and put in order and the two feeble universities closed. Napoleon spent only three weeks in the kingdom over which he placed his brother, preparatory to incorporation with France. In addition to galling taxation, the people suffered from the decline of native manufactures and industries. Of forty thousand Dutch conscripts who marched to Mos-