

mitted her to challenge, aggravate, and inspire men like Talleyrand and Napoleon, or even of Gertrude Stein ("the mama of dada" according to Clifton Fadiman), whose patronizing of the so-called Lost Generation is the stuff of legend. These women, unlike Longworth, were activists within their own spheres of influence, as opposed to our heroine, who relished her role as the operator of a patrician cock-fight: tossing the roosters into the ring and enjoying the battle without ever being sullied by the blood. On her ninetieth birthday she confessed, "I'm a hedonist. I have an appetite for being entertained. Isn't it strange how that upsets some people?"

It does not upset, so much as puzzle. How could a woman with such breeding, intelligence, and connections within the inner circles of power have been so impotent? Moreover, why, in the fashion of the emperor's clothes, did so many movers and shakers consider her imprimatur so crucial? Aside from the obvious benefits accruing from an evening of stimulating conversation, a session at the Longworth table seems to have been highly over-rated. Mrs. Felsenthal produces no evidence that 2009 Massachusetts Avenue was the scene of secret alliances or parleys that in any way altered the course of history. No missile crisis was disarmed, no grand legislative program was conceived, no daring political scheme was devised, so far as we can tell, during the endless, gaseous sessions that unfolded with the deft choreography of this towering yet oddly hollow figure.

Working from the personal recollections of the grande dame, as well as the prolific correspondence from the Roosevelt family, Mrs. Felsenthal has constructed a workmanlike portrait of an interesting bit player on the Washington scene. One wishes that she had chosen to enrich her chronicle with more historical background that might have offered flesh and fiber to the times—as opposed to the life—of the subject. Moreover, we are left dangling in a few spots, as in the death of Teddy Roosevelt, a man who exerted enormous influence over his daughter. She was blindly loyal to him and his causes as a young woman, yet his demise is dismissed in but a few paragraphs and we are doomed to puzzle how this trauma affected not only her public life but the carnivorous relationship with her only offspring.

Mrs. Felsenthal is inclined to play the role of court stenographer, laying down only the facts as reported by eyewitnesses and offering a modicum of her own insights. To be sure, such efforts can often descend into the realm of pop psychology, but in this case more personal analysis, even as raw, unlet-

tered speculation, would have been welcomed. Her accuracy is difficult to fault, considering her plethora of sources, although it should be noted that one anecdote attributed to Alice's husband may be apocryphal. Nick Longworth, as Speaker of the House, was carrying on a liaison with the wife of a fellow congressman. The cuckolded gentleman is reported to have risen up behind Longworth at a public function, rubbed Longworth's famous bald pate, and observed that it felt exactly like his wife's bottom. Longworth is said to have stroked the same spot and mused, "So it does." This story is also attributed to dramatist Marc Connelly while seated at the Algonquin Round Table. One also notes that the author at one point places a character "outside Bavaria" which, presumably, is either Austria, Baden-Württemberg, or Czechoslovakia; but this is a niggling oversight in a volume that seems to have been prepared with a monk-like attention to detail.

But detail without perspective can trivialize the most dramatic of epics, and surely Mrs. Longworth's story has a certain epic quality, even if her role is one of a peripatetic busybody rather than a prime mover. In many ways she remains a rather pathetic symbol of the disintegration of the great Hudson River dynasties that controlled so much of the nation's fortunes during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was the Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, Fishes, Schuylers, and of course the Roosevelts who dominated the Wall Street-Washington axis throughout that lurid period (the Vanderbilts frittered away their strength, mindlessly squandering the Commodore's millions while energizing the scandal sheets and managing, in a fit of social conscience, to invent the game of contract bridge). The decline of the Roosevelts was considerably more gentle, ending with the elevation of Eleanor to Democratic party sainthood prior to her death in 1962. It was all downhill from there, our heroine's windy free-for-all notwithstanding.

Still, the decline and fall of this great American family, as represented by the lady in question, is the stuff of wonderful drama. While Alice Roosevelt Longworth will at best be recalled by a mere footnote in the history books, the sheer scope of time in which she lived, and the circle of the rich and powerful in which she endlessly circulated, creates a riveting spectacle seemingly ready-made for the big screen.

