

hammer out the final form of the Statement of Principles, to hear a Chicago attorney describe the legal implications of a school closing down, to discuss tactics used to counteract violence and university shut-downs and to lay the foundations for future activities. Mark Souder, former student body president at Indiana University at Fort Wayne and leader of "Students for Order on Campus," chaired the meeting and became the Coalition's president.

Among the activities urged at the conference were the formulation of a kit to include instructions on how to organize a Campus Coalition chapter, suggested tactics to use to keep universities open and calm, a discussion of legal alternatives available if these tactics fail, and hints on how to raise money and how to get press coverage. Rocky Rees of the Yale "Free Campus Committee" and John Meyer of the University of Pennsylvania Law School announced that this kit would be available in a few weeks. These kits will be sent to any student on any campus who feels that his school might be threatened with violence, and who would like to do something about it.

A second activity of the Campus Coalition is the construction of a nationwide network of attorneys who will be available to help students exert legal muscle to keep schools open if the tactic of moral persuasion fails. The success of this venture is tied directly to the success of a fund-raising effort.

The most immediate goal, however, is to spread the news of the Campus Coalition to

students on campuses throughout the country in order to get as many groups as possible started to work for campus peace before trouble starts. At least the Coalition hopes to exist as an address and telephone number which any student can contact for legal help or suggestions once trouble has occurred.

Right now the Coalition is assembling data from member schools on potential trouble areas in order to prepare for problems before they arise. Plans being made now for nationwide anti-war demonstrations in late April or May will be watched closely as they develop. (A second meeting of the Campus Coalition is being planned for spring.)


The fight for the preservation of our educational institutions is everybody's fight. The Campus Coalition needs more student chapters, suggestions, offers of help from professional people (especially attorneys) and money. The Coalition also needs its address and telephone number distributed nationwide. Please address all questions, suggestions, offers and/or pleas for help to the following address: CAMPUS COALITION, Room 204, 2313 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60201 or call 312-866-7575 or 312-492-7146. □

Mr. Bowman is an undergraduate at Northwestern University. He is one of the founders of the Campus Coalition and a member of the League for In-vincible Truth, Inc.

To Be or Not to Be

Defense Policies In The 1970s

William Schneider Jr.



The body politic of the United States is emerging from one of the more bitter struggles over defense policy in this century. This dispute, however, has by no means been the most acrimonious or divisive. The internal debate over the War of 1812 for example was so severe that the New England states threatened to secede from the Union. Nevertheless, the internal debate in the sixties over the course of U.S. foreign policy objectives and the defense policy designed to support it is of sufficient importance that the issues

raised should be carefully studied. Every nation has a defense policy. This is true for the nation with the most belligerent objectives. There is, of course, the trivial case of the nation which supports no mechanism (i.e., armed forces) to support its foreign policy objectives. This is simply stating that a nation with such a policy will take no action involving the use of force should its foreign policy objectives conflict with those of another state. The more representative case concerns the nation which maintains armed forces

organized to conform to some defense policy which in turn supports politically determined foreign policy objectives. The reason for doing so is that international disputes are the only conspicuous example of a case where agreements made under duress are considered internationally binding. For example, Nazi Germany's surrender at the end of World War II is considered by all parties, including Germany, to be internationally binding although the surrender was signed under duress, i.e., the force of arms of the victorious allied armies.

The question to be resolved then in the normal case is what foreign policy objectives should be pursued, and what defense policy is appropriate towards the pursuit of those objectives. In his address on U.S. foreign policy for the Seventies, President Nixon has stated it is to be his intention to "harmonize U. S. commitments and capabilities (18 February 1970)."

We might consider that there are three classes of potential U.S. commitments. The most important would be the constitutional commitment to preserve the republic which implies maintaining sufficient forces to insure the political and territorial integrity of the United States. The second class of commitments could be defined as commitments to Allies whose security is sufficiently important, that a loss of a particular Ally to a hostile power could jeopardize the ability of the President of the United States to carry out the first class of commitments. The third class of commitments might be characterized as gratuitous commitments. That is, the connection to U.S. security may be symbolic, or the motivation for accepting the commitments might be Israel or Cambodia, or some may argue, Vietnam.

During the Sixties a twenty-year consensus that the United States should retain commitments of all three types began to weaken. There is a very broad consensus to the effect that the United States should maintain sufficient forces to guarantee its own territorial security. There is a somewhat smaller but still overwhelming majority in favor of maintaining alliance relationships with selected Allies. Although there probably still exists a majority sentiment in favor of maintaining "gratuitous" commitments, there is undoubtedly considerable debate over which gratuitous commitments we should accept.

