

indictment of Tory administration during the era in which Grey lived—an indictment conceived in the unmeasured violence of a political antagonist.

Anyone whose political convictions are of the same order will find his own views of the period from 1789 to 1832 abundantly fortified by this latest survey. For Mr. Trevelyan, although the unpublished correspondence of Grey gave him little scope for a distinctive contribution from new material, has made excellent use of most of the published works of the last fifteen years—particularly of the three notable books of Mr. and Mrs. Hammond, with their extensive research into the Home Office Papers. Anyone, again, who desires to understand the Liberal-Radical interpretation of this period, particularly its detestation of Pitt, will find this book peculiarly forceful. Anyone anticipating a work of judicious scholarship will probably share the reviewer's disappointment, for the general effect is to make the tradition of Burke and Pitt, of Castlereagh, Canning, and Wellington, appear contemptible rather than intelligible. There will be difference of opinion as to whether or not this was the best service to render to the memory of Grey. Also there will be difference of opinion as to whether or not Mr. Trevelyan's over-emphasis of the personal responsibility of the leaders of Tory reaction does the best service to a present school of statesmanship which, on its historical side, is perhaps too ready to attribute to a few distinguished Tories the original failure to solve the problems of industrial dislocation and class antagonism at their first critical appearance after the Industrial Revolution.

C. E. FRYER.

Brief History of the Great War. By CARLTON J. H. HAYES, Professor of History in Columbia University. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1920. Pp. xiv, 461. \$3.50.)

THIS is the best single-volume history of the Great War which has so far appeared, and it is one of the very few which deserve serious consideration by professional students of history. It is written with a high degree of scientific responsibility, and not for mere purposes of journalism or propaganda. It covers the entire period of the war from the Serbian note to the Treaty of Versailles with reasonable fullness, and there are not many places where it can be criticized for the amount of space assigned to the various major events. Finally, it is written in a thoroughly readable, not to say spirited style.

Of course whether this volume or any other like it will seem of first-class historical value, a few years from now, remains entirely in the lap of the gods. Not merely will our judgment on a great number of happenings be subject to drastic revision as time inevitably changes our viewpoints—*e.g.*, as to many Balkan, Slavic, or economic matters—but we also are now manifestly at the mere beginning of a long succession

of "revelations", official and personal, which, while they may not swerve our judgment as to the greater things, will assuredly modify current statements as to many important secondary matters. The published apologiae of such worthies as Ludendorff, Tirpitz, etc., are of course mere forewords to many more significant rejoinders by the *advocati diaboli*, while we have hardly as yet received any of the elaborate and less contentious material we shall surely obtain from high British, French, Italian, not to say American, sources. Certainly, too, all our chancelleries will pretty soon become less jealous in safeguarding what were once confidential despatches. The access to power of a strongly anti-Wilsonian administration in this country, or of a pronounced Labor ministry in Britain, would probably be followed by the release of a great mass of diplomatic and even military correspondence, the publication whereof the present custodians would loudly deprecate.

Even as things stand, Professor Hayes seems to have sent away his last proofs before he could make use of such interesting commentaries as Bernstorff's *My Three Years in America*, Czernin's defensive memoirs, or Sir Philip Gibbs's *Now it Can be Told*, with its light upon the seamy side of the war. To take very ordinary events, it does not seem probable that the whole truth about the *Lusitania*, the resignation of Mr. Bryan, the exit of Dr. Dumba, or the inwardness of the Zimmermann note to Mexico has yet been told in this or in any other book. Nor, if we cross the Atlantic, do we feel that we are at the bottom of such problems as why "Tino" of Greece was allowed to stay so long in Athens; why Rumania was cast away in 1916; how far the Teutonophiles around the Tsar intrigued for a separate peace in 1916-1917; what was the part played by the Vatican in the various attempts to rescue Austria from the maelstrom of war; or what was the real story of the rather elaborate peace negotiations in Switzerland during the winter of 1917-1918. As for military matters (to select a random example from a legion) it is still a matter for prolonged argument whether Nivelle was an over-rated braggart or a skillful though unfortunate general.

Such points Professor Hayes in no wise attempts to settle finally, although he usually suggests the current orthodox explanations. However, though it is likely enough that many of his statements are subject to future amplification, they will very seldom need correction. Two thousand years hence sundry pundits will doubtless descant learnedly upon the First and Second Marnes, and upon the dramatic achievements of Ferdinand Foch. The military and political outlines of the Great War can never be essentially different from those the author has given them, and the present age cannot be asked to wait for the philosophic retrospects of a Grote or a Mommsen. It may be safely stated that few histories of our Civil War written about 1867 have stood the ordeal of later revelations and criticism, so well as this history is likely to go through the next four decades.

