

d'être. Its imminent death seems as unlikely as the renunciation of Immaculate Conception by the Vatican.

George Kennan had once hoped that containment would lead to the break-up of the Soviet empire. Nevertheless, the most troubling question about containment is whether, as actually practiced, it implies acceptance of any Soviet gain. Originally formulated to save Western Europe, containment has enjoyed at best mixed success in the non-European world. It has developed dubious formulas for dealing with Soviet military action by proxy, "wars of liberation," and limited, brushfire conflicts. In truth, not even the United States can create a world in which every

Soviet-encouraged movement can be contained every time. Nor is there good reason to accept challenges in areas where this country has no compelling geopolitical interests.

There was a broad consensus among the academics that in a nuclear world it would be simply too dangerous to challenge the core area of Soviet dominance, Eastern Europe; Eisenhower and Dulles, after all, backed away from that game nearly thirty years ago. Some believed, however, that it should be possible to challenge Soviet imperialism in peripheral areas beyond any natural Russian sphere of influence. It had been done in Grenada; it could be done elsewhere. Notably, I

heard no denunciation of aid to the contras in Nicaragua.

What, finally, were one observer's conclusions after two days of exposure to the academic foreign policy establishment? A dominant impression was the spectacle of admiring acolytes more committed to containment than the Old Master himself and hardly as soft-skulled as many on the right believe. There was also excessive optimism and two-dimensional thinking, intently focused on political and economic matters, heedless of military matters.

If, as seems probable, the USSR remains much the same, the world will

continue to be a troubled, dangerous place throughout our lifetimes, and the Soviets likely will keep busy doing what they can to make it more troubled. The choices on such a planet are few. Withdrawal would be dangerous folly, condominium—call it *détente* or what you will—unrealistic. Containment is all that is left. If one considers the alternatives, it has been a success, not a "brilliant success" perhaps, but about the best that could be expected given the history of the last forty years. Because it has been a more feasible and reliable approach than "liberation," "*détente*," and "human rights," it has survived them all as the cornerstone of American foreign policy. □

Arch Puddington

EAST BLOC ECOLOGY

Smoke gets in their skies.

Until quite recently, official Communist dogma treated environmental deterioration as an exclusively capitalist phenomenon. Typically, Soviet ideologists blamed "anarchy and uncontrolled development in the capitalist world, the pursuit of profit, the legacy of colonialism" as the overriding causes of ecological problems throughout the world. If capitalism created pollution, then logically capitalism should assume the burden of pollution's elimination. "If the ecological crisis originates in the capitalist world," Soviet philosopher I. T. Frolov posited, "then it is necessary to rebuild substantially the capitalist system in order to remove the ecological threat." As for the inescapable existence of pollution in the Soviet bloc: "In a society with public ownership of the means of production, environmental disruption will invariably be accidental." Or, as a Czechoslovakian commentator once blurted out, ecological decay would be nonexistent were it not for "non-socialist individuals still surviving in the country."¹

Unfortunately for the people of the

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Soviet Union and its Communist neighbors, the "accidents" have been fast accumulating over the years. It is by now evident that rational Marxian planning is no better equipped than anarchic capitalism to cope with the

complex array of environmental problems which inevitably follow in the wake of industrialization. If Communist regimes were to publish accurate statistics for foul air and polluted water (most do not), they

would discover that in this one area Marxism has caught up with and even surpassed the democratic world.

The label, "environmental crisis," overused and depreciated in the United States, is an appropriate description of current conditions in the more economically developed countries of Eastern Europe and parts of the Soviet Union. The word "crisis" has even begun to creep into official language. Although the quotations above were gleaned from fairly recent articles in the Soviet bloc press, they are not (or, to be precise, are no longer) representative of Communist writings on environmental matters. Especially in heavily industrialized countries like Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, the official media have been striking an uncharacteristically despondent theme of looming catastrophe,

¹The problem of environmental decay in the Communist world has recently elicited the attention of Western journalists and scholars. Two of the more interesting studies are Joan DeBardleben's *The Environment and Marxism-Leninism* (Westview, \$32.50) and Christine Zvosec's article "Environmental deterioration in Eastern Europe" (*Survey*, Winter 1984). Also worthwhile are the research bulletins prepared by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.



presumably as a way of warning the public that improvements cannot be expected for years to come.

