

he points out. Elsewhere he adds: "An argument that a thing cannot happen . . . collapses when there is evidence that it has already happened, somewhere else."

Due to an outage of navigation equipment at Anchorage, KE007 took off south of its intended track and was vectored northward by an order to follow a magnetic heading of 246


## CALL FOR PAPERS

### The Legacy of the New Deal: A Reconsideration

Hillsdale College will host two conferences on the Legacy of the New Deal, one in November, 1986 and another in March, 1987. These conferences will examine the intentions behind and the consequences of the New Deal and consider the relevance of the New Deal to the current condition of American institutions and to contemporary policy debates.

Prospective participants should submit a *vita* and a 500 to 1000-word abstract to Ralph Hancock, Department of History and Political Science, Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, MI 49242. 517-439-1763, by October 15, 1985.

## HILLSDALE COLLEGE



### CENTER FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES

degrees. The pilots are known to have started out that way. When they reached their intended route they were to have turned a rotary switch one click to put the autopilot onto inertial guidance mode. Sayle suggests that this single switch throw was not made (he has several plausible explanations why it wasn't), and he provides evidence that it could not have been made. He argues persuasively that when the aircraft was last seen it was still following heading 246 sometime after it should have turned slightly to the left, and also that when hours later it was at last spotted by Japanese radar (along a track which it could have followed purely by a heading of 246 with reasonable wind variations) it was still heading at 246. Sayle's expository narrative betokens a researcher well familiar with the terms and concepts he deals with, and his conclusion has the ring of truth to it.

Most of his early research was done under contract to a British television station which wanted to do a first anniversary special show. But when Sayle presented them with the results of his research, the documentary was canceled. He recounts what the executive producer told him: "Conspiracies are sexy, accidents are not. We have to at least put forward the possibility that Reagan and the CIA were involved, or we don't have a viable program."

If the spy theorists seem nevertheless to get more attention than they deserve, they are highlighted even more in the Soviet news media. Their opinions tend to fuel official Soviet xenophobia, which has always proved useful in keeping the population in line. But in their eagerness to find excuses for any Soviet brutality, the spy theorists may go a long way toward encouraging still more actions like the KE007 massacre. The Soviets are clearly ready to shoot down the next lost airliner, and a zealous band of Westerners has proclaimed its own readiness to come up with excuses.

In its June 30 issue, the official Soviet military newspaper *Red Star* warned Soviet servicemen to be ready to replay the KE007 tragedy. "The incumbent U.S. administration, following a policy of state terrorism, has not ceased airborne espionage against the Soviet Union," wrote captain Yevgeniy Nikitin. "The airborne spies' activity is assuming increasingly sophisticated and dangerous forms. Under these circumstances, squalid new provocations can be expected from the American makers of irresponsible and aggressive foreign policy, provocations executed with blessing from [Reagan]."

Such venomous words are terrifying evidence that the 269 dead of KE007 will probably not be the last innocents to fall before Soviet weapons. □

### OBSERVATIONS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND ESSAYS, 1982-1984

Henry Kissinger/Little, Brown/\$17.95

Mark Falcoff

In the nearly twenty years that he has been a major political figure, Henry Kissinger has already appeared in three separate (but chronologically overlapping) incarnations. For the left, there is the evil genius of Richard Nixon's foreign policy (Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, etc.); for the right, the architect of détente (SALT I, the Panama Canal treaties, the vast expansion of commercial credits to the Eastern bloc, the abandonment of Taiwan); and for all seasons, but particularly since his departure from office, the most persuasive expositor of what used to pass for mainstream American foreign policy.

What is perhaps equally interesting

Mark Falcoff is resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

is the way that two successive administrations which have governed the United States since Kissinger's retirement from the State Department in 1976—both disposed at the outset to cast him in Outer Darkness—have each discovered in turn that they could not quite dispense with his services. (They were helped to reach this conclusion, of course, by the fact that their subject continued to make himself available, even after a campaign of sustained vilification.) Having observed him at close range for a brief period in 1983, I can attest that the Kissinger mystique consists in more or less equal parts of an unrivaled work capacity; a sense of history and an appreciation for cultural differences; sheer intellectual brilliance; and a wicked sense of humor very unlike that normally found in either

academic life or the government.

