
David Brock

Jimmy Carter's Return

How a disgraced ex-president's crusade for vindication led to the hijacking of Clinton foreign policy.

I.

The consensus view: he has been a superb ex-president.

—Time, October 3, 1994

From virtually the moment he left office in defeat and disgrace, Jimmy Carter refused to retire with the quiet dignity that long has been the custom for ex-presidents. As early as the spring of 1981, he fell into a fit of pique over not having received briefings on national security similar to those his own administration had given Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. (Reagan aides had planned to brief all three living ex-presidents, but the crush of business had not yet permitted them to do so.) Carter put out word that he would embarrass Reagan by complaining to the press, and his threat paid off. Within weeks, Reagan NSC director Richard Allen and an aide were off to Plains. Nixon and Ford were also briefed, but only the Plains visit was unpleasant; Rosalynn Carter served the group dreadfully overripe peaches without plates or napkins.

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More unpleasant still was a letter Carter wrote a few weeks later to members of his former cabinet and senior staff, which he made public. Carter accused Reagan of a "one-sided attitude of belligerence toward the Soviet Union" that would "severely damage our own reputation as a peaceloving people." The leaked letter was vintage Carter: blunt, self-righteous, determined, and treacherous. He would soon follow with more of the same. In 1983, he labeled a U.S. arms

reduction proposal "propaganda" and took the Soviet line that defenses against ballistic missiles were an "insuperable obstacle" to arms control.

But Carter did more than snipe at Reagan from his outpost in Plains, unusual enough for an ex-president. He undertook quasi-diplomatic missions without the consent of the U.S. government, indeed often in derogation of the sitting president. Whether or not one agrees with the policies of a particular president, this is reprehensible behavior. The 1798 Logan Act, in fact, expressly proscribes private citizens from negotiating with foreign nations. Carter added insult to injury, the record shows, by deceitfully manipulating both sides in such negoti-

ations, including his own government, and lying to the press.

Many observers have commended Carter's role in heading off Clinton's planned invasion of Haiti. But whether or not Carter played a helpful role in this case, the dangers posed to American interests by an ex-president's ad hoc diplomacy—even if sanctioned by the U.S. government—are not mitigated. The dangers are considerable, since through his own lack of interest and vacillation President Clinton appears to have allowed his foreign policy to be hijacked not only by Carter's people and Carter's style, but also now by Carter himself. Many of the foreign policy *démarches* claimed as triumphs by Clinton and touted as such in the press are Carter's, not Clinton's. And on close examination they are thin gruel indeed.

Back in 1981, some foreign leaders saw that they could turn Carter's travels to their advantage. The Chinese were especially canny. That year, the New China Agency published an exclusive interview with Carter in which he seemed to lavish praise upon China's treatment of Tibet and the Tibetan people. It turned out that Carter had let himself speak with Tibetans through a Chinese government interpreter, who tailored the remarks. A flustered Carter told reporters that he wasn't an expert on Tibet.

In an effort to remind the world of the Camp David Accords, Carter has been active in the Middle East. In 1983, he met with leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization, though U.S. policy had forbade official contacts on the grounds that the PLO's charter refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist. Refusing to acknowledge the symbolism of the meeting, Carter said he was acting in his capacity as a professor at Emory University—a position he assumed soon after leaving office—and was not “representing my country in any way.”

As he was about to leave for Africa in 1986, Carter was advised by the Reagan administration to turn back because the bombing of Libya was about to commence. It is one of the few times that anyone on Carter's staff can remember his deferring to anyone, let alone the American government. “Carter takes no instructions, and that includes from presidents,” as one former Carter Center aide put it. Carter subsequently denounced the bombing as a “serious mistake” and, in a flash of the old moral equivalence for which he was once condemned, stated that if his daughter Amy had been killed under circumstances similar to Moammar Qaddafi's, he would devote his life to retribution and expected Qaddafi to do the same.

The Reagan administration also opposed a Carter visit in 1987 to Syria, since all high-level meetings had been banned after Syria's involvement in a plot to blow up an Israeli airliner taking off from London. Carter went anyway, and described Syrian President Hafez al-Assad as an “intelligent” man, “totally dedicated to independence from domination by any country.” He also used the occasion to lash out at Reagan for “always” preferring military to negotiated solutions. Reagan, he said, was “more inclined to form a contra army to overthrow the Sandinistas, or inject the marines into Lebanon, or use American battleships to shell villages around Beirut.” The comment was so intemperate it drew criticism in the liberal U.S. press while Carter was still abroad.

In 1986, with the president and Congress supporting the contra movement to democratize Nicaragua, Carter held twelve hours of private talks with Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. When Ortega visited the U.S. the next year, Carter invited him to visit a tenement renovation project on

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Manhattan's Lower East Side, run by the nonprofit organization Habitat for Humanity, with which Carter has close ties. Habitat later built houses in Sandinista Nicaragua. “We've got a lot of friends in Nicaragua. We want folks down there to know that some American Christians love them and that we don't all hate them,” Carter said.

