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NIXON

the man and his politics

by Ralph de Toledano

A series of extraordinary planning sessions were held last April at No. 3 Vocelova Street in Prague. Behind the facade of the International Union of Students, a general staff of political activists began drafting the directives and writing the slogans to be used against Vice President Richard Nixon during his trip to Latin America. Propaganda broadcasters from the Communist world, beaming their Spanish-language programs 102 hours a week, began spewing an incendiary line.

In Mexico City, Lima, and Caracas, orders were issued to men trained in riot and insurrection. Communist-led unions of the dwindling Confederation of Latin-American Workers were given their marching orders. Communist

Party members—85,000 in Argentina, 5,000 in Bolivia, and 80,000 in Venezuela—were assigned their roles. Fellow-traveling organizations were instructed to begin beating the drums of hatred.

The Communist strategy was, as always, a complex one. The Kremlin hoped to convince the world that the United States was hated in Latin America. It also wanted to humiliate in public the second highest elected official of this country. And it frankly hoped that the frenzy of the mobs would get so out of hand that a serious, and perhaps successful, attempt on Nixon's life would be sparked. For the Communists realize that the Vice President is the one important public figure in America who remains intransigently anti-Communist and suspicious of the current Soviet blandishments for "peaceful coexistence."

The strategy almost succeeded. In Lima, the Nixon motorcade was stopped by the mob several blocks from the Bolivar Hotel. The Vice President jumped out of his car and forced his way through the jeering, spitting crowd of "students." In Bogota, there were organized cries of "muerte"-death-when Nixon arrived. At the Caracas airport, there were four to five hundred rioters, led (one reporter remarked) by the "usual bunch of garden variety thugs." A detachment of troops with fixed bayonets melted away, compelling the Vice President, Pat Nixon and a handful of U.S. Secret Service men to fight their own way to the waiting cars as the mob screamed and spit and threw stones.

Afterward, Earl Mazo of the New York Herald Tribune said to a friend: "The more dangerous the situation, the cooler the Vice President became—and so did Pat. I wouldn't mind having Nixon for a battalion commander."

The Latin American riots, however, were only the physical and violent manifestations of a campaign aimed at Nixon which began when he forced the prosecution of Alger Hiss. That campaign took many forms: in the brilliantly executed but conscienceless drawings of Herblock, the Washington Post cartoonist; in the repeated

statements that he was a "slick politician" and an "opportunist"; in the cry that he has no principles; in the armchair analyses by magazine writers who have never met him but insist that he is "cold" and "not human"; and latterly in the more subtle talk about an "old" and a "new" Nixon.

That, in his 12 years in public life, he has spoken millions of words, carefully elucidating his political and economic position, does not bother the creators of the Nixon myth. That he has taken positions highly unpopular to substantial segments of the general population and his party is also of no concern. That those who most loudly decry his alleged "excesses" are themselves expert practitioners of demogogy—Truman called President Eisenhower a "Nazi"—seems hardly to matter.

T ANY OTHER PERIOD IN American $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}$ history, an observer could take a detached view of this piecemeal assassination of a political figure. Men rise and fall in the councils of government and history moves on. But at this time, when the cold war can convert minor errors into major tragedies, it is of serious consequence. When Richard Wilson, presumably a friendly witness, outlines the qualities of the "new" Nixon Look magazine—and lists among the attitudes, policies, and actions of the "changed" Vice President the same things which made

Nixon outstanding a decade earlier—the time for comedy has ended.

Whether or not the new/old Nixon espouses policies which this group or that may find misguided is not the point. A Southern segregationist may take umbrage at the Vice President's position on civil rights, a Northern liberal may shudder at his economic views; this is legitimate. But it is a far cry from such charges as that made by James A. Wechsler, editor of the liberal New York Post, that Richard Nixon has switched on foreign policy in the last years.

For the sake of the record, then, it is important to answer some questions about Nixon which much of the press and the high-priced commentators have done their best to avoid by misrepresentation: What kind of man is Richard Nixon? Where does he stand on the important issues of the day? Why do hostile writers concede that he has one of the keenest political minds of the day, that he is probably the best-informed man in Washington—and then go on to use these attributes as if they were somehow shameful?