There is something ironic about the Communist world's plight. As a man of the nineteenth century, Marx cannot be blamed for his failure to anticipate the price which industrialization would exact from the air, rivers, and forests. Despite his unconcealed contempt for the pastoral ethic (recall his sneering reference to the "idiocy of rural life"), we can well imagine the cannonades Marx would have aimed at the bourgeoisie had he written a Thesis on the Pollution Question. More to the point, Marxism has always counterposed the rationality and *humaneness* of a centrally planned economy to the sprawling, wasteful, and rapacious nature of capitalism. And from a theoretical standpoint, Communism, with its controls, centrally determined blueprints, and absence of entrepreneurial freedom, *should* be able to manage the environment with considerably more efficiency than a system which gives relatively free rein to the market. As we have learned in the United States, effective environmental protection often demands far-reaching, permanent government intervention in previously unregulated areas of business decision-making. Yet the degree of state interference summoned by the environmental impact statement pales before the constraints imposed by Communist regimes to prevent the reemergence of a capitalist class. Under the centralized arrangement adopted, at least at the beginning, by all Communist regimes, such crucial questions as where to locate factories, whether to emphasize heavy or light industry or agriculture, whether to use coal, oil, or nuclear energy, even the question of where people are allowed to live—all were to be determined by the state, in the presumed interest of the people.

The environmental debate, moreover, emerged initially in the West; Communist planners were thus granted a decade or so grace period during which action could have been taken to avoid the troubles afflicting their ideological adversaries. That the necessary measures were not adopted was not due to the stupidities of official ideology. For while Communism's public voice was boasting of socialism's built-in capacity to avoid environmental devastation, others—planners, economists, scientists—well recognized that Soviet-style economies were as susceptible as capitalism to pollution and the deterioration of nature's resources.

Yet the warning signals emanating from the West were ignored. In fact, the most severe damage to Soviet and East European environments was occurring during the 1970s and '80s, a time when

widespread, vocal concern over the environment was forcing Western governments to implement thoroughgoing (and expensive) clean-up programs and, in countries like West Germany, provoking dramatic changes in the political culture.

Take the case of Poland. Polish authorities have divided water quality into four categories, ranging from Class One—fit for human consumption—to Class Four—unfit even for in-

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dustrial use. According to one study, rivers which met Class One standards declined from 22 to 10 percent between 1967 and 1977. More disturbing were the figures for Class Four—unfit for any use whatsoever; these registered an astonishing increase from 32 to 48 percent from 1977 to 1980.

Equally serious problems have been noted in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Northern Bohemia experiences periodic air-pollution alerts during which children are kept indoors and doctors told to be prepared for emergency treatment of those overcome by the pervasive smog. In that region's most seriously affected areas, workers are paid a special indemnity after ten years on the job as compensation for the presumed damage to their health caused by constant exposure to fumes from coal-burning power plants. At the same time, the regime has taken precautionary measures to prevent workers from abandoning the region, since the industries and mining operations there are considered crucial to the national economy. Water pollution has also reached crisis proportions: Prague, historically one of the most culturally advanced cities of Europe, doesn't bother to treat two-thirds of the sewage dumped into the Vltava River while Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, treats none of its waste. In some parts of Czechoslovakia, bottled water is obligatory, much as in the Third World, and some Czechoslovaks reportedly insist on using bottled water for brushing teeth. The drastic upsurge in pollution is also blamed for the emergence of serious health problems in Eastern Europe's industrial pockets. For example, the male life expectancy in northern Bohemia is ten years lower than the national average, while infant mortality rates are 15 percent higher.

The official response to the mount-

ing calamity varies from country to country. Generally, it has been the most politically secure regimes which have permitted the most candid debate and implemented the most aggressive enforcement measures. Thus the Soviet Union permits a more free-wheeling discussion of environmental controversies than the countries of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and possibly Hungary excepted. Unfortunately, these free commentaries are restricted

to limited-circulation, specialized journals; in *Pravda*, the party line still reigns supreme. Even so, it is not unusual for the daily press to report on the poisoning of a river, the impending demise of an endangered species, or the devastation of a forest, and the coverage may include sharp criticism of an offending factory or of bureaucratic inertia.²

In the Soviet Union, of course, there is a limit to freedom of debate on environmental matters, as on every other question. No one is permitted to endorse, even obliquely, the limits-to-

² Nevertheless, when in 1983 a dam burst in the Ukraine, spilling thousands of tons of contaminants into a major river, news of this ecological disaster was withheld from the Soviet public for six weeks.

growth thesis, which is dismissed as a plot hatched by the capitalist haves to undermine the development of the have-nots of the Third World. The Soviets, in fact, have gone to considerable lengths to refute the Club of Rome's *Limits to Growth* doctrine, something due less to compassion for impoverished Asians and Africans (the Soviets having contributed mightily to their poverty through the export of a failed economic model) than to nervousness over latent anti-growth and anti-urban sentiments among the Russian people.

