

English university students. While very complete accounts of the history of each branch of the Tudor government are given, owing to the form of the book the relative importance and connections of all the various organs are difficult to show as clearly as might be desired. The modern student of constitutional history is not, however, satisfied with a constitutional history which stops here. He desires to understand the cultural and economic basis of the government—the classes which form it and the cultural and economic forces which placed them in control. The nineteenth-century idea of the Tudor state as the “people at large” rallying around the hero kings of the house of Tudor, which seems to be accepted by Dr. Tanner, is not sufficient for the modern historian. The improvement of roads, which lessened distance; the development of the new science of bookkeeping and accountancy, which made supervision over vast extents of land from a distance possible; the rise of the gentry to new economic wealth through changes in methods of agriculture; the education of their sons either in law at the universities or in accountancy and bookkeeping in the houses of the great nobles, are very pertinent for the advent and continuation of the new centralized gentry commonwealth which is called the Tudor monarchy—and these factors are entirely overlooked in this really monumental work.

F. C. DIETZ.

*English Government Finance, 1485-1558.* By FREDERICK C. DIETZ, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History, University of Illinois. [University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. IX., no. 3.] (Urbana: the University. 1920. Pp. 245.)

THE first impression made by a reading of this excellent monograph is of its thoroughness. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the subject, the unusualness of the sources, the technicalities of sixteenth-century finance, and the obscurity of the devices of kings and ministers to obtain funds, no question arises without being thoroughly examined and clearly answered. Early Tudor finance is a closed book to almost all historical students. Mr. Dietz puts a wide-open volume in their hands.

The second impression is of the striking extent to which historical events can be clarified by studying their financial background. Not that the whole foreign policy of Henry VII., or the Reformation under Henry VIII., or the reaction under Mary, are to be explained as mere financial expedients of those rulers; but these events certainly have a new significance when it is seen how many steps in their development were taken in response to financial needs. The “Submission of the Clergy” of 1531, for instance, was a device for reaching two ends at the same time, and apparently, of equal interest to the king, his acknowledgment as head of the Church and additional income in a period of diminishing revenue and rising expense. Concomitant with all the

early measures of the Reformation was a financial policy forced upon the king and his minister by the danger of attack from Spain due to those measures. Long before the attack upon the monasteries, financial need had suggested and indeed made imminent the almost complete confiscation of the possessions of the Church, secular as well as temporal. It is an interesting parallel to see Henry VII. recuperating his finances at the expense of the nobility, Henry VIII. at the expense of the Church. The study of financial records in this degree of detail and thoroughness serves an almost equally useful purpose in the interpretation of some prominent personalities. The growth of the Empson and Dudley legend, with its partial justification, the inferiority of Wolsey and the excellence of Cromwell as finance ministers, the reckless financing of the period of Edward VI. and the partial rehabilitation in the reign of Mary, preparing a better soil for the growth of Elizabethan financial solidity, are all substantial contributions to a sane and trustworthy knowledge of history.

Nowhere in all history, not even in recent world experience, does the terrible cost of war and its baneful effect directly on finance and indirectly on many other sides of national life come out more clearly than in the difference between the careful, systematic, enlightened financial arrangements of the best period of the reign of Henry VII. and the reckless expenditure of his father's savings by Henry VIII. in his first and least justifiable war with France and the oppressive and injurious and undignified taxation compelled by his second.

It would be pleasant, if there were room, to pay tribute to Mr. Dietz's industry, independence of judgment, breadth of view that raise a somewhat technical study to the level of good general history; but the few remaining lines must be devoted somewhat reluctantly to a less pleasing criticism; that is, of the very bad proof-reading. This is not a captious criticism; mistakes of spelling, of figures, of prepositions, when frequent, give the reader a sense of uncertainty, a doubt of other names, figures, and statements which are almost certainly correct but are weakened in authority by the proximity of those which are certainly wrong. Such are, for instance, "Henry VI." for "Henry VII.", on page 54, and "of France" for "by France", a few lines below; "Henry III." for "Henry VIII." in a foot-note on page 47; "conventional" for "conventual" twice on page 109, following two mistakes in the spelling of proper names. Without further emphasizing this point, it may be remarked, first, that it is especially incumbent on a university series of publications to give an example of all rectitude to merely commercial publishers; and, secondly, that even the author of an excellent historical production must submit to have his work criticized in such particulars as may be for the future good of the cause. Henry C. Lea, who was both a publisher and a historian, once said to the reviewer that it had been an unfulfilled ambition of his life to get out a book in which there

was not a single misprint. In the last volume published before his death, in a foot-note "1639" appears for "1369".

EDWARD P. CHEYNEY.

*Étude sur le Gouvernement de François I<sup>er</sup> dans ses Rapports avec le Parlement de Paris.* Par ROGER DOUCET, Agrégé d'Histoire, Maître de Conférences à la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger. Volume I., 1515-1525. (Paris: Édouard Champion. 1921. Pp. 379. 20 fr.)

THIS is a very interesting book. Its purpose is to show how "the traditional and still feudal monarchy of Louis XII." began to be converted, under Francis I., into the centralized absolutism which reached its culmination under Louis XIV. The method adopted is to describe a series of conflicts between the king and the Parlement de Paris, which was dominated, more than any other part of the body politic, by the methods and ideals of the preceding age, and therefore naturally became the centre of the forces opposed to the crown.

After an illuminating chapter on the political theories of the first part of the sixteenth century, the author takes up the problem of the relations of Church and State, which was brought to the fore by the Concordat of 1516. The king, who aspired completely to subject the French church to his own authority, cared solely for the maintenance of those of its "liberties" which rendered it independent of the pope: the Parlement, on the other hand, harked back to the system established by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. "Gallicanisme royal" and "gallicanisme parlementaire" found themselves, for the first time, in direct opposition; but it was "gallicanisme royal" that won the day. Next comes the question of finance. New methods of obtaining revenue and credit were being invented, which rendered the king independent not only of grants from the national and local estates, but also of the tutelage of the *gens de finance*, to whom his predecessors had been constantly obliged to have recourse. The Parlement did not like the way things were going, and sought to put on the brake by an occasional refusal to register an edict or to sanction the creation of a new official; its opposition, however, was not sufficiently systematic or continuous to be effective. The king's power, on the other hand, was immensely strengthened, not only financially, but territorially and politically as well, by the results of the treason of the Duc de Bourbon, and the confiscation of his vast domains. A final chapter takes up the differences between the king on the one hand, and the Parlement and the University of Paris on the other, over the treatment to be accorded to the disciples of Lefèvre d'Étaples. Francis had little or no love for the Reformers, but he was far too much engrossed in other affairs to give enthusiastic support to a policy of persecution. The Parlement and the university, however, were consistent in their demands for the