To understand the man Nixon and the policies he espouses it is necessary first to set him in the context of his early life and his family background. It is of prime importance to remember that Richard Milhous Nixon was born and raised a Quaker in a small Quaker community in California. He learned to

play poker in the Navy and he will take a drink before dinner—but he has never outgrown that paradoxical combination of conscience and practicality which is his birthright. His early years were also marked by the experience of grinding economic pressure which will forever remain academic to an Adlai Stevenson, a Nelson Rockefeller, or a John Kennedy. In March, 1958, when he said to this writer, "I think I ought to speak out on the recession; you see, I know what it means to be poor," he was reflecting the impact on his thinking of his Quaker conscience and his early struggles.

The feature writers have made much of the fact that Nixon took on responsibilities far beyond his years when he was a boy, that he arose at 5:00 A.M. in order to do the marketing for the family store, that he clerked for his mother and father when he was a boy, and that with all these burdens he consistently remained at the top of his class. They are aware that he worked his way through college and law school, that he found time to be a leader in student activities and to win elective office as class president both in high school and in college. They note somewhat dubiously that he was a "serious" boy-but fail to explain that seriousness is not merely an oddball trait but is a handicap in the rough-and-tumble of undergraduate politics. Alger Hiss, too, had a

notable campus career, but his former classmates discuss him with an edge of ridicule to their voices, and his class elected him the "best handshaker." Nixon's appeal was not through handshaking or backslapping but in his interest in the problems of his fellow students. Recently Stewart Alsop wrote with some wonder that Nixon listens as much as he speaks—a quality rare in the babble of Washington.

The picture of the student Nixon was best drawn by his faculty adviser at Whittier College, who wrote in the Spring of 1934 of his "rich sense of humor, human understanding, personal eloquence, and a marked ability to lead. If he has any handicap, it is his lack of sophistication." Walter F. Dexter, president of Whittier, in a letter of introduction to the Dean of Duke Law School which Nixon attended, went far beyond this. "I believe that he will become one of America's important, if not great leaders," he said.

That lack of sophistication began to wear off at Duke, from which Nixon graduated with honors, in his law work at Whittier where he began to glimpse the seamier side of human existence, in Washington where he got a close look at government bureaucracy in the OPA, and in service in the South Pacific as a Navy officer. But it did not entirely disappear, and it still crops up as it did recently in his startled bufflement when a New York

Times correspondent hid behind anonymity to criticize him sharply in a *Pageant* magazine piece.

That lack of worldly wisdom had a part in launching him on his political career. A more sophisticated man would have refused the Republican nomination for Congress in California's Twelfth District when it was offered to him in 1946, for it had been one of the few California districts which consistently went Democratic. Nixon had no money except what he and Pat had saved during the war years and the Republican organization dropped him when it seemed apparent that the five-term incumbent, Representative Jerry Voorhis, would be the hands down winner. Governor Earl Warren had little interest in seeing a young conservative win. When Harold Stassen, who had known Nixon in the Navy, offered to go into Twelfth District to aid the campaign, Warren vetoed the plan. Both Stassen and Warren had their eyes on the 1948 Presidential nomination—and Warren had no desire to see a rival make hay in the California sunshine.

NIXON TURNED the tables on Voorhis by challenging him to a series of debates in which he pressed the incumbent on three points. Voorhis was a "funny money" exponent and a supporter of Upton Sinclair's zany socialism; he had concededly done little in Con-

gress and less for his district; was so far out of contact with his constituents that he continued to support war-enacted controls on meat and other commodities at a time when the American housewife was sick unto death of rationing. When the votes were counted, Nixon had defeated Voorhis by 15,000. In 1948, he swept both the Democratic and Republican primaries. In 1950, when he ran for the Senate, Nixon received the biggest plurality of any candidate running for that august body in that year—682,000 votes.

A vast mythology has been created around the 1946 and 1950 campaigns by Richard Nixon's opponents. (Those interested in a detailed account can find it in my book, Nixon, published in 1956.) That the charges of what Nixon supposedly did or said then can be thoroughly demolished by an examination of the record, however, does no stop those who continue to repeat them. They are, moreover, academic at this time. But since they are still periodically reiterated, at least some comment on them is pertinent.