For those entrusted with the formulation of the official line, environmental contamination poses a special dilemma. The traditional Soviet position has been that Soviet might plus Marxian rationality can conquer any problem. Lately, and especially under Gorbachev, the braggadocio has been muted; the Soviet people are being told things which more nearly resemble what the future actually holds in store.

The difficulty facing propagandists is to explain just why it is that the environmental situation is unlikely to improve for many years. The most obvious, and not unjustified, excuse would be that truly effective environmental enforcement would hamper economic growth. The Soviets, however, have thus far rejected the ecology versus growth trade-off argument as an admission of weakness unworthy of the Leninist heritage. As an alternative, the Kremlin has concocted a strange line of reasoning: Capitalism



is responsible for socialist pollution. The capitalist ruling stratum, it is argued, purposely maintained pre-revolutionary Russia as a feudal backwater, thus compelling the new Bolshevik government to telescope into a few decades an industrialization process which had evolved in the capitalist world over several centuries. Crash industrialization did have its costs, of course, environmental degradation being one of the most prominent. Furthermore, now, just when the Soviet Union has achieved a remarkable economic transformation, a new threat stands in the way of full Communist prosperity and environmental health: World imperialism, under American instigation, has launched an unprecedented arms build-up, necessitating the diversion of resources from consumer goods and the environment to bombs and missiles.

The notion that ecological progress is dependent on dismantling the Euromissiles and jettisoning SDI may carry a certain credibility in the Soviet Union, where military power and foreign conquest are carefully promoted as the surrogate of economic success. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, money spent for defense is seen as money contributed (some would say extorted) for the support of an imperialist army of occupation. With the authorities there unable to appeal to citizens' patriotic instincts, and with the old alibi about capitalism as the



source of Communist failure gone stale, new explanations and new approaches have been devised.

The most radical solution was instituted in Poland by the Gierek leadership during the 1970s. The regime had reached the conclusion that open discussion of the environmental problem—or any other domestic issue for that matter—posed a serious threat to the nation's fragile political equilibrium. It thus imposed strict and wide-ranging censorship. Air and water

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pollution, food contamination, the implications of widespread use of pesticides, and similar agricultural controversies—these and many other questions practically ceased to exist in the Polish press. As censorship guidelines (smuggled out of Poland in 1977 and later published in the West) reveal, the regime placed a high priority on smothering the burgeoning environmental debate.³ For example, censors were instructed that

No materials should be permitted which provide information about the current level of pollution or the increasing pollution of the Polish sections of rivers flowing from Czechoslovakia that results from industrial activities in this country.

Another example, involving a specific incident:

It was discovered that harmful substances were being emitted from a material being used to seal the windows in School No. 80 in Gdansk. Classes have been suspended in that school. Absolutely no information on this subject should be permitted.

By no means were these isolated incidents; article after article was censored or totally suppressed—this in a country whose media have enjoyed a reputation as the Soviet bloc's most liberal. And we can safely assume that many articles that would have been routinely published in a free society were simply never written by journalists who, for career reasons or out of utter exasperation, succumbed to self-censorship. Not that journalists abandoned the struggle altogether. Some information was permitted to seep through to the public. The censor's blessing, however, was usually restricted to vague, general, and optimistic formulations; references to specific events, or suggestions that a problem might

³See *The Black Book of Polish Censorship*, edited and translated by Jane Leftwich Curry (Vintage, \$8.95).

not be readily soluble, were deleted. Thus many scientific warnings went unheard: about the inadvisability of locating an industry in an area suffering a water shortage; the level of pollution in the Baltic Sea; references to the devastation of forests by air pollution; reports on the amount of DDT in Polish fish; even recommendations of specific ways to bolster environmental enforcement.

