

Gerald Ford (R.-Mich.) has predicted that if the Administration stands firm, enough Republicans and conservative Democrats will vote to sustain.

To their credit, the intellectual and congressional fathers of the Great Society have recognized what they perceive as an attempt to redirect American politics and they are now conducting a highly publicized, well-coordinated campaign to stop it. Their response has been reinforced by that ultimate in political bliss, a marriage between principle (i.e., the desire for centralized social welfare programs) and politics (the cuts adversely affect important constituencies, and there is a desire to gear up for the next elections.)

Administration supporters haven't been blessed by any such political union, and their response to date has been sporadic, fragmented, and tentative.

Many fiscally conservative legislators are now torn between desires to reassert fiscal discipline, to cut back on ill-conceived and unworkable social programs, and to bring some order and control to the bureaucratic hydra, on the one hand, and, on the other, the natural urges to

avoid offending constituents who might be affected by cuts and to reassert congressional authority *vis-a-vis* the Executive branch. The impoundment controversy has unfortunately muddled the waters and caused even greater division among the President's Capitol Hill allies.


It is pertinent to the budget battle to note that all great political changes occur when, due to a variety of factors, ideas and events meet. This is usually expressed by the phrase "an idea whose time has come." Mr. Nixon apparently believes that such a combination of events and ideas has occurred and is attempting to harness the much heralded "taxpayers revolt," with its signs of individual anomie which usually indicate imminent changes in political and social institutions, to help create his "New Federalism." He has embarked on an attempt not only to restore fiscal discipline, but to take first steps toward redirecting American political life.

The President realizes that such opportunities occur rarely in political life and must be exploited promptly and skillfully if they are to succeed. He also understands that this struggle will be won

or lost by public pressure created by ideas. His series of radio messages on the budget and the state of the union is an attempt to maximize the intellectual impact of Administration proposals for localism and economy in government, and thereby to win round one of the contest.

In this first phase of the struggle, the main participants will be academicians, journalists, and members of the media. The Administration will rely heavily on the work done by the Milton Friedmans, Yale Brozens, *Public Interests*, and many others. The public policy philosophy they represent may now be about to bear fruit, after being neglected for so long. At a minimum it will now be more fully aired than ever before. The question now is which side will do the best research on a vast array of government programs and policy, and which side will demonstrate superior will and ability in hammering its message home to the public. On exactly these considerations does the success of Mr. Nixon's domestic policy, and the philosophy upon which it is based, rest.

Wayne H. Valis



### *An American Family* Meets Ozzie and Harriet

The life and times of the William C. Loud family have become an important part of the popular culture, have in fact satisfied one of our fondest expectations. By playing themselves in a theatrical situation, the Louds have automatically fulfilled that consistency of behavior we have always demanded of our actors, a demand which reaches for a mutual antagonism with which we are ultimately most comfortable. Even when *An American Family* appears on the Dick Cavett Show to defend itself against its own series, the event merely adds another episode. They are an event themselves, the Louds, unable to extricate themselves from the event they are, unable, too, to perceive the impossibility.

At a time when questions concerning censorship are being put so ardently in various journals of opinion, it is interesting how smoothly the Louds pass by. People who debate the inspirational elements of *Deep Throat* and *Last Tango in Paris* do not include *An American Family* in their conception of debilitating and tasteless influences. The reason may be that the Louds are not naked in these episodes, not naked in the sense of performing without clothing. Their intimacies, where they occur, are merely verbal, thus evidently more tolerable, des-

pite the fact that once a week we all sit down to watch an organization of human beings deliberately set out to murder each other.

Of course, murder is a form of intimacy we tend to regard as sterile. The quality of excitement it bears suggests no likelihood of reproduction, so despite the accuracies achieved by television *verite*, we view most aspects of the Louds' behavior as the antics of an American family of another country. On the other hand, public criticism of *An American Family* has been couched almost entirely in personal terms. One judges the success of each episode, and the whole series, by deciding whether one likes the Louds, not the program or the idea of it, a decision which hinges on our surface identifications with, and correspondences to, the family, and eventually becomes refined to the point where we judge some Louds better than other Louds — healthier, more honest, more entertaining — until finally we begin to root for our favorite Loud.

This is a procedure with which we are quite familiar, and it is accomplished almost by reflex. Every radio and television show, movie, and comic strip built on the family format has required of us the same superficial discriminations.

Even now, as the Louds are asserting their presence in their medium, they are in direct competition with *The Brady Bunch*, *All in the Family*, *Family Affair*, *My Three Sons*, *The Partridge Family*, and more. It may be argued that *An American Family* is real life drama, and ought not to be yoked with *The Brady Bunch*, but theoretically a semblance of reality is the aspiration of *The Brady Bunch*, and of the other shows as well. The questions of propriety raised by *An American Family* are no different in kind from those raised by the Bunker family, which has been hailed and defiled solely because of its proximity to reality.