The story of the war is told in fifteen rather long chapters, interpreted by ten large and thirty-nine smaller maps. The first chapter contains a small section taken from the author's well-known *Political and Social History of Modern Europe* and suggests rather familiar lines of thought, but when the narrative is fairly started the author cuts loose from his earlier undertaking, and writes not a well-balanced textbook, but a really spirited history calculated to appeal to the oft-abused "general reader". The economic factor does not receive the pronounced stress possibly to be expected from a leading member of the so-called "Columbia school", and indeed industrial and economic aspects of the war might well have been developed at somewhat greater length. Such chapters as those treating of the Russian collapse and the great Ludendorff drive in 1918 stand about every test whether considered as scientific or as very well narrated "popular" history.

Almost inevitably the least complete part of the volume is that dealing with the participation of the United States. Professor Hayes had to choose between stating opinions as to Mr. Wilson's policies, our years of neutrality, the League of Nations, etc., which would be pretty sure to offend a large fraction of his readers, whatever views he took, or giving us some rather colorless chapters. He chose the latter alternative, possibly wisely. Theodore Roosevelt, and his service in rousing the nation to its supreme duty at a time when our official leaders sounded no clarions, receives, I believe, only one, entirely passing, reference. It is a reasonable inference that the author is a profound admirer of Mr. Wilson and his policies, and that he is not unwilling to be called an "internationalist", but this is an inference not to be proved by specific texts. Nevertheless it is noticeable how full of freedom and verve is the treatment, *e.g.*, of Kerensky, and how gingerly is that of the "extraordinary opposition [to the League Covenant] from the Republican majority of the Senate". This merely illustrates the difficulty of speaking out one's full mind before one's own countrymen.

As an indictment of Hohenzollernism and its works, and a justification of the Allied and American advocates of "Peace through Victory" this book is invaluable, not because of its epithets but because of its careful and cumulative use of probative material. Thanks to the relatively ample space assigned to diplomatic and political events, and not merely to battles, it is a far more useful general guide to five momentous years of history, than the recent volume of Professor Pollard, about its only serious competitor. There are a few obvious errors, *e.g.*, about the area of Austria (p. 383), but they are of small import.

To sum up: this book must doubtless be rewritten say within five years, but at present it holds practically a unique place for fullness of information, fairness, balance, and accuracy.

WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS.

History of the Great War based on Official Documents, by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Naval Operations. By Sir JULIAN S. CORBETT. Volume I. *To the Battle of the Falklands, December, 1914. Maps to accompany Volume I.* (New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1920. Pp. xvi, 488, 18 maps. \$6.50.)

ABOUT the ability and knowledge with which this book is written, there cannot be the slightest question. The field covers almost the whole surface of the earth, and describes in detail the simultaneous movements at high speed of ships and squadrons in the North Sea, the North and South Atlantic oceans, the Mediterranean, the North and South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the seas that skirt the eastern coast of Asia: and yet the pictures presented are consecutive and clear. The efforts of the author to produce a plain and interesting narrative are ably seconded by the publishers; for the make-up of the book is admirable in the highest degree, and presents a model that makes the work of most American publishers seem crude.

The narrative is arranged in chronological order, as far as possible, and naturally begins with the naval preparations, made before the war.

The author throughout evinces a high admiration for the work of the Admiralty, even before the war, and evidently seeks to impress his readers with the same feeling. In fact, in the opening sentence of his first chapter he says, "Amongst the many false impressions that prevailed, when after the lapse of a century we found ourselves involved in a great war, not the least erroneous is the belief that we were not prepared for it." Yet the statements that follow conclusively show that they were unprepared, though designed to show the contrary. That the author must have realized this himself is indicated by the following sentence on page 3, "It was not for want of study or foresight that we were found unprepared": and though the steps toward preparedness which the author details prove that there was no lack of study, they equally prove that there was a "plentiful lack" of foresight. They show that, although there were numerous committees at work (and at hard work), yet those committees looked ahead so little that, by the time any one of their tasks had been completed, the progress of invention and development had already made their decision inadequate. The committees seem to have been continuously behind the procession of events. In no case among the many mentioned does any committee or any decision seem to have endeavored to arrange to meet the conditions of even the approximate future. Among the many defects in foresight evidenced, the most remarkable are the failure to foresee the development of long-range firing, the submarine, and the aeroplane. The failure to realize the possibilities of the aeroplane must stand for many years to come as the most extraordinary single phenomenon in modern naval history.