The defense policy that appears to be "in the works" for the Seventies involves a reduction in "gratuitous commitments," or at least the means by which such gratuitous commitments are supported. The basis for this policy change appears to be the "Nixon Doctrine" which seeks to maintain alliance relationships, whether explicit or implicit, with those nations whose security, it can be argued, is at least important if not vital to the security of the United States. The mechanism for fulfilling these commitments is the supplying of logistics and advisory services to such Allies, with the formal commitment of U. S. forces only done as a last resort.

Under this doctrine, the only forces required are the so-called general purpose or conventional forces. For such a role,

however, a relatively small (e.g., 750 thousand men) army possessing high mobility and professional expertise would be required. Nuclear forces whether tactical or strategic would be of relatively little direct consequence with respect to such commitments.

The defense of Allies as well as the defense of the territory of the United States almost certainly require strategic nuclear forces. In addition, tactical nuclear forces and perhaps general purpose forces are also required to support foreign policy objectives which result from commitments to defend selected Allies and the territory of the United States. Although most of the rhetoric associated with the ongoing debate on defense policy has focused on the gratuitous commitments of the United States, perhaps much more deserving of attention is given the broad consensus for the defense of selected Allies and the territorial defense of the United States that we examine the adequacy and appropriateness of existing U.S. defense policies to support those objectives.

It will be argued here that defense policies pursued during the Sixties have made it extremely difficult for the President of the United States to support those objectives. The reasons for this failure have been both doctrinal and budgetary. They have been doctrinal in the sense that U. S. objectives in arms control, defense planning, and related areas have tended to make the territorial and political integrity of the United States far more vulnerable than it need be (given U. S. capabilities and technological ability) while simultaneously weakening the credibility of our commitments to key Allies.

To illustrate this position a device commonly employed in the analysis of alternative public policies will be employed known as the scenario. The scenario is simply a device for testing the plausibility of assumptions and conclusions by substituting plausible events for actual experience.

In May 1975, a 1975 Nightmare Scenario, East German Prime Minister, Walter Ulbricht, dies suddenly. Though an aging man, his rule had been law in the German Democratic Republic for over two decades. So critical was his role in the affairs of the German Democratic Republic that the party machinery was thrown into complete chaos by his death. The chaos is only temporarily quieted by selection of a committee to rule the Communist nation. Scattered resistance, suppressed under the Ulbricht regime, begins to spring up so that the new ruling committee makes suppression of "counter revolutionaries" its top priority. Efforts at suppression are inept, simply raising the tempo of unrest.

Faced with the possibility of a revolution, the ruling committee of the German Democratic Republic calls for the assistance of the sixteen Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany. The focal point of dissent is East Berlin. Two Soviet armored divisions and supporting logistics units move into East Berlin in an attempt to quell widely scattered and spontaneous resistance. News of the appearance of

Soviet armored units leads to mass attempts to escape to West Berlin. Holes are blown in the "Berlin Wall" at numerous places with homemade explosives, and it becomes apparent that scores if not hundreds of East German citizens are escaping to West Berlin to prevent such escapes, Soviet armored forces engage in "hot pursuit" of escaping East Germans into West Berlin precipitating daily skirmishes between Soviet forces and elements of the 6,000 man U. S. garrison in West Berlin.

Faced with the growing problem of spontaneous unrest in various areas of East Germany, the Soviet forces are determined to suppress unrest in the Berlin area so it cannot become a symbol of successful unrest. In order to prevent reinforcement of the U. S. garrison, the highway access and air corridors are declared closed by Soviet officials. The Soviet premier presents the U. S. ambassador in Moscow with an ultimatum ordering U. S. troops in Berlin to cease giving aid to escaping East Germans, and demanding that West German police turn over illegal immigrants (i.e., "escapees") to Soviet authorities. The President, conscious of steadily reinforced U. S. commitments, both to NATO and West Germany, over a twenty-five year period, rejects the Soviet ultimatum out-of-hand and warns of "drastic consequences" if the Soviets do not immediately reopen land and air routes to West Berlin. With an air of tension, NATO forces execute war mobilization aiming at complete force readiness within thirty days. The Soviet prime minister warns NATO countries that the Soviet Union cannot "stand idly by" while NATO forces mobilize for war. Although it is well known that Soviet doctrine comes down strongly on the side of "preemptive attacks" as a way of minimizing an opponent's initial superiority, NATO forces have been so weakened by isolationist pressure within the U.S. during the Sixties, that NATO forces are ill-prepared for the mobilization. With tensions increasing, the Soviet Union mobilizes the Warsaw Pact which has been on "maneuvers" since the East German crisis began. Less than one month after Ulbricht's death, the world's two largest military alliances are ready for war.