THE ATTACK ON Nixon's behavior is focussed on the accusation that he called Voorhis in 1946 and Representative—Helen—Gahagan Douglas, his opponent in the 1950 senatorial race, "Communists." The facts, however, are very clear. In the 1946 election, as a reading of Voorhis's own extended account of

the campaign shows, Communism was not an issue. Voorhis himself ends that account with the statement that he and Nixon parted "as personal friends." And he expressed the belief that Nixon would be a "conscientious" congressman. Voorhis wrote of the campaign in 1947—and in anticipation gave the lie to all the horrendous stories which were later to be invented and accepted as articles of faith by the liberals.

The 1950 campaign was more complex—and more interesting. Mrs. Douglas had a substantial and long-established record of Communist-front affiliations. She had consistently opposed the Truman Administration's efforts to block the spread of Communism in Europe, voting against Democratic measures for Greek and Turkish aid and against Selective Service. She had been an ardent supporter of Henry Wallace. And as late as 1946, she had attacked the "antagonism" of the United States to what she characterized as the "new democratic and anti-fascist governments" behind the Iron Curtain. But she believed that an attack is the best defense—so she had launched her campaign, during the tensions of the Korean war—which broke out at the beginning of that election summer—by accusing Nixon of voting with pro-Communist Representative Vito Marcantonio against aid to Korea. This was sheer misrepresentation. Nixon had voted to recommit a 1949 Korean aid bill because it did not include funds for Nationalist China. When it was amended, he gave it his vote. Marcantonio, of course, did not. Fully aware of the trickery in this charge, the Nixon forces countered with an analysis of the Helen Douglas voting record: 354 times on the side of Marcantonio and frequently in opposition to the majority of her own party.

Mrs. Douglas's activities were all there, in the cold print of the Congressional Record. Her answer was the whispering campaign. (Years later, this writer appeared on the Tex & Jinx radio show to discuss the Nixon-Douglas campaign and Richard Nixon's record in general. Mrs. Douglas phoned in angrily to protest what I had been saying. When Tex McCrary offered her unlimited time on the air to rebut what had been said, she refused to appear.)

Until 1952, when Nixon received the Republican Vice Presidential nomination, the bulk of anti-Nixon propaganda was related to his role in putting Alger Hiss, the spy-perjurer, behind bars. The myth of the 1946-50 campaigns was codified in that year in two articles for the New Republic—as fine a collection of vituperative fiction as that magazine has ever published. Since then, every anti-Nixon writer has borrowed almost verbatim from that series, without bothering to check or verify.

In 1952, moreover, something new was added. The sensationalizing New York Post, having failed in its attempts to prove that Nixon was allied to the Devil, tried to prove that he was a crook. But its headlines about an \$18,000 "secret" fund (so secret, incidentally, that contributions had been solicited in a form letter which went to hundreds of Californians) to pay for certain of Nixon's political expenses, backfired when Nixon took to TV and in a speech, which admittedly lacked sophistication, not only answered the charges to the satisfaction of the country but made himself a major factor in the campaign. The *Post* muttered darkly of what Nixon's income tax returns would show—but these innuendoes were never retracted when Look magazine filled several of its pages with photographs of these documents. (During that campaign, charges were made that Governor Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic Presidential aspirant, had a fund of \$100,000 contributed by contractors doing business with the State of Illinois; Stevenson refused to comment on them and the New York Post disregarded that story.)

The "fund" story, however, opened the floodgates. From that moment on, as at least one Democratic spokesman would gloat, it was "open season" on Richard Nixon, with no regard for the facts. In subsequent political con-

tests, Senator Wayne Morse's campaign literature accused the Vice President of being "anti-Semitic" and "anti-Negro." Stevenson accused him of "slyness, slickness, and slander." Harry S. Truman stated categorically that Nixon "voted wrong every time"-a sad commentary on the ex-President, since Nixon voted for a substantial number of Truman's foreign policy proposals. This was taken up by Mayor Robert Wagner of New York who said that Nixon had "voted for every reactionary measure and voted against every progressive measure." George Leader, then governor of Pennsylvania, suggested that Nixon be sent to Alcatraz. Senator Estes Kefauver, who defended Jim Crow and voted against anti-lynching legislation, charged Nixon with a "magnificent disregard of the Bill of Rights."

