

governments, second, to respect nationality, and third, to reduce armaments. And to accomplish this the United States must assume her share of responsibility. "Western civilization is a grandiose Gothic vault . . . one of its arches is Europe, the other America. If either arch is broken, the other will be endangered."

WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH.

MODERN ORIENTAL HISTORY

An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century: a Summary Account of the Political Career of Zahir-ud-din Muhammad, surnamed Babur. By L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, Fellow of All Souls College, Fellow and Professor of Modern Indian History in the University of Allahabad. [Publications of the Department of Modern Indian History, Allahabad University, no. 3.] (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, for the University. 1918. Pp. xvi, 187. \$3.00.)

THE life of Babur has been told repeatedly, first by himself, in Turki, then in the Persian translation, and finally in the English versions of Erskine and Stanley Lane-Poole. The present author acknowledges his indebtedness to all these, as well as to the translation of the Turki text by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge; but he calls attention to the fact that Erskine's conclusions were faulty because he failed to make use of five important sources, of which one is the Shaibani Nama (this shows the Usbeg side of the struggle between Babur and Shaibani), and that Lane-Poole's work (in the *Rulers of India*) is based entirely on translated sources, one of which is unreliable even in the original. In short, there was need of a "summary account" of Babur drawn from all sources, and this is here presented in the Allahabad University Lectures for 1915-1916. If the material is thus not very novel, it is at least more correctly stated than has hitherto been possible when, as in the case of Erskine's *History*, a contemporary historian such as Khwandamir was not even known.

Babur's life lacks the glamor that hangs about that of his greater grandson Akbar. Intellectually he was the inferior, but in activity, in warlike energy, in his dash, patience, and endurance, he was second to none. To found a new empire in India a conqueror, not an administrator, was needed, and Babur the Tiger, ruler at twelve years of the little province of Farghana (now in Russian Turkistan), and victor in battle and conqueror of Samarkand at the age of fifteen, was the predestined man for the work, if inheritance may be said to determine destiny. He united Mongol blood and Persian culture, as did his maternal grandfather, who was conspicuous for the same paradoxical combination, and Babur as fifth descendant of Tamerlane (Timur the Lame) and, on his mother's side, fourteenth descendant of Chingiz

Khan, may be said to have had fighting blood by double inheritance. Born in 1483, son of a fourth son and hence heir to the smallest heritage of the old ruler of Herat, fighting, failing, conquering, betrayed, a homeless vagabond, a persistent hopper, before he was twenty-two he had endured as many vicissitudes as most kings suffer in a long life. But by twenty-two he had made himself master of Kabul and determined his destiny. Till then it was a problem to him whether to work west and rule from Herat or Samarkand, or to turn his back on his native heath and advance east to reconquer the realm his ancestor Timur had held. He was but a boy when he decided definitely to strike east from Kabul, and doubtless he was strongly influenced by the thought of imitating his glorious model. At any rate it was at this time that he proclaimed himself Padshah, no equal among equals but head of all the Mughal or Mongol world.¹

The most picturesque incident in the youthful hero's career is the long march through a veritable blizzard before he entered India; but everything pales before the audacity of the entry itself. Despite the fact that Ibrahim, the Afghan ruler of Delhi, could place more than a hundred thousand men in the field ("twice that", sneers Babur, "if he were willing to pay for them"), Babur invaded India with only twelve thousand men all told, and at his first great battle of Panipat he was outnumbered five to one at the most conservative estimate (not counting camp-followers). His victory was due only partly to his use of firearms, though it is noteworthy that they play an important rôle in this and subsequent military activities. Babur had learned a lesson from the defeat of Shah Ismael, in 1514, at the hands of the Turks, who already used guns; and he secured Ustad Ali and then Mustafa, Ottoman Turks, to manage artillery and musketry for him. When he got to Agra he himself made a gun that carried a "big ball" sixteen hundred paces. Two other incidents in Babur's life are characteristic: first, his spectacular "breaking of wine-cups" in the presence of his army, when he induced all his nobles to renounce strong drink with him and thereby filled his despondent army with new enthusiasm; second, his "sacrifice of self". His son and heir Humayun lay dying, and the father walked thrice around the bed, drawing into himself the deadly disease. At least, he so believed and Humayun lived, while Babur slowly died (1530). But victory, ease, self-indulgence, had already weakened the Tiger. He needed adversity to be strong. Wine, for he failed to keep his pledge, women, and leisure were his destruction; by forty-eight he was used up. "So died a very gallant gentleman", concludes the author; also an empire-builder, whose realm remained till the British absorbed it.

The author has consulted all the native authorities and has embellished his little book with maps and plans, and also with fifteen illustrations from the Alwar and less known Agra College codices, for the

¹ The author consistently uses both forms, Mughal in the broader popular sense, and Mongol in the narrower ethnical sense.

use of which he was indebted to the Maharajadhiraj of Alwar and Mr. Cuthbertson Jones, principal of Agra College.

E. WASHBURN HOPKINS.

✓ *Geschichte Aegyptens im 19. Jahrhundert, 1798-1914.* Von ADOLF HASENCLEVER. (Halle-am-Saale: Max Niemeyer. 1917. Pp. xv, 497.)

EGYPT has always been a subject of much interest to students of history. It will remain so, if only because of its geographical position. And, because of its geographical position—almost at the junction of three continents—this history must perforce be varied. In the book before me, Professor Hasenclever has endeavored to give a history of the country during the years 1798-1914, which he somewhat loosely calls the nineteenth century; perhaps he should have said, the period between Napoleon Bonaparte and William Hohenzollern. For, as he very rightly takes the Napoleonic period as the one in which Egypt once more became a matter of concern for Europe, so he looks upon the Great War as determining for some time to come the future of the Nile region.

As a German, writing during the years 1916 and 1917, it is quite natural that Hasenclever's pen should be dipped in anti-British ink. Yet it is at times fatiguing for the reader to be forced to read all the ill-tempered and churlish adjectives that he attaches whenever his subject forces him to mention Great Britain and British doings. In a book dealing with Egypt—and especially since 1882—this must be reasonably frequent; so frequent as to make the perusal at times nauseating. Now and then there is the evident attempt to be just to Great Britain; *e. g.*, in his description of the crisis in 1838-1841 (p. 137); in his record of English policies in the Sudan (p. 340); in his estimate of Lord Cromer (p. 354); or in his description of the Liquidation Law of 1885 (p. 393). But, in general, his terms are so ill-favored and uncouth as to make it evident that he has written in the heat of war-fever and under the impulse of disappointment caused by the failure of the Turks and the Germans to drive the English out of the country (p. v). Thus, England is wanting in every "sozialen Empfinden" (p. 403); the great dam at Assuan is always called a "Staudamm" and is described only as a "fitting monument of English power" (p. 407). Lord Cromer's attitude toward Abbas Hilmi is a seemly example of "the unscrupulous methods of the English government" (p. 431). The stories told about the prodigality and squanderings of Ismail Pasha are "a nicely fashioned tale put together by the French and the English" (p. 182)—though on the very following page our author is bound to acknowledge this squandering as a "Tatsache". And even the "Scrap of Paper" treaty theory finds an advocate in him (p. 136), on the excuse that the recent war has been a "Krieg aller gegen alle"!!

But let me hasten to say that Professor Hasenclever has given us a very scholarly account of the events as they have occurred, carefully