

citizen....A professor's political freedom can surely be no wider than anybody else's, and his responsibility is surely somewhat heavier than that of many others." Felix Morley, former President of Haverford College, wrote in a long review in *Barron's* that: "...his well-reasoned and well-supported argument must be taken seriously...Mr. Buckley makes a case against current college instruction that cannot go unanswered." And Peter Viereck, in a not uncritical review in the *New York Times*, was able to say: "As gadfly against the smug Comrade Blimps of the left, this important, symptomatic, and widely hailed book is a necessary counterbalance."

We have come a long way since McGeorge Bundy characterized William F. Buckley, Jr. as "violent, unbalanced, and twisted" to the point of being unbelievable for having pointed out a situation which subsequent events—the student revolts of the 1960s, among others—have made obvious. While the universities themselves have proved Buckley to have been right in his basic thesis, the immediate impact of the book, in spite of the storm it aroused, was probably slight, at least on Yale. As Bundy confidently predicted they would, Yale alumni contributed more to their university the year after the publication of "the book" than they ever had before, thus confirming Joseph Schumpeter's famous remark that the bourgeoisie not only educates its enemies, but permits itself to be educated by them. The great question the Buckley book raised, however, still remains unanswered, and asking it may have been its greatest service: If those entrusted with handing on "the sustaining intellectual and moral structures of civilization" (the phrase is Eliseo Vivas') instead disparage and

subvert them, where are we to turn?

How does one account for the remarkable impact of a book which, as Dwight MacDonald observed, was "a non-fiction work by an unknown author put out by a small publisher and dealing with no broader or livelier topic than the Yale curriculum"? MacDonald's explanation, that "there is a big market today for anti-liberal polemics," explains nothing. The book was perfectly timed, of course—Yale was in the act of celebrating, with much ceremony, the two-hundred-fiftieth anniversary of its founding just as the book came out; but there was more to it than timing. The book was written in great style, the facts, however much one might quibble about this or that quotation or emphasis, were irrefutable, Buckley's personality and skill as a debater were invaluable promotional assets, and Yale is a major American institution. There is also another factor, and this might be the most important one: Buckley, as I said at the beginning, challenged a concept of knowledge and of teaching which has dominated the universities for at least a century, and which many people, perhaps more instinctively than explicitly, were beginning to feel uneasy about. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had demonstrated with startling clarity that knowledge, pursued for its own sake and without regard to value or purpose, can give us the means to destroy ourselves. Bill Buckley put an issue before us for which there is no simple solution, but which becomes every day more pressing: How do we control the universities? His solution, that the alumni must step in and take over, was obviously no solution, but the question remains. □

Joseph Hazan

## Why France Belongs in NATO

*France's re-entry into full military status in the Atlantic Alliance  
would breathe fresh vigor into the Free World.*

A great power play is in the making in Western Europe. It began with the oil crisis of 1973; now it threatens to make the whole continent a Soviet sphere of influence. While the Communist threat in Western Europe looms large—perhaps larger than ever before—NATO, the treaty organization designed to defend Western Europe, lies weak. The Soviet Union continues to devote ever larger proportions of its Gross National Product to its military forces, despite a lagging national economy. The Warsaw Pact forces outnumber those of NATO 3 to 1 in manpower, planes, and tanks, and the Communist forces are deployed offensively, whereas the readiness of United States armed forces in Europe is, in the words of the U.S. General Accounting Office, "woefully deficient." Meantime the Communist political opposition within Europe presses ever harder to accede to power. In Italy, a Communist takeover of the parliament was averted in last summer's elections, but the Communists continue their insidious penetration into the highest levels of government. Communists now lead the most powerful—and still growing—labor organization in Spain; the revolutionary leftists of Portugal, denied power last year in the first elections since Salazar's demise, wait anxiously for a false step by the Socialist minority government; in the United Kingdom the extreme Left is becoming increasingly vocal while the Labour Party tries desperately to avoid a major economic catastrophe.

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But France appears to stand aloof from this power play, her allegiance to NATO shaken since General de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military command in 1966.