SATURATION bombing of ▲ Nixon has been part of a deliberate strategy by the Democrats, and by his other political enemies. It has been carefully planned. Richard Nixon has painstakingly answered the charges and has demonstrated by the consistency of his public and private record that opportunism has played no part in his political life. His position on the major issues of the day may not always please the Left, the Right, or the Center—but he always has acted in the context of his principles and has stated them cogently. The answer to the glib accusation that he "has no principles" is implicit in the stands he has taken. There have, of course, been occasions when as spokesman for the Eisenhower Administration he has been required to submerge his own views and to defend certain policies which he would not have inaugurated, but in every such case he has always made it clear that, if he is in disagreement, he nevertheless is unwavering in his dedication to the correct performance of his duties.

His philosophy of government and of economics, though it has matured over the years, has remained consistent. Like all sound conservatives, he believes that he who governs least governs best. But he is also aware that in a complex industrial society, tugged hauled by concentrations of economic power—both business and labor—the government from time to time must intervene. The cold war, with the vast expenditures for defense which it entails, has also imposed restraints on the free play of social forces which would be his ideal. There are, moreover, areas in which the human factor must override the ideological.

For example, Nixon feels deeply that the government must do what it can to minimize the privations and hardships of the unemployed even if it means some intrusion of the Federal authority in the affairs of the states. This he considers a matter of simple humanity. But he

has always argued that the real answer to unemployment is not merely to feed the unemployed. He has therefore advocated a revision of the tax structure, which would then cease to stifle the productive use of money and to hamper the economic expansion which makes for jobs rather than doles.

In March 1958, when the "conservative" Treasury Secretary, Robert Anderson, was calling for tremendous expenditures in public works as a means of battling that recession, Nixon took strong issue with a program which would have meant, in his words, "WPA, PWA, and what have you." To block such a program of massive public works, Nixon broke the Administration's "team" front to call attention to the experiences of the Roosevelt Administration in 1933-40. "After years of emphasis primarily on government spending rather than on encouraging private enterprise," Nixon warned, "there were still ten million unemployed in the early months of 1940." Nixon fought for a tax cut—"one that will put money in the hands of consumers and purchasers but will also put more money in the hands of investors and job creators."

This position was an odd one to take for a man considered opportunistic. It ran counter to the opinions of the liberals who control mass communications, of the labor unions, and of presidential aide, Sherman Adams, who was then highly potent at the White House. But Nixon pressed it hard—and saved the American taxpayer billions of dollars for boondoggle Post Offices. Nixon believes—as he did during the Quemoy and Matsu crisis when the newspapers were crying for a retreat there—that a leader must sometimes take unpopular stands. Recently, he told a group of friends:

"It's the function of a responsible leader to lead public opinion—not just to follow it. It's a leader's job to get all the facts and then make his decision. Once he has made a decision he believes is right, he must develop support for it among the people by explaining the facts to them. If he fails to win support, then he must be prepared to take

the consequences."

THIS IS NOT A NEW policy for him. ▲ When he was a freshman congressman on the Herter Committee he saw at first hand the need for foreign aid to block the Communist postwar advance. His district, however, was dead set against the aid program. Nixon helped write the legislation, voted for it, and then stumped his district from one end to the other, explaining the reasons for what he had done, and won over popular support. He is applying that same principle today on a far broader scale, involving his theory of government and its functions. For instance, as a student and advocate of the Hoover Com-

mission's recommendations, he feels that the government must get out of private business and that it must divorce itself from all activities which can better be done by the people themselves. He knows, however, that the Federal "handout" has become almost a tradition in the past 26 years, with farmers and businessmen turning increasingly to Washington for help. But in public speeches and in private conversations, Nixon has made it clear that he intends to stick by his guns, to hold the line against a full-scale welfare state.

Richard Nixon's stand on civil rights has caused considerable controversy among both his friends and his enemies. Northern Democratic liberals, who can find nothing in his record to smear, end up by impugning his motives. "He's doing it to get the Negro vote," they sneer. Some Republicans feel that he is jeopardizing chances for a reestablishment of the GOP-Southern Democratic coalition in Congress. The Vice President has worked for strong civil rights legislation for a variety of reasons, all deeply ingrained. His Quaker upbringing bred into him a visceral repugnance for Jim Crowism and anti-Semitism—and this he demonstrated long before he went into politics. (Though he was made an honorary member of the NAACP in 1946, he never tried to trade on this when campaigning in cities with large Negro votes and the fact

became generally known only when a Southern Democrat attempted to make political capital of the fact during the 1956 election.)