Some future historian will have quite a time explaining which Kissinger is the "real" one—the bugaboo of Jesse Helms, Richard Viguier, and Lyndon LaRouche; or of Anthony Lewis, Seymour Hersh, and William Shawcross. No doubt whoever writes that book will have to begin by placing the man in the context of his time, much as Kissinger himself did with Metternich in his Harvard doctoral dissertation, which explored—presciently enough—the politics of conservatism in a revolutionary age. One need not accept Dr. Kissinger's own version of events (much less that of his patron Richard Nixon) to appreciate that the years 1969-74 were for American foreign policy the most difficult and disadvantageous in its history. Nixon and Kissinger had a grander name for it, but theirs was a foreign policy of crisis management and damage limitation. It may well be that in the hands of different men—say, Hubert Humphrey and George Ball—the outcome would have been twice as dismal; certainly to judge by what Ball himself is saying these days, there is plenty of reason to think so.

If Kissinger is back in fashion, it is partly that the stormclouds of Vietnam have cleared, and it is now possible for the first time in many years to approach our foreign policy choices with a measure of objectivity. One man's dispassion is, of course, another man's bias, so that much of what appears in *Observations* will not be to the taste of certain kinds of American liberals, or for that matter, certain kinds of American conservatives. For Kissinger approaches his topics—the Atlantic alliance, East-West relations, arms control, the Third World, and international economic issues—from a decidedly unsentimental and unapologetic perspective. As he pointedly states, "The American Right still yearns for ideological victory without geopolitical effort; the American Left still dreams of reforming the world through the exercise of goodwill unsullied by power."

Three themes in particular occupy the lion's share of *Observations*. The first is the crisis of the Atlantic alliance, a topic to which Kissinger has repeatedly turned when addressing Western European audiences. Though he's often been accused of venting ill-temper and crude threats on such occasions, the speeches reproduced here show him to be courteous, balanced, and fair. He is not blind to the deficiencies of the American foreign policy process—far from it, since he recounts their horrors in luxurious detail—but he does insist that the Europeans cannot seize upon these as an excuse perpetually to

postpone important decisions (particularly the enlargement of their conventional deterrent) which the times demand. Nor is he particularly admiring of Western European governments, including and perhaps especially conservative governments, which attempt to appease the "peace" vote in their countries by waffling on INF negotiations over intermediate range nuclear forces or the acceptance of Pershing missiles, as if in discharging their obligations under treaty they were doing some sort of favor for the United States. While some disagreements between Washington and its principal allies are, to be sure, inevitable, NATO "cannot be called an alliance," he writes, "if it agrees on no significant issue."

The root of the problem is cultural and historical. Since about 1960 the Europeans have virtually adopted the traditional American practice of moralistic posturing, deprecating "the importance of power [in favor of an] abstract faith in goodwill . . . in the pacific efficacy of economic relations," and attempting to escape from "the necessities of defense and security [and] from the sordid details of maintaining the global balance of power." Meanwhile, the United States, while forced by circumstances to modify in part its earlier moralism, "has never . . . fully developed a concept of equilibrium."

To a very large degree this psychological retreat on the part of Western Europeans is based on fear—fear of Soviet rearmament and military superiority, and fear also of a United States which may not turn out to be reliable in a pinch. These European concerns are, Kissinger concedes, legitimate enough; but they cannot be effectively met by evasion, posturing, or wishful thinking. Still less can the special strains to which the trans-Atlantic relationship has been subject be eased by urging the United States on one hand to defend the balance of power, "and then give it equal billing as a threat to peace with the Soviet 'hegemonist.'" And he adds tartly, "It is time for our European allies to abandon the charade that their principal foreign policy goal is to moderate an intransigent America—a role more appropriate for neutrals than for allies."

