



KOREA and the Middle-East are thousands of miles apart. Yet, there are elements in these areas of collision between Communist Russia and the West, that are similar in cause and effect and are thus valuable in the formulation of a foreign policy, in the best interest of the United States. The Yalu and the Suez Canal were crucial objectives that were not attained. The

action was broken off under UN pressure. The armed collision, the crises and political intrigues are directly chargeable to the Russians, as part of their global plan to embarrass, humiliate, weaken and in the end destroy the West. The United Nations played a baffling role in both areas, disastrous in effect, though on an ostensible level of high moral intentions.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Major General Charles A. Willoughby

The United States formulated a "Middle East Doctrine" that spells possible intervention of United States troops, under certain Communist provocations, exactly as in Korea.

A careful analysis of the situation, along geo-political and strategic lines, however, marks the Middle-East paradoxically as a promising area where the West can still make a stand—even after having thrown away a sure-fire opportunity to win in Korea. The key lies in the impact of "relative military distances" and the capacity of the Soviet "mass" to operate.

The super-Parliament of our Century, the UN, is loaded with "Peoples' Democracies" and the voting structure was carefully calculated by Alger Hiss. Under certain circumstances, the United States can be, has been and again will be outvoted. The late Senator Vandenberg, who practically cast the deciding vote that "put over" the United Nations in Congress, should have known better. He had plenty of experience with Congress-

sional "log rolling" and the slow but effective evolution of our own Pan-American Union should have been a model and a warning.

SENATOR Knowland, who carries the mantle of Taft with dignity and energy, is troubled about the United Nations. He has also arrived at a conclusion: "On the basis of its record to date, no free nation dares risk its security on the UN ability to function effectively." He lists certain inherent deficiencies: "the double standard of international morality; the repeated abuse of the veto power by the Russians;

The author, a military analyst and expert, discusses the present and future problems of the United States in a critical area. Major General Willoughby, U.S.A. Retired, was MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, 1939-1951. He is the editor of the Foreign Intelligence Digest, the author of several books, a lecturer, publisher and contributor to various magazines.

the increasing trend to racial bloc-voting under the aegis of India; interference in internal matters of sovereign states; and failure of the 80 members to pay their share of UN costs." He fears that the foreign policy of the United States may become "the tail to a United Nations kite."

Knowland is ably seconded by a thoroughly qualified British observer, Lord Cherwell, one of Churchill's wartime assistants. His Lordship dwells on the voting mechanism of the United Nations, the equalization of nations regardless of cultural attainments or population density. He says: "Barely five percent of the World's population can carry the day against the other 95 percent and ten percent could claim two-thirds majority in the Assembly. Half the population of the World is represented by four Delegates and the other half by 75 Delegates."

As far as the United States is concerned, the crafty, typically oriental manipulation of racial "blocs" may (and will) outvote this country. The Assembly has 78 members, at the moment; a two-thirds majority then requires 52 votes. Between the 21 inter-American States, the Western European and the British group (20), we could possibly muster 41 votes which is 11 votes short of a majority, on any issue of vital importance to the West.

The Russians are already on record with as bald a diplomatic

threat as known in modern history. They threatened the use of Atomic rockets. The Washington doctrine is less bellicose in language but it does envisage the "use of troops." What troops? The United Nations troops or the ubiquitous American draftee? What is the record of the United Nations?

It was established in an analogous situation, in Korea. The last week of November 1950 is highly suggestive: Walker's 9 Divisions pulled back to avoid the encirclement by 33 fresh Chinese Divisions. In this action we must recall the macabre statistics in dead, wounded or missing, 11,964 Americans, exclusive of Republic of Korea forces. There were only 1,011 other United Nations casualties, a ratio of ten to one. This is no index, of course, of relative gallantry but merely reflects the small percentage of forces furnished by the United Nations. What will they furnish in the Middle East when the chips are down?

WE UNDERSTAND, perfectly, that the Washington Doctrine was tailored to fit the Baghdad Pact nations rather than the entire Middle-East; they are adjacent to the Russian border and immediately under the Soviet guns. If the "Doctrine" also advocated peace, it would be an acceptable moral thesis. Unfortunately, although it may fervently wish for peace, it is also geared for war—it calls for the em-

ployment of troops in case of Communist intervention, overt or covert.