Yes, this is the story of a wonderfully colorful and profligate rich-bitch who, thanks to good luck and a dollop of good genes, dallied with the mighty. With a little Hollywood hyperbole this could be major box office. Now, if only Kate would return our calls . . . □

PEACE AND REVOLUTION: THE MORAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN PACIFISM

Guenter Lewy/William B. Eerdmans/\$19.95

William McGurn

In a small jumble of steel and concrete in the midst of Asia's most dynamic city, Manh Chung Tu waits for a freedom that may never come. Mr. Manh is a Vietnamese in his mid-twenties, one of the thousands of boat people to wash up on Hong Kong's shores in recent years. He has been here

William McGurn is deputy editorial page editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal and editor of Basic Law, Basic Questions (Review Publishing Co.), a collection of essays about the future of Hong Kong under Peking rule.

six years—six years and one day on the sunny afternoon I met him. Over the walls, looped with barbed wire, the tops of the colony's blue-and-cream double-decker buses are just visible.

Mr. Manh has some 5,137 neighbors, close neighbors you might say, since at Sham Shui Po camp they live in two warehouses filled with row upon row of bunk beds, each bed three levels high, stacked three deep on either side of a center aisle as long as a football field. Makeshift curtains strung around the sides represent futile efforts at modesty; "a bloody stalag," says one



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British official visiting the site. Yet Mr. Manh and the others all say they'd sooner stay here than go back to Vietnam, willing to wait years in the hopes of that magic ticket to America. Back in Vietnam, there are reports of famine in the North, skirmishes with the Cambodian resistance (including the murderous Khmer Rouge), and an outflow of refugees now at its largest level in years. Whatever you call this, it's not peace. So where are the peace workers today?

According to Guenter Lewy, they've long since moved on to other things, Central America and South Africa for example. The reason, says Lewy, is that the American peace movement was interested not so much in peace as in a unilateral American withdrawal that would "in effect make sure that the war would go on until the NLF and the North Vietnamese had achieved their objectives." In his latest book, *Peace and Revolution*, Lewy charts how American pacifism moved from a principled repudiation of the use of arms to a whorish endorsement of armed struggle on behalf of some of the world's most brutal Communist insurgencies.

It couldn't be a more timely work. Coming as it does just as Congress quibbles over funding for the Nicaraguan contras and the Democratic party drafts a presidential platform labeling South Africa a "terrorist state," *Peace and Revolution* makes bracing reading. We've seen it all before, says Lewy, who charts the hijacking of the peace movement

through four mainline pacifist groups: the American Friends Service Committee, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the War Resisters League, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The lessons it contains are of import to pacifists interested in restoring integrity to their movement. More important, the book should be required reading for U.S. policymakers responding to similar pressure in troublespots from El Salvador to South Korea today.

Although Lewy takes time out to deal with the peace movement's flings with such countries as Nicaragua and Cuba, the book's 283 pages amply demonstrate that the real catalyst for its sorry transformation was Vietnam. Prior to 1965, American pacifists had been careful to steer clear of any cooperation with Communists, and their principled refusal to distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of force led them even to deny the legitimacy of the war against Hitler, as abhorrent as they held Nazism to be. With Vietnam, they became partisans and opened themselves to cooperation with Communists and their friends. "Unlike earlier conscientious objectors who had recognized the right of society to make decisions on war and peace but had claimed for themselves the right to refuse to abide by the command to bear arms," says Lewy, "the new 'resisters' engaged in acts of obstruction and even sabotage of the war effort." It wasn't long before NLF flags start-

ed flying at American peace rallies.

In a way this was almost inevitable. Once the emphasis was shifted from nonviolence to the establishment of a socialist order, the slope was slippery enough for advocates to slide easily into the propagandist role. In 1967, for example, A. J. Muste, a leader of the War Resisters League, argued that "politically sophisticated pacifists" had to distinguish "between the violence of liberation movements (of people who, in a situation where they have no real possibility of democratic means, resort to violence) and the violence imposed on these countries by imperialist powers, for example, the violence which the United States is carrying out in Vietnam at the present time."

The head of the Indochina program for the American Friends Service Committee, John McAuliffe, likewise suggested in the aftermath of the fall of Saigon that America ought to rethink "the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in Vietnam's success and consequently its application to our own and other struggles. . . . It is not in the interests of the American people to oppose socialist/communist revolutions in other countries. Moreover, if we try to understand what is in their best interests, we are likely often to support such revolutions in the Third World." Not surprisingly, these same groups were the last to criticize the newly installed Communist regimes in Indochina even after evidence of the re-education camps and killing fields became overwhelming. Instead, they directed their energy at undermining the credibility of refugees bearing reports of persecution as well as those in their own movement with enough integrity to acknowledge that something had gone horribly wrong.

this claim needs to be fully taken in before the seriousness of what happened in Vietnam can be appreciated. For whereas most people will under certain conditions sanction war as a means to an end, a sometimes necessary evil if you will, pacifists make nonviolence an end in itself. In other words, while others have various moral mechanisms to allow for a certain (but not unlimited) use of force in pursuit of a just cause, pacifists rule out questions of goals altogether.

