

detailed account of the relations between Germany and the United States, with a large number of illustrative documents; treats with a fullness of detail not found elsewhere President Wilson's attempt to mediate between the warring powers of Europe, and offers a weighty and convincing defense, fraught with logic and good sense, of the author's diplomacy while ambassador to the United States.

Since the above review was written, a translation of Count von Bernstorff's book has appeared (Charles Scribner's Sons). It is an excellent piece of work, exact and accurate, but not too literal. In spite of some rather clumsy sentences, it can be read with pleasure, because written in pure English, instead of the mongrel language of many translations, with the vocabulary English and the idioms German.

The excellence of the translation may be due in part to the style of Count von Bernstorff; for, unlike many German writers, he does not hide his thought behind dense and complicated entanglements of language, but sets it forth in clear, short, crisp sentences.

E. E. SPERRY.

The Inside Story of the Peace Conference. By Dr. E. J. DILLON.
(New York and London: Harper and Brothers. Pp. xi, 513.
\$2.50.)

THE title of this book is singularly non-descriptive. It has none of the qualities of narrative and every page betrays the fact that the author remained entirely outside the real workings of the Conference. It is in form a series of loose-jointed articles dealing ostensibly with such subjects as the City of the Conference, censorship, the personalities, aims, and methods of the peacemakers, Italian policy, Bolshevism, and the League Covenant. In reality it is little but the rather peevish reflections of a veteran correspondent who, snubbed by the Big Four, found solace in railing at their work in the company of Bratiano and the delegates of the smaller states. His chief complaint is that the Conference was dominated by the ignorant Anglo-Saxon "Duumvirs", Wilson and Lloyd George. The former, he believes, might have aroused the masses of Europe to support of his policy—a policy which Mr. Dillon, in his heart, evidently despises, for in his description of the Rumanian violation of the armistice he is obviously glad "to see the haze of self-righteousness and cant at last dispelled by a whiff of wholesome egotism". But Wilson lacked the courage and his interference ultimately served merely to confuse the settlement, which, the author insists, is based neither upon justice nor upon expediency. The French he attacks without discrimination, whether they oppose or yield to Wilson.

Such an attitude, involving wholesale condemnation of the Conference, is comprehensible, but the author's substantiation of his assertions is so prolix, confused, and apparently dependent upon the merest gossip, that it will hardly carry conviction with the critical reader. He is in-

consistent in his generalizations as to his particulars. Thus on page 274, "Sentiment in politics is a myth"; but on page 284, speaking of Italian policy, "Where sentiment actuates, reason is generally unimportant". He pictures Wilson again and again as the irresponsible master of the Conference, sharing power only with Lloyd George, and as often he emphasizes the defeats which the President underwent at the hands of Clemenceau. On page 185 he complains that Wilson refused to grant the Rhine frontier to France; but on page 188 we find, "whenever Britain or France's interests seemed to be imperiled by the putting in force of any of the Fourteen Points, Mr. Wilson desisted from its application". The author, who obviously never entered the room, pictures the Council of Ten in wholly imaginary fashion sitting around a table with Clemenceau at the head. He lays bitter stress upon the allegation that apart from Mantoux's notes there is no record of what was done by the Council of Four, evidently ignorant of the careful mimeographed reports. He takes as text for an onslaught on the tactics of the chief statesmen an apocryphal rebuke administered by Clemenceau to Bratiano (p. 236), the falsity of which the reviewer can attest. And if Mr. Dillon insists on substituting gossip for fact, it is a pity to take the point out of Clemenceau's witty epigram on Klotz (p. 423), which may or may not be authentic. Constant use of the *Chicago Tribune*, the Paris edition of the *Herald*, and the *Echo de Paris*, explains, perhaps, misstatements too numerous to list. It is not true that the Polish Commission was dismissed unheard (p. 105); nor that the leading statesmen were opposed to a plebiscite in Teschen (p. 191); nor that two American censors concealed from Europe the opposition to Wilson in the United States (p. 119); nor that when "Italy invoked self-determination she was promptly non-suited" (p. 313); nor was it in March, 1919, that "Wilson hit upon the expedient of linking the Covenant with the Peace Treaty" (p. 141). With all respect to Mr. Dillon's experience, he has written a misleading book.

CHARLES SEYMOUR.

BOOKS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

Africa and the Discovery of America. By LEO WIENER, Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures in Harvard University. Volume I. (Philadelphia: Innes and Sons. 1920. Pp. xix, 290. \$5.00.)

PROFESSOR WIENER makes in this work another contribution to the rising tide of books relating to the earliest history of the New World. He approaches his subject along the less popular and, it must be affirmed, less certain path, that of philology.

The reviewer has always been suspicious of the "last word" treatise, and he was not a little shocked to find that Professor Wiener's studies