In an effort to stave off what the Soviets believe to be an inevitable attempt to make a show of force in the Berlin situation, Warsaw Pact nations launch a preemptive first strike against NATO airfields, supply depots, command and control centers, and other critical military facilities employing modern "Foxbat" strike aircraft and mobile short range ballistic missiles with high explosive warheads. Because of the ill-prepared character of NATO defenses, the Soviet strike is highly successful destroying two-thirds of the NATO tactical air force, and one-third of NATO's heavy artillery.

NATO doctrine worked out over a period of more than twenty years calls for the employment of nuclear weapons under circumstances of a massive Soviet attack. Because of the depleted character of NATO forces, including U. S. forces in Europe, the President authorizes the

employment of tactical nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact military targets in Eastern Europe, but not including the Soviet Union. This attack is executed without warning primarily employing air-dropped nuclear weapons from the remaining tactical aircraft on European soil with an assist from carrier-based aircraft in the Sixth Fleet. The attack is highly successful; "collateral damage" (i.e., damage to nearby non-military targets) is substantial. In an effort to deter the United States from the further use of nuclear weapons, a single Soviet SS-11 ICBM equipped with four MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles) warheads is fired in a "demonstration attack" against four widely separated military targets in Alaska including the major U. S. military facility in Alaska, Ft. Greeley, which is totally destroyed in the attack.

The United States begins a crisis mobilization, calling up reserves, deploying ships to sea, and placing U.S. strategic forces on alert. The U. S. strategic forces consist of 500 Minuteman-III ICBMs with three MIRV warheads each, and 500 Minuteman-II ICBMs with a single one-megaton warhead each, 250 aging B-52 heavy bombers, and 41 Polaris/Poseidon nuclear power submarines. Because of severe budget cuts in the early Seventies, the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, the B-1 manned bomber and various improvements to the Minuteman and Poseidon ballistic missiles have not been completed (and will not be completed until the late Seventies or early Eighties).

Fearing the loss of "bargaining power" in the Berlin crisis, the Soviets seek to execute a "surgical" preemptive attack against U. S. strategic forces so that the United States will be effectively disarmed. The Soviet SS-9 force has reached the number of 350, but each has been equipped with a technologically advanced MIRV warhead package of six warheads per missile. The Soviets launch a coordinated attack of SS-9s and submarine launched ballistic missiles on U.S. bomber bases, U. S. submarine bases, and U. S. ICBM bases. The attack on U. S. ICBMs is highly successful because they are undefended and the Soviet SS-9 MIRVs outnumber them by about two to one. The Soviets on the other hand retain a residual force of over 800 of the smaller SS-11 MIRV type ICBMs for the purposes of threatening U. S. cities should the United States attempt to retaliate.

The President is left, at the conclusion of the attack with the following state of affairs. One-half of the B-52 fleet is destroyed because many were caught on the ground due to the difficulties of maintaining a twenty-year-old aircraft. He has three hours to send the remaining airborne B-52s to their assigned targets or recall them to emergency bases within the United States. The only force that is apparently intact is the fleet of 31 Poseidon type submarine launch ballistic missile carrying submarines now on station at various points around the Soviet Union. However, the President is faced with the fact that the Soviets now only possess an ABM system, but their anti-aircraft missiles may well

have a capability against ballistic missiles because of the fact they were tied into the Soviet "space radar net" in the early Seventies. In view of the circumstances, the President is left with no choice but to recall the B-52s to their bases, and accept the Soviet ultimatum in Europe.

Some Implications for Defense Policy

This gloomy scenario is nonetheless plausible. We need not accept the "worst case" arguments posed by the Secretary of Defense, but merely recognize the technological improvements to the Soviet strategic forces, add malevolent intentions on the part of Soviet leaders, and extrapolate the effects of budget cuts on the effectiveness of U. S. forces through 1975. This scenario should suggest that U. S. forces likely to be in existence by 1975 are not, in many plausible circumstances, capable of supporting the foreign policy objectives which are shared by an extremely wide consensus of the U. S. population. One need not accept the stark possibility of intercontinental nuclear warfare between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to arrive at the conclusion that U.S. strategic forces are inadequate to support foreign policy objectives. One need only consider the perceptions of both U.S. and Soviet leaders in an intense crisis such as the Berlin Crisis posed in the above scenario. It is unlikely that the U.S. President in 1975 will face the Soviets with the brash confidence that President Kennedy was able to face Premier Khrushchev with in 1962 over the deployment of a few Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Such a state of relative perceptions about the international balance of forces would, in most cases, be sufficient to deter a U.S. President from behaving firmly in a political crisis in which U.S.

foreign policy objectives were challenged by Soviet forces or the threat thereof.

