

answer could be received, the Western Powers, at the suggestion of Austria and on the understanding that she would support them, demanded the evacuation of the Principalities by April 30, 1854. But it turned out that the Austrian support was diplomatic only. The tsar therefore made no reply to the ultimatum, and on March 27 France and Great Britain declared war.

The fundamental point at issue, which is sometimes overlooked by those who would ascribe the Crimean War to Lord Stratford, Napoleon III., or some other person, was the future of the Ottoman Empire. For half a century the military power of Turkey had been steadily declining, as her wars with Russia and Egypt attested only too well; her subject races, Serbs, Greeks, Rumanians, were demanding and securing autonomy or independence. The reason was that in spite of innumerable efforts to reform the public administration, the last of which, the *hatt-i-shérif* of 1839, had promised to all Ottoman subjects, without distinction of race or creed, security of life, honor, and property, the equitable distribution of taxes, the public trial of prisoners, and the right of all to devise property, yet justice was not done to Christians, and their lives, honor, and property were not safe. But by article VII. of the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) between Russia and Turkey, "the Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches". For this "vague claim to exercise the guardianship of civilisation on behalf of the Christian races and the Orthodox church",⁷ Russia now proposed to substitute a definite right of intervention; and it was generally recognized that she had a case for redress. But the acceptance of her demands would, it was believed in France and Great Britain, have confided to her the practical control of the Turkish government, would have converted the inhabitants of the Balkan provinces of the sultan into virtual subjects of the tsar; all of which was opposed to the interests of the Western Powers, and, in spirit at least, contrary to the Convention of 1841, which pledged the Five Powers to recognize the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Right or wrong, this view was sincerely held; nor was the conduct of the tsar calculated to inspire confidence in his intentions.

He despatched to Constantinople a special ambassador, Prince Menshikov, who was not a diplomat but a rough soldier, at a moment when both the French and British ambassadors were absent from their posts, with the obvious intent of dragooning the Sublime Porte into an acceptance of his demands. Neither the quarrel about the

⁷ John Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, I. 354.

Holy Places nor a dispute between the Porte and Austria concerning Turkish operations in Montenegro, the adjustment of which was the announced object of the embassy,⁸ required the display of pomp and ceremony which marked the arrival of Menshikov at Constantinople and the mobilization of extra troops along the river Pruth. The real purpose of the mission was soon revealed, despite Menshikov's efforts to keep it secret. He desired the sultan to enter into a secret alliance with the tsar, who would put at Turkey's disposal a fleet and 400,000 men for use against a western power. In return, Russia demanded "an addition to the Treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek Church should be placed entirely under Russian protection without reference to Turkey".⁹

The proposal for an alliance may have been a manoeuvre for position; at any rate it was dropped in the face of Turkish opposition. But the demand anent the Greek Church was pressed with vigor. Early in May, Menshikov presented the draft of a convention to be concluded between Russia and the Porte and required an acceptance within five days. By this the sultan was to agree:

No change shall be made as regards the rights, privileges, and immunities which have been enjoyed by, or are possessed *ab antiquo* by, the Orthodox Churches, pious institutions, and clergy in the dominions of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, which is pleased to secure the same to them in perpetuity, on the strict basis of the *status quo* now existing.

The rights and advantages conceded by the Ottoman Government, or which shall hereafter be conceded, to the other Christian rites by treaties, conventions, or special arrangements, shall be considered as belonging also to the Orthodox Church.¹⁰

When this was refused, Menshikov announced that he would be content with a *sened*; and, failing that, drafted a note which should be addressed to him by the Porte, the sultan to promise that

the Orthodox Church of the East, its clergy, churches, possessions and religious establishments, shall henceforth enjoy, without any prejudice and under the aegis of His Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which have been assured to them *ab antiquo*, or which have been granted to them on different occasions by imperial favor; and on a high principle of equity they shall participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects, as well as to the foreign legations accredited to the Sublime Porte by convention or special arrangement.¹¹

⁸ Memorandum of the tsar, February 21, 1853, *Annual Register*, 1853, "History", p. 255; Nesselrode to Brunnow, April 7, 1853, *Eastern Papers*, no. 138, pt. I., p. 115; Castelbajac to Drouyn de Lhuys, March 21, 1853, *Jasmond*, I. 57.

⁹ Rose to Clarendon, March 25, 1853, *Eastern Papers*, no. 134, pt. I., p. 107; Stanley Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford Canning* (1888), II. 248.

¹⁰ Walpole, *op. cit.*, VI. 19; Edmond Bapst, *Les Origines de la Guerre de Crimée*, app., p. 490; *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 239.

¹¹ Bapst, p. 492.

What were the precise objects of the Russian government? In a circular of June 11, 1853,¹² Count Nesselrode, the Russian chancellor, denied that Russia aimed at any territorial aggrandizement, the ruin and destruction of Turkey, or even at any religious protectorate beyond that already exercised on the basis of facts or treaties. "The treaty of Kainardji . . . implicates for us sufficiently a right of surveillance and remonstrance. This right is again established, and more clearly still specified in the treaty of Adrianople. . . . We have, therefore, in fact, and have had for nearly eighty years, the very rights conceded to us which are now contested." But in the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, which had not been raised by Russia, "the equilibrium . . . had been destroyed" "at the expense of the Greco-Russian form of worship", and in addition, considering "all the acts of weakness, tergiversation and duplicity which have characterized the conduct of the Ottoman authorities" in carrying out their engagements, it was evident that the new firmans (those of May 5 embodying the settlement made by Stratford), "after the flagrant violation of the one which had preceded them, could not possess any greater value than the latter", without a guarantee that they "would be executed and religiously observed in their principles and their consequences". In general, Russia contended that she was claiming with reference to the Greek Church only rights similar to those exercised by France for Roman Catholics under the Capitulations of 1740. Finally, said Count Nesselrode, "the careful examination of our *projet de note* will prove that it contains nothing that is contrary to the rights of sovereignty of the Sultan, nothing that implies any exaggerated pretensions on our part or which presupposes a defiance as injurious to us as it is little justified by our previous actions".

Writing fifty years later, M. Edmond Bapst is of the opinion that "the acceptance of the note of Prince Menshikov by Turkey would have placed Russia in a rather ridiculous position"; after mobilizing three army corps and putting her Black Sea fleet on a war basis, she would have secured, "in terms which were vague and open to argument, a right to intervene in the quarrels of the Greek clergy with the Ottoman authorities, when in fact she had been intervening freely and at every opportunity in these quarrels for a long time".¹³ And it may not unreasonably be argued that this was the original view of European diplomacy, or at least that the dispute between Russia and the Porte was not really understood.

¹² *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 260.

¹³ Bapst, pp. 377-378.

For the Vienna Note, framed by the German and Western Powers after the Russian occupation of the Principalities, was little more than a redraft of the Menshikov note.

The Porte was to declare:

If at all times the Emperors of Russia have shown their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman empire, the Sultans have never refused to confirm them anew by solemn acts which attested their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects. . . . the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and the spirit of the stipulations of the treaties of Kainardji and of Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian worship, and that His Majesty regards it as a point of honour with him to cause to be preserved for ever from all attacks either at present or in future, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been accorded by the august ancestors of His Majesty to the Orthodox Church in the East, and which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, to allow the Greek worship to participate in a spirit of high justice in the advantages conceded to other Christians by convention or special agreement.¹⁴

Not only did this note satisfy the demands of Russia, who at once accepted it; it practically conceded, by its last clauses, the Russian claim that the Orthodox Church should enjoy rights similar to those of the Latin Church under the Capitulations, although Lord Clarendon, the British foreign secretary, had been at some pains to point out that the analogy was false.¹⁵

There was, however, no real harmony between Russia and the other powers. The note had been hurriedly drafted,¹⁶ and the Porte proposed three amendments. By the first, "the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire" was declared to depend, not upon the "active solicitude" of the emperors of Russia, but upon the sultans, who "have never ceased to provide for . . . and to confirm them".

¹⁴ *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 278.

¹⁵ Clarendon to Seymour, May 31, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 195, pt. I., p. 200.

