

**JACKSON**

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as they did not add to their offensive potential.

(4) Neither side would deploy a population defending ABM.

Such a program would greatly increase the security of our strategic forces. Moreover, it should calm any possible Soviet concern that we might be increasing the offensive potential of our forces so as to threaten the security of their deterrent. I would hope, therefore, that such a proposal would be vigorously pressed at the SALT talks.

It seems to me that the risks involved in proposing such an interim agreement for an initial period of one year are minimal. The advantage of halting the deployment of Soviet offensive weapons would be real, immediate, and stabilizing. It would diminish the pressure that we are now under to press ahead with new offensive nuclear systems of our own. It would genuinely add to the security of both countries.

By permitting us to deploy defenses to protect our Minuteman silos we would be able to counter any likely qualitative upgrading of the current Soviet offensive forces. And we could do this without in any way adding to our capacity to strike the Soviet deterrent.

By preventing the deployment of ABM systems for the purpose of defending populated areas — thick city defenses — we would diminish the necessity for deploying MIRVs on our Minuteman force. At the same time we could continue to deploy the very much smaller warheads of the MIRVed Poseidon missile on

our Polaris submarines so as to increase the effectiveness of our sea-based deterrent.

Moreover, the discussion surrounding this proposal may help to illuminate the nature of Soviet strategic objectives. In spite of the obvious importance of having such knowledge, we really know very little about Soviet strategic doctrine. My own view is that we will not emerge from the SALT talks with a very comprehensive agreement unless we and the Soviets succeed in arriving at some common understanding as to the nature and objectives of strategic nuclear forces.

One final word: The United States is experiencing a wave of hostility to the military at the moment, a hostility that makes fair and objective discussion of defense issues a difficult thing to achieve. From the belief that we have been doing too little to solve our domestic problems — a view that I share with many in this country — it is all too easy to pass to a belief that what we spend on defense is wasted.

The strategic budget is a small fraction of the defense budget and an even smaller fraction of our gross national product. About one percent of the goods and services we will produce this year is allocated to the procurement, maintenance and operation of our strategic deterrent.

That one percent is an essential investment. To fail in the job of strategic defense is to fail in all our aspirations for better housing, health, welfare, education and the environment. I believe that this country is rich enough in moral and material resources to provide for the security of our people and resolve our domestic problems as well. □

three alternative hypotheses of Soviet intent: strategies of "opportunity," "caution," and "condominium." Only the "strategy of condominium" would be likely to lead to reduced tensions and a lower probability of political or military confrontation. If the Soviets were to employ this strategy, they would seek local rather than global objectives, and would prefer a partner relationship with the United States rather than an adversary relationship. The "strategy of caution" implies that the Soviets would attempt to replace U.S. influence short of means likely to lead to confrontation. The author's assessment of Soviet capabilities and behavior lead them to the grim conclusion that:

"The Soviet Union has begun to follow the strategy of opportunity increasingly, particularly in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean areas. Although the strategy of caution is currently being employed in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America, we can anticipate trends toward opportunity in these regions also. Although we have posited condominium as a logical alternative to Soviet expansionism, it is unlikely that the Soviets are committed to this choice other than as a transitory tactic." Enough said.

Professor John Erickson has produced a scholarly work of the first rank that proves to be a useful complement to the Kintner-Pfaltzgraff study. While that latter study hypothesizes trends in and the implications of Soviet military buildup, Erickson examines the Soviet buildup to deduce the character of Soviet strategy with regard to the evidence we have about Soviet force deployments and strategic doctrine.

Contrary to the yearly reiterated theory that Secretary McNamara advanced in his annual defense *Posture Statement* to the effect that every U.S. attempt to capture the strategic advantage would only be matched by a Soviet build-up to achieve "parity," Soviet military thinking follows a much different line of reasoning. Erickson suggests in effect, that the model which best describes Soviet military behavior is that they do "the best they can." Their best effort in 1950 consisted of a massive conventional force to threaten Europe, while relying on political warfare to attenuate any political advantages which the U.S. might seek to employ stemming from its nuclear arsenal. Their best effort in 1971 is considerably more formidable.

In the past few years, the Soviet economy has become sufficiently large to support a defense establishment roughly equal in size to our own. The Soviets have tended to concentrate their efforts in a few well-known areas to the U.S. disadvantage — strategic nuclear forces and naval forces.

The work of Erickson and Kintner-Pfaltzgraff significantly improve our understanding of the importance of

\*And reported in such works as A. Chayes and J. Weisner, *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti Ballistic Missile System*. (New York, Harper and Row, 1969).

## Military Trends: Implications for U.S. Security

by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.  
American Enterprise Institute, \$3.00

Soviet Military Power  
by John Erickson  
Royal United Service Institute, \$3.00

Since the unmistakable details of the broad-based Soviet military buildup since 1968 emerged, there has been an increasing number of books, monographs, and articles by professional and academic defense specialists examining the character of Soviet efforts. The studies often produced ambiguous conclusions because the public data could be interpreted in several ways as late as 1969. Since that time, the conclusions of virtually every competent defense analyst has been that the Soviet obsession with defense is singular; and that the Soviet buildup has far exceeded the requirements of any plausible defense objective that had heretofore been attributed to the Soviets.