Gaullists claimed that France's adherence to the NATO integrated command would hazard dragging her into a conventional war in remote Angola or Indochina, or worse, into a nuclear conflict. Yet in the light of global realities, there must be doubt as to whether a country like France, if it acts alone, is not in the end working against its best interests by profoundly weakening NATO. In the only valid sense, French national independence must be understood as the condition wherein French values are best preserved. And the aims of Soviet foreign policy pose a far greater menace to those values than would the most constricting alliance with the United States. Throughout history, even the greatest of empires have relied on alliances to defend themselves. And the mark of a true statesman is to recognize in time the necessity for alliance. It is in light of these observations and my faith in alliances that I should like to re-examine briefly France's Atlantic policy of the last two decades and to suggest what its new orientation should be.

One of General de Gaulle's first major moves after regaining power in 1958 was to propose that NATO be led by a tridirectorate of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is vital for Gaullists to remember this because they tend to forget that de Gaulle's initial choice was not independence but integration in a system where France would be on a par

with the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

It remains an open question whether France's proposal for a tridirectorate was the best course; the Americans and the British, at the time, were unconvinced. The United States had not yet tasted defeat (Vietnam) and could see no serious threat on the horizon; the dollar was king. The British lived on the illusion of their glorious performance during the war; their economy did not yet show the signs of weakening; they had so far refused to join the Common Market.

For the Anglo-Saxon leaders of the Free World, France's strength still had to be proven. The memory of her humiliating defeat in 1940 lingered while her difficulties at decolonization—the rout in Indochina (1954) and the Algerian upheaval which started in earnest in 1956—were blemishes on the West's democratic image before the Third World at a time when America still had an angelic reputation. What is more, France's economy lagged in a 19th-century style. The Anglo-American refusal to set up a tridirectorate can therefore be understood, but with hindsight it can also be seen that the United States and Great Britain misjudged both their own latent weaknesses and General de Gaulle's capacity to turn France into a disruptive force within the Atlantic Alliance.

It was only after the proposal for a tridirectorate fell through that France mustered every available stratagem for an anti-American offensive: the attack on the dollar in the gold-standard controversy, the military withdrawal from the NATO integrated command, vocal opposition to America's presence in Indochina and elsewhere in the world.

Seeking allies to increase his pressure on the Americans, General de Gaulle consolidated France's entente with Adenauer's Germany. De Gaulle adroitly took advantage of the feeling that only France could absolve Germany of its guilt feelings from the Nazi era; his flattering speeches warmed many Germans to a friendly posture, and in some circles even won him the sobriquet, *Unser General* (our general). No doubt he hoped to attract other members of the Common Market to create a counterweight to the United States within NATO. His thinking might have been that if America would not admit a tridirectorate with France holding a major position, perhaps she could be obliged to accept one with Europe, led by France or a Franco-German condominium, as a principal partner.

To what extent de Gaulle was bluffing in these maneuvers, we cannot be certain. Be that as it may, it has been a constant of French foreign policy in the last fifteen years to try to separate and distinguish Western Europe, and especially Germany, from the United States on all major international issues.

America responded by applying pressure to Germany to reaffirm its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. The move was easy for the Americans, since the Germans could not and still cannot do without America's nuclear protection, or even conventional forces, in the face of the Soviet-Warsaw Pact buildup. Germany has emerged as the real winner in the Franco-American confrontation, re-establishing its political and economic significance to the point of becoming the dominant factor in Western Europe today.

In a larger sense, both France and the United States—indeed all the Free World—have been losers in the Franco-American feud. True, France transformed her old colonialist image to one of solidarity with the Third World, but in so doing helped turn world opinion against American policy everywhere. Within the Atlantic Alliance, France failed to polarize European nations into pro-French and pro-American camps, but she succeeded in retarding and confounding the political organization of Europe, and consequently its military defense.

Whatever justification there may have been for French policy in the sixties, today the situation is different and the danger very pressing.

The deep and recurring recessions and the accelerating inflation caused by the sudden five-fold oil price increase have created or accentuated political crises in several European countries: Portugal, Italy, Great Britain, and France to name a few. As a result, the leftist factions and the Communist parties in these countries are in a position to lure the electorates into thinking that

their venue to power would bring back to the masses the steady growth in their standards of living which they had been enjoying since World War II.