¹⁶ Clarendon, in accepting the Vienna Note, had instructed Westmorland "to inform Lord Stratford that her Majesty's Government desire that this project should be adopted by the Porte, if no other arrangement has been made already". Clarendon to Westmorland, July 28, 1853, *Eastern Papers*, no. 5, pt. II., p. 2; Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford Canning*, II. 290-291. As a matter of fact, other arrangements had been made: the note of July 25, drafted by the ambassadors at Constantinople and acceptable to the Porte. Had Westmorland insisted that the Vienna Conference reconsider its note in the light of Stratford's project, the Vienna Note must have been a very different document; and the dispute about its interpretation, upon which so much was to turn, might never have arisen. Since the tsar accepted the Vienna Note as an ultimatum, he would probably have accepted one that had been more carefully drafted.

Secondly, the sultan would "remain faithful to the *stipulations* of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection *by the Sublime Porte* of the Christian religion", and, lastly, the Greek Church was to share only in the advantages granted to the other Christian communities, "*being Ottoman subjects*".¹⁷

These changes were most unwelcome to the powers, since they could not persuade the tsar to accept them. So an effort was made to assure the Porte that the note gave the tsar no new rights, that the treaty of Kainardji did not involve the immunities and privileges of the Greek Church; and that the note could not be construed to mean the extension of privileges to several millions of subjects that had at various times been granted to foreigners.¹⁸ The powers even proposed to guarantee that the note would be so interpreted. But their arguments were made ridiculous by the interpretation actually given by the Russian government.

According to a despatch of Nesselrode,¹⁹ mysteriously published in Berlin, the Vienna Note possessed three advantages. (1) It recognized "that there has ever existed on the part of Russia active solicitude for her co-religionists in Turkey, as also for the maintenance of their religious immunities, and that the Ottoman government is disposed to take account of that solicitude, and also to leave those immunities untouched". (2) Its "terms, which made the maintenance of the immunities to be derived from the very spirit of the treaty [of Kainardji] . . . were in conformity with the doctrine which we have maintained and still maintain. For . . . the promise to protect a religion and its churches implies of necessity the maintenance of the immunities enjoyed by them". (3) Russia could claim for the Greek Church privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Roman Church under treaties between the Porte and Catholic governments. In later years the Russian government expressed its satisfaction with the "certain vagueness around these delicate questions", which put it in their power "to interpret them in accord with [their] views, which were perfectly proper".²⁰

In other words, the question was thrown back to its original terms, should the protection of the Greek Christians be accorded by the Porte or regulated by Russia? The latter still contended that the treaty of Kainardji had availed nothing and was useless without

¹⁷ *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 280.

¹⁸ Clarendon to Stratford, September 10, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 88, pt. II., p. 91.

¹⁹ *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 284; Bapst, p. 497.

²⁰ *Diplomatic Study of the Crimean War*, I. 208.

a guarantee. The former insisted that the treaty never intended to recognize any right of intervention. The Porte would promise anything²¹ except to sign a treaty or note which would allow Russia to make representations on behalf of the Greek Christians; Russia would be content with nothing less. Thus in the proposals made after an interview between Nicholas and Francis Joseph at Olmütz in September, 1853, the tsar, though insisting that he asked for nothing which could prejudice the independence or rights of the sultan or which would imply a desire to interfere with the internal affairs of the Porte, and though stating that he desired only the maintenance of the *status quo* in all matters pertaining to the Greek Church, nevertheless stood by the Vienna Note, without renouncing the interpretation given by Nesselrode.²² These overtures were therefore rejected by the Four Powers. Instead they ultimately adopted, in a protocol signed at Vienna on January 13, 1854,²³ as their last word to the tsar, the answer of the Porte to their request for a statement of the terms on which it would make peace.

Apart from the demand for the evacuation of the Principalities and the admission of Turkey to the European Concert, the essential feature was the promise to confirm and uphold the spiritual privileges of the religious communities consisting of its own subjects; "and if one of those communities should possess, as regards spiritual privileges, something more than the others, [the Porte] will grant to the latter, if they desire to enjoy them in the same manner, the favor to be put in this respect on a footing of equality"; with the object of ensuring this, a firman would be communicated to the Four Powers and to Russia. This was practically what Turkey had offered from the beginning of the controversy. In her counter-proposals,²⁴ Russia demanded a special reference to the privileges of the Greek Church—as distinct from the general enumeration applicable to all the Christian communities; to the mention of privileges added the words "*droits et immunités*"—which the Porte and Lord Clarendon had insisted were distinct from the privileges; required that the firman offered by the Porte be annexed to the treaty of peace—which would have given Russia the long-desired legal ground for interference.

Lord Stanmore, who believes that "the objects at which [the Emperor Nicholas] really aimed at that time were neither extra-

²¹ See Reshid Pasha's final offer, June, 1853. A. W. Kinglake, *Invasion of the Crimea*, I. 634.

²² Lord Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert, a Memoir* (London, 1906), I. 185.

²³ *Annual Register*, 1854, app., pp. 498-499.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 520; Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 190-191.

gant nor unjustifiable", argues that the differences between the Turkish offer and the Russian counter-proposals were "slight" and "eminently such as might have been removed by negotiation and discussion".²⁵ Actually, the changes desired by Russia, slight though they were, involved the whole question at issue; and it is difficult to accept his view that "at every fresh stage of the proceedings Russia had conceded something, and it was probable, nay, almost certain that she would concede still more". There was, in short, an "irreconcilable deadlock".

It may be observed that Russia was always willing to give the same assurances as regards Turkey that Austria offered in 1914 when her ultimatum seemed to strike at the very independence of Serbia; and they carried an equal conviction. For early in the year 1853 the tsar, in conversations²⁶ with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, had attempted to draw the British government into a discussion of the eventual fate of the Ottoman Empire. The sultan is very sick and may die on our hands, said Nicholas. "If England and Russia arrive at an understanding, there would be no further concern." The European territories of the Porte could be formed into independent states, and British interests could be safeguarded by the occupation of Egypt and Crete. For herself, Russia would insist that no great power should be installed at Constantinople; she would support the *status quo* as long as possible, but she would not allow a pistol to be fired for the reconstruction of the Turkish power. The British government politely declined these overtures, declaring that "nothing is more calculated to precipitate [a Turkish catastrophe] than the constant prediction of its being close at hand".²⁷ But the tsar clung to his idea. On August 6 he expounded it to General de Castelbajac, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, and probably discussed the partition of Turkey.²⁸ Likewise he tried to bribe Austria with territorial concessions. In May, 1853, he requested that power to occupy Bosnia and Serbia, with the hope that this would induce the Porte to accept his demands,²⁹ and according to M. Bapst, the offer was renewed in January, 1854, as a bid for Austrian neutrality.³⁰ The tsar frequently professed his intention to respect the integrity

²⁵ Stanmore, *op. cit.*, I. 201, 191.

²⁶ Printed in full in *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 248 ff.

²⁷ Clarendon to Seymour, March 23, 1853. *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 258.

²⁸ Castelbajac to Drouyn de Lhuys, August 9, 1853. Bapst, p. 433, note 3.

²⁹ H. Friedjung, *Der Krimkrieg und die Oesterreichische Politik* (Berlin, 1907), p. 6.

³⁰ Bapst, p. 486.

of the Ottoman Empire, but he was clearly formulating plans for its partition and disposition.

Subsequent events have proved that the tsar's diagnosis of Turkey's condition was correct, that Stratford and Palmerston, who believed the regeneration of Turkey possible, were wrong. Moreover, the territorial settlement of what had been the Ottoman Empire, reached after a succession of wars, was in 1914 substantially that envisaged by the tsar in 1853; in some quarters it is doubtless considered a proof of English hypocrisy that Great Britain, which in 1853 explicitly disclaimed any wish to join in a partition of Turkey, has acquired a larger share of it than any other power. Yet it does not follow that the tsar's offer should have been closed with by any government to which it was made. "Had it not been for the Crimean War, and the policy subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's government, the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians would now be in Constantinople."³¹ This judgment of Lord Cromer carries great weight, and it is not to be discarded because Great Britain and France in 1915 recognized the Russian claims to Constantinople; for the situation had been profoundly modified by the independence of the Balkan States and by the far greater dangers that threatened from the German control of Turkey. The establishment of Russia on the Bosphorus sixty years ago would no doubt have put an earlier end to Turkish tyranny, but would the substitution of Russian autocracy and nationalism have appreciably benefited the Balkan peoples?

