

ments of the day. It is really not sufficient, and it serves only the most limited purpose, to contrive, as Miss Hotblack does, to make Chatham explain his conduct in his own words. It would be better, in addition, to attempt to value his views by resetting them in the arena of public debate from which they have been isolated. Had Miss Hotblack only cared to go further afield and to master, for example, the collections of pamphlets upon the Seven Years War alone, her study of Pitt's trading policy would have appeared less contracted. A few, even, of the eighty-odd pamphlets on the Canada-Guadaloupe controversy would have shown that in such a dispute the routine information of a government department does not compare for interest with the lively solicitude given the question in unofficial discussion. Also, more specifically, the same pamphlets would have explained the actual issue in the choice between Guadaloupe and Canada—an alternative which Miss Hotblack, relying too closely perhaps upon departmental letters, seems strangely to misinterpret; partly, it is to be feared, from a rather insecure understanding of the geography and economic exploitation of Canada before the cession. However, within the self-imposed limitations of this brief piece of research Miss Hotblack has sought out some very telling illustrative material, which elucidates Chatham's mercantilism, and throws the subject into clear outline.

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*The Origins of the Triple Alliance.* By ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. Pp. vi, 236.)

Although in Russia the Bolsheviki appear ready to open to all mankind the diplomatic *arcana* of the old régime, it will probably be many a day before Prussia, Austria, and Italy will allow historians free access to the secret records of their diplomatic history between 1866 and 1882. Until that day comes the historian must be content to catch at the clues in inspired newspaper articles, in hints, discreet and indiscreet, which statesmen drop in their reminiscences for the enlightenment or befogging of posterity, and in stories current in the legations and chancelleries of Europe. Professor Coolidge has caught with unusual success at all these clues available and has weighed their value with great acumen and common sense. He has wisely forborne to

burden the reader with long notes on controversial points, but he has given the clearest, simplest, and most convincing narrative in English, of the way in which Bismarck sought to make secure from without the new German Empire which he had founded.

Bismarck's chief source of anxiety immediately after the Franco-Prussian War was the possibility of French schemes of *revanche*. To protect Germany from this he skillfully pursued a tortuous policy which had as its successful purpose the diplomatic isolation of the new French Republic. In this he was aided by the so-called League of the Three Emperors—a combination of the same three great powers which had brought about the First Partition of Poland just one hundred years earlier. Later, in 1879, owing to justifiable Russian resentment over the outcome of the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck felt it necessary to insure the German Empire on her Eastern frontier also—hence the Dual Alliance with Austria. It is worth noting that when he went to Vienna in September, 1879, to negotiate with Andrassy, he pretended to wish that the treaty of alliance between the two Germanic empires should be a general treaty and should be made a part of the constitution of both states. Andrassy, however, refused both points: a general treaty might antagonize France, with whom Austria had no quarrel; and the inclusion of the treaty as a constitutional document would recall in a measure the German Confederation which had been ruptured by the War of 1866. So Bismarck yielded, and the Dual Alliance, as signed, looked primarily eastward: "Should one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires" (Art. I). If one were attacked by another power—by which Bismarck of course meant France—the other contracting party bound itself "to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude" (Art. II). In the Triple Alliance three years later there appears this same ominous phrase, "benevolent neutrality"—itself a contradiction in terms—the full significance of which was not apparent until August 2, 1914, when Germany demanded that Belgium maintain an attitude of "friendly neutrality" toward herself.

Aside from its clearness and interest, the book is noteworthy for its considerable attention to Russian and Balkan influences, for its evaluation of the personal influence of rulers and statesmen, and for its just estimate of Bismarck.

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*The Statesmanship of Wordsworth.* By A. V. DICEY. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1917. Pp. 134.)

England is fighting against German imperialism for the same reasons that she fought against French imperialism under Napoleon a hundred years ago. She may derive strength of purpose and confidence from the remembrance of the motives which urged her on and sustained her determination in former times. This was the originating idea of Professor Dicey's book. Wordsworth deserves to be known, not only as a poet, but as a thinker, and especially in that sphere of intellectual activity, so closely connected with the leading motive of his poetry, namely, the application of moral principles to the political and social laws which regulate the relations of citizens within the state, and to the international laws which ought to regulate the relations of nations in the world.

The first part of Professor Dicey's book deals with the influence of the French Revolution on the mind of the poet. Here the material is well known and Professor Dicey is content with stating again, with occasional illuminating remarks, what the historians of literature may consider as trite, but what has not yet reached the general public. On this subject one regrets that Professor Dicey quotes only Harper's recent biography of Wordsworth and does not mention Légouis's *Jeunesse de Wordsworth*, or Cestre's *La Révolution française et les poètes anglais*.

The second and more original part of the book treats of the "doctrine of nationality" as anticipated by Wordsworth in the *Sonnets Dedicated to Liberty* and in his prose work, *The Convention of Cintra*. It is here that one may truly speak of the "statesmanship" of the poet. Through the exercise of his moral and patriotic intuition, Wordsworth understood that one of the most valuable lessons of the French Revolution ought to be the principle of the independence of nations as moral and political units—a principle claimed by the French in 1792 and then violated by them under Napoleon. The vindication of this principle, without which there could be no lasting freedom for any country in Europe, was worth the most strenuous exertions and the most costly sacrifices on the part of England. England then led the crusade for civilization and for the future progress of the world. To-day she has the same reason to fight to the uttermost against German imperialism. Wordsworth deserves to be one of her guides. While setting forth the poet's prophetic insight into a great truth of interna-