N IXON HOLDS the simple faith that it is wrong in general to push people around and particularly wrong to do it because of their color or religion. His legal training was in Constitutional law, so that he is not prone to forget that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the states to "make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," and that the Fifteenth Amendment guarantees that the right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

That these amendments have been a dead letter in many parts of the country is hardly a secret to him, and he knows that any argument justifying this violation of the Constitution is nothing more than sophistry. So, too, he feels are discussions over the legal phraseology of the Warren Court's Brown vs. Board of Education decision which ended school segregation. Another factor in the Negro question also concerns Nixon. As Vice President he has covered a substantial portion of the world's surface—talking to political leaders and the man in the street. He knows how deeply damaging to U.S. prestige abroad—and how unnecessarily so—are the manifestations of race hatred which persist in this country.

That the vice president favors foreign military and economic aid and a strengthened information program is hardly a secret. (The Voice of America is substantially the child of his Republican col-Karl league, Senator Mundt.) Where he differs from the Democratic opposition is in the conviction that its success must be measured by the job done by these programs rather than by the amount of money spent. He is troubled, for example, when Congress balks at increasing allowances for U.S. representatives abroad to give them a chance to approach their counterparts on a social basis, then blithely approves millions for an unnecessary and unwanted dam in Southeast Asia.

Where the Vice President differs with other proponents of foreign aid is over the duration of the program. He is convinced that it would be wiser policy and sounder business to see private enterprise enter into the field through investments in the so-called underdeveloped areas. Such investment, he feels, is in the national interest and should be recognized in this context. Venture capital, he says, should be offered inducements in the form of substantial tax benefits. Enlightened self-

Of the information program, Nixon has much to say that is encouraging, much that is critical. Given the Soviet propaganda onslaught, the United States cannot pull out of the field. But he sees no point in centering our efforts on those areas of Europe which are adequately covered by the wire services. Expensive installations in Paris, London, and Rome are fine for those who man them—but it is in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that a clear and objective account of

American policy must be disseminated. Incidentally, he applies the

same reasoning to our Foreign

Service which sends its best men

into Europe and relegates the less

efficient to those countries which

need the most attention and under-

standing.

interest suggests that he is right.

T I IS ON THE ISSUE of Communism, ■ both foreign and domestic, that Nixon draws the most fire. His role in the Hiss case, and his insistence on getting to the bottom of the contradictions between Hiss's and Chambers's testimony, are well known. That he blocked an attempt by elements within the Truman Justice Department to indict Chambers instead of Hiss is less known. What is not known at all is that over the years he has resisted incredible pressures to whitewash I. Robert Oppenheimer or to extend the hand of friendship to such people as Dr. Edward U. Condon, de-

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scribed by one congressional committee as the "weakest link" in our atomic security. And he has resisted the efforts of some who have advised him to get the academic community off his back by subscribing to the late Senator Robert A. Taft's defense of universities which allow Communists to remain on their teaching staffs. As a member of the Eisenhower "team," Nixon has been constrained to play down the domestic Communist issue—but that does not mean that he has forgotten it, as any one of his intimates will attest.

Resistance to the Soviet threat whether it be in Greece, Iran, Korea, Lebanon, or Berlin—has always been the keystone of Nixon's foreign policy. As Vice President, he has been part of a small but effective group which has fought against appeasement—the polite term nowadays for it is "flexibility"-toward the Soviet Union and recognition of Red China. At meetings of the National Security Council, he has stood side by side with Secretary of State Dulles in the debates over Soviet moves. He believes that the Russians are neither as strong as some say nor as weak as others hope and that much of what they do or say is part of a propaganda war which has no direct relation to their strength or weakness. "The Soviet leadership is tough and dedicated," he said recently to a friend, "but it wins its biggest victory because we remain on the defensive

instead of taking the diplomatic offensive. If Russia were as strong as she claims she is, the Communists would have attacked us long ago. Our best strategy is to bore in, to keep the Soviet leaders off balance, and to joggle their propaganda arm.*