Of course the Four Powers were not thinking of the Balkan peoples, but of the larger political aspects of the whole Near Eastern question, which, they contended, was a problem for Europe, not the preserve of Russia. And Russia they did not trust, as will appear to any one who reads the published correspondence. The tsar might write to Queen Victoria that "in public affairs and in the relations between one country and another, there is no pledge more sure than the word of a sovereign",³² but the powers opposed to him were unwilling to put his pledge to the test. And that for a sufficient reason. At the very moment when Nicholas was telling Sir Hamilton Seymour that "the best means of ensuring the permanence of the Turkish Government is to avoid worrying it by excessive demands made in a manner humiliating to its independence

³¹ Earl of Cromer, *Political and Literary Essays* (London, 1913), p. 275.

³² December 14, 1853. *Letters of Queen Victoria* (New York, 1907), II. 565.

and dignity",³³ his ambassador at Constantinople was presenting demands which the Porte found "humiliating" and the powers "excessive". Nor was the tsar always honest with his own ministers, for he concealed from Nesselrode the real purpose of the Menshikov mission and thus laid his chancellor open to the charge of double-dealing.³⁴ Then came the unfortunate incident involving the interpretation of the Vienna Note, and, lastly, although the tsar was unquestionably within his rights, the affair of Sinope, which followed upon an announcement that Russia would not undertake any offensive operations against Turkey, in spite of the latter's declaration of war. Palmerston's criticism was indeed not lacking in fact:

the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow—moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the Petersburg Government adopts them as a *fait accompli* which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions.³⁵

If no positive instance of this kind occurred in 1853–1854, there was some ground for suspicion of the real motives of the tsar.

Those motives were, it may be safely said, to secure a virtual protectorate over the Greek Christian subjects of the sultan, a design announced as early as December, 1852,³⁶ and to buy the support or consent of some great power to it. Nicholas first sounded the British government, partly because he disliked Napoleon III., partly because he thought Lord Aberdeen, whom he had known for some years, in sympathy with his ideas.³⁷ Meeting with no encouragement, he turned promptly to his despised "friend", the Emperor of

³³ *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 259.

³⁴ Clarendon to Seymour, May 31, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 195, pt. I., p. 200. The Russian *Diplomatic Study*, I. 163, admits that the failure to publish the demands of Menshikov was "very grave". The private letters of Thouvenel, political director of the French foreign office, and Castelbajac show that Nesselrode, being of German origin and Lutheran faith, was not entirely trusted by the tsar, and that the religious zealots of the Russian foreign office had much to do with shaping Russian policy. L. Thouvenel, *Nicolas Ier et Napoléon III.* (1891).

³⁵ Letter to Clarendon, May 22, 1853. E. Ashley, *Life of Palmerston* (London, 1876), II. 273.

³⁶ Rose to Malmesbury, December 5, 1852. *Eastern Papers*, no. 55, pt. I., p. 51.

³⁷ Clearly, if cynically, brought out in the *Diplomatic Study*.

the French, whose policy was based on a close understanding with Great Britain, and sought to make him the accomplice of Russian designs. He was so far successful that the Vienna Note was based on a draft prepared by the French foreign office.

But while the content of the Vienna Note was entirely acceptable to Russia, its origin was not; that is to say, it had been prepared in concert by the Four Powers, whose combined pressure the tsar did not feel strong enough to resist. Nicholas had assured Sir Hamilton Seymour that when he spoke of Russia he spoke of Austria as well; that what suited the one suited the other; that their interests, as regards Turkey, were perfectly identical.³⁸ It was time to prove it. So he visited Francis Joseph during the Austrian manoeuvres at Olmütz (September, 1853), invited the young emperor and the King of Prussia to Warsaw, and himself went to Potsdam. The results were quite satisfactory, at least for the moment. Not only was Francis Joseph "entirely persuaded of the sincerity" of the Russian ruler; his government decided upon a reduction of the Austrian army, and Count Buol, his foreign minister, accepted Nesselrode's proposals as a basis of settlement.³⁹

Another success, small in itself but full of possibilities, and all the more gratifying because unexpected, was achieved. Among the personages present at Olmütz was General de Goyon, as the head of a special French military mission. He was singled out by the tsar for special attention, and invited to the Russian manoeuvres at Warsaw. Later Nicholas told the general that he would be pleased to receive the Emperor Napoleon in Russia as a brother.⁴⁰ With the Germanic powers in his pocket and a complaisant French general to carry his honeyed words to Paris, the tsar might well seem to be making progress.

As it turned out, General Goyon was peremptorily recalled by his government, to the great disgust of the tsar. Also, the Turkish declaration of war had the effect of restoring the Concert of the Four Powers. But Nicholas only pursued with greater zeal his set policy of winning over some member of the Concert to his programme. In January, 1854, he despatched Count Orlov, one of the most eminent Russian statesmen, to Vienna to secure the neutrality of Austria for the duration of the war with Turkey; the Russian minister in Berlin was instructed to make a similar request of

³⁸ Seymour to Russell, February 22, 1853. Jasmund, I. 38.

³⁹ Westmorland to Clarendon, September 28, 1853, *Eastern Papers*, no. 121, pt. II., p. 128; Friedjung, *Der Krimkrieg*, p. 9.

⁴⁰ Bapst, pp. 447-448.

Frederick William IV. If these missions were successful, Russia could abandon the defensive attitude in the field and ignore the hostility of the Western Powers. To attain this, Count Orlov was authorized, apart from promises of territorial gains in the Balkans, to guarantee the integrity of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation, that is, from attack by Napoleon III. on the Rhine or in Italy.⁴¹ Both the Austrian emperor and Buol declined to negotiate on this basis, insisting, instead, that the Russian troops must not pass the Danube. How deep was the resentment of the Russian government appeared later on the publication of the *Diplomatic Study of the Crimean War*.

This lengthy analysis of Russian policy warrants the conclusion that the tsar intended from the beginning to secure a protectorate, recognized by the Porte, over the Greek Christian subjects of the Porte, and never receded from that programme. But understanding the certain opposition to this from the other powers, he sought to detach one or more of them from the Concert. He failed to accomplish this; but his pride, a belief in the justice of his cause, and high confidence in his military strength led him to refuse all concessions. The principal cause of the Crimean War was, then, the continued effort of Russia, after the question of the Holy Places had been regulated, to carry through a policy which would have profoundly disturbed the *status quo* in the Near East. Whether the diplomacy of the powers opposed to this policy was conducted in the manner best calculated to restrain the tsar is another question.

In so far as the Crimean War was the logical development of the dispute concerning the Holy Places, the Emperor Napoleon III. must bear a fair measure of responsibility. "The ambassador of France" . . . , declared the British foreign secretary, "was the first to disturb the *status quo* in which the matter rested. Not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches were not very active, but that without some political action on the part of France, those quarrels would never have troubled the relations of friendly Powers".⁴² Nor was it until the pressure of La Valette had forced the Porte into a definite decision in favor of France that the tsar mobilized troops on the Turkish frontier, and, somewhat later, despatched the Menshikov mission to Constantinople.

⁴¹ Friedjung, *Der Krimkrieg*, p. 17. About the same time a final effort was made through the Saxon minister in Paris, who was a son-in-law of Nesselrode, to establish an entente between France and Russia. On the strength of this Napoleon addressed his autograph letter to Nicholas on January 29, 1854. Bapst, pp. 479-480.

⁴² Russell to Cowley, January 28, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 77, pt. I., p. 67. AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XXV.—4.

After this, however, the diplomatic conduct of France became pacific and conciliatory. The impetuous La Valette was recalled, and his successor strove for an accommodation between Menshikov and the Porte; while General de Castelbajac was instructed to declare that France did not wish to deprive the Greek Church of any of its existing privileges.⁴³ During April and May, 1853, when the contradiction between the assurances of Nesselrode and the actual demands of Menshikov rendered suspect the entire policy of the tsar, Drouyn de Lhuys, the French foreign minister, kept asserting that while France would support the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire in conformity with the Convention of 1841, yet the matter in dispute was one to be settled by the powers acting together.⁴⁴ In keeping with this attitude, he drafted the document which became the Vienna Note, and he counselled, though he was overruled, the acceptance of the proposals put forward by the tsar at Olmütz.⁴⁵ Throughout the long negotiations, the French foreign office sought to preserve the Concert of the Four Powers as the best means of exerting pressure upon Russia; and if its ambassador at Constantinople unduly stimulated the war spirit of the Turks, nevertheless he labored with his colleagues to find a settlement satisfactory to both the Porte and the tsar.

