

Bismarck." The Triple Alliance, he kept reiterating (*cf.* pp. 494-501), contemplated only mutual defense against possible attack and did not demand that Germany should support Austria's Balkan interests against Russia. Similarly, no one had done more than Bismarck himself to emasculate the Reichstag and prevent the valuable development of parliamentary responsibility and parliamentary control over foreign policy. Yet after 1890 he complains,

The most disquieting feature for me is that the Reichstag has abdicated its position. We suffer everywhere from bureaucracy. . . . To strengthen the Reichstag the responsibility of ministers should be increased. . . . When I became minister the Crown was threatened by the people. Hence I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. Perhaps I went too far in that direction. We now require a balance of power within Germany, and I believe that free criticism is indispensable to the monarchy.

How far, one wonders, if Bismarck had remained in power, would he, or could he, have altered or reversed the policies which he himself inaugurated. These are nice questions, of infinite difficulty and complexity, which Mr. Robertson touches upon, but wisely refrains from attempting to answer with finality.

The sources from which the author writes are chiefly the great collections of Bismarck material which have been edited by Busch, Horst Kohl, Poschinger, Penzler, and others. He is also thoroughly familiar with the mass of memoirs and the secondary works. Though trained under Lavissee, he studied and visited many times in Germany and had opportunity to talk with soldiers and politicians who had known Bismarck. His volume is the result of many years of study and reflection before there was a thought of war. It is written *sine ira et studio*. He makes Bismarck a living, human being, extenuating, to be sure, none of his grossness or arrogance, but nevertheless deeply appreciating his genius, his greatness, and all that was tender and sincere in him. History written with such sympathy and poise, and on such a subject, is one of the best means of aiding a distraught world to reach a sound judgment on the causes which lay behind the Great War.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

Weltgeschichte seit der Völkerwanderung. Von THEODOR LINDNER, Professor an der Universität Halle. Band IX. (Stuttgart and Berlin: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger. 1916. Pp. xiv, 524. M. 6.50.)

PROFESSOR LINDNER's work represents the last volume of a history of the world since the barbarian invasions, and covers the period from 1860 to the outbreak of the war in 1914. The author states that he has limited his treatment of the period to its political development, although he has allowed one short chapter to Socialism and to the Catholic church.

The book was evidently written for Germans primarily, and especial space is given to Germany and to the German element throughout the world. At times this emphasis seems a little overdone; the history of Austria is much more a history of the Germans in Austria than of the empire. Naturally the point of view is frankly German, although one is left with the impression that the author has made a sincere effort to be an historian and not a mere controversialist. Even in his last chapters which treat of the events of the ten years previous to 1914, the tone is more impartial than in many German post-war publications.

A history of the world during the last half-century in less than five hundred pages can only treat of the leading facts in the story. Few, if any, of the important facts are omitted; indeed, the author seems to show a tendency to overload his account with relatively unimportant details. At times the account becomes almost a chronology through which the reader makes his way without assistance as to the bearing these details may have on the history of the period as a whole. The treatment, throughout, follows the conventional lines and no new facts are brought forward.

The first third of the book deals with European history from 1860 to the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890. The period represents, in the view of the author, the "age of Bismarck" (p. 205), and is treated almost entirely from that standpoint. The account follows the conventional lines, but makes clear the essential facts, especially in the treatment of the internal history of the European states. The second third of the book, dealing with the history of the non-European states since 1815, is perhaps the best portion of the work. The chapters on America are clear and cover the essential points, although Americans may take issue with the treatment of the last few years of our history. The last third of the book deals with European history since 1890, and especially in the ten years previous to 1914. It is the conventional German account, in which England is the disturber of the peace, Germany the innocent victim forced to defend herself. Russia is less severely treated, although Pan-Slavism comes in for its share of the blame.

Errors in fact occur, although relatively infrequent. Among them may be mentioned the statement that Lincoln was almost unanimously elected in 1864 (p. 241) and that "Italy obtained certain police rights over the Adriatic Sea" in the settlement following the Bosnian crisis of 1908 (p. 435). The account of the period 1900-1914 contains many undoubtedly incorrect statements, which may be based on a lack of full knowledge at the time when the book was written.

The author gives at the end of the text a list of books used in writing the volume. It presents many serious gaps, especially in the section devoted to America, and has little value except as giving a list of books published on international affairs in Germany since 1914. The works are listed without order and without comment. The index is brief but usable; the format of the book leaves nothing to be desired.

Apart from its value as a compendium of events, for it is little more than that, the book presents a series of thumbnail sketches of European statesmen that provoke thought even if the reader disagrees with them. But the whole work illustrates the terrible difficulty in writing contemporary history in the midst of the prejudices of a world war.

MASON W. TYLER.

Alsace-Lorraine since 1870. By BARRY CERF, University of Wisconsin. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1919. Pp. viii, 190. \$1.50.)

THE purpose and tone of this book are not adequately revealed by the title; one might readily anticipate a description of German administration, a study of the temper of the native inhabitants, or both description of administrative failure and analysis of the attitude of these unwilling subjects at the outbreak of the war and throughout its course. These larger and more general aims are never entirely submerged, but they are constantly obscured by the disposition of the author to present his material in the form of a brief urging the restoration of the provinces to France. The presumption that it is necessary to argue this question at every point has resulted in an unfortunate arrangement of the material and in a disproportionate number of citations. Many of the passages quoted are very brief, so that scrutiny of the text and the character of the author cited leads to a serious interruption in the train of thought. The book would be useful to the student desiring to secure some familiarity with the material available on the subject, but is likely to weary any reader not possessed of more than the average patience.

In the handling of some of the larger questions this method of composition has become the cause of unfortunate inconsistencies of statement. The grounds for the allegiance of the natives to France are variously given. In the first reference to the matter (p. 26), much stress is laid upon the conciliatory policy of the ministers of Louis XIV.; a few pages later (p. 29), a striking passage is cited from Fustel de Coulanges which lays all the emphasis upon the influence of the French Revolution. Subsequent allusion to the matter and a citation from Reuss (pp. 90-91) seem to leave little doubt of the author's opinion, but a casual reader might well fail to appreciate the immense significance of the Revolution.

The character of the motives underlying the annexation in 1870 is also the subject of ambiguity. A brief reference in the earlier chapters (p. 19) attributes the annexation to purely military objects. Subsequently, in connection with a careful discussion of the economic significance of the provinces, it is implied that Bismarck consciously sought the iron mines of Lorraine. "Bismarck's geologists in 1871 made a mistake. They did not, as they thought, seize *all* the French iron fields" (p. 120). Now this statement is not justified by anything we know of the negotiations at Versailles in 1871, nor by the technical facts concerning these Minette ore fields. Some of the facts are evidently familiar