

Its ancient convention of royal burghs took on new life and usefulness. It developed a school of municipal administrators not second even to those of England since 1835. It developed the greatest centers of steel shipbuilding in the world. It often gave the Whigs and Liberals their majorities from 1832 to 1886. It provided the house of commons at least with one speaker. It developed one of the best newspaper presses in the English-speaking world; and not to lengthen the catalogue of achievements, Scotland between 1886 and 1914 gave Great Britain three premiers. The writer of this note is not a Scotsman; but he looks forward to the time when Scotland will be fairly regarded by English historians as of the British Empire.

E. P.

*Law and Order in Industry.* By JULIUS HENRY COHEN. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1916. Pp. xviii, 292.)

The agreement or "protocol" made in 1910 between the New York local unions of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union and the Cloak, Suit and Skirt Manufacturers' Protective Association has received a large amount of attention. Exhaustive studies of the working of the agreement and of the peculiar problems of the industry have been published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and numerous magazine articles have discussed the merits of the plan. Mr. Cohen's book adds to the literature of the subject a connected history of the agreement interspersed with many interesting digressions on the larger questions involved in the relations between organized labor and capital.

Mr. Cohen has been counsel for the manufacturers during the entire life of the agreement, and is intimately acquainted with the events of which he writes. He has not, however, added much to the available information concerning the protocol. The chief interest of the book to students of trade agreements will be found, therefore, in Mr. Cohen's argument in favor of judicial determination as a means of settling trade questions. As is well known, the protocol differs from nearly all other important trade agreements in providing for a standing arbitration board. Most students of the subject have regarded the board as a temporary device, necessary, perhaps, in view of the extraordinary conditions in the trade, but to be dispensed with at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Cohen on the contrary, believes that the standing board represents an important advance in the means of settling trade disputes. He argues that it is only by such a device that "moral issues" such as the right of discharge can be permanently disposed of.

GEORGE E. BARNETT.

*The Recognition Policy of the United States.* By JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. (New York: Columbia University. 1915. Pp. 228.)

Without showing marked evidence of original work, this volume presents the most elaborate discussion yet given of the policy of the United States with regard to the recognition of new states and of new governments—the recognition of belligerency is not treated.

Of the two chapters forming the first or introductory part of the book, the first outlines the accepted account of the development of the principle of legitimacy through its dynastic and monarchical stages to the point where in international law it develops into the principle of *de jure* government. The second chapter, in which the author, closely identifying recognition with the *de facto* theory, holds that "the recognition of governments is purely a formality" (p. 65), and that the recognition of states "is neither a right of the new state nor a free act on the part of the state which grants it" (p. 55) but is "inevitable" (p. 57), is a statement of modern German theory, as developed in particular by Jellinek. This chapter is, indeed, considerably marred by the forms of expression which are far more German than English. Such phrases as "the normative force which is contained in the purely factual" (p. 47) and "It is precisely this act which produces a legal community from the purely political *de facto*" (p. 58) are English translations of German rather than original English composition.

The second part treats of recognition in its application to this country during its establishment; in its application by us a little later to France, then to the revolted Spanish colonies, to Texas and to Hungary; in its application to a part of this country once more during our Civil War; and finally its application by us again since that war. With the exception of the civil war period, during which the author notes a reversion toward legitimacy, the principle of recognition of *de facto* authorities was slowly developed and finally established in our policy.

The fact cannot but be the occasion of surprise that the author does not in any way indicate indebtedness to F. L. Paxson's *Independence of South America: A Study in Recognition and Foreign Policy*. This book is listed in the author's extensive bibliography at the end, but no reference whatever is made to it. The three central chapters of the present book follow so closely the lines laid down by Dr. Paxson in his work from original materials, that if this work was familiar to the author, it is hardly conceivable that it was not of use to him.

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