Less moderation was observed by the Emperor Napoleon, who, according to the late Émile Ollivier,⁴⁶ was determined to bring on a war, not from personal pique with the tsar, who had addressed him as "friend" instead of "brother", but because the conflict of interests between Austria and Russia in Turkish affairs would, if properly exploited, disrupt the Holy Alliance that had been reconsecrated by the events of 1848-1849, and remove a serious obstacle to the unification of Italy. When, therefore, the Grand Vizier, alarmed by the demands of Menshikov, requested the Western Powers to make a naval demonstration, Napoleon, against the advice of his ministers, ordered his Toulon fleet to Salamis. He was apparently guided by the opinion of Persigny that "the despatch of your fleet . . . will force the hand of the British government".⁴⁷

⁴³ Drouyn de Lhuys to Castelbajac, January 15, 1853. *Annuaire Historique*, 1853, app., p. 25. Castelbajac was so strongly in favor of peace that he was sometimes accused of being pro-Russian. Thouvenel, *Nicolas Ier et Napoléon III.*, *passim*.

⁴⁴ Drouyn de Lhuys to Bourqueney (Vienna), April 12, May 26, 1853; to Walewski (London), May 31, 1853. *Annuaire Historique*, 1853, app., pp. 31, 58-60.

⁴⁵ Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 186; Bapst, pp. 453-454.

⁴⁶ É. Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral* (Paris, 1898), III. 188.

⁴⁷ Bapst, p. 354.

As the British government did not fall in with this policy, the emperor soon regretted his move,⁴⁸ which left him in a false position; he could not withdraw without stultifying himself, yet from Salamis he could not in the least control events. But the withdrawal of Menshikov from Constantinople afforded an excuse for further action. He proposed that the French and British fleets should proceed to Besika Bay,⁴⁹ and this time the London cabinet, with doubtful wisdom, yielded.

To the occupation of the Principalities, Napoleon, according to Ollivier,⁵⁰ would have replied by a declaration of war, if he had been directing the policy of the powers. For the moment he had to content himself with the Vienna Note. But he declared that the French fleet could no longer remain at Besika Bay, and on August 19 he pressed the British government to order the fleets into the Dardanelles.⁵¹ Late in September, on the strength of a despatch from the French ambassador at Constantinople reporting grave disturbances in the city—which Stratford presently contradicted—the British government accepted the French policy,⁵² and authorized Stratford to call up the fleet. Finally, the decision to send the fleets from Constantinople into the Black Sea was eventually taken at the demand of the French emperor.

Not one of these measures was illegal. Besika Bay lies outside the Dardanelles, and the Convention of 1841 could not be invoked against the presence of the allied fleets.⁵³ Those fleets did not pass the Dardanelles until two weeks after Turkey had declared war on Russia;⁵⁴ if they could pass the Straits with perfect right, they could

⁴⁸ Clarendon to Queen Victoria, March 29, 1853. *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II. 538.

⁴⁹ Paul, *Hist. of Mod. England*, I. 313.

⁵⁰ Ollivier, *op. cit.*, III. 179.

⁵¹ Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, July 13, August 19, 1853. Jasmund, I. 123, 153.

⁵² Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, September 21, 1853. *Ibid.*, I. 167. "Lord John quite approves of the fleet going up to Constantinople because it is a war measure, whereas it was only agreed to by Aberdeen for the preservation of peace." Sir H. Maxwell, *Life and Letters of George Villiers, Fourth Earl of Clarendon* (London, 1913), II. 30.

⁵³ The Russian government repeatedly declared that the decision to occupy the Principalities was taken as the result of the despatch of the fleets to Besika Bay. This was not correct, for the two measures were announced in St. Petersburg and London on the same day, and were, in fact, quite independent of each other.

⁵⁴ The statement of Goriainov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles* (Paris, 1910), p. 94, that the fleets passed the Dardanelles in June, 1853, is a clear mistake.

also go into the Black Sea. A policy, however, may be perfectly legal and yet not expedient, and the action of the French and British governments is open to precisely that criticism. They resorted to half-measures. Lord Aberdeen pointed out that the fleets at Besika Bay could not save Constantinople in the event of a sudden Russian stroke from the Black Sea.⁵⁵ Later, when the Dardanelles had been passed, the Turks were less conciliatory, which was agreeable enough to the war parties in the various capitals, but most embarrassing to those diplomatists who still hoped for peace. Above all, the proud Russian autocrat was deeply incensed by the steady advance of the allied fleets, and while he sparred for time and kept offering to negotiate, he was less disposed than ever to concede any of the vital points at issue; yet at no time was the question of peace or war put squarely to him. But Ollivier⁵⁶ compliments Napoleon for concealing his "*désir intérieur*", and, denying that his policy was hesitant or fluctuating, says, that "if the Emperor came out for war cautiously it was for the very reason that he wanted war".

This interpretation is not necessarily confuted by the next move of Napoleon, which was seemingly a last effort to preserve peace between Russia and the Western Powers. When the French and British fleets entered the Black Sea, with instructions to prevent Russian vessels from leaving port, the Russian government asked whether it would be allowed to revictual its troops by sea and whether the allied squadrons would prevent the Turkish navy from attacking Russian ships on the Russian coast. In the event of a negative reply, the Russian ambassadors in London and Paris were to ask for their passports.⁵⁷ At this juncture the Emperor Napoleon wrote a personal letter to the Tsar Nicholas. He proposed that hostilities should cease, the Russian armies withdraw from the Principalities and the allied squadrons from the Black Sea, and that Russia negotiate directly with Turkey a convention which would be submitted to the Vienna Conference.⁵⁸

According to his French apologist,⁵⁹ the emperor desired to withhold the answer to the Russian questions pending a reply from the tsar to this communication. The conditions suggested were fair enough to warrant a reasonable hope of peace, and even Kinglake

⁵⁵ Sir Arthur Gordon (Lord Stanmore), *Earl of Aberdeen* (London, 1894), p. 222.

⁵⁶ Ollivier, *op. cit.*, III. 177, 184, note.

⁵⁷ Nesselrode to Brunnow and to Kisselev, January 16, 1854. *Eastern Papers*, pt. III., no. 1, p. 1; *Annuaire Historique*, 1854, app., p. 7.

⁵⁸ *Annual Register*, 1854, pp. 242-244.

⁵⁹ Bapst, p. 483.

believes the proposal to have been sincere, explaining it by the desire and necessity of Napoleon to keep in the forefront of great events. He had brought on a crisis which made war seem inevitable; he would now conjure away the dread vision, and consolidate his political position both at home and abroad.

One cannot, however, avoid a suspicion that the French emperor was playing a deep game. He yielded at once to the British insistence that an answer be given immediately in the Black Sea matter; furthermore, the language of his letter to the tsar was not exactly calculated to appease the irritation of that proud prince. Napoleon said that the affair of Sinope had been a "check" to the "military honor" of the Western Powers, thus introducing the dangerous element of prestige which had hitherto been kept out of the negotiations; he declared that there must be "a definitive understanding or a decided rupture". He informed the tsar that if the French proposal were declined, "then France, as well as England, will be compelled to leave to the fate of arms and the fortune of war that which might now be decided by reason and justice". It could not have been a matter of surprise that this language, together with the notification that the Russian fleets would not be allowed to revictual the Russian troops,⁶⁰ proved too much for the temper and dignity of Nicholas. As La Gorce remarks, the result was only "*trop prévu*".⁶¹ The tsar replied in a tone so haughty as to destroy all chance of negotiation, for he gave warning that "Russia would prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812".⁶² The French government thereupon began military preparations, and on February 27, 1854, joined with Great Britain in the ultimatum that made war inevitable.

The positive interests of France in the Near East were at this time rather limited—the protectorate of the Roman Catholic Church and a vague aspiration in Egypt; the Russian demands upon Turkey would affect her only as they might disturb the general balance of power, although, as a great power, France was entitled to participate in the solution of the problem. But these issues were complicated by the personal relations of the two emperors; each intended to be the dominant force in international politics, each cherished a grievance, real or fancied, against the other. If the ambition of the tsar was the principal cause of the Crimean War,

⁶⁰ Clarendon to Brunnow, January 31, 1854, Jasmund, I, 235; Drouyn de Lhuys to Kisselev, February 1, 1854, *Annuaire Historique*, 1854, app., p. 5.

⁶¹ La Gorce, *op. cit.*, I, 211.

⁶² *Annual Register*, 1854, p. 246.

the policy of Napoleon, conciliatory enough in the diplomatic channel, but provocative in the direction most likely to rouse the Russian autocrat—"military honor"—made a peaceful solution difficult, perhaps even impossible.