European fears of the Soviet Union lead to Kissinger's second major theme—the problem of arms control. Kissinger begins by pointing out what surely should be far more obvious than it is—namely, that "mankind cannot unlearn the secret of the atom. . . . We are doomed to some sort of deterrence, equilibrium, or balance at some level and in some form." We must also recognize that "as a general principle, arms do not cause political tensions; they reflect them." Arms control

negotiations over the years seem to have evaded these central truths, and public debate on the issue often touches only indirectly upon the details being negotiated. (This includes the spurious "no first use" doctrine launched not long ago by Messrs. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith, of which he offers an incisive critique.) Unfortunately, in both Europe and the United States arms control has come

to be perceived "primarily as an exercise in moral virtue," evading what must be the bottom line: If we wish to reduce nuclear arsenals, we must be prepared to pay the price for a conventional buildup, and we cannot pretend that there is no such price.

The third theme naturally follows from this—the need to have a realistic


understanding of what kinds of incentives will induce the Soviets to moderate their international conduct. In Kissinger's view, increased economic relations with the Soviet Union should follow demonstrations of a more peaceful course. This is not, to be sure, what happened during the decade of détente. Whether Kissinger himself actually followed his own advice during those years is open to question, but

## LibertyClassics

# The Glasgow Edition of Works And Correspondence of Adam Smith

LibertyClassics is publishing softcover versions of the edition of Adam Smith's works commissioned by the University of Glasgow to celebrate the bicentenary of *The Wealth of Nations* and published in hardcover by Oxford University Press.

This edition consists of six titles in seven volumes. The titles listed below are presently available from LibertyClassics. Others will follow over the next two or three years.



### Essays on Philosophical Subjects

General Editors:  
D.D. Raphael and  
A.S. Skinner  
Softcover only \$5.50

### Lectures on Jurisprudence

Editors:  
R.L. Meek,  
D.D. Raphael,  
and P.G. Stein  
Softcover only \$5.50

### The Wealth of Nations

In Two Volumes  
General Editors:  
R.H. Campbell and  
A.S. Skinner  
Textual Editor:  
W.B. Todd  
Softcover only \$11.00 the set

Prepayment is required on all orders not for resale. We pay book rate postage on prepaid orders. Please allow 4 to 6 weeks for delivery. All orders from outside the United States must be prepaid in U.S. dollars. To order, or for a copy of our catalogue, write:  
LibertyPress/LibertyClassics  
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. K101  
Indianapolis, IN 46250



does not invalidate the utility of his observations today. What began as an instrument of foreign policy, he writes, took on a life of its own, and today more and more Western governments "act on the premise that the immediate goals in employment outweigh the political risks in strengthening a hostile and aggressive political system." More than that, trade with the Soviet Union is often conducted on concessional terms, so that it amounts to a form of appeasement, a subsidy to ward off Soviet bad conduct. What is even worse, domestic pressures in both the United States and Western Europe to increase economic relations, or to offer new arms control proposals, often increase after demonstrations of intransigence or lawlessness by the Kremlin.

Actually, one of the ironies of the Reagan Administration that Kissinger cannot forbear from mentioning more than once is the difference between its

bark and its bite. After all, it was Reagan, not Carter, who campaigned in 1980 against the grain embargo, and the conduct (as opposed to the posturing) of his administration has been a model of restraint. Now even the posturing is changing, but both critics at home and allied leaders abroad seem not to notice. Why is this so? "Is it because the critics seek an excuse for a barely disguised neutralism, and the leaders require—or believe they require—at least the pretense of 'moderating' American obtuseness and intransigence as a unifying element in their domestic politics?" It is troubling to consider how close the question comes to answering itself.

Though no responsible figure in the media or politics has chosen to exploit Kissinger's foreign origins to criticize his policies (editorial cartoonists naturally excepted), during his term as National Security Adviser, and even more, as Secretary of State, there was

a perceptible undercurrent of resentment at the "European" way in which he viewed some foreign policy matters. This attitude was fueled at times by his ill-considered remarks on the American political process. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine any European—certainly not Lord Carrington, certainly not Claude Cheysson—writing a book like this. Kissinger's is an American vision enriched by European experience. He is one of the last true "trans-Atlantic" figures in our political community, and our NATO allies

would do well to consider his counsels as those of a true friend—one of the last, in fact, they are likely to have, unless and until his advice is acted upon. American conservatives and liberals would do well, too, to moderate their fire on one of the few serious foreign policy thinkers this country has produced in the last generation. For the U.S., the underlying theme of *Observations* is the need for it to act its age. This is something against which as a political culture we still rebel, but from which, inevitably, there is no escape. □