The Gierek regime's censorship policies were not without logic. Gierek

rose to the pinnacle of power because of the previous leadership's botched economic policies and a series of regime-shaking worker riots. As Gierek saw things, Communism's future—not to mention his own—would rise or fall with the regime's ability to induce high rates of economic growth. But unlike the Stalinist era, when workers and farmers were made to work harder and consume less in the interest of industrial development, Gierek faced simultaneous challenges of expanding the industrial base and satisfying restive consumers with more food, cars, and televisions. To meet these two goals, Gierek hit upon the idea of financing domestic economic expansion through trade and credits with capitalist nations, something never really tried by a Communist country. And the psychological element in Gierek's strategy was crucial: Dubbed the "propaganda of success," this amounted to an endless stream of articles touting the achievements of the new course, coupled with the suppression of anything that might raise doubts in the minds of Poles or foreign investors—like the suggestion that pollution and industrial activity were intertwined.⁴

No other Soviet bloc regime has felt it necessary to impose a virtual press blackout on environmental subjects. Instead, an interesting shift in official

⁴It is only fair to note that official Polish attitudes toward the environment have improved since the Gierek era. An important side effect of the Solidarity era was the establishment of the Polish Ecological Club, an independent organization which remains in existence today. More significantly, a confidential report prepared by the Polish Academy of Social Sciences describes Poland as suffering the worst pollution in the world and concludes that one-third of the population lives "on the verge of ecological catastrophe."

pronouncements on ecological issues has taken place. Where in the past the public was assured that environmental catastrophe could be prevented by the timely and intelligent application of socialist principles, today expressions of extreme pessimism and impotence are often encountered. Occasionally, individual sloth is blamed, as in a Czech ideologist's assertion that "lack of discipline and indifference" are at the heart of the trouble. Or, alternatively, we are told, again by a Czech, that "the solution for the ecological problems depends on the success of ideological work." A somewhat different course has been followed by the East Germans, who have attempted to divert public attention from the industrial sources of pollution by attributing the deterioration of the country's forests to various subsidiary causes: heavy snowfalls, storms, poor forestry management, even predatory insects.

It goes without saying that nothing resembling independent environmental movements is allowed to function in Communist societies. In fact, the authorities regard *Western* environmentalists with considerable wariness. This fact by itself tells a great deal about the disruptive potential of ecological issues, at least as the Communist ruling elite sees things. One ordinarily would expect the Kremlin to support unconditionally those in the capitalist world who are in rebellion against capitalism and the alleged lack of humane and spiritual values in the West. Yet the



Soviet press nearly ignored Three Mile Island; on the other hand, months after the event *Pravda* continued to denounce the "persecution" of the black radicals of MOVE who died in the Philadelphia incident. The Kremlin has also been cautious in bestowing praise on West Germany's Greens, despite their manifest neutralist sympathies. While it is conceded that mass ecology movements "could be an important positive factor in the class struggle and a significant antimonopoly force," such movements are also seen as uncertain allies, whose "concepts combine both progressive and reactionary positions and elements of antimonopoly

and other prosperous nations of Europe.

In a perverse way, those who think capitalism responsible for the environmental catastrophe now confronting Eastern Europe are right. From the very outset of postwar Communist rule, a time when economies all across Europe lay in ruins, the example of capitalist success has been a destabilizing force, an ever-present reminder of Communism's inability to compete economically. In practical terms, the capitalist example has meant that the economic structure of Communist societies cannot be built at a normal pace for fear of falling further and fur-

any political system; but they pose a dangerous threat to societies whose sole claim to legitimacy is economic security. In a country like Poland, a decision to raise the price of ham is fraught with political risk; even in the Soviet Union, increases in the price of food and changes in production norms have triggered riots. It is thus hardly surprising that no Communist regime has seen fit to institute the kind of sweeping change which, while almost certainly beneficial in the long run for both the economy and the environment, would necessitate short-term dislocations in employment patterns.

If anything, environmental decay can be expected to worsen in the immediate future. Eastern Europe is becoming more reliant on brown coal as the Soviet Union increases the price of oil. The adoption of strict anti-pollution standards has not been accompanied by anything approaching a serious enforcement effort. The key enforcement instrument—imposing fines on offending industries—is one of the least effective means of fighting pollution; factories find it less expensive to pay the relatively mild fines than to install scrubbers or similar devices; and it is common practice for an enterprise to include in its budget a special fund for payment of environmental fines. Another diversionary approach is the much-heralded development of "smoke-resistant" trees, which are planted in forests killed off by coal-burning power facilities.