Great Britain took no interest in the original dispute concerning the Holy Places. The spectacle of "rival churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ died for mankind", said Lord John Russell, was "melancholy indeed",⁶³ and the Porte was urged to sanction whatever arrangements might be reached between France and Russia.⁶⁴ Nor does the British government appear to have been specially alarmed by the overtures made by the tsar to Sir Hamilton Seymour. The foreign office, while combating vigorously the view that Turkey was *in extremis* and therefore rejecting the Russian proposal for an understanding,⁶⁵ did not deem it necessary to warn the tsar that Great Britain would resist any design to establish a Russian ascendancy in the Balkans or Turkey. Reliance was placed upon the Convention of 1841 which morally, if not technically, confided the guardianship of the Ottoman Empire to the Concert of Europe. Even the reappointment of Lord Stratford to the embassy at Constantinople, though he was known to be a bitter enemy of the tsar, and therefore suspect to those who did not like the Turk,⁶⁶ was dictated by praiseworthy motives. He was sent out because of his unrivalled knowledge of Turkish affairs, and with definite instructions⁶⁷ to "put an end to the existing differences", to support the independence and integrity of Turkey which were endangered by that "dictatorial attitude which [France and Russia] have assumed", and above all, to "prevent a Turkish war". He was no longer to "disguise from the Sultan and his Ministers that perseverance in their present course [of maladministration and inefficient government], must end in alienating the sympathies of the British nation". It was only in the permission to summon the British fleet from Malta (though it was not to "approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from Her Majesty's Government") that the Aberdeen ministry manifested the slightest suspicion of possible untoward developments. The news of Menshikov's violent conduct—he had forced the resignation of the Turkish foreign min-

⁶³ Russell to Cowley, January 28, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 77, pt. I., p. 68.

⁶⁴ Russell to Rose, January 28, 1853. *Ibid.*, no. 76, pt. I., p. 67.

⁶⁵ Russell to Seymour, February 9, 1853, *Annual Register*, 1853, p. 250; Clarendon to Seymour, March 23, 1853, *Eastern Papers*, no. 113, pt. I., p. 94.

⁶⁶ Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell* (1889), II, 179, note.

⁶⁷ Clarendon to Stratford, February 25, 1853, *Eastern Papers*, no. 94, pt. I., p. 80; Lane-Poole, *Stratford Canning*, II, 234.

ister by refusing to call upon him—and his harsh demands apparently did not disturb the serenity of the British cabinet, which declined to emulate Napoleon's example in sending his fleet to eastern waters, and even expressed its confidence in the pacific intentions of the tsar.⁶⁸ It was not until Menshikov had abruptly left Constantinople and broken diplomatic relations with Turkey that any positive action was taken. On May 31, 1853, the British fleet was ordered to Besika Bay, and Lord Stratford was authorized to summon it to Constantinople upon the manifestation of hostile intent by Russia.⁶⁹

By this forward step the British government had committed itself far more than was realized at the time. It was hoped that a show of force would cause the tsar to stay his hand; actually his government went so far as to say—incorrectly, to be sure—that the occupation of the Principalities was occasioned by the movements of the allied fleets. The reason assigned for the demonstration was the fear that Russia, angered by the failure of Menshikov, might attempt a *coup* against the Turkish capital.⁷⁰ More likely was it a measure dictated as a compromise between the two factions in the cabinet, and as "the least measure that will satisfy public opinion".⁷¹ Any lack of harmony in the cabinet has been denied by several of its members. Gladstone, writing in 1887, declared, "I have witnessed much more of sharp or warm argument in almost every other of the seven cabinets to which I have had the honour to belong".⁷² According to the Duke of Argyll, "there was not the slightest shadow of difference among us as to the course which it was our duty to pursue. That duty was to adhere to the principles laid down in the Treaty of 1840 [*sic*]"⁷³

The last sentence quoted from the duke is undoubtedly correct. It was the intention of the British government to oppose any action by Russia that would prejudice the independence and integrity of Turkey, to insist that the question between Russia and the Porte was one for consideration by and agreement between the five Great Powers. But there was a marked difference of opinion as to what

⁶⁸ Clarendon to Cowley, March 23, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 111, pt. I., p. 93. Clarendon in House of Lords, April 15, 1854.

⁶⁹ Clarendon to Stratford, May 31, 1853. *Ibid.*, no. 194, pt. I., p. 199.

⁷⁰ *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1863, p. 166. This review was revised by Lord Clarendon himself, and may be regarded as the *apologia* for the policy of the Aberdeen ministry.

⁷¹ Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 194, quoting Clarendon to Aberdeen.

⁷² *English Historical Review*, April, 1887, p. 288.

⁷³ Argyll, *Autobiography and Memoirs* (London, 1906), I. 447.

constituted an infringement of Turkish rights and what policy would best prevent such an infringement. For Lord Aberdeen, who was friendly to the tsar, disliked the Turks because he believed them incapable of reform, and desired peace almost at any price, the essential thing was to keep the Russians out of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. His policy, accordingly, was to avoid any expression of doubt as to the pacific intentions of Russia; to maintain a rigid control over the actions of Turkey, certain, if left to itself, to precipitate war; and to have the Four Powers "adopt resolute and identical language at St. Petersburg, in which the intimation of a desire to see the just complaints of Russia redressed should be combined with a clear indication of united resistance to the acquisition by Russia of new and objectionable powers within the Turkish Empire".⁷⁴ This policy of "moral influence"⁷⁵ was supported by the majority of the cabinet.

Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, took the position that the occupation of the Principalities was a *casus belli*, and urged the despatch of the British fleet to Constantinople and even into the Black Sea.⁷⁶ Lord John Russell, while not, like Palmerston, convinced of "the progressively liberal system of Turkey",⁷⁷ was of the opinion that, "The Emperor of Russia is clearly bent on accomplishing the destruction of Turkey, and *he must be resisted*".⁷⁸ As the summer of 1853 advanced, he became more and more a partizan of "direct action". He had understood that Lord Aberdeen would, at a convenient time, retire in his favor, and he began to press for the change. In other words, the pressure of the "war party", if it may be so called, steadily increased.

Between these two extremes, Lord Clarendon, the foreign secretary, tried to steer a middle course. He would preserve the Concert of the Four Powers, and thus exert effective diplomatic pressure on both the tsar and the sultan, in accord with his own and his chief's conviction. At the same time he attached such importance to the cooperation of France,⁷⁹ for the policy of Austria and Prussia was uncertain, if not pro-Russian, that he was willing to take military, or rather naval, measures proposed by the Emperor of the French. Unfortunately, as has been shown and as Lord Aberdeen himself

⁷⁴ Gordon, *Aberdeen*, pp. 237, 248.

⁷⁵ Maxwell, *Clarendon*, II. 14.

⁷⁶ Ashley, *Palmerston*, II. 274, 279.

⁷⁷ Palmerston to Sidney Herbert, September 21, 1853. *Ibid.*, II. 281.

⁷⁸ Walpole, *Lord John Russell*, II. 181.

⁷⁹ This is more apparent in the *Edinburgh Review* article than in the biography by Sir Herbert Maxwell.

predicted,⁸⁰ these measures only irritated the tsar without inducing him to pause, and they played into the hands of the Turks. Moreover, such effect as they might have had on the tsar was destroyed by the prime minister himself. According to Kinglake, Clarendon warned Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, of "the dangers which the occupation of the Principalities would bring upon the relations between Russia and England", but Aberdeen requested the ambassador to consider the words as unspoken.⁸¹ This doubtless explains why "the Czar was fatally misled" by his ambassador.

Brunnow reported that all the English liberals and economists were convinced that the notion of Turkish reform was absurd; that Aberdeen had told him in accents of contempt and anger, "I hate the Turks"; and that English views generally as to Russian aggression and Turkish interests had been sensibly modified.⁸²

The occupation of the Principalities, it seems to the writer, was the turning-point in the long controversy. The tsar announced bluntly that he intended to hold them as a "material guarantee"⁸³ for the acceptance of his demands, and the challenge was not taken up. M. Goriainov, the archivist of the Russian foreign office, asserts, on the ground that the Convention of 1841 did not impose upon its signatories any formal obligation to defend the sovereign rights of the sultan but merely stated their intention to respect them, that "in occupying the Principalities Russia did not violate any formal obligation"; but he admits that "she thereby gave notice that she was no longer one of the Powers that had agreed to respect the integrity of the Sultan's rights".⁸⁴ According to the common interpretation of international law, an act of war against Turkey had been committed. Napoleon and Palmerston saw this clearly enough, and Clarendon later took the same position. But at the moment, at the insistence of Aberdeen, the British government advised the Porte not to consider Russia's action as a *casus belli*.⁸⁵ Doubtless there were strong reasons for this advice. It was not yet understood that the tsar would make no concessions; the Turks would certainly make none if they saw the Western Powers coming

⁸⁰ Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 193.

