

dominated his councils in Yedo. How else can the Exclusion Edict of June, 1863, be explained? It is beside the point to say that the Shogun was merely playing up to the sentiments of the emperor and did not intend that his instructions to expel the foreigners were to be taken seriously. Not all the "searchings of heart" on the question of expulsion went on in Kyoto. Yedo too had its lapses from strict adherence to the spirit of the treaties, as the edict in question demonstrates.

When this book reaches a second edition, it is to be hoped that the author will restate his generalizations where they are in error, will annotate his bibliography so as to indicate the relative merits of the secondary books mentioned, will moderate his unduly harsh anti-British tone, and remove some of the traces of his pro-Japanese bias, derived doubtless from the habit of relying too implicitly upon the writings of disguised Japanese propagandists.

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*The President's Control of Foreign Relations.* By EDWARD S. CORWIN, Ph.D. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1917.)

Professor Corwin's monograph on the President's power over the foreign relations will probably not need material revision or amendment hereafter. The controversies that have arisen between the executive and the legislative departments, so far as those relations have been concerned, cover practically all the points on which there can be dispute, and the results of former controversies are not likely to be reversed. If this were a general treatise on the powers of the President, what a change in it must by and by be made in a chapter on the President's invasion and capture of legislative powers, all of which the Constitution bestows on Congress!

In practically every contest in whatever field between the President and Congress, from the very beginning, the victory has rested with the President. Congress had ultimately to admit that it was wrong, even in the Tenure-of-Office Act with which it tied the hands of President Johnson. In all the matters of foreign relations both the right and the victory have been with the President. The language of the Constitution upon which successive Presidents have relied is sufficiently vague, but it gives no support to the contentions of Congress. Diplomacy and all the functions connected with diplomacy are surely executive and not legislative.

Professor Corwin cites the facts and the arguments employed on every point that has been in controversy in that branch of the government, and comments briefly and judiciously upon the result. It has been a continuous development. The expressly-conferred power to appoint ambassadors has come, not without strong congressional opposition, to carry with it an exclusive right to recognize or to refuse to recognize foreign governments the product of revolutions. The division of the treaty making power has repeatedly led to a claim from the senate that the right of initiative was also divided. And the reservation to Congress of the power to "declare" war has left to the President a gradually increasing power so to conduct the foreign relations as to render war inevitable, even to force a foreign government to declare war upon us.

On all these points, which here are merely outlined, the historical and documentary presentation of the facts leading to conclusions, by Professor Corwin, is full and satisfactory. What in other treatises on the diplomatic history is usually put in a single chapter, our author has given in full and logical detail.

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*The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson.* By EDGAR E. ROBINSON and VICTOR J. WEST. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1917. Pp. vi, 428.)

The authors frankly acknowledge that there has been much adverse criticism of President Wilson's foreign policy, especially the part dealing with Mexico and Germany; but they avow the belief that such criticism would disappear if the policy were fully understood. To promote such an understanding has been their purpose. The authors devote 159 pages to the interpretative development of the policy; 16 pages to a chronological statement of the more important events in our foreign relations; and 234 pages to excerpts from the principal utterances of the administration, concluding with the reply to Pope Benedict XV.

President Wilson is portrayed as a political philosopher whose administrative acts have been, and are, grounded upon well reasoned principles. In spite of a policy of "watchful waiting" towards Mexico, Huerta was not recognized because he obtained power through treachery and violence, while Carranza was recognized only after President Wilson accepted the mediation of the "A.B.C." powers. Even the sending of troops into Mexico was not armed intervention which violated