This is not to suggest that, even over a few years, this situation is beyond repair. It should be understood however, that if U.S. foreign policy objectives of maintaining the territorial and political integrity of the United States, and defending selected allies from the threat of nuclear warfare are to be maintained, U. S. defense policy must be changed, and changed soon.

With regard to the highest priority of U.S. defense policy—defense of the territorial and political integrity of the United States—the most immediate requirements are for upgrading U. S. strategic forces. This should include deployment of ballistic missile defenses for both strategic forces and population centers, enhanced air defenses against the threat of manned bombers, and expansion of our strategic attack forces so that they can fulfill what is known as the "Brass Rule"—a reasonable requirement stating that U.S. strategic forces should be designed and maintained at a level sufficient to inflict as much damage on an opponent as the opponent is able to inflict on the United States. Our strategic forces in no way—even at current force levels of both the United States and the Soviet Union—meet the requirements of the Brass Rule.

The Soviet Union outnumbers the United States in total force megatonnage by about a factor of four. The United States, of course, does not have the benefit of "Screwdriver inspection" of Soviet forces so it does not know in detail the composition of such forces, but by adding to what we do know about the gross characteristics of Soviet forces and applying well known U.S. technology to those characteristics, the magnitude of Soviet strategic forces are such that a substantial increment of budgetary support is

required without delay to build up U.S. strategic forces to a level capable of sustaining U.S. foreign policy objectives.

U.S. funding of strategic forces has fallen from about one-third of total defense expenditures to as low as ten per cent (in fiscal year 1969) of total expenditures. In absolute terms, the United States was spending approximately \$15 billion for strategic forces in the Fifties, an amount which would correspond to \$30 to \$35 billion in 1970 dollars. We are spending less than \$10 billion in fiscal year 1970. If we are to support what I have described as "gratuitous commitments" — even on a more limited basis than in the Fifties — in the hope of minimizing world disorders, such as localized violence by either indigenous Communists or externally supported Communists, the U.S. "general purpose" or conventional military forces need to be highly mobile (many foreign bases are likely to be less secure in the Seventies than they have been in earlier years), professional (maximize volunteers and minimize conscripts), and elite.

Some Conclusions

We can conclude that U. S. defense policy is not adequate to support those foreign policy objectives widely shared by most Americans. The United States lacks none of the necessary resources, technological, fiscal or manpower, to support these objectives. The United States requires defense policy that will enable the President to support such objectives. The highest priority should be allocated to strategic forces. This means sustained strategic force budgets of from twenty to thirty billion dollars per year merely to meet the minimum requirements of U. S. foreign policy. At a lower order of priority, but still necessary if primary U. S. foreign policy objectives are to be adequately supported, is a structuring of U.S. general purpose forces so they serve as a credible support mechanism for the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine.

Traditionally, Americans have had little interest in foreign policy, and even less interest in defense policy because of the fact that circumstances, usually crisis preparedness, has enabled the United States to be virtually undisturbed by the most tumultuous of foreign disturbances. U.S. forces, when they have been needed, have always been mustered in time to save a deteriorating foreign situation from influencing the daily lives of U. S. citizens quite unlike the matter in which tumultuous foreign disturbances have effected the daily lives of many Europeans for nearly all of this century.

We may be coming into an era during the Seventies in which the failure to sustain an appropriate defense policy could result in a situation where the demands of foreign policy could have a daily impact on the routine lives of every American. It is for this reason that our defense policy in the Seventies deserves serious examination. A free people must maintain adequate forces. Such a nation must also maintain the appropriate philosophical predisposition to employ forces that will support its national foreign policy objectives. □



A practical difficulty in the doctrine of Pacifism.

How Green Grows Your Tale

The Greening of America

by Charles A. Reich
Random House, \$7.95



Not very long ago, a regiment of East Coast writers mostly from the Long Island pulp *Newsday*, was mustered to contribute individually lascivious vignettes on the general theme of the drippings of one woman's glands. The whole mess was eventually palmed off to American devotees of belles-lettres as a novel titled *Naked Came the Stranger*, by Penelope Ashe, and no one was the wiser. Shortly thereafter an American art gallery displayed the dauberries of a chimpanzee and the fans of contemporary doodles formed queues in front of the gallery, so eager were they to compare the chefs-d'oeuvre of an anthropoid ape with those of their trendy masters. And now a committee of eleven chimpanzees and one Yale professor of law have combined to write a book criticizing the Great Republic's indiscretions while vaticinating on its rosy future.