Time and again *Peace and Revolution* illustrates how old-timers in the movement—genuinely committed to this difficult principle and seasoned by bitter experience with Communist groups during World War II and the fifties—were most prescient about where their movement was heading and why it was going there. A good example was Alfred Hassler, who in 1973, after almost a decade of futile opposition to the change, put his finger squarely on the issue at stake:

A good many people in the movement, seeing the origins of the Indochina war in "the system," and recognizing that the institution of war will not be eliminated until the system is changed, let their logic drift into the untenable conclusion that the killing in Indochina could not be ended until the system, especially in the United States, was changed. Consistently then, they became more assiduous for the victory by their side, which would be a defeat for the system, than for an end to the killing and a transfer of the conflict, which was not all that simple, to the diplomatic arena.

It is a point we pacifists need to get straight in our thinking. The broadest possible alliances are not constructive if they rest on the abandonment of our central belief. War is our first enemy; when we justify it for any ends (which is different from understanding the reasons people go to war) we have lost.

Even the brothers Berrigan, whose thoughts and writings confirm the legitimacy of the pejorative "jesuitical," chastised the peace groups for looking at North Vietnam as "an angel of light in comparison with the slouching Western beast." By then, of course, it was too late.

A good part of the new pacifists' problem was their misunderstanding of pacifism itself, a blurring of the lines between personal and public morality. Pacifism is by definition a highly personal option, given that most of us accept that to stand by while the strong bully the weak can itself be criminal. It was such reasoning that reconciled Augustine to the duties of Roman citizenship, the great saint seeing the end as a "just order" rather than the mere absence of conflict. In short, the pacifist cannot turn his neighbor's cheek.

Lewy's impressive documentation of these events has to convince even the thickest reader. Nevertheless, a little juggling of his arrangement, along with a tad more attention to the philosophical claims of pacifism, might have helped put the evidence in better perspective. True enough, the first few chapters discuss pacifism itself, and the book is dotted with criticisms by longtime pacifists upset with the drift of their respective organizations. But a bit more development of this theme early on would have underscored the author's main point, to wit: that the American peace movement not only picked the wrong side in Vietnam, it betrayed its own principles in the process.

To be sure, in the very first sentence Lewy correctly defines pacifism as "the doctrine of those who are morally opposed to bearing arms and who refuse to sanction war for any purpose, defensive or otherwise." The magnitude of

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Given the inevitable tension of such a challenge, pacifism is not likely to remain true to itself when it attempts to become a mass movement. Like religious communities, pacifism can opt for purity, a way of example without retreating into naivete. As George Weigel has put it in *Tranquillitas Ordinis*, "By witnessing to the truth of how things ought to be pacifism could become a standard for measuring the gap between that moral and political horizon and things as they are." In 1955, Weigel notes, the AFSC published a study called *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence*, which did not shy away from the dilemma of power, was resolutely anti-Communist, and recognized that a genuine pacifist movement could lead even non-adherents to pay more attention to nonviolent options. As Weigel further notes and Lewy more than proves, pacifism never did pick up this thread, to the great loss of both American society and the movement itself. If ever it does so, it will have to acknowledge its debt to these more traditional ethicists.

Apart from these philosophical shifts, there may be an even simpler explanation for the dramatic change in the American peace movement, mirroring the shift in America's mainstream churches, universities, and unions: the change in the kind of people who led these groups. Lewy points out that in the aftermath of World War I, pacifism became inextricably linked with socialism, particularly because of the argument that "wars are based on the economic rivalries of imperialist nations and are encouraged by the traffic in armaments carried on by profit-hungry capitalists." This in turn set up a "conflict of loyalties between the pacifists' ideals of non-violence and their aspirations to liberate the exploited and oppressed." By the time Vietnam rolled around, it was painfully clear that the commitment to socialism outweighed the commitment to nonviolence, much as church elites found that this same commitment outweighed their religious doctrine. So whereas old-timers were people who were pacifists first and fuzzy socialists second, the new breed were committed socialists who didn't seem to comprehend the radicalism of the genuine pacifist position. This disturbed not a few people, and *Peace and Revolution* is peppered with complaints, for example, that the AFSC was being increasingly run by non-Quakers often hostile to Quaker principles. Perhaps there's another book in this which might also ask why the driving force of the new movement, even more than the commitment to "national liberation," was a hatred of American democracy.