This being the case, the Middle East must be viewed as a predominantly military problem rather than an economic or political one and certain strategic factors, mainly on the Russian side, enter the scene and are expected to dominate it for some time to come. Paradoxically, the same factors tend to form a pattern that can become the basis for effective American policy in the critical area. The general situation has some of the characteristics of the late Korean war before the Chinese massive entry except that Russia cannot draw on such powerful stooges in the Middle-East. This area thus has certain characteristics that are in favor of the Western or United States operations—*not as good as in Korea but still better than a collision along the present German border*. The "Doctrine" suddenly has the feeling of teeth in it: the last chance to accept the Soviet challenge on fairly equal terms.

The mass of Russian Infantry Divisions, not counting the Satellites, is concentrated in East Germany, Poland and Eastern Russia. There are at least 45 Divisions immediately available. Distances by rail, truck or marching are within a 500-mile range. Communications are relatively easy and effective air cover is always available. This is the area of deadly menace in the

light of what has happened in Hungary. *Considering the weakness of NATO, the United States cannot afford to accept the Russian challenge in this locality.*

On the Southern front—Greece-Turkey-Iran—at least 40 Russian Divisions are immediately available. Distances by rail, truck or marching are within a 2000-mile range.

This area is less dangerous than the East German front. Roads and communications via Iraq and the Persian Gulf are limited and cannot handle more than six or eight Divisions.

The Korean front was from 10,000 to 12,000 miles from the center of Russian power. This enormous distance was accentuated by the limited capacity of the Trans-Baikal Railroad. In Siberia, the Russians currently maintain 33 Divisions, wholly dependent on supplies from central Russia. *This was the place where the Russian challenge should have been accepted. Due to UN meddling, the United States threw away the chance to fight under highly advantageous conditions.*

THE RED MENACE increases as military distance to the objective decreases. Under this criterion, from our stand point, the Korean area was ideal; the Middle-East is still practicable; the East German front is hopeless with 100 to 175 Red Divisions confronting

NATO's 20 to 25 Divisions. These considerations mark the "Eisenhower Doctrine" for the Middle-East a feasible military project. It is predicated on a "limited, brush-fire operation."

It is prudent, however, to examine its impact in case of a general war or an attempt by the Russians to "limit" it to the Middle-East through the classical subterfuge of a "Peoples' Volunteers" maneuver, through staged Communist uprisings in either Syria, Kurdish-Iraqi minorities or the perennially smouldering rebellion of Azerbaijan.

The "mass" of Russian-Satellite Divisions is in the area adjacent to the Russia-Polish border and in Communist East-Germany. The relative distances from East-Germany to NATO military bases and garrisons is 500 to 1,000 miles. From Russian Western Border via Iran to the Persian Gulf is 1,000 to 2,000 miles; and from Central Russia to Siberia and North-Korea is 10,000 to 12,000 miles. It can therefore be concluded that the Red menace increases as "military distance" to objectives decreases.

The Soviets should have been challenged in North-Korea. Their military base in Siberia was isolated, linked to European Russia by a highly vulnerable railroad only. They are still at a disadvantage in *the Middle East*. Thus the Middle East offers a last chance to meet the Russians while still vulnerable.

The general Plans of the Soviet War Ministry are fairly well known, in many channels. General Staff studies are neither secret, exclusive nor copy-right. Armies move along certain lines dictated by armaments, supplies and logistics—road and railnets.

THE Russian war-plans, for the Middle-East, comprise coordinated movements and operations along the front—Rumania-Greece-Turkey-Iran. The operations are probably consecutive in the order: (1) Greece and the Straits area (2) Conquest of Turkey, by combined attacks from the Straits and the Black Sea. (3) Penetration of Northern Iran and Iraq with a thrust into Syria.

These areas are all in the "Baghdad Pact" front. Long after the "Doctrine" passed Congress, the coincidence of the Bermuda conversations disclosed the entry of the United States, into the "military commitments" of the Pact, *the real motivation of the Doctrine.*

This should mean general war but the Russians may attempt to "localize" the conflict, in their fairly successful "one-bite-at-a-time" maneuvers. A general war includes a Russian offensive in Western Europe. Except for the dismal prospect of an Atomic holocaust, there is nothing there, at present under NATO, to really keep out the Russians. There are only 19½ divisions along the West Front—the Den-

mark Switzerland line. The West may therefore compromise and wish to "limit" the war also. If the Russians, following the pattern of the Spanish Civil War, succeed in still further "limitation" as in the Azerbaijan-Syria Corridor, the West may acquiesce though still applying in Middle East "Doctrine."