Such activities out of office (not to mention his record of appeasement, accommodation, and acquiescence within) have led some to mischaracterize Carter as a leftist, a dictator-lover, or a dolt. Actually, the driving force behind Carter's approach—his one constant in facing any foreign-policy problem—is fear of American military intervention. It is a strikingly non-ideological and non-strategic position, always placing him on the side of American enemies and assorted global terrorists and thugs, because they are ipso facto the object of any exercise of American power.

“He tries to appeal to the deeper, inner self, even in a bad character,” said one former assistant who admires the approach. “He believes that even a dictator will have a weak point, which in a dictator is the good [side]. He looks for the good in any human being.” The problem with this philosophy is that it fails to recognize that some systems and some leaders have more good in them than others, and some have no good in them at all.

Carter's mode of operation is more that of a therapist than a statesman, often lending his diplomatic rhetoric a surreal quality. He once said of Mikhail Gorbachev and himself, “Two farmers can't be antagonistic toward one

another." In the same vein, he said that Sandinista Nicaragua had "as much free enterprise, private ownership, as exists in Great Britain." These statements will strike most observers as laughable, though Carter can't be so easily dismissed. He is no lightweight. Acting within his own belief system, however naive or cowardly it may be, he is both tough and shrewd. "If you watch the way he constantly slaps the cuffs on his own government," says one foreign-policy expert who has traveled with Carter, "you can see that this is one hard-nosed SOB." The former Carter aide added, "Carter never does anything without a purpose."

What, then, is the purpose of Carter's long-standing desire to be a player again on the world stage, now apparently facilitated by Clinton? The most credible explanation is hinted at by an official who traveled with Carter to observe the Panamanian elections in 1989 and accompanied the ex-president to his post-election briefing of President Bush in the White House. "It was the first time he'd been back to the White House since Sadat's funeral in 1981," the official recalls. "It was the end of a long and trying trip, every pore was oozing Panama. He went in and briefed the president and half the cabinet. When we came out and got in the car, he didn't even mention Panama. Out came this intense anguish over the

[Iranian] hostages and the helicopter crash." Those close to Carter believe that he is still embittered by what he sees as a misperception of failure in his handling of Iran and the hostage situation. Carter is angry that he lost the 1980 election and believes that he did the right thing in resisting the use of force to end the crisis. Ergo, his entire subsequent career has been spent seeking to redeem his presidency in the eyes of history by re-making contemporary American foreign policy along pacifist lines.

Carter's obsessive effort to redeem his reputation by projecting his own failures in Iran onto Reagan prompted his call in 1991 for a congressional investigation into the "October Surprise" allegations leveled by former Carter NSC staffer Gary Sick. Sick alleged that Reagan aides stole the 1980 election by negotiating with the Iranians to delay the release of the hostages.

The ensuing investigation found no evidence of this. On the contrary, a case can be made that it was Carter, not Reagan, who played politics with Iran, when he did too little, too late in ordering the abortive Desert One rescue effort. In late 1979 the military had told a paralyzed Carter that a rescue effort had a much better chance of succeeding the sooner it was ordered. By March 1980, Carter, stuck with his commitment not to campaign while the hostages were in captivity, was about to take a beat-

ing from Senator Edward Kennedy in the New York primary. Although by then the chances of success weren't good, Carter ordered the rescue mission anyway. At a White House meeting immediately following the debacle, according to someone who attended it, Charles Manatt, then the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, asked Carter a question that appeared to be prearranged: "Would you now be willing to campaign in New York?" Carter's answer was "Yes." This suggests that the rescue attempt was initiated to liberate Carter from his pledge not to campaign by changing the circumstances.

II.

Both Carter and his wife Rosalynn traveled a long road back from the depths of depression to which they had sunk after losing the 1980 election. In their 1987 book, *Everything to Gain: Making the Most of*

the Rest of Your Life, the Carters recounted their return to a "potentially empty life" in Plains. The family peanut farm was bankrupt and creditors were anxious. Agri-giant Archer-Daniels-Midland saved the day when it went into the peanut business and bought several Georgia warehouses, including the Carters'. Still, they suffered periodic

bouts of self-pity, disillusionment, and anxiety. Jimmy spent hours beating objects with a hammer in his woodworking shop.

The Carters eventually saw light at the end of this dark tunnel. Carter took a teaching post at Emory University in Atlanta in 1982 and announced plans to build an elaborate public-policy center on the campus. The Carter Center was dedicated in 1986. The complex includes the Jimmy Carter library, a presidential museum (complete with an Oval Office replica), the Global 2000 project (a health program focused on Africa), the Carter-Menil Human Rights Foundation, and the center itself. The operation runs on a budget of more than \$20 million a year, most of it from private foundations, and employs some 200 people. Carter has managed to grab several hundred thousand dollars in public funds for his vote-monitoring projects, and the Carter Center has received Agency for International Development grants to the tune of several million dollars. (AID's administrator under Clinton, Brian Atwood, served in the Carter administration.)

