

► *F. D. R. prepares for the toughest political fight of his career.*

ROOSEVELT'S FOURTH TERM STRATEGY

BY CHARLES HURD

THERE is no longer any doubt in Washington that President Roosevelt will run for a fourth term. His political staff has begun to lay the plans and the President has begun to re-form his lines for what he expects to be the hardest and closest race of his career. His friends defend the mixing of shrewd political moves with the conduct of the war.

If the fighting is still under way, they argue, his re-election will itself become a vital war measure to assure victory for the United Nations. The country will be asked to "see the war through with your Commander-in-Chief."

The broad outlines of Mr. Roosevelt's strategy are now visible.

The most sensational detail of the battle plan is that Vice-President Henry A. Wallace will be dropped from the fourth-term ticket. It is believed that the political general staff, with Harry Hopkins in command, has con-

vinced the President that he should not carry deadweight into a knock-down-drag-out fight such as 1944 seems certain to become. Wallace is not a vote-getter. He can add to the ticket no strength which Roosevelt does not already command.

The best bet for the spot now occupied by Wallace is a dark horse, Chester C. Davis, the new food administrator. Davis has most of the qualities which Wallace lacks. Like Wallace he is an Iowan, but unlike Wallace he wields great influence with the powerful farm organizations which must be wooed if the fourth-term ticket is to have a real chance in the Midwest.

Indeed, Davis seems to the New Deal strategists almost too good to be true. A veteran farm lobbyist and, more recently, head of the St. Louis branch of the Federal Reserve Bank, he is not in the slightest smeared with the Leftist brush. He looks a little like a business man, a little like a conserva-

CHARLES HURD is one of the best-known Washington correspondents. He has been writing on politics for newspapers and magazines since 1929, and formerly was on the New York Times.

tive, and a great deal like the Professional Farmers' Friend that he is.

From his own point of view the President is left little choice when he considers the fourth term race. He knows, as even the most rabid Democrats can agree, that without him at the head of the ticket a Republican victory is assured. Neither in peace nor war has the New Deal developed any heirs apparent. The President either must strike out for the fourth term and fight his hardest fight, or else he must accept the inevitability of the end of the New Deal and a GOP reorganization.

Even if the President wished to retire — and there has been no indication that he does — the decision is virtually out of his hands. The vast array of his camp followers, knowing that they are out on their collective ears when the President goes either by defeat or retirement, are capable of generating an enormous pressure.

There are only two developments, both highly unlikely, which could disrupt the fourth term plans. Those who are closest to the President have always contended that he would never risk defeat; that his acknowledged political intuition would warn him of defeat and he would retire rather than risk it. These are the commonest words

around Washington: "If the President thinks he might lose, you can depend on his announcing his retirement."

It is probably true that the President would retire if he reached any such conclusion. But he believes he can still win. He believes that during the next twelve months he can both prosecute the war and make the moves which will fill his hand again. Time will tell whether his judgment has been dulled by twelve years of success and yes-men, or whether it is as reliable as ever.

The second development which might change the plans revolves around Big Jim Farley. At present Farley is far out of the fold. He has made a pilgrimage to Uvalde, Texas, for a cracker-barrel chat with Jack Garner. There are some who believe that Farley could assure a Republican victory in 1944 if he chose to oppose the President openly as he did in the 1942 New York elections. Suppose Farley went to the President in January 1944, and told him straight across the table that he would support the Republican ticket if there was a fourth term attempt? There are observers very close to Farley who believe he is ready to go to such an extreme. If he did, would the President ignore the threat, leaving Farley, and

perhaps Garner, to do their worst, or would the President decide to retire?

These are intriguing situations to contemplate, but politics being politics, it seems logical to predict that the President and his general staff will be able to lure most of the recalcitrant party leaders back into the fold, and that they will at least be able to prevent an open break with the affable Jim. Despite the vigor with which Farley partisans express themselves on the fourth term, it is best to remember that in politics there are few irreconcilable breaks.

Farley himself is making no statements. Other party leaders who have been critical of the administration are expected to begin toning down their remarks and gradually crawl back on the New Deal train during the next few months. The hard choice for them is a chance to retain patronage with Roosevelt versus no chance at all without him.