It is far less interesting that the Louds are real than that we react to them as if they were not. Because they come to us on a regular schedule each week, the same cast, the same settings, because they engage in a new and complete adventure every episode, edited largely in the same patterns, and because our appreciation and apprehension of them increases according to the continuum of the performances, we reasonably take the Louds to be fictitious. If they were on radio, they would bring to mind *One Man's Family*. On television, they become reincarnations of Ozzie and Harriet Nelson, a notable American family of another age, whose appeal, like the Louds', derives from their being the same family off-stage and on. Like the Louds, Ozzie and Harriet had teenage children, and a nice house, and confusions and misunderstandings. Ozzie did something for a living — it was never clear what — but his family, like the Louds, never wanted. Ozzie was a good guy, just like Bill. Ricky was a rock 'n roll star, just as Grant and Kevin hope to be, just as Delilah wants to become a tap dancer.

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James Grant

## *The Origins of the Cold War*

Rarely have so many had such good reason for humility as that growing band of historians whose specialty is the Cold War. With Soviet intentions in the immediate postwar period still unclear — the early years of the Cold War are among the most secretive in Russian history and U.S. State Department archives have only recently opened through to the end of 1946 — dogmatism can rest on no firmer foundation than political theory and bluster.

The defeat of Hitler's Germany laid waste not only the threat of Nazi aggression, but the balance of power that had earlier failed to contain it. When the United States and Great Britain faced the Soviet Union in the spring of 1945, it was across a chasm of suspicion that during the bleakest hours of the war had threatened the allied coalition with disintegration. With Hitler's fall, nothing was left — certainly little of the trust that had been the object of Roosevelt's "grand design" for postwar cooperation. In the unfamiliar daylight of victory, the Soviet Union emerged not as the allies had come to imagine her — co-defender of civilization, partner in the peace to follow — but as a Great Power, heir to both the dreams of Russian empire and the pretensions of a universal ideology.

"If it's not one damn thing, it's another." So must many a diplomat have groaned in the early days of victory. The war that began with the invasion of Poland had ended with her rape. By mid-1945, the Yalta Declaration on Eastern Europe stood revealed as a fraud. The western-oriented Polish government in London, promised representation in the Warsaw puppet regime, was effectively blocked from power. Sixteen resistance leaders whom the Soviets had invited to Moscow for discussions on "broadening" the communist government had been arrested. ("The guilty ones will be tried," Molotov reportedly assured American and British colleagues — Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet*

*Foreign Policy, 1917-67*; New York, 1968, p. 383.)

By the Potsdam Conference (July, 1945), noncommunists in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania had been barred from government's front door or ushered out by the back. In June, the Czech communist regime found itself faced with Soviet demands for cession of the Carpatho-Ukraine. Tito, firmly entrenched in Yugoslavia, had ordered his forces into Trieste and the Italian province of Venezia Giulia.

In April 1945, calls from within the Party for postwar coexistence with the West European democracies had come under the scathing and apparently official attack of French communist leader Jacques Duclos. The American State Department which a year earlier had noticed links between revolutionary activity in Latin America and Soviet embassies there, quickly interpreted the article — aimed at the policies of American Party chief Earl Browder — as Moscow's signal for a new phase of Party activism. Then in June came news of the arrest of six people, among them State Department officials, on charges of passing classified documents to the editors of *Amerasia*. The promise held out by the abolition of the Comintern (1943) and Stalin's wartime appeals to Russian nationalism seemed a pipe dream.

In the West, strategists were alarmed but not surprised. It had appeared that some Russian pressure in East Europe was inevitable, if regrettable. (So FDR had earlier characterized the prospects of Soviet hegemony over the three Baltic states assigned her in the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact.) The war had cost the Soviets millions of lives. (Later estimates put the figure at between 15 and 20 million; total Anglo-American losses were less than a million.) Suffering and destruction had been enormous. Surely Stalin's claims that this disaster must not be allowed to happen again — "(Poland) was a question of both honor and security" to the Soviet Union, Churchill remembered the Soviet dictator re-

minding him at Yalta — were not without merit. Were there to be no tangible rewards for the enormous Russian contribution to victory?

Western statesmen were all too aware of the burden Soviet armies had carried. Three months after the Normandy landings, Churchill could write Stalin, "I shall take occasion to repeat tomorrow in the House of Commons what I have said before, that it is the Russian army that tore the guts out of the German military machine and is at the present moment holding by far the larger proportion of the enemy on its front." General Douglas MacArthur, who could later marvel at the generosity of American concessions at Yalta, remarked to a Washington staff officer in early 1945 that Soviet support would be essential for the planned invasion of Japan.

"It is easy, after the Germans are beaten," Churchill cautioned critics yet unborn, "to condemn those who did their best to hearten the Russian military effort or to keep in harmonious contact with our great ally, who had suffered so frightfully . . . . Our hopeful assumptions were soon to be falsified, but they were the only ones possible at the time." As the war progressed, the specter of international communism and memories of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Russian invasion of Finland receded in the minds of men whose first duty was to oversee the Axis defeat.

Another source of the American preoccupation with allied harmony, which neither revelations of the Katyn Forest massacre nor the agonizing Soviet pause outside the gates of Warsaw could dampen, was a view of postwar security premised on the notion of collective security. The balance of power had been discredited by history, leading American planners believed. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had campaigned for the League in 1920 as Democratic vice-presidential candidate, told a joint session of Congress following his return from Yalta: "(The Crimean Conference) spells the end of the system of unilateral action