

scene, and for a song becomes a landed proprietor. From that instant the death knell of a privileged church, a privileged crown, and a landed aristocracy begins to sound. To the numerous small burgher proprietors of the towns is added a great class of small landed proprietors and the sovereignty of the bourgeoisie is only a matter of time.

The best and fullest division of the book is that which contains the history and discussion of attempted reform, the effort to rebuild subsequent to the shattering of medieval ecclesiasticism. This must, of course, be read and carefully studied. The author's conclusion regarding the Civil Constitution of the Clergy is condemnatory. It satisfied neither friends nor foes of Romanism, it created neither a primitive church nor a free one, it perpetuated the idea of a state church and was destined to enslave religion or engender civil war. For the behavior of pope, hierarchy, king, and legislature there is no apology and not a very savage denunciation. The schism, too, is described in temperate language, due blame being meted out to the small minority of vile creatures who were chosen bishops in the state church, and equal reprobation for the vacillations and procrastinations of the Papacy. Even the manoeuvres of the radicals, the kings tergiversation and the repercussion on politics of the flight to Varennes are all discussed without heat. The book closes with a clear and comprehensive rehearsal of what resulted far and near from the king's behavior in accepting what he dared not reject, of the clashes between moderates and radicals throughout the provinces, of the despair and cowardice of the classes who should have closed up the ranks of patriotism but who were flying in alarm across the border, and the feeble attempts at amnesty, thwarted by religious intolerance—all this combined exhibits the complete anarchy in politics and society due to the gross mismanagement of the religious question.

The author claims for himself a certain impassive temper—not the impartiality of indifference but that which is seated in profound respect for the truth of history. He alters no fact, mutilates no text, and puts no man in a false light. Such is his claim and we are disposed to grant it. Yet the spirit of the volume is distinctly reverential: it depicts the sufferings of Frenchmen for God and the Church with sympathy. It does not attempt to enforce a magisterial judgment of history regarding the men of the epoch nor to impose one on the reader. Nor is there any evident parallel between present conditions and those of the eighteenth century. The lesson may infiltrate and interpenetrate the public or it may be lost. The author claims that in presenting the lesson his duty is done. We can recommend the volume unreservedly and we await its successors with interested expectation.

L'Exil et la Mort du Général Moreau. Par ERNEST DAUDET.
(Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1909. Pp. ix, 267.)

THIS book by the historian of the Revolutionary emigration is an

interesting account not only of the exile and death of General Moreau but also of his trial for complicity in the Cadoudal-Pichegru plot against Napoleon. The writer's attitude is entirely sympathetic with the hero of Hohenlinden, whose downfall he ascribes, in common with other anti-Bonapartist writers, to the jealousy which Napoleon had for Moreau's ability, influence, and popularity. For materials the writer has had access to the archives of France, Sweden, and Russia, and to the inedited papers of Moreau. These papers upon which the account of the trial is based are letters which Moreau managed secretly to send to his wife during the five months between his arrest and his release from the Temple. In them not only is Moreau's sincere devotion to his wife evident but his frankness and ingenuousness import a note of verity which appears conclusive as to Moreau's loyalty in 1804.

According to M. Daudet, Moreau's destruction was decreed by Napoleon and to prove this he cites the irregular nature of the trial and the unusual action of the twelve judges, who, after voting seven for acquittal and five against, sentenced the general to two years in prison. Before the trial Moreau had written to his wife of his desire to leave France. After the judgment he hoped that his sentence might be commuted to exile though he could not "negotiate upon that point". Yet when the sentence of exile was sent him, it was upon the ground that Moreau had solicited it. Moreau left France for Spain, remained there for a year and proceeded to the United States, where he remained from 1805 to 1813. The events of Moreau's stay in America are passed over lightly except for the consideration of the influences and motives which led to his return to Europe for service against Napoleon. M. Daudet disproves the contention that Moreau while in the Temple had planned to offer his services to Russia, and denies that Godoy received similar overtures while Moreau was in Spain. It appears, however, that the Russian government undertook to enlist Moreau's services soon after his exile began. Pahlen, afterwards Russian representative at Washington, was sent to America in 1807 to persuade Moreau "to lend his aid to Russia". Moreau refused upon the ground that he would not enter the service of a country at war with France. What, then, caused Moreau to reverse his decision six years later? M. Daudet finds the motive in Moreau's visionary desire to organize a legion of French prisoners in Russia and to invade France at their head in order to incite a revolution against Napoleon; further, that he worked out the plan while in America, that in it he was encouraged by the Russian chargé at Washington, Dashkov, and that had he believed such a scheme impossible he would never have left the United States. M. Daudet's argument at this point is scarcely convincing. When asked by Dashkov to name his conditions, Moreau replied that his confidence in Alexander was complete. His one idea was that in fighting against Napoleon he was fighting for France, with the hope added that after

Napoleon's downfall he might be "mediator between his vanquished country and the victorious foreign powers". That Moreau should have wanted revenge against Napoleon was but human. The Napoleon whom Moreau saw from America was dissociated from France and only a tyrant to be overthrown. M. Daudet believes Moreau to have been "a great patriot always, in whom a distant exile had so obscured the vision of duty that he believed it proper to fight under those foreign flags which Frenchmen, who had never left France, held to be the flags of enemies".

J. S. R.

The Last Days of Papal Rome, 1850-1870. By R. DE CESARE.

Abridged with the assistance of the author and translated by HELEN ZIMMERN, with an introductory chapter by G. M. TREVELYAN. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1909. Pp. xxiii, 488.)

PERSONS who appraise a book's value by its foot-notes will be quite at sea with Dr. De Cesare's volume. For it has no references to sources and no bibliography. However, bibliographies can be made up, and there are historical periods about which printed authorities are very meagre or entirely lacking. The end of papal Rome was such a period. Pius IX. did not believe in newspapers; the machine, of which Cardinal Antonelli was head, which really ran the government, did not care to have published the papers concerning either its home or foreign secret transactions. The official documents which it gave to the press were about as close to reality as is an American campaign platform. In the absence, therefore, of the sort of material that one usually relies upon, we turn gratefully to Dr. De Cesare's memorabilia. There is not an item in his book for which he could not cite authority, but as many of his authorities gave their testimony to him orally, he naturally withholds their names. His own memory covers the second decade (1860-1870) of his chronicle.

Read with insight, this work is very significant. The last twenty years of Pius IX.'s temporal reign form a logical whole. Under Antonelli's lead in politics and that of the Jesuits in ecclesiastical polity, the Papacy adopted its attitude of unyielding antagonism to modern progress. In politics it was on the verge of declaring constitutional government heretical; in theology, it promulgated the doctrines of the Immaculate Conception and of Papal Infallibility and compiled the virulently obscurantist Syllabus; and in the mixed field of theology and politics it pressed the theory of the Temporal Power almost to the point of an article of faith. Dr. De Cesare tells of these matters with open-minded frankness. He is never polemical. His concern throughout is with social and personal facts, rather than with either political or theological theories.