When the first Soviet sput-niks went up, the Vice President called for increased efforts on the part of our military to meet the challenge. The Democratic Digest, which seldom scruples to rewrite history, accused him of "20-20 hindsight" and asked, "Where was the Republican 'Paul Revere' back in the years from 1953 to 1957?" The answer was on the record—going back to 1950. On May 6 of that year, Nixon warned: "There is ample evidence that Soviet Russia is directing a great percentage of its resources toward the development of new, modern weapons of wartare . . . We cannot, in the interest of security, afford to lag behind (them) in weapon research and development." That same year, a Democratic Administration was spending a grand total of \$21 million on procurement and production of guided missiles—as compared with the \$2.8 billion spent last year in an effort to catch up with the lead the Soviet achieved between 1946 and 1953 when the United States was doing almost nothing in that field of weaponry. But the answer to the Soviet

threat is not merely a strong foreign policy, Nixon says, not merely a balanced military and economic program abroad, not merely in keeping our industrial plant humming. "We must develop a greater will to resist, and a richer faith in the principles and traditions of American life. The spirit which pulled an ill-prepared and divided country through the last war must be rekindled to win us victory in the cold war."

To this end, he puts in the longest work day of any man in official Washington, His sole Constitutional duty is to preside over the Senate. But under President Eisenhower, he has participated actively in the business of the Executive branch, sitting in at all meetings of the Cabinet and the National Security Council (taking the chair in Mr. Eisenhower's absence). During the several emergencies of President Eisenhower's illnesses and consistently since the departure of Sherman Adams, he has also been a kind of assistant president. On Capitol Hill, he has worked closely with senators and congressmen to swing the votes for legislation which he believes necessary. Since the 1958 campaign, moreover, he has assumed *de facto* leadership of the GOP, striving to heal the wounds inflicted by Adams and other "amateur" politicians who isolated the Republican National Committee from the state, county, and precinct chairmen, who form the backbone of the party. This would be time-consuming enough for any man, but Nixon has also been assigned the mission of representing the American point of view in the Far East, the Middle East, Austria, Latin America, and Great Britain.

As the preliminaries for the 1960 Presidential campaign begin, Richard Nixon will become the target of an attack matching in violence the outcries of the Latin American mobs. Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler has made it clear that he will leave no stone unturned—or unthrown—in his efforts to destroy the Vice President. But he may have a little difficulty matching his verbal slings and arrows with some words spoken on the floor of the Senate on Nixon's 43rd birthday, January 9, 1956:

"He is always courteous. He is always fair."

The speaker was Senator Lyndon Johnson, leader of the Democratic majority.

- Modern Evolution -

It was Junior's birthday and the mailman brought him a book as a present from Aunt Alice, "What is it?" he asked gloomily, "That's what they call a book, dear," his mother explained. "It's what they make a movie out of for television."

THE BERLIN CRISIS:

A ROOSEVELT-EISENHOWER LEGACY

by Gen. Charles A. Willoughby

THE AMERICAN PRESS has the best L foreign news coverage in the world, but the American public remains confused on international issues. The foreign correspondent may file an accurate story but the home office may "slant" it. The true "inside" story must come from bona-fide local sources. Fortunately, there are from behind the iron curtain vast groups of refugees or rather "expellees" who interpret Russian plans more accurately. They have been actual victims of Russian brutalities and, able to spot danger from afar, they are unmatched as a source of accurate Communist intelligence.

These "expellees" become highly organized political entities within their host country although they still hope to return to their homes now in the grip of Soviet satellites.

The group known as "Sudeten Germans," is composed of a bloc of nearly 3,000,000 who were brutally expelled from their homes in Czechoslovakia (the most ardent of Soviet satellites) after their people had lived there a thousand years.

Some of the Czech functionaries directly responsible for this outrage have found lucrative jobs with

"Radio Free Europe" and some UN agencies. The United States Congress intermittently has displayed some sympathetic interest in these people. Their organizational secretary, Dr. Walter Becher, M.D.L., toured America last year, a brilliant advocate of a lost cause. As the legitimate spokesman of his important "expellee" group, Dr. Becher's comments on the Berlin crisis and the Russian "ultimatum" have the obvious quality of inside information.

The Russian Ultimatum: "... the Soviet leaders have dropped the mask of coexistence and have made it clear that Communism is willing and determined to use force to achieve its aims. Encouraged by international apathy reacting to overt aggressions with impotent protests, as in the case of Hungary, Soviet Imperialism is now trying to bully Berlin (and West Germany) into submission. ..."

Khrushchev manipulates the Potsdam Agreements: "... Simultaneously with the Russian ultimatum (of evacuating West Berlin within six months) Khrushchev went on record in a news conference: "The Berlin situation is a