Finally, no discussion of the East European environmental crisis is complete without reference to the psychological incapacitation brought on by decades of totalitarian rule. In most democratic societies, and certainly in the United States, the environmental ethic has become ingrained in the public consciousness. But it has yet to take hold in societies under Communist rule. Although Marxist propaganda boasts that under socialism nothing is impossible, those who live in existing socialist systems understand that in practice very little is possible beyond the necessities of life. The authorities complain of apathy and indifference, especially among the young. Yet these are the attitudes which Communism inculcates in those ordinary citizens whose destinies are not directly tied to the Communist party. Having witnessed movements for change or liberation rise and fall—twice in Poland, once each in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—the people of the satellites regard with cynicism the prospects of changing the system "from within." To be sure, there exist in every Communist country dedicated conservationists, and even a few ecology radicals of the anti-growth variety. But environmental reform requires that the ideas propounded by the activist elite enjoy the support of the public. Today, such support does not exist among people who are constantly being told that a few more years of sacrifice will be necessary before the march towards full Communist affluence can begin again. □

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protest with apolitical and even anti-Communist aims."

As is their usual practice in dealing with troublesome social causes, Communist regimes attempt to control and manage citizen concern over the environment instead of overtly suppressing it. Party-sponsored environmental entities have been formed in most Communist countries, and the party takes care to channel their energies into such non-threatening projects as tree-planting and municipal clean-up expeditions. Nevertheless, the official environmental committees are permitted more latitude than the bogus peace councils or the hierarchies of certain subverted church bodies. The success of the Greens has apparently sent a cautionary message to the East, and the authorities have decided that a limited quota of protest must be tolerated to head off spontaneous movements which could eventually serve as the basis for a political opposition.

Ultimately, the major obstacle to environmental improvement in the Communist world is the stalemate of the Soviet economic model. Throughout Eastern Europe, and to a lesser degree in the Soviet Union, Communism has relied on economic growth and an undemanding workplace routine as the principal vehicles for the attainment of a measure of popular acceptance. Growth is particularly crucial for the rulers in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, countries with historic links to the West, whose citizens equate Communism with a culturally inferior and imperialist foreign power, and compare living standards not with the Soviet Union but with Austria, West Germany, Sweden,

ther behind the West. Nor have the relatively high rates of growth registered during the sixties and seventies resolved the dilemma, since growth predictably whetted East European consumer appetites and since, in any event, the exhaustion of the Soviet model has produced a stagnant or even declining standard-of-living over the past five years. Of course, if Communism were to be forced on the entire world, there would no longer be a need for Communist regimes to engage in an inherently unequal race with capitalism; since such an outcome is unlikely, the environment must be sacrificed at the altar of growth.

This trade-off poses special problems for the Communist world, with its reliance on technologically archaic industries and one of the most environmentally destructive sources of energy, brown coal. Another disadvantage for Communist economies is their resistance to change. In the United States, environmental achievements have resulted not simply because of stricter regulatory enforcement, but also because of the transformation of the economy brought about by its openness to technological innovation. Communist countries are not, of course, incapable of economic modernization; after all, many of the world's most sophisticated weapons have been produced by the Soviet Union. Here again, the problem is less technological than political. As we know in the United States, the making of a post-industrial economy is disruptive and often painful, involving high unemployment, the virtual death of smokestack cities, and downward mobility for millions of blue-collar workers. These are serious problems for



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SAILING FROM BYZANTIUM

A lesson in history's finality.

Istanbul, like Rome, is an imperial city. Unlike Rome, the transitions between the phases of its past have been swift and violent, with little continuity between them. Modern Istanbul has been for sixty years the chief city of a secular, nationalistic republic, kept in order by a business-like military. Ottoman Constantinople was, for four hundred years before that, the hub of an oriental empire that started out crass and competent, and ended merely crass. The Constantinople of the Byzantines—or the Romans, as they styled themselves to the very end—lasted longest of all. It is also the most interesting today.