The Greening of America is a surprising accomplishment for eleven chimpanzees and one Yale law professor. Beyond being well written the book displays considerable erudition — at the very outset one of the chimps has seen fit to quote such abstruse Western philosophes as Mr. Woody Guthrie, Mr. Chet Powers and Wallace Stevens. Further, the tome rests on such a complex vertebra of psychosocio-economic terms I have come to conclude that the Yale law professor was allowed access to *Psychology Today* by his doctors — the frontiers of mental therapy are truly boundless.

Now, I do not pretend to understand the complicated ideas reposing within this difficult study. The work is far beyond the grasp of my relatively smooth cranium. It seems the authors' recollections of this supermarket republic's sordid history have inspired them to neatly subsume it into two periods, or as the authors poetically put it Consciousness I and Consciousness II.

During these two periods stupidity, wickedness and contradictions were in abundance. But there is hope, for today we stand in the dawn of a third period, a period reeking with sweetness, saintliness and blissful concord. Designated Consciousness III, it would be for any normal man oppressive, boring and preposterous. Yet, so rhapsodically is it described in this book that only a dunderhead would read it and not immediately conclude that he had come upon the contribution of the Yale law professor.

Consciousness I lasted roughly from the apostasy of Britannia's brat to the 1932 coronation of Franklin the Magnificent. These were the great days of pioneer spirit, rugged individualism and limited government. Thomas Jefferson served as Consciousness I's first public relations whiz, and it deranged an entire century of American history, culminating in deepest Babbitt.

Franklin Roosevelt brought apparent deliverance in what the chimps call Consciousness II. Reliant on social tinkering, market control, coercion, and an unhealthy resort to axioms, its crowning achievement is the Welfare State; and it is responsible for practically every contemporary discomfort—not excluding the American proclivity for oversimplification. Consciousness I promised freedom and equality, but it was maculated by the wrong virtues. Consciousness II assumed freedom and equality, but by pursuing security and abstraction it has brought us to the hem of a national nervous breakdown.

Neither the wisdom of the Founding Fathers nor the wisdom of the great Legal Guardian was flawless or capable of vouchsafing contentment to every single solitary *Homo sapien* from sea to shining sea, so it is back to the drawing boards where we find a lone Yale professor of law, Dr. Charles Reich, laboring mightily.

The author has designed a period of incomparable splendor. In Consciousness III we shall all spend long dulcet hours of contemplation, often emboldened by drugs and primitive music. A new interest in the spiritual dimension will flower, but this will not be like those spiritual monomanias of yesteryear that were forever convulsing the world in religious brainbashings. Oh no! In fact, the Christian deity is hardly mentioned. Further, everyone will be kept quite busy experiencing the wonderful exhilaration of individual creativity. Preferably we will work off this creativity in our vocational activities. But, if a chap in one of the more advanced vocations of Consciousness III, say a blacksmith, has not sweated out all of his creativity in his daily toils, he will skip home and dash off a symphony, or compose a sonnet.

Our lives will be characterized by a profound sense of community, but it will not be the community of the ham-fisted cigar-chomping politician. Nor will it be the dreary world of the township trustees. It will be a world in which we shall all simply do our glorious things. Joyousness will reign, and our nights will be spent in nice warm caves—at least three months out of the year. In this sublime era the likes of Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt will be very small change indeed, for the new Chautauqua Circuiteers will be luminaries like Charles Manson and Timothy Leary, Ph. D.

Obviously, the authors are discoursing on a very high plane. They have quite transcended mere economics, political theory, simple technology and the like. Theirs is a spiritual wisdom and humane polity. I feel much like the celebrated scholar who, in reviewing *The Greening of America* for that illustrious journal of Liberal thought, *The Nation*, judged the thesis of the book simply above reproach. He found Reich and the chimps on an entirely different wave length from the rest of us, and I agree.

Nevertheless, there are two final points I should like to make. *The Greening of America* has raised my opinion of the inhabitants of all America's zoos and insane asylums. And despairing capitalists should be encouraged by the enterprising honeyfogelers at Random House. They have finally discovered a lucrative way to publish books without relying on raw sex and cheap thrills.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Awfully Green

If you have a nostalgia for the Middle Ages, you'll really be enthusiastic about Charles Reich's *The Greening of America*. Wow! That was when your work really meant something, for crissake. The Round Table was real wood, not formica, and the leige lord's whip was real leather. Talk about the "good old days"!

The problem with Reich's book is that he is continually trying to prove that Marx was really "right" about capitalism, even though, under America's semi-capitalism, everyone's prosperity has greatly improved. Right because...well, everyone still isn't happy. Reich is one of those liberals who is trying to figure out why the