Why is any of this important today? As Lewy points out, despite being relatively small in number the peace movement is perhaps more influential than ever, one example being the rejection by America's Roman Catholic bishops of the idea of deterrence and, more recently, of the President's Star Wars program. It was these groups and their offspring that defeated funding for the Nicaraguan con-

tras. And in the Philippines right now, it is the peace movement's financial and moral support that helps keep the insurgency alive and, even within the Aquino government, fuels the resentment against the U.S. bases there—this despite the overwhelmingly pro-American stance of the Filipino people.


For the American people, *Peace and Revolution* is a sharp reminder that the public realm has its own special virtues,

particularly with regard to the use of force. For the American peace movement, it warns that being pure of heart is not enough once the line is crossed into public advocacy. Toward the end of the book Lewy quotes Camus's warning that some forms of sincerity "are worse than lies." If that is a hard lesson to learn from a book, it is easier than learning it from a bayonet. Just ask the folks at Sham Shui Po. □

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

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
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THE USE AND ABUSE OF SOVIE TOLOGY

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of *Survey*, March 1988)/\$39.95

Joseph Shattan

Are intellectuals an endangered species? I confess that I'm of two minds about this. Sometimes it seems to me that far from being endangered, intellectuals—particularly those associated with the media—are among the dominant groups of our society, and exploit their dominance to threaten the rest of us. But when I reflect on what intellectuals used to be—free-spirited polymaths, fluent in several languages and disciplines, able to integrate their wide-ranging knowledge and bring it to bear on current affairs—I am reluctantly forced to conclude that such intellectuals may well be an endangered species, soon to be superseded by academic specialists who know everything about nothing, and pop-journalists who know nothing about everything.

Leo Labedz is an intellectual in the older, honorable sense of the term. His friend Zbigniew Brzezinski has rightly called him "an activist-scholar . . . with an ability to work in many languages and with a wide knowledge of history, political science, sociology, and other social sciences." For many years now, often under precarious financial circumstances, Labedz has edited *Survey*, one of the finest journals on East-West relations in the world today.

Like *Encounter*, with which it shares a similar political outlook, *Survey* is published in London but probably enjoys a wider readership on this side of the Atlantic, an anomaly best explained, perhaps, by the fact that British intellectuals are even more estranged from reality than their American counterparts. Nor are they any more willing than Americans to listen to the truth about Soviet domestic and foreign policy, especially when it comes from someone who speaks with a funny Polish accent, thinks they're a bunch of bloody fools, and is not afraid to say so.

Last March, *Survey* brought out a special issue, "The Use and Abuse of Sovietology" (now published in hardcover by Transaction Books) containing sixteen essays written by Labedz over the past twenty-five years. These erudite, argumentative, passionately

outspoken essays encompass an extremely broad range of political, literary, and philosophical themes, but what binds them together is Labedz's activist approach to history—an approach that stresses the ability of human beings to overcome historical adversity and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Such a view might seem to be little more than sturdy common sense, yet it is remarkable how much of contemporary political and scholarly discourse has been informed by a very different set of assumptions.

Take, for example, the writings of Isaac Deutscher. Though he is not much read today, at one time Deutscher was regarded as a veritable Walter Lippmann among Sovietologists. Like Lippmann, Deutscher was usually wrong, but his flawed prophecies, far from diminishing his intellectual stature, seemed only to enhance it. Born in 1907 to an Orthodox Polish-Jewish family, Deutscher chose to place his trust in History, rather than in the Lord of History who had inspired his forebears, and joined the Polish Communist Party at the age of nineteen. Although he was expelled from the party in 1932, and eventually became a regular contributor to the *Observer* and the *Economist*, as well as a world-famous biographer of Stalin and Trotsky, Deutscher always retained what Labedz called, in a famous polemic published in 1962, "his own private unpuzzled vision of a Communist wave of the future." Deutscher's unwavering commitment to historical determinism, and his view of Stalin as history's agent, led Labedz to launch a furious attack on him in the pages of *Survey*—an attack which must have drawn blood, since Deutscher threatened to sue Labedz for libel.