II

A brief analysis of the President's support reveals the problems and indicates the probable moves of his political high command. The groups which have swelled the Roosevelt majorities in the past are:

the South, the unemployed, the Negroes, the small business men, the big city machines, labor and the farmers. In 1932 the President had clear majorities in all these groups; in 1936 the majorities were even larger. By 1940 small business men and the farmers had swung back to a 50-50 division, and in the 1942 elections their disaffection continued.

What is the situation now in these decisive groups? The South has drifted steadily away from the President in part because of Mrs. Roosevelt and the mythical "Eleanor Clubs" among the Negroes. But the President has begun to make the indicated moves. His choice of the South for an Army camp tour was not entirely accidental. While patting the professional Negro leaders on the back with his left hand, he pushed his right hand into the War Manpower Commission and squelched the Fair Practices Committee which had irritated Southern leaders with its activities toward breaking down segregation practices in war plants.

The unemployed, who formed a New Deal bulwark when Hopkins was "spending and electing" as head of WPA, have disappeared as a pressure group. The idea that they still remain grateful and loyal to the New Deal is probably ro-

mantic. Strange things happen to those who have found the security of jobs after a long ordeal of joblessness: witness how even ham-and-egggers in California, under the influence of wartime prosperity, helped to turn out the New Deal administration in favor of a Republican.

The Negroes are restless and unhappy over the very moves which the President has made to placate the South. It seems likely that their vote will be badly split in 1944. Both Bricker and Willkie have strong personal following among the Negroes.

The scrapping of Leon Henderson and the appointment of Prentiss Brown to head OPA was a deliberate effort to make OPA's restrictions and questionnaires more palatable to small business operators. There will be more efforts to sugarcoat the rationing pill.

Brown is important to the President also for another reason. Though defeated last year for re-election to the Senate, he is popular in his state of Michigan despite the fact that he was outvoted. And Michigan will be crucial in 1944. Politicians believe that no man can win the Presidency if he loses the "triangle" of Michigan, Indiana and Ohio. In 1940 Roosevelt lost Michigan. He lost it again in effect

in 1942 when his party ticket was defeated. Roosevelt lost Indiana, Willkie's state, in 1940. He carried Ohio in 1940, but it is not a certainty for 1944. Governor Bricker of Ohio may or may not be nominated, but his early start may swing the state to the Republicans whoever their standard bearer may be. The Presidential build-up for Prentiss Brown must therefore be regarded as part of the fourth term strategy, a maneuver in the fight for the "triangle."

The big city machines have suffered from the loss of relief patronage. The Hague machine, a Roosevelt bulwark, is being whipsawed by Governor Charles Edison of New Jersey, and its influence in the 1942 state elections was less than at any time since Boss Hague became dictator of Jersey City. However, the President has never wavered in his faithfulness to Hague. The Kelly-Nash machine in Chicago had its tightest squeeze in ten years in the last election. The President must make moves to help these machines, since the Republicans have been concentrating on building up state machines and now control nearly two-thirds of the populous states.

The labor situation seems to be in for a special treatment by the fourth-term general staff. Since

John L. Lewis hates the President with a blinding passion, he has been written off, and the strategy is to help make Lewis as hateful as possible to as many people as possible; in short, to try to capitalize on his opposition. In this move the President seems to have the unintentional cooperation of Lewis himself.

The President has always used the sword of class differences to lure his labor support, and he can be expected to sharpen the old sword before 1944. The Presidential order limiting salaries to \$25,000 was a move in this direction. When Congress over-rode his decree, Roosevelt actually strengthened his hand by recommending legislation to place this limit for the duration on all incomes. From the angle of a class appeal to labor, the demand serves the President as well as the deed. It is in the best Roosevelt style of what his detractors call class-war strategy, reminiscent of the denunciation of "tories" a few years ago.

The New Deal ace-in-the-hole with labor, however, is the cradle-to-the-grave security program submitted by the National Resources Planning Board. The Board's report was ready many months ago, but it was held up deliberately so that it could be timed for political

effect. The plan has little appeal to self-reliant farmers; it makes its fullest appeal to labor. It represents the projected extension of the New Deal into postwar planning. It reflects the philosophy of the Palace Guard. It is cut from the same cloth as the state socialism preached by Harold Laski, a Britisher and former Harvard professor who is now in England acting as spokesman for the left wing of the British Labor Party.