⁸¹ Kinglake, *Invasion of the Crimea*, I. 136.

⁸² Morley, *Gladstone*, I. 361. "The Emperor had been misled by the reports he had received from Baron Brunnow in London and from Count Kisselev in Paris, who both expressed the opinion that an alliance between England and France would not be brought about." Lord Augustus Loftus, *Diplomatic Reminiscences*, first series, I. 184.

⁸³ Circular of Nesselrode, July 2, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, pt. I., no. 329, p. 342.

⁸⁴ Goriainov, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁸⁵ Gordon, *Aberdeen*, p. 225.

to their support; diplomacy was working hard on a project to settle the dispute; Austria would now be more interested. It is, of course, impossible to say whether a naval demonstration in the Black Sea would have given pause to the tsar, for that policy failed in January, 1854. But in November, 1853, Clarendon had arrived at the conviction that the "anomalous and painful position" in which the British government then found itself "might have been avoided by firm language and a more decided course five months ago", and Lord Morley agrees.⁸⁶ Whatever one may think, the fact remains that no positive counter-move was made to Russia's action. Force had not been met by force, and the lesson was not lost on the tsar, who could afford to and did refuse all concessions so long as his troops occupied the Principalities.

The divisions in the British cabinet assumed greater importance as the crisis continued. On October 4 the Porte, in defiance of all counsel, declared war on Russia. At that moment the powers were still striving for a diplomatic settlement, the basis this time being a note drafted by Stratford, which would ensure its acceptance by the Porte. Aberdeen proposed that the note should be accompanied by a declaration that if it were not adopted by the Porte, the Four Powers would not "permit themselves, in consequence of unfounded objections, or by a declaration of war which they have already condemned, to be drawn into a policy inconsistent with the peace of Europe, as well as with the true interests of Turkey itself".⁸⁷ Stratford was to inform the Porte that

it is indispensable that all further progress of hostilities should be suspended by the Porte during the course of the negotiation in which Her Majesty's Government are at present engaged for the restoration of a good understanding between the Porte and Russia.⁸⁸

The point of this warning was that the Turkish commander in Europe, Omar Pasha, had summoned the Russian general to evacuate the Principalities by October 18, but without success; actual hostilities might break out at any moment. In this event, Aberdeen intended to leave the Turks to their fate.

Yet this was precisely what certain members of his cabinet had no intention of permitting. Lord John Russell seems to have feared that Russia would prolong the negotiation for her own advantage or cause her troops to advance on Constantinople. So he proposed to add the words "a reasonable time" to the clause requiring the

⁸⁶ Morley, *Gladstone*, I. 360.

⁸⁷ Gordon, *Aberdeen*, p. 232.

⁸⁸ Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 213.

Porte to suspend hostilities, and for the restoration of friendly relations, to impose the condition that "no hostile movement is made on the part of Russia". Aberdeen accepted these amendments to prevent the resignation of Russell, without whose support the ministry would fall, and to forestall the formation of a war government under Palmerston or Russell.⁸⁹

The result was entirely unexpected, even to Russell himself. At Constantinople, a fortnight was considered a "reasonable" time for negotiation. Omar Pasha then began the passage of the Danube, and the resistance offered by the Russian troops was construed as a "hostile movement"! General operations were then begun in Armenia against the Russians.

Russia's answer was not long delayed. Her admiral in the Black Sea, finding a Turkish squadron at anchor in the harbor of Sinope, sailed in and destroyed it. There was nothing exceptionable in this. The tsar had indeed promised that he would not assume the offensive against the Turks.⁹⁰ But he and the sultan were at war; the Turkish fleet was engaged in transporting supplies to the troops operating in the Caucasus. But in France and Great Britain the news of Sinope aroused the wildest indignation; it was regarded as "a humiliation and a defiance".⁹¹ It was therefore impossible for the British government, although Aberdeen was reluctant and Gladstone protesting, to resist the demand of Palmerston, identical with that of Napoleon, that the allied fleets, which had been summoned to Constantinople after the Turkish declaration of war, should enter the Black Sea and compel all Russian men-of-war to keep in port.⁹² But this was, as noted above, the prelude to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Western Powers; moreover, it made the tsar unwilling to accept the terms of peace presented to him by the Vienna Conference. One must conclude that the schism in the British cabinet was in part responsible for the failure to preserve peace.

One other phase of British policy has been severely criticized. After the rupture with Russia, but before the tsar replied to the letter of Napoleon, the French and British governments decided to demand the evacuation of the Principalities. They presented their

⁸⁹ Gordon, *Aberdeen*, pp. 233-234.

⁹⁰ Circular of Nesselrode, October 31, 1853. *Annuaire Historique*, 1853, app., p. 87.

⁹¹ Walpole, *History of England*, VI. 25; *Diplomatic Study*, I. 334.

⁹² Gordon, *Aberdeen*, p. 241; Morley, *Gladstone*, I. 364; Ashley, *Palmerston*, II. 289-290; Maxwell, *Clarendon*, II. 31; Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, December 15, 1853, *Eastern Papers*, no. 333, pt. III., p. 307.

ultimatum on the understanding that Austria would support it, whereas she actually gave only diplomatic approval, not a promise of military assistance, which alone would have compelled Russia to yield. The unwillingness to wait for the tsar's answer was due to a fear that the Russian armies along the Danube might reach Constantinople before aid could be forwarded to the Turks, although past experience did not warrant any such assumption.⁹³ But public opinion in England, which was clamoring for war, was not to be denied, any more than the war party in the cabinet, which now included Clarendon and the First Lord of the Admiralty. The more the pacifists, like Cobden and the Quakers,⁹⁴ protested against the war, the more furious did the popular demand become, until it was confidently believed in London that Aberdeen and the Prince Consort would be committed to the Tower for treason.⁹⁵

Upon the matter of Austria's apparent trickery, Aberdeen's biographer has written:

There can be no doubt that when this proposal [to demand the evacuation of the Principalities] was made, the Austrian Cabinet intended to take part in the war which must be the inevitable result of its adoption; and it is equally certain that when the "summons" was despatched from England, Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon were under that impression. Either Lord Westmorland [the ambassador in Vienna] failed to detect, or he failed to report, any change in the intentions of the Austrian Government. . . . What was the cause of this retreat has never been fully known.⁹⁶

Professor Friedjung, who has written the fullest account of Austria's policy, is silent about the whole matter. The semi-official review of Kinglake, revised by Lord Clarendon himself, says: "The Western Powers obtained from Austria all the aid she was capable of giving, namely, her moral support". The probable explanation is that Prussia, unwilling to break with Russia, refused to march with the Danube monarchy, and the latter, knowing that Russia was keeping in Poland "the finest corps of her whole army", declined the chances of a contest which would certainly encourage the Italian states to rise against her.⁹⁷

At the same time the action of the Western Powers was "precipitate, injudicious, and disastrous".⁹⁸ Had they joined with the

⁹³ Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 220-221.

⁹⁴ The Quakers sent a mission to the tsar to urge peace. Nicholas received them affably and introduced them to his "wife". His conviction that England would not fight was probably strengthened by this incident.

⁹⁵ Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 218.

⁹⁶ Gordon, *Aberdeen*, pp. 246-247.

⁹⁷ *Edinburgh Rev.*, April, 1863, p. 172.

⁹⁸ Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 199.