This in fact is an illusion since the latest increase in the price of oil (equivalent to a 50 to 70% increase over the 1973 price) will quickly send the industrialized nations back into a new recession and keep them going on the road to increased poverty, no matter which political party were in power. But irritated and impoverished electorates may still call leftist regimes to power, as they look for an alternative to their growing discontent.

The weakening and gradual disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance, which one or more Communist-influenced governments in Europe would cause, might very soon force the American armed forces from Europe without the Soviets having to fire a single shot themselves—as was the case in Vietnam.

For a country like France to continue stressing the theme of "national independence" under the present conditions is in fact to prepare her passage from dependence upon the United States to a merciless colonization by the Soviet Union.

The real choice for the French people, and indeed for all the peoples of the Free World, is between an alliance with the U.S. and one with the Soviet Union; unfortunately real independence does not exist. One may deplore this fact, but it is useless for the leaders of the Free World not to acknowledge it nor to show the courage of stating this alternative plainly to their peoples, while there is yet time.

In spite of this apparently glum picture, all is far from lost. Dissensions now mar the union of OPEC countries and we do not have to face the implacable and united front of three years ago. There are increasing pressures for national independence in Eastern Europe; the growth of Soviet military might and involvement throughout the world has taken its toll within Russia, stunting internal economic growth; large numbers of Soviet intellectuals now question totalitarian authority, as illustrated by an endless list of cases like Solzhenitsyn's; this in turn breaks down the unlimited faith and solidarity which Western European working classes had in the utopian Soviet regime, and the hypocrisy of their own Communist leaders for the last 20 years is a theme that can be repeatedly drummed upon.

What is needed to top this is a gesture of dramatic psychological impact and France is in an excellent position to deliver it, since she has acquired a reputation for international nonpartisanship during the Gaullist regime and its aftermath.

The French leaders should come out publicly and strongly to say that in view of the danger at hand they have decided to re-enter NATO with full status. President Giscard d'Estaing has made some timid and surreptitious steps in this direction, but this is quite insufficient. What is required here is a knock-out punch, not a homeopathic treatment. Such a policy statement would have a triple effect.

First, within the Atlantic Alliance and in particular in Europe, it would create a renewed enthusiasm, a greatly yearned-for togetherness and sense of common purpose. It would give fresh vigor to all democrats in the Free World.

Second, the Soviets, the OPEC countries, and the whiners of the Third World (to be distinguished from the serious members of the developing group of nations) would know that they would henceforth be facing a redoubtable front of nations whose toes are not to be trodden upon.

Third, the Free World would be in a better position to pressure the OPEC countries into substantially lower oil prices, which in turn would permit the world economy to bounce back into a healthy growth orbit and ipso facto significantly reduce the economic and political turmoil we are in.

Finally, we should add that France should have no reluctance in making such a move because since the initial Gaullist attempt to install a tridirectorate the balance of power within the Atlantic Alliance has changed sufficiently for it now to have a better equilibrium between its constituents; none will feel dominated, and on the contrary, a real sense of the interdependence of the democratic nations of the world would be publicly revealed and enthusiastically accepted. □

David Everitt

## "He's Just Playing John Wayne"

*The ultimate measure of the Duke's abilities is that  
so many think he isn't even acting.*

John Wayne has been a leading man for nearly forty years and his movies are estimated to have grossed more than any other star's. To call him just a notable actor or star seems inadequate. For millions of movie-goers he has become a living mythic figure. For his fans, his two-fisted image symbolizes all that is admirable about the American tradition (in short, the "old-fashioned" values and the frontier spirit), and for his disparagers he represents everything wrong with that tradition (he is, and probably always will be, the only actor to have been challenged to a debate in Harvard Square.) Both cases testify to his remarkable position.

The cowboy loner is the definitive American hero, and while there have been other outstanding Western stars, John Wayne has come to represent this figure more than any others. Not only has he insisted on doing most of his own rugged stuntwork. He has also exhibited his cowboy heroism in his personal life, as when in 1964 he survived his bout with cancer. He "licked the Big C" and went to Durango, with only one lung, to hit the trail for his next picture and put away his usual quart of booze a day. One couldn't help but think that John Wayne the man was no different than the John Wayne in *The Horse Soldiers*, who would walk away from a bullet extraction on a makeshift operating table to lead a column of galloping cavalry.