There is a very good chance to fight in this area under conditions similar to North Korea. Air operations may become decisive in the end, but they cannot take or hold ground objectives and they have only been able to delay but not prevent Army movements. In Korea, in 1951, the Red Chinese moved 75 Divisions by marching from Manchuria to the Seoul lines, a distance of 500 miles.

Looking South from Moscow, focal point of Russian power, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey and Iran are within flight radii of 1,000 miles—an easy flight for modern, four-engine bombers or cargo planes. The 2,000 mile radii blanket all of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf oil centers, Kuwait, Dharan, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean approaches thereto. Thus, Russia can supply her Mid-Eastern stooges by air and render useless all American airbases and auxiliary fields in the Middle-East. The air potential is thus favorable for the Russians. Land operations, however, are distinctly unfavorable, especially in a "limited, brush-fire war," of the Korean type.

IT MAY BE argued that these are mere speculations. Every move we make in the cold war is predicated on "speculative estimates of what the Soviets may or may not do". The military staffs and diplomatic chancelleries of the world play that game continuously. The possibility of errors of judgment is always there but a resignation to a policy of drift, to move the chessmen as the Reds dictate, is supine.

With the recent announcement of closer ties with the Baghdad Pact—one of the probable results of the Bermuda Conferences—the burden of support and/or intervention will fall on the United States as it did in Korea.

The United Nations may mobilize "world opinion" but it certainly cannot mobilize "Armies". It cannot bully Russia. Against the background of our Korean experience and the realities of Russian capabilities in the Middle East and Western Europe, certain summations are inescapable, though there is a great temptation to ignore them:

The Yalu and the Suez represented crucial objectives that failed of attainment under UN pressures.

Both areas were under direct Russian influence and were objectives of Communist global planning.

The splitting of the Middle East into two camps, follows the standard pattern of Communist subversion and civil war that began in

Spain, in 1936, and has since been attempted in Greece, Indo-China and Korea.

The inexorable march of events have placed decisive importance on the Baghdad Pact nations, with emphasis on Iraq and Iran. The demonstrable military efficiency of Israel will ultimately become a factor. Efforts must be made to estab-

lish a *modus vivendi* between these stabilizing forces.

The implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine will bring it into covert and overt collision with Russia. The U. S. must be prepared to draw a sharper line of demarcation between friend and foe. Economic and military measures must conform to that line of demarcation.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article was written on February 1st. Events sometimes outrun literary analysis—but not in this case. The long-range problems have remained static.

From the broader viewpoint of American liabilities, our gradual sinking into international quicksand, brings into nostalgic relief the classical policy of the United States, as defined by John Quincy Adams, sixth President of the United States. America became great in pursuing that policy. It is at once a diagnosis and a remedy:

“... America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice and the benignant sympathy of her example.

She well knows that by enlisting under any other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all wars of intrigue and interests, of individual avarice, envy and ambition—which assume the color and usurp the standards of freedom. . . .”



Now Hear This— Now Hear This the birth of the public address system



by **LEW SCARR**

A TEAM of presidential advisers stood high atop vast Balboa Stadium in San Diego and looked pessimistically out at the empty bowl where President Woodrow Wilson was to deliver an address a few days later.

No, they agreed, no, it would be impossible for Mr. Wilson to speak before such a large crowd and outside, too. His voice would never carry. Impossible!

But local sponsors of the event explained that they anticipated a crowd of at least 50,000 persons.

"There is no indoor facility in the world that could hold such a mob," said G. Aubrey Davidson, arrangements chairman. "Our largest movie theater here will hold only about 2,000 persons. Too many would be turned away there."

All the President's aides could say was, "We're sorry."

But Davidson had to live with the San Diegans—those who would hear the President and those who would be denied and disappointed. Then he remembered a recent news item describing how Vice President Thomas R. Marshall had addressed a large crowd in a Washington, D.C., church with the aid of a gadget called a loud speaker.

Why not use the device to carry the voice outside as well? But how successful was the Marshall experiment? The news dispatch had made no mention of the degree of clarity or timbre with which the Vice President's remarks had come through.

A telephone call to Marshall settled that. Yes, the amplified speech