

perative. I shall continue to assume, until educated to the contrary, that medieval homosexuals lived lives of unspeakable terror (if they practiced their homosexuality) or of pathetic loneliness (if they didn't). Enough on the mediev-als.

In his last pages, Veal opens some worthwhile areas of discussion. I applaud Mr. Veal's steps in the right direction, as outlined in his penultimate paragraph. But I wonder: how can a homosexual both be encouraged to come to accept himself without guilt, without shame, without self-loathing, and simultaneously not appear to be "proselytizing" just by virtue of his manifest self-confidence once he has succeeded in breaking out of his closet? Veal wishes to enjoin "homosexual proselytization, direct and indirect," through "stringent" bans. Certainly "indirect" proselytization would include merely *being*—and letting one's friends and acquaintances and associates know the fact of being—a happy homosexual, would it not?

In conclusion, or rather, in termination (for no conclusion is possible), I



should reiterate that I do not *urge* anybody to "be" homosexual, which would be as stupid an exercise as urging anybody to "be" heterosexual, given the

likelihood that children *become* "heterosexual" or "homosexual" as a direct result, and during the time span, of their early childhood, which time of life is (or should be, let us hope) the affair of the parents and not of the state or other interlopers.

I *do* insist that we know what the historical record is, know what goes on now, and act like concerned, decent human beings and cease our continual, vicious maltreatment of homosexuals and other unfashionable minorities. My main concern now in regard to this matter, as evidenced by my willingness to respond to these two basically ignorant letters (ignorant of the central problems of sexuality, of the contemporary struggle by despised homosexuals to gain their full measure of equality and understanding, albeit superficially erudite in spots as to some details of some past eras), is in opening the discussion.

Let us not give our descendants a century hence yet another reason to shake their heads in wonderment as to our ignorance. Let us, instead, try to understand, try to improve our own attitudes, try to speak sense and not nonsense. □

Book Review

Eisenhower and the American Crusades

by Herbert S. Parmet
Macmillan \$12.95

Writing in 1951, Samuel Lubell appraised Truman's term in office as follows: "There is much to be said, after all, for the mariner who, knowing that he cannot quiet the storm, contrives somehow to stay afloat until the storm has died down of itself. The major problems Truman has been grappling with are mainly inherited. All are fearfully difficult, perhaps impossible of harmonious solution. As the President of the last center of hope in the world, Truman could hardly confess helplessness. Unable either to reconcile or to ignore the forces in conflict, he has tried to stall them off hoping that time would make decision unnecessary" (*Future of American Politics*, first ed., p. 22).

The burden of Parmet's book is that the Eisenhower Administration saw the storm die down; by skillfully exploiting his public image as a man "above politics," Eisenhower was able to preside over the calming down of the storm so as to help the process along. For eight years, it seemed as if the crucial decisions could be put off; and, indeed, for most of the eight years, it seemed as if, both in foreign affairs and in the economy, the situation was righting itself without the need for major governmental breakthroughs.

In foreign policy, Truman had managed to take some major steps (the Marshall Plan and NATO among them) to reestablish the strength and prosperity of the Western European democracies, and to stabilize the positions of commu-

nist and non-communist influence roughly along the line reached by Russian troops at the end of World War II. These policies, however, came under sharp attack from a vocal segment of the so-called Old Guard of the Republican Party.

On the one hand, the isolationist sentiment of the prewar years bridled at the collective security aspects of NATO, and fiscal conservatives warned against the high costs of foreign military and economic aid. On the other, Truman's policy, bearing the impolitic title of "containment" offered no promise that action could be taken to remove Eastern Europe from Soviet influence and control. Truman's policy, which demanded continual exertion without, however, promising or even pursuing an early total victory, was precisely the sort which, more than one hundred years earlier, Tocqueville had written that a democracy could not follow; and certainly Truman's experience did not disprove the general rule that "a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience" (*Democracy in America*, I, ch. 13, end).

With respect to Asia, Truman's situation was even worse. The communist victory in China had closed the "Open Door" and the war in Korea was achieving only "containment," but at a far greater cost. Enthusiasm for a victory over communism had made it impossible to stop the northward advance of the UN troops at the thirty-eighth parallel in

what would have been an impressive display of the ability of the United States to stop the armed advance of communism. On the other hand, the real costs of an all-out war with China made complete victory an inadvisable goal and led to the firing of the popular General MacArthur.