The emperor Constantine made the city capital of half his empire in 330 A.D. A Turkish army took it in 1453. The interval of time between the two—eleven centuries—is almost incomprehensible, as a measure of social duration. Buildings may survive that long, or bristle cone pines—not human institutions. In the modern world, only the papacy and the god-emperor of Japan have had a better run for their money.

At its greatest extent, in the sixth century, the Byzantine Empire stretched from Spain to Egypt. Five hundred years later, it still covered an immense rectangle with corners in Syria, Sicily, Croatia, and the Crimean peninsula. A long succession of enemies tried to whittle it away. Some—the Persians and the pagan Bulgarians—were beaten. Others—Arabs, Normans—took their bits and pieces before they were finally stopped. Catholic western Europe, in the form of the Fourth Crusade, sacked the city and gave the empire its death blow. (The Pope, to his credit, excommunicated the crusaders when he found out what they had been up to.) Moslem Turks disposed of the husk.

Surprisingly little remains in the city

the Byzantines built. An aqueduct straddles one of Istanbul's main north-south roads, swirling with little Turkish Fiats and aged DeSoto limousine taxis. There are the walls of the emperor Theodosius, which were manned and maintained until the end of the nineteenth century, when developments in naval gunnery made them obsolete. There is a small park whose outline preserves the course of the chariot track of the Hippodrome, and which contains two characteristically imperial monuments—plunder from somewhere else: an Egyptian obelisk, and a broken trophy stand from the oracle of Delphi. (The park also has an iron gazebo, Victorian and absurd, a present from Kaiser Wilhelm II.) Here and there are columns, mostly toppled, and churches, turned into uninteresting mosques. Two churches, once mosques, have been turned again, into museums.

The church of St. Savior in Chora (still known to cab-drivers as Kariye Jami, or Kariye Mosque) lies in sight

of the Theodosian walls. When it was erected, in the sixth century, it was in the countryside, like St. Martin-in-the-Fields in London, though the city soon swept around it. After eight hundred years, it was touched by a genius. Between the Crusaders' sack in 1204 and the final Turkish siege, the Byzantine empire shrank to a mini-state, about the size and importance of Belgium. But in that period of political impotence, it experienced a cultural renaissance. The glory of St. Savior dates from that midwinter spring.

The patron of the work was a statesman and dilettante, Theodore Methochides. There is a mosaic of him in the church today, wearing a bright, bulbous turban (in their final eclipse, the Byzantines adopted Turkish fashions). He offers a model of the church, the size of a big toy, to the Virgin. Methochides fell from power in a court intrigue, and ended his days as a monk in the church he covered with splendor (it would be interesting to know whether the mosaic of himself was a source of joy or pain).

The mosaics that cover the outer rooms of the main church are mostly intact. The Turks did not whitewash them, as they usually did, but only covered them with wooden partitions. In a small church with a low ceiling, they make a sumptuous and intimate feast. The most striking thing, to Western eyes, is the absence of a Passion. There is a fine death of the Virgin, which must have elicited the same emotions of pity and terror. But the Byzantine Christ, at least as St. Savior depicts him, is a young middle-aged man in the fullness of his vigor, with stern eyes and brows—a dispenser of justice, not a sufferer of injustice.

But the prize of the church, even more than its mosaics, are the frescos of the side chapel. Under the dome at the end stands a row of church fathers, dressed in robes of black and white checks and stripes, stark as Mondrians. Over them is one of the great resurrections. The ground is strewn with a litter of locks—the broken bonds of death. Adam and Eve, who brought death into the world, come to life first—Adam a noble, ruined old man, Eve a failed Mary in red. Between them strides Christ the resurrector, hauling them from their tombs with a firm, irresistible grip. They seem surprised, maybe still half asleep. He is a picture of power, love, and impatience. When this vision becomes too hypnotizing, you may retreat outside, where the Turkish Automobile Club has planted trees and painted the neighborhood.

St. Savior is small and perfect. Hagia Sophia, the Church of the Holy Wisdom, is huge and perfect. It was the cathedral of Constantinople, dedicated on Christmas Day, in the year 538, at the height of Byzantine power. When Justinian the Great, who had commissioned it, first saw it, he is supposed to have exclaimed, "Solomon, Solomon, I have beaten you at last." It is surely the most impressive non-Gothic church building in the world. The Gothic succeeds by the use of light and darkness,



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