It is intriguing that this image was in no way diminished by the fact that Wayne did not fight in the real adventure of World War II. Other leading men, James Stewart for instance, served and were decorated for their wartime efforts; however, Stewart, for all his talent and appeal and all the Westerns he's made, has not come close to the same hero stature. How has Wayne come to this position? What has set him apart from other Western stars? What is it about his persona that has captured people's imagination?

Wayne's early years in the movie industry were something of a bumpy ride. He got his start in the mid-twenties as a prop man, soon to become a double, stuntman, and bit player. In 1930 he got his first starring role in a big budget Western called *The Big Trail*. The movie was a big financial failure and Duke was quickly relegated to lower-class stardom in B Westerns. He languished in this capacity until 1939. But it was a highly active languishing, if nothing else, coming out with as many as eleven pictures a year. Among other things, he was the star of the Three Mesquiteers series and also enjoyed the dubious distinction of playing Singin' Sandy, the movies' first singing cowboy, well before either Roy Rogers or Gene Autry. Along the way, he played an important part in the development of the "pass system" (the now standard method of staging a movie fist fight) and did much to polish his spirited craft, but, with the exception of a small but faithful following in the South and Southwest, he remained an unknown, a star sharing a lower-bracket constellation with the likes of Buck Jones, Tim McCoy, Tex Ritter, and Johnny Mack Brown. By the end of the thirties he left this company for good. In his own words, there was one reason for this lasting change in fortune—John Ford.

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Although a friend of his since the twenties, Wayne did not get to play a substantial role in any of Ford's films until *Stagecoach*. In this Western classic, under Ford's commanding, sometimes emotionally brutal instruction, Wayne gave his affecting portrayal of the honor- and destiny-bound outlaw, the Ringo Kid. The role established him finally as a star of the first order and the partnership between director and actor was to last for more than two decades, producing such American standards as *Fort Apache*, *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon*, *The Searchers*, and *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance*. They also teamed up for some memorable non-Western films, including *The Quiet Man* and the stunning Eugene O'Neill adaptation, *The Long Voyage Home*. Starting in the early forties, Wayne went on to become one of Hollywood's major leading men, playing alongside some of the most notable female stars and distinguishing himself not only in action pictures, but romances and comedies as well. In 1948 his image hardened into the salty, leathery mold we are now more accustomed to when he played Tom Dunson, the unrelenting cattle baron, in Howard Hawks' *Red River*. By 1970, after winning his Oscar for *True Grit*, he had become more firmly entrenched than ever before in the Western and has since worked almost exclusively in that genre.

Wayne has never been properly appreciated, however, by critics. "He's just playing John Wayne," they say, and they have been saying it with a stubborn and downright uniformity for years. But this attitude displays as little understanding of acting as it does of John Wayne. In part the misunderstanding reflects an unthinking prejudice against Westerns, a feeling that "horse operas" are rarely worth considering seriously and playing a cowboy is just not acting. Wayne's detractors also seem not to understand the rare ability to appear natural on the screen, to mask the technique necessary to produce this naturalness, a technique that is thoughtfully considered and perfected by years of experience. Considering the larger-than-life nature of the characters he plays, this apparent ease is all the more extraordinary. But it was not until he had been a star for thirty years that his talent received its proper critical acclaim, and that was for *True Grit*, in which Wayne altered his usual image and took on the guise of a character actor by putting on an eye patch. All the previous full-bodied portrayals were still virtually unaccounted for. Related to this odd critical standard is the tendency to take for granted an actor who maintains a great consistency of characterization. If a "natural" like Wayne were less of a professional and followed the Brando example by occasionally lapsing into awful, self-conscious performances, perhaps critics would take more note of his good renditions.

In an interview with the *Village Voice*, Clint Eastwood, seemingly the only candidate as the Duke's heir, made a revealing remark about his own critical invisibility. He says that maybe what really turns critics off about him is that "the kind of thing I do is to glorify competence." Over the years, Wayne's specialty has been to play characters of dignity and authority and to play them with conviction. But then, it seems, that's not acting. That's playing yourself. Acting is playing tormented neurotics. As if acting does not include portraying positive qualities, qualities of strength. ➔