## THE LAST TWO YEARS OF SALVADOR ALLENDE

Nathaniel Davis/Cornell University Press/\$24.95

Claudia Rosett

Since at least the time of the conquistadores Latin America has been haunted by the legend of El Dorado—the land of treasure that lies always just beyond the horizon. But the search for this easy wealth leads to sordid realities. A Spanish and Indian expedition that set out in 1541 to find the land of spices and gold ended with a few hungry survivors butchering their own horses and dogs for food.

In 1970, with the election of Salvador Allende to the presidency, Chile embarked on a twentieth-century version of the same quest. The elusive prize was not El Dorado's gold, but socialist revolution, to be achieved in a unique and gratifying manner: through democratic process in a free society.

Only wishful thinking suggested that Allende's venture would succeed. Although he talked of the "via Chilena" to democratic socialism as if it were a freeway to brotherly love, he was in practice trying to follow two roads. One was the ongoing course of Chilean democracy; the other veered off sharply toward a centrally planned economy. His government could not follow the latter way without engaging in economic coercion and, ultimately, political repression.


By August 1973, the Chilean congress had passed a resolution accusing the Allende government of assaulting freedom of education and of the press, violating property and trade union rights and the autonomy of universities, and illegally arresting and torturing its opponents. Compromise among the many political factions had become

impossible. The congress called upon the military to steer the government back to legal behavior, and the armed forces responded, but not as congress had hoped. They broke the political deadlock on September 11, 1973, with the *coup d'état* in which Allende died and Augusto Pinochet's grim military regime was born.

For many, especially foreigners who had not suffered the forced march along the *via Chilena*, it was intolerable to believe that Allende's ruin might have come from his own confused ambitions. Instead, in a monumental exercise of ethnocentricity, many Americans blamed the usual suspect—the United States. In *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* Nathaniel Davis, who was U.S. ambassador to Chile from October 1971 to November 1973, aims to dispel this notion. This book, as he says, is both monograph and memoir, an attempt to explain what happened in Chile and to vindicate himself.

In challenging the common wisdom on Chile, Davis has set himself an uphill task. The romance of Allende and the villainy of the U.S. are simple fables sunk deep in the American psyche. Davis hopes to overwhelm the myths with a truly massive onslaught of facts, so he gives a sometimes maniacally detailed but diplomatic description of events during his stay in Chile, piling up fifty-one pages of footnotes from sources that span the political spectrum.

The facts are very much on Davis's side. They suggest that though the U.S. did supply a little more than \$6 million in covert aid to the opposition during



**SUBSCRIBE TO AMERICA'S ONLY SATIRICAL MAGAZINE**

I loved Sting and am sharing it around the office.  
M. Seifert, PA.

Here is my renewal. Can't take a chance that I will not receive the next issue — Sting is terrific.  
P. Dean, Beyton Beach, FL.

My 18-year old likes your magazine, too. First anything I've seen her read cover to cover in ages.  
P. Kite, CA.

Love your magazine, my subscription is already in the mail.  
Susan Dewar, Calgary

I enjoyed the first issue. I picked it up at the White House. Here is my subscription.  
J.D.A., WI.

Sting is great!! Send Sting to my two daughters, pronto.  
M. Sackner, FL.

In short, you're invited to become a charter subscriber and save off the regular price, 12 issues for only \$12. This offer is an introductory one.

**INSIDE:**

- THE GREAT DEBATE
- THE BEST OF SOCIETY PAGE
- THE AYATOLLAH MEETS HIS MATCH
- A HOSTAGE'S ACCOUNT
- UNCOVERED AT HARVEY MILK HIGH
- PAY A TOLL
- COERCION FOR THE WORKFORCE

**Send to: STING, 1079 Rt. 202, Blue Bell, Pa. 19422**

□ Please send me Sting, enclosed find check for \$12.00

Name (please print) \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_ Apt. \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

Rates in U.S. dollars. In Canada \$15. Other foreign \$32. Note: Order must be paid before the receipt