More than twenty years after his assault on Deutscher, Labedz launched an equally devastating attack against Deutscher's friend and fellow Sovietologist, Edward Hallett Carr. A product of Cambridge and the Foreign Office, and a former Deputy Editor of the *Times*, Carr's background was very different from Deutscher's, yet both men were gifted writers who became subtle apologists for Stalin. Carr's pro-

Sovietism, however, did not derive from a quasi-religious faith in history. Rather, it stemmed from a political stance characterized by Carr as "realism." "Realism" meant that in evaluating history's handiwork one must set aside one's moral scruples and repeat, with Hegel, that "whatever is real, is rational." In 1939, Carr's "realistic" acceptance of German hegemony led him to endorse the Munich Agreement of 1938, calling it "the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major issue by a procedure of peaceful change." Subsequently, this same "realistic" stance caused Carr, in his multi-volume history of the Soviet Union, to identify with the nomenklatura rather than with its victims. Labedz's indictment of this attitude is right on target: "Carr," he explained, "was only one of a number of intellectuals fascinated with power who at the time of its decline in Britain were looking with nostalgic sympathy at the rising new empire. Only a few of them, in identifying themselves with it so irrevocably, went as far as to commit actual treason, but many engaged in *la trahison des clercs*."

Another supporter of the Munich Agreement, destined like Carr to become a distinguished historian of Soviet affairs, was George Kennan. As a young American diplomat writing from Prague in the aftermath of Munich, Kennan expressed the hope that the Czechs would set aside "political romanticism" and reconcile themselves to the verdict of history, which would lead to "greater economic security and greater racial tolerance for the Czechoslovak people sadly in need of both." Unlike Carr, Kennan's views sprang less from "realism" than from a kind of historical fatalism, a feeling that there is not much human beings can do about history, apart from accepting, and adjusting to, the inevitable. But this streak of fatalism in Kennan's character has been constantly at odds with another, more activist strain, which led him to advocate the "containment" of Soviet aggression in the 1940s. The result, according to Labedz, has been "an almost schizoid political dualism" which Kennan has been unable to overcome. In a brilliantly perceptive essay published in 1979, Labedz described "the two minds of George Kennan," and demonstrated how his psychological contradictions account for Kennan's evolution "from his original position of advising resistance to Soviet expansionism to the present one of advocating its accommodation." According to Labedz, a growing disenchantment with American politics and culture has led Kennan, in his old age, to return to the fatalism of his Munich days and repudiate the activism of his middle years.

Deutscher, Carr, and Kennan: One could hardly imagine a more vivid study in contrasts than those between the Marxist-Rabbi, the Cambridge Hegelian, and the American Preacher. But what these three Sovietologists have in common is a conviction that in the grand historical scheme of things, human choice and volition count for very little. In the 1930s, this defeatist attitude found its political expression in the policy known as "appeasement." In the 1970s, according to Labedz, similar attitudes formed the intellectual underpinnings of détente. As he put it in a 1974 essay, "Those who defend the policy of détente in the way in which it is understood in the Soviet Union argue that international negotiations between powers are simply a matter of realistic policies to which ethical issues are irrelevant. A supplementary argument for the Soviet form of détente is that whatever the current conduct of the Soviet leadership, international détente will in the long run, more or less automatically, lead to an improvement in the Soviet treatment of its own citizens . . ." It is almost as though Western policymakers, having learned their Soviet history from Deutscher and Carr, set out to fashion a policy which incorporated the "realist" and determinist assumptions of their mentors.

Of course, not all students of Soviet affairs have subscribed to these views. Shortly before his death, for example, the great French political commentator, Raymond Aron, affirmed his belief that there are times "when lucidity and a bit of courage can suffice to alter the future." This belief, Aron declared, "is part of my philosophy of history." In an appreciation of Aron published in 1977, Labedz identified himself completely with Aron's position. And in an article advocating Britain's entry into the Common Market, published back in 1971, Labedz was quite explicit about his own philosophy of history. "Since the First World War," he wrote, "we have known that civilizations are mortal. But there is nothing automatic about it, just as there is nothing inevitable about 'post-imperial decline.' Historical alternatives do exist."

It is tempting to relate Labedz's unswerving belief in "historical alternatives" to the events of his own dramatic life. As Zbigniew Brzezinski notes in his introduction to this anthology:

Leo Labedz was 19 years old in 1939, having returned from studies in Paris and living again in his native Poland. With the wartime partition of Poland between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, many families had to face the stark choice of deciding whether to flee East or West, into

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