German states in demanding that Russia accept the terms of peace formulated in January, the result might well have been favorable. The Russian government was wavering, and it later confessed to a regret that it had not accepted those terms in the first instance.⁹⁹ But the truth is, the French and British governments, in February, 1854, did not desire peace, and however great the responsibility of Russia for raising the issue out of which the war arose, however stubborn her refusal to make any real concessions as long as there was a chance of destroying the Concert of the Powers, it is clear that she was not given a last opportunity to accept the terms of peace acceptable alike to Turkey and to the powers. When, therefore, the ultimatum of the Western Powers merely demanded the evacuation of the Principalities, without any reference to the proposed terms of peace, the Russian government pursued the natural course and said that the tsar "did not think it becoming to make any reply".¹⁰⁰

From one point of view, of course, the Turks were the real cause of the war. It was their disingenuous conduct in the affair of the Holy Places which incited the tsar to resume a forward policy, their corrupt and intolerable government which gave some warrant to the proposed Russian protectorate over the Greek Christians, their refusal of the Vienna Note and their unexpected declaration of war which led on to the more general conflict. In short, their purpose was, once the quarrel of the Holy Places was adjusted and they had taken the measure of the Menshikov demands, to bring on a war with Russia that would drag one or more powers to their assistance. By seeming concessions, by clever appeals to Mohammedan fanaticism and Turkish patriotism, by a constant parade of an attitude of injured innocence, above all, by the despatch of that squadron into the Black Sea which was annihilated at Sinope, they succeeded only too well in persuading Europe that their cause was just, their preservation necessary for the balance of power. Their success in this policy is generally attributed to the support received from the British ambassador in Constantinople, who is represented as adapting the instructions of his government to meet his own views and as preventing the Turks from accepting the Russian demands.

The exact rôle of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe is, indeed, after more than sixty years, not easy to determine. He sincerely believed, at this time, in the possibility of Turkish regeneration, provided the influence of Russia were eliminated. He certainly re-

⁹⁹ *Diplomatic Study*, I. 434.

¹⁰⁰ Michele to Clarendon, March 19, 1854. *Eastern Papers*, no. 137, pt. VII., p. 82.

garded the Russian policy in 1853 as fatal to Turkey's continued existence as an independent state, a view he was at small pains to conceal from the Ottoman statesmen, over whom his influence was unbounded. According to some reports, he openly rejoiced when the war finally came.¹⁰¹ Yet the evidence of his private papers, published by his biographer, shows that to the end Stratford labored for peace.

He had resigned from the Constantinople embassy in 1852. When, however, the London cabinet learned of the tsar's overtures to Seymour, it asked Stratford to return to his post. Before he arrived, the Grand Vizier, Rifaat Pasha, had decided to retire rather than accede to Russia's demands for an offensive and defensive alliance or to her programme for a protectorate.¹⁰² This is important, because it is commonly asserted that the Turkish decision to resist Russia was formed under the influence of Stratford. He did support this decision, but he saw no reason why, "if another less binding form" were given to the proposed *sened*, an accommodation should not be reached;¹⁰³ and he recommended to the sultan the issue of a comprehensive firman, including all the Russian demands, which should be communicated to the Five Powers. Finally, he refused to summon the British fleet, on the ground that the problem was "one of a moral character".¹⁰⁴

During the last days of the Menshikov mission, Stratford declined to advise the Porte,¹⁰⁵ but after the Russian's departure, he set to work on a note which should provide a satisfactory settlement. In its final form, it guaranteed to the Greek Church "the perpetual enjoyment of all spiritual privileges ever granted to it, and would accord in addition such other privileges and immunities which His Majesty the Sultan should be pleased to grant, for ever, to any other religion of his Christian subjects".¹⁰⁶ Stratford hoped, so he wrote Clarendon, to satisfy the Russians, get them out of the Principalities, and avoid war, to which he was opposed.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ "Thank God, that's war", he is reported to have said when the news of Sinope came to hand. Gordon, *Aberdeen*, p. 254, note. Clarendon wrote: "He is bent on war, and on playing the first part in settling the great Eastern question, as Lady S. de R. admitted to me . . . he now considered it." Maxwell, *Clarendon*, II. 29.

¹⁰² Lane-Poole, *Stratford Canning*, II. 248.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, II. 264.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 266.

¹⁰⁵ Stratford to Clarendon, May 22, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 234, pt. I., p. 235.

¹⁰⁶ Protocol of Balta Liman, July 25, 1853. De Testa, *Recueil de Traités de la Porte Ottomane*, vol. IV., pt. II., p. 308.

¹⁰⁷ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, II. 283.

These plans were upset by the Vienna Note, which Stratford was ordered to recommend to the Porte, although it differed in several vital respects from his own project. The ambassador did recommend the note; but according to Sir Spencer Walpole, "the universal judgment of historians is that the Sultan's Ministers, in demanding the alteration of the note, carried out the private views and disregarded the official language of Lord Stratford".¹⁰⁸ Kinglake, Herbert Paul, Lord Eversley, and the French historians do take this view. It seems to have been held even by Clarendon,¹⁰⁹ who never wholly trusted the discretion of Stratford and often referred to him as "the Sultan". Yet, unless Mr. Lane-Poole has deliberately suppressed damaging letters in the ambassador's private correspondence, the charge will not stand.

When the Grand Vizier said that the note was unacceptable without amendments, Stratford suggested that "the Porte should signify its acceptance of the Note under its own construction of the objectionable passages, and for securities rely on the assent and sanction of the Powers". He concealed from Reshid Pasha his private approval of the Turkish modifications, he "scrupulously abstained from expressing any private opinion on the merit of Count Buol's Note, while it was under consideration", and to Clarendon he quoted Reshid as saying that "no personal influence could have induced the Porte to give way". To Westmorland he declared "wholly unfounded" any "insinuations" that he had "rather hindered than promoted the acceptance of Count Buol's Note". A member of the embassy staff wrote Lady Stratford that "whatever Lord S's private opinion may be, you may rest assured that this has in no way added to the Turks' exaltations by influencing them one way or the other".¹¹⁰

It is to be remembered that the Vienna Note differed little from the Menshikov ultimatum, radically from Stratford's own scheme of July 25. No great perspicacity was required for the Porte to determine what Stratford's real opinions were. The real blame for the rejection of the Vienna Note, so far as it was due to outside pressure, must probably be laid to the French ambassador. La Cour advised the acceptance of the note, but he helped draw up the Turkish amendments, "made inquiries about landing troops on the coasts of Turkey, and even asked whether the Porte considered the Dardanelles as already open to the passage of the Allied squad-

¹⁰⁸ *Cambridge Modern History*, XI. 314.

¹⁰⁹ *Edinburgh Rev.*, April, 1863, p. 171.

¹¹⁰ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, II. 291-296.

rons".¹¹¹ It is significant that shortly afterward the passage of the Straits was twice urged by the French government.

By the beginning of September Stratford was convinced that the Turks were "bent on war", which Clarendon suspected him of desiring and provoking.¹¹² In point of fact, he was seeking to prevent it. He calmed a war demonstration in the Turkish capital by quietly bringing up a couple of British frigates. He advised against the Turkish declaration of war, and then held out against the French ambassador, who desired to summon the fleets forthwith;¹¹³ indeed not until the Russians had refused to evacuate the Principalities and positive orders had been received from London did Stratford bring the British fleet to Constantinople, and then only a part of it.¹¹⁴

One explanation of this reluctance is that the ambassador was drafting a new note for the Porte to present to Russia. Based on the Turkish amendments to the Vienna Note, it was to be accompanied by a "declaration of the Four Powers, bearing something of the character of a guarantee, with an annexed Note in which all reasonable confirmation and warranty of the rights of the Greek Church were to be formally granted by the Sultan".¹¹⁵ "A forlorn hope", Stratford called it;¹¹⁶ but he secured from Reshid a promise that hostilities would not be opened before November 1. Actually Omar Pasha crossed the Danube on October 27, and the war was really begun. Henceforth the ambassador seems to have worked on the principle that "war is the decree of the Fates, and our wisest part will be to do what we can to bring it to a thoroughly good conclusion".¹¹⁷

But he was not "just as wild as the Turks themselves",¹¹⁸ as Clarendon complained. He prevented, on November 5, the despatch of the Turkish fleet into the Black Sea; and when later the Turks, despite him, sent out some of their smaller vessels, he tried, but failed, owing to dissensions between the French and British admirals, to have them followed up by allied ships, which would have kept the peace and prevented the battle of Sinope.¹¹⁹ After this affair he drafted a note, signed by his colleagues, proposing terms

¹¹¹ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, II. 292.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, II. 299; Maxwell, *Clarendon*, II. 29.

¹¹³ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, II. 309.

¹¹⁴ Bapst, pp. 455-456.

¹¹⁵ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, II. 279.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, II. 311.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Maxwell, *Clarendon*, II. 29.