The NRPB program was largely the work of Dr. Evaline M. Burns, director of research for the Board. She recently foreswore her British nativity to become a citizen of the United States. She studied under Laski at the London School of Economics and is a close associate of David K. Niles, who lives at the White House and is to be one of the architects of the fourth term blueprint. In 1932 Mrs. Burns wrote a pamphlet entitled *Socialist Planning and a Socialist Program* from which excerpts have been read into the *Congressional Record*. One excerpt reads:

The socialist state will have to devise some means of coercing labor where necessary to make labor do what the socialist state wants.

At the proper time Hopkins, Niles and their associates will resuscitate the cradle-to-grave program,

and the President will probably use it as his main argument to labor.

Davis, as mentioned above, is to be called upon to bring the farm vote back into line. He is not a log-cabin product, but he is a reasonable facsimile. He was orphaned in his youth, one of six children of an Iowa farmer. He won a Phi Beta Kappa key at Grinnell College while earning his way by washing windows, mopping floors, waiting on tables, and servicing a laundry route. Before he was graduated, however, he had become a newspaper reporter.

His first professional farm job was as editor of a farm journal in Montana, and he shortly became Commissioner of Labor and Agriculture in that state. A great mixer, he won the admiration of Wallace's father, old H. C., Secretary of Agriculture under Harding. Wallace the Elder brought Davis to Washington to serve as liaison man between Congress and the Department of Agriculture during the drafting of the McNary-Haugen farm-relief act. Davis liked the Washington atmosphere and stayed on to become the top farm lobbyist.

When the New Deal arrived, Davis was settled comfortably as vice-president of a couple of agricultural companies and as a farm

"legislative agent." When the AAA was formed, Davis joined it as director of the production division. He advanced to the head of AAA in December, 1933, and also became director of the Commodity Credit Corporation and a trustee of the Export-Import Bank. In 1936 he became the agricultural member among the Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and two years ago he left Washington to accept the highly paid job of president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Six years of banking service may have insulated Davis against the criticisms of New Deal policy that caused the defections in agriculture in 1940 and '42. Also Davis is palatable to many outright anti-New Dealers because of his handling of some of the better known left-wing theorists. He put Jerome Frank out of AAA in 1935, and he was openly contemptuous of Dr. Rexford Guy Tugwell.

Davis as a Vice-Presidential candidate may prove the smartest Roosevelt move in 1944.

III

It used to be said that the New Deal was run by political amateurs. If that were ever true, it is false now. The President's political dep-

uties know their trade. They have little more to learn about the science and art of using the paternalistic and money power of government to mend political fences.

Most prominent among these Presidential deputies, of course, is Harry Hopkins. He is in every sense Mr. Roosevelt's personal chief of staff, the same informal, shrewd fellow who weathered the storms of the WPA — but a broader and more informed man since he chatted with Churchill in London and Stalin in Moscow, sat in on high strategy with the Combined Chiefs of Staff here, and visited Casablanca with his chief. There are those who insist that Hopkins is a country boy who got a break because the President and Mrs. Roosevelt liked him. But it is time that Hopkins was accorded the recognition that he is where he is because of unusual political acumen. He is no amateur. He was no amateur when, unknown, he arrived in Washington. And he has held the post of court favorite longer than anyone else since the Roosevelts moved into the White House.

Justice Frankfurter is not so close to the President, but his mind is keener than most. He is a past master at judging in advance events in relationship to their results. He is credited with being one

of the best informed men in Washington on political developments, if only because he has so many of his favorite law students installed at strategic points for seeing things and reporting things.

Postmaster General Walker is the practical politician of the general staff group — not the inspired but the digging type. He likes politics and learned a lot from James A. Farley.

The new face in the fourth-term high command is that of David K. Niles, relatively unknown to most persons, reputedly extreme left-wing in orientation, introduced into the inner White House circle by Hopkins. Niles went to Washington from Boston, where for many years he directed the Ford Hall Forum. A disciple of the Laski school of economics, he is now regarded as Hopkins' most confidential lieutenant and therefore powerful also among the President's lieutenants.

Decidedly small-bore as a politician and without any personal following whatsoever, the Boston man's significance may be in his economic coloration. The emergence of such a man on the White House scene coincident with the writing and release of the cradle-to-grave program raises the question — in Democratic as well as Republican

circles — whether the fourth-term strategy may not be double-barrelled. Outwardly it is today one of open compromise with dissatisfied groups. The compromising has already gone far enough to draw howls of dismay from liberals of the collectivist persuasion on the one hand, and on the other, hints from some conservative elements that perhaps, after all, “you can do business with the New Deal.” The suspicion voiced is that the fourth term planners are preparing to ride two horses — one headed toward private enterprise and the other toward some variant of state socialism. More daring tricks are not unfamiliar in the political circus.