Two recent studies — without question, among the best yet available — specify the trends in Soviet military power, and assess its implications. Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, both of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania have

set forth in compact fashion, the dimensions of Soviet military growth. When one digests the disparate information concerning the vast scope of the Soviet military buildup, it is clear that the whole of the separate elements is greater than the sum of its parts. With the exception of a few categories of military strength, there is an unambiguous Soviet quantitative advantage over the United States. There are, of course, ongoing debates within the defense community as to where the net qualitative advantage for this or that weapon system lies. When one attempts to make some sort of aggregated calculation however, as to how the United States might fare in a military confrontation in an area of mutual vital interest, it is an extremely difficult task to formulate a theory of how the United States can support its foreign policy objectives by military force in such a crisis. Kintner and Pfaltzgraff make a useful contribution to the analysis of the Soviet military buildup by suggesting

recent developments in Soviet defense policy. What is now needed is a thorough analysis of Soviet bargaining strategy dealing with arms control negotiations so that we may be better prepared to understand the manner in which the Soviets are conducting themselves at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

For a decade or so we were ill-informed by various officials in the national security apparatus who allowed their beliefs to refract their judgments

about Soviet strategic force deployments. We cannot allow a similar process to decide our attitudes on Soviet arms control. We do not have the time.

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## *Deceitful Peace: A New Look at the Soviet Threat*

by Gerhart Niemeyer  
Arlington House, \$6.95

*Between Nothingness and Paradise*

by Gerhart Niemeyer  
Louisiana State University Press, \$8.95

The Cold War seems to have passed into the hands of the historian. The politician and political scientist are now concerned with detente, relaxation of tensions, disarmament, and in general, reordering our national priorities from a foreign war that is over to a domestic war on social problems.

The last chapter of the Cold War is supposed to have been written because communism has been perceived to have lost its militant urge to conquer the world. Sometimes it is admitted that communism is not as peaceloving as we would like, but that being patient and willing to prove our good intentions, the suspicious masters in the Kremlin, Peiping, and elsewhere will see that they too can afford to relax tensions and reduce their arms budgets. Sometimes this latter line of reasoning is applied retroactively to support the conclusion that if the United States had not built up so many alliances all over the world, Stalin's suspicions would never have been aroused. The United States is then seen to be the cause of the Cold War since we supposedly overreacted to a system which was not actually our enemy. The Communists' ideology is supposed to be a mere cover for power — and that's the way we are too, right?

Whether it be argued that communism has changed, or that the United States is finally taking the appropriate measures to allow Communists to get along with other nations, the argument stands or falls on both the historical record and on the nature of communism. Gerhart Niemeyer, Professor of government at Notre Dame has provided a needed analysis of these questions in his two latest books.

To grasp the nature of communism, one of course usually begins with Marx. Niemeyer places Marx in the camp of those who, because they are motivated by a profound alienation from the world, fashion a total critique of society. The total critique of society is in turn used


as a call for total, or permanent, revolution. Such a critique goes a lot deeper than a mere complaint about particular wrongs in society. Rather than a simple reformism, this critique calls for salvation through the liberating experience of smashing everything.

In *Between Nothingness and Paradise* Niemeyer finds that Marx welded two previously developed total critiques of society. The one critique (axiological) sees all of history as alien to the true order of reality and human nature. Human experience, both past and present, is seen as unreal. There is a gnostic aspect of this critique — a secret knowledge is said to be available to the thinker-as-messenger. By making known his secret knowledge, the thinker will cause the present unreality to collapse, releasing the redemption available only through participating in the true reality. Other than a sort of magical leap in being to the true order, this critique is otherwise short on prescriptions for action.

The second total critique of society (teleological) that found its way into Marx's thought sees history as a concatenation of stages toward an ultimate end. Although there is no logical reason for doing so, this critique posits the final "goal" stage as the only time when man will live in a true reality. History once again is seen as alienation. The particular seductiveness of this critique is the pretension of positive knowledge of the future. Since all value is seen to lie in the future, knowledge of that places one beyond the limits of present moral judgments or historical imitations. This critique can only accidentally provide a picture of the inevitable Goal.

The teleological critique claims to reduce man to an objectively known product of the meaningless flux of things. The axiological critique tends to overlook any consideration of the historical and to see man only in terms of a "true" nature, of sheer desirability in a "possible reality." Marx combined the advantages of both in an attempt to eliminate their deficiencies. In either case, the total critiques: "have assumed an Archimedian point beyond the realm of experience from which the world of experience can be surveyed, criticized and even declared a nothingness." The Archimedian point, in turn, a realm of phantasmal perfection, appears as paradise when viewed from the point of view of actual nothingness. A polarity between nothingness and paradise is characteristic of every ideological total critique of society, which always extends to a critique of all experienced reality."

The ideologist of a second reality (the true one as opposed to the unreal) has committed himself by definition to a destruction of the present reality. What a far cry from Augustine's total critique of society which was based on the Biblical doctrine of the corruption of the human soul. Society, in the Augustinian view, is not seen as the enemy, since it is but a product of the flawed constituent. Evil is seen as man's problem here and now to be faced rather than hidden by resort to the use of a future possible reality. Salvation is God's work, not man's. Augustine's view permits a choice outside of the phony dichotomy of a complete acceptance of the status quo or its total destruction.



East European Landscape