Compounding these frustrations was the American penchant for refighting old battles—in this case, the attempt by the prewar isolationists to vindicate their opposition to American entry into the war against Nazi Germany. The importance of Yalta probably stems from the fact that it symbolizes the unsatisfactory result of the war in Europe; Germany's defeat brought in its wake the communization of Eastern Europe. It was consequently no defense to say that the Yalta agreement in fact provided for more autonomy for Poland than the Russians subsequently allowed; the real point was that the war, and the "defeat Germany first" policy, resulted in the Russians being able to treat Poland as they wished, Yalta or no Yalta.

Eisenhower and Dulles in large measure continued the Truman policy, but were careful to deflect the anger and

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frustration to which it had given rise away from themselves, in part by actively directing those passions against their predecessors. In fact, Parmet indicates that the main motive behind Eisenhower's candidacy in 1952 was his desire to protect the policy of collective security through NATO and American military and economic support for Western Europe. According to our author, the decisive point in the decision to run was Senator Lodge's argument, on September 4, 1951, that Eisenhower must protect the Republican Party, and thereby the country, against the "prominence of Old Guarders and their indifference or even hostility to programs that had been created to fortify Western Europe against communist expansion. Shortsightedness and political opportunism from such quarters threatened the viability of democratic, private-en-

terprise economies outside the Soviet sphere" (p. 47).

Eisenhower and Dulles avoided the pitfalls of their predecessors' policies by changing the accompanying rhetoric. Hence, the attacks on "containment," in favor of "liberation" of communist-controlled countries in Eastern Europe. In addition to serving the specific political purpose of appealing to those normally Democratic voters whose ancestral homelands were behind the Iron Curtain, these attacks presented the appearance of taking the offensive against communism. The harsher anticommunist tone of the Eisenhower Administration assuaged the frustrations of the years of communist advances in Europe and Asia without, however, forcing the country into any potentially dangerous confrontations. Accordingly, Eisenhower followed the Truman policy in Korea, set-

ting for an armistice which left Korea divided and which Syngman Rhee actively tried to sabotage.

In domestic affairs, as well, Eisenhower disappointed those who hoped for a total reversal of direction. On the specific issue of economy in government, Eisenhower was unable to reduce the federal budget to the extent the Old Guard Republicans had wished. By making some suggestions about a "New Look" in military preparedness which would reduce governmental expenditures by "getting more bang for the buck," he played up to the fiscal conservatives. Nevertheless, breaching the \$70 billion expenditure level, which he considered a necessity, disappointed the conservatives and prepared the scene for the embarrassing budget battle of 1957.

In many areas of domestic policy, Eisenhower was a true conservative, but not in the sense in which the Old Guard understood the term; for he was not in favor of dismantling the New Deal, nor was he prepared to absolve the government of responsibility for maintaining a high level of economic activity. Similarly, he did not share the desire to undo the gains that labor unions had made in the course of the previous Democratic administrations.

Rather, Eisenhower's conservatism represented an adherence to many of the political ideas and values that dominated American life before the depression and which the New Deal had violated but not destroyed. Such values as economic individualism (crudely expressed in Secretary Wilson's preference for bird dogs over kennel dogs: "You know, one will get out and hunt for food rather than sit on his fanny and yell.") were still strongly held by the mass of the people, as they were by Eisenhower who was, in many ways, that population's most accurate representative. This feeling did not, however, translate itself into a doctrine of *laissez-faire*, a sudden return to which would have been regarded as risky and anything but conservative.

Eisenhower also shared the fear of the centralization of power which forms an important element of the American political culture. Yet, again, this did not become dogma—the centralization process was slowed but allowed to continue with respect to felt needs in the areas of school and highway construction.

The Eisenhower Administration is an interesting test of the feasibility of a nonideological conservatism based on traditional morality and tempered by the expediency and caution which usually go by the name of "statesmanship." It is a difficult question to what extent its successes were based on its own character and actions and to what extent it was merely lucky. Certainly, its problems in the field of foreign affairs were very much eased by the death of Stalin and the sudden willingness of the North Koreans to compromise on the POW issue. On the other hand, its avoidance of war in Indochina, the Middle East, and the Formosa Straits seems to be due to its subtle and cautious handling of these crises. As

Book Review

Here Comes Immorality

by Jerome Tuccille
Stein & Day \$6.95

I know notice that anarchy has managed
to capture the imagination of the Mass
Media.

I read books/reviews
and remember the
New Left

Children
dead as my empty glass.
Right-wing

Anarchists
Seeking space in New York Times
Pictures next in Vogue/Playboy/Time

Gentle
men
women
people
(Or some percentage thereof)

Actions speak louder than
praise for Chairman Mao or
North America

How nice to
confront a
NEW
movement.
Remember your children.

At all times there
are two sides to the
coin.

Destroy the State.
The State believes
That it can survive.

TREAD CAREFULLY.

Phillip Abbott Luce