One or two familiar types are missing as yet from the President’s fourth-term board of strategy. There is no gifted publicist to take the place of Charles Michaelson, who apparently is out of the picture. More important, there is no organizer with the gifts of a Farley. But whoever comes to the fore as the public strategist, the real leader of the fourth term drive will be the candidate himself. Many persons will organize but FDR will direct. His directions will be as carefully planned as his moves in conducting the war; more carefully planned than his other campaigns.

The elections of 1940 and 1942

showed the President that the Republican Party can muster impressive strength. He knows that the Republicans, in contrast to the New Deal, have a variety of candidates to choose from — Dewey, Bricker, Stassen, Willkie, *et al.* — to match the mood of the country at convention time. But Mr. Roosevelt has no such choices. He has a single personality to offer, one that might be retouched but cannot be basically changed. Neither can he change his political wares; the New Deal pattern is well set and in the long run his program must be more or less consistent with what has been done.

The President must fight along those lines, and is aware that it will not be a walk-over. He will pull new political tricks out of his capacious bag. He will streamline his campaign and shuffle the cast of characters in many ways. The fight will be conducted by a man stripped for action, a confident man. While the issues are debated, it is more than likely that the President will submerge them increasingly beneath a pyrotechnic display of his personality on the one hand and quiet manipulation on the other.

The fourth term, as an issue in itself, does not have the vitality that the third term did. The smashing of the two-term tradition

in 1940 was a profound shock to the country. Even some of the most outspoken partisans of the New Deal were upset. Now that the hurdle has been taken with a third term, the fourth comes as an anticlimax. It is doubtful whether the opposition can whip up as much excitement about the principle involved as it did four years earlier. For the more sober observers of the political picture, indeed, this relative popular complacency on the matter offers the ultimate proof that the two-term tradition expressed a deep political wisdom. After three terms, a fourth seems natural, and thereafter the numer-

ical progression can be extended with ever greater ease.

Postmaster Walker recently swung around the country. His reports and others reaching the White House reveal numerous holes in the fabric of party solidarity as the fourth term showdown comes closer. Despite the war — in a sense because of the war — Mr. Roosevelt and his political mentors are giving time and thought to the job of patching those holes, one by one. The events of the war will necessarily influence the 1944 nominations and election, but war will not necessarily decide the issue. Politics is still politics in democratic America.



German Headquarters, 1943

► *Britons and Americans learn
to understand each other.*

THE CHANGING BRITISH ISLAND

BY HECTOR BOLITHO

IN September 1939 when Mr. Chamberlain said over the wireless, "Consequently we are at war with Germany," we suddenly felt lonely on our island. Those of us who were travelers fell into a kind of claustrophobia. Our sailors, soldiers and pilots would be allowed to venture away from our shores during the conflict. But those of us who were older had to put our passports away and sigh in vain for spring in Transjordan, for plates of tamales in Monterrey and for the dazzling sea of Hollywood at night, seen from Beverly Hills. We settled down to several years of geographical cramp.

For a little time we forgot Mr. Cole Porter and we played our national songs instead: *The Yeoman of England* and *The Bonnie Banks of Loch Lomond*. Our sea-girt isle became a reality and no longer an

echo in a song. Farmers polished their guns and remembered that we had beaten off invaders since the days of the Danes. Olive oil no longer came from Lucca and oranges were ghosts. A night club hoyden who had been given a banana by a ferry pilot appeared in a restaurant with it tied about her neck. Sardines no longer arrived from Norway, nor cheese from Holland. We ate our last Bismarck herrings, calling them Hitler herrings because their mouths were always open and their brains removed. I think it was the first war joke. Our food became dull. We dug our own earth, like peasants, and we ate what it gave back to us. When an actress in a play mentioned that she had eaten two eggs for breakfast, the line had to be cut because everybody in the audience laughed so much.

HECTOR BOLITHO is one of the most widely-read English biographers. Among his books are *Marie Tempest*, *Albert the Good* and *Victoria the Widow and Her Son*. He has also written three novels. Mr. Bolitho is at present serving with the RAF Voluntary Reserve, with the rank of Squadron Leader, and is assigned as public relations officer in the Air Ministry.