¹¹⁹ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, II. 328-329; Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, I. 198.

on which the Porte might make peace. Substantially the same as the second Vienna Note (December 5), which arrived the following day, it was perhaps Stratford's greatest triumph. For it embodied the promise to confirm all the ancient privileges of the Greek Church,¹²⁰ a promise most reluctantly given, for the Turks believed that France and Great Britain would under no circumstances desert them. Stratford had carried his point by refusing otherwise to send the fleets into the Black Sea,¹²¹ although he considered that action an absolute necessity,¹²² and by threatening to leave Turkey to her fate in the event of massacres in the city, which were feared owing to the restlessness of the *softas*.¹²³

After this Stratford played little part in the course of events, which was directed by the chanceries of Europe. He had used every power to keep the Turks in line, to extort concessions, to prevent actual hostilities, except that he refused privately to advise the full acceptance of the Russian demands. At all times he sought to work in harmony with the other diplomatists in Constantinople; he was more restrained than his French colleague. No doubt he was anti-Russian and pro-Turk, and the hopes that he entertained for his *protégés* were never fulfilled. But he strove honestly for peace, as he understood the problem, and his conduct was formally approved by his government.

Perhaps the strangest aspect of the long negotiations was the attitude of Austria. The Hapsburg monarchy was directly interested in the Russian programme, for if the tsar should secure a protectorate over the Greek Christians of Turkey, a large proportion of whom were Slavs, the reaction upon the Slav subjects of Francis Joseph, smarting as they were under the treatment accorded them during and after the Revolution of 1848, would be certain and perhaps serious.¹²⁴ For this reason several Austrian diplomatists, notably Hübner at Paris and Prokesch-Osten at Frankfort, desired that Austria co-operate with the Western Powers to block the ambitions of Russia. But the feudal aristocracy and many of the leading generals remembered the services of the Russian army in sup-

¹²⁰ Note of December 13, 1853. *Annual Register*, 1854, p. 496.

¹²¹ Stratford to Reshid, December 12, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 371, pt. II., p. 341.

¹²² Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, II. 330.

¹²³ Stratford to Reshid, December 21, 1853. *Eastern Papers*, no. 373, pt. II., p. 344.

¹²⁴ In the autumn of 1853, the tsar gave assurances that neither he nor his son would countenance any movements against the Austrian government by its Slav subjects. Friedjung, *Der Krimkrieg*, p. 14. This book is the chief authority for the following paragraphs.

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pressing the Magyars, and they disliked Great Britain as the home of liberalism, as the refuge of Kossuth and other exiles. Baron Brück, the ambassador at Constantinople, anticipating by half a century the *Drang nach Osten* of our time, regarded Great Britain as the chief commercial rival of the German Powers in the Near East, was therefore jealous of Stratford, and advocated a common policy for Austria and Prussia which would at once give pause to Russia and challenge the ascendancy of Stratford at the Porte. The emperor himself was young and inexperienced, he dreaded the thought of a rupture with the tsar to whom he owed such a debt and whom he regarded as the bulwark of conservatism. A further difficulty arose from the general reluctance to join in any enterprise with Napoleon III., who was regarded as the champion of Italian nationality and the opponent of the Austrian system in the peninsula.

Between such conflicting currents, Count Buol, who was not a man of dominating character, pursued a weak and vacillating policy. Not until the occupation of the Principalities did he take any active part in the negotiations. His policy then was to force upon Turkey the acceptance of the Russian programme; he continued to recommend the Vienna Note after the Western Powers had abandoned it; he found the assurances of the tsar at Olmütz satisfactory; he refused to support Stratford's "forlorn hope". Likewise the Emperor Francis Joseph, who declared to the Russian ambassador in Vienna that Austria would never ally herself with the Western Powers,¹²⁵ and to Nesselrode at Olmütz that he would remain true to his old alliance on condition that the Russians did not cross the Danube.¹²⁶ When, in addition, the Austrian army was reduced, the tsar had reason to suppose that he could count on Austrian neutrality¹²⁷—and acted accordingly.

Early in 1854, however, the policy of Austria grew distinctly hostile to Russia. Count Orlov was unable to secure a promise of permanent neutrality from Francis Joseph; he admitted that the tsar aimed at the creation of vassal states in the Balkans under the protection of Russia. The offer to share this protectorate was rejected; instead the emperor demanded that Russia conduct her campaign exclusively in Asia.¹²⁸ The ministry had already determined to resist any further advance by Russia in the Balkans, by diplomacy

¹²⁵ Friedjung, p. 7.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹²⁷ Austria actually issued a declaration of neutrality when the Turks declared war. This was unfavorably viewed by the Western Powers.

¹²⁸ Friedjung, pp. 17-18.

if possible, by force if necessary; and the troops on the Hungarian frontier were reinforced. But it was not until March 22, on the very day that the Russians crossed the Danube and nearly a month after the ultimatum of the Western Powers, that the decision was finally made to place the Austrian army on a war footing; furthermore, any action was to be dependent on the support of Prussia, and the treaty of alliance with that power was concluded only on April 20.¹²⁹

Thus the policy of Austria, energetically as it finally manifested itself, was of no assistance to France and Great Britain in the final play. One cannot say that she deliberately allowed the Western Powers to pull her chestnuts out of the fire, though she has been roundly accused of it; but she certainly did not give them that whole-hearted support which would have confronted the tsar with the solid front of Europe and in all probability have constrained him to moderate his demands upon Turkey.

Of Prussia little need be said. She had no direct interest in the question, and therefore no policy.¹³⁰ In a vague way she supported Austria, but King Frederick William IV., the brother-in-law of the tsar, was almost pro-Russian, and the anti-Russian party was powerless because of its liberal leanings. For practical purposes, Prussia pursued a policy of neutrality, though not of the straightforward variety advocated by Bismarck.

Certain conclusions may be briefly stated. The tsar knew from the beginning what he wanted, and observing that Europe would not unite to oppose him, yielded none of his demands, the acceptance of which by Turkey would at least have upset the *status quo* in the Near East. Napoleon probably desired war, but made a parade of pacific intentions. Great Britain at the outset unquestionably desired peace, but did not make clear that the designs of Russia would be resisted, by force if necessary, thereby encouraging the tsar to stand his ground. Austria's attitude, until too late, was equally uncertain. The Turks¹³¹ played their game admirably. In the face of such confusion war could have been avoided only by a miracle.

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¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 43-44.

¹³⁰ Loftus, *Diplomatic Reminiscences*, first series, vol. I., chs. XIV.-XVI.

¹³¹ The tsar spoke to Castelbajac of "*ces misérables Turcs*", and Clarendon qualified them as "beastly".

NOTES AND SUGGESTIONS

NOTES ON THE BEGINNINGS OF AERONAUTICS IN AMERICA

IN view of the important part played in the Great War by aircraft of various sorts, it is interesting to know that, more than a century and a quarter ago, three of the founders of the American Republic, signers of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Francis Hopkinson, were intensely interested in this subject, and definitely predicted the part that navigation of the air was to play in subsequent history.

The history of modern aeronautics begins on June 5, 1783, when the Montgolfier brothers, Joseph Michel and Jacques Étienne, gave a public demonstration of their discoveries by sending up at Annonay, France, a large hot-air balloon. That this demonstration, which attracted so much attention in France, aroused almost an equal amount of interest in America is proved by the fact that during the next winter a correspondent in America of the *Journal de Paris* contributed to that paper a fictitious account of a balloon ascension which purported to have taken place in Philadelphia in the latter part of 1783.

According to this story, which was published May 13, 1784, "Ritnose" and "Opquisne", members of the "Philosophical Academy",¹ sent up, on December 28 of the preceding year, forty-seven small balloons, attached to a cage, in which they placed, first animals, and later "Gimes Ouilcox" (James Wilcox), a local carpenter. When the latter saw that he was approaching the "Scoul-quille" River, he became alarmed and punctured some of his balloons and so brought himself down.

This story is a pure myth. There is no mention of the event in the records of the American Philosophical Society, in William Barton's *Life of David Rittenhouse*, in the correspondence of Francis Hopkinson,² or in Jacob Hiltzheimer's *Diary*—which does record the first real ascension. Nevertheless, it was generally accepted as true; it was quoted in Hatton Turnor's elaborate history of aeronautics, *Astra Castra*, and is repeated in the eleventh edition of the

¹ This evidently refers to David Rittenhouse and Francis Hopkinson, prominent members of the American Philosophical Society.

² The author of this article has written a life of Francis Hopkinson, which is deposited among the doctoral theses in the Harvard College Library.