Among the guests at the dedication of the center was Agha Hasan Abedi, the founder and president of the Bank of Commerce and Credit International. BCCI promoted itself as a Third World Bank committed to Third World

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development. As Carter would later tell Senate investigators, "His relationship with us was one of 'I want to do something practical to help people who are suffering and we will help you.'" Abedi contributed more than \$500,000 to the center, and as co-chairman of Carter's Global 2000 project, he forked over another \$8 million. Abedi, the head of what would later be revealed to be a global criminal syndicate, sought to avail himself of Carter's reputation. And Carter—either too naive to see the situation clearly or too morally cocksure to care—obliged.

According to a December 1992 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "The BCCI Affair":

Less than one month after the Carter Center opened, the former President traveled with Abedi to Pakistan and to Bangladesh to sign agreements with government officials starting Global 2000 health care programs in those countries. . . . Without President Carter's knowledge, BCCI either had, or was to develop corrupt relationships with several of the countries visited by Carter and Abedi, including Bangladesh.

With the exception of Carter's local paper, the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, media coverage of the report all but ignored the Carter connection. The *New York Times*, for example, didn't even mention it in a long piece that focused on the far more tenuous ties between the bank and Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah. This may have been because the report faulted the CIA for failing to inform Carter that he had exposed himself "to the designs of a criminal institution for almost a decade." Interestingly, the aide to Democratic Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts who was largely responsible for the report and the attending media spin, Jonathan Winer, has been rewarded by NSC adviser Anthony Lake, a Carter era veteran, with the post of deputy assistant secretary of state for international narcotics matters. Winer, however, is still functioning as a political operative. His fingerprints were on a *Washington Post* story run just before the election that sought to implicate GOP Senate candidate Oliver North in contra drug-running charges from the mid-1980s, which Winer had fruitlessly pursued for Kerry. (Winer didn't return a call seeking comment.)

Over the years, the countries to which Carter and Abedi traveled together on Abedi's plane—including Pakistan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and China—became major banking centers for and investors in BCCI. According to the Senate report, China allowed BCCI to be the second foreign bank to operate in the country. China lost \$500 million when BCCI collapsed in 1991. BCCI stole \$171 million from Bangladesh alone, including disaster relief aid from foreign countries, the Senate report said. How many AIDS-ridden, starving African children have Carter to thank for their plight is difficult to estimate.

Carter told the committee that it was not until Panamanian General Manuel Noriega was indicted in

1988 that he became aware of BCCI's involvement in illicit activities (the indictment charged that Noriega used the bank to launder money). Yet according to the report, even after the Federal Reserve Board issued a cease-and-desist order concerning BCCI's ownership of First American Bank in 1991, Carter continued to "solicit and receive significant contributions from Sheikh Zayed, who together with his government had formally purchased the controlling interest in BCCI." Sources at the Carter Center say the free travel relieved the biggest budgetary pressures Carter faced.

III.

Abedi wasn't Carter's only strange bedfellow. Though it went entirely unnoticed, Carter began to develop real influence for the first time as an ex-president by forging links with, of all things, a Republican administration that was known for its cool and competent conduct of foreign affairs. "Everything changed when Bush came in," said a Carter Center source. "All of a sudden, our calls were getting returned." The first contact came when Brent Scowcroft, Bush's NSC adviser, made a quiet trip to Plains soon after the Bush inaugural.

Carter's big break came when Secretary of State James Baker decided to distance the new administration from Reagan's Central America policy by essentially turning it over to the Democrats. He appointed moderate Democrat Bernard Aronson, who had helped forge bipartisan coalitions for contra aid in the mid-1980s, as the assistant secretary for Latin America. And Baker chose the Carter Center as the site of his first major statement on Central America policy in March 1989.

The Carter Center is organized like a mini-National Security Council, with experts in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, arms control, and conflict resolution. The Latin expert, Robert Pastor, the only Carter Center scholar who served in his administration, is first among equals. The son-in-law of Robert McNamara, he has ties to left-wing lobbies like the Committee on Latin America and the Institute for Policy Studies. As the Carter NSC's Latin American expert, Pastor "was a loose cannon on deck," recalled one former Pentagon official. "He was orchestrating the Panama Canal Treaties with a real bum and a crook [Gen. Omar Torrijos]. Next they were going to give away Guantanamo." Alarmed at Pastor's free-lancing, the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff George Brown passed on a note to Carter NSC adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was nominally Pastor's boss. Brzezinski wrote back saying that he couldn't rein in Pastor, since the masterful in-fighter was "hiding behind the skirts of Rosalynn."

Pastor's vast contacts and Carter's name recognition made the duo players in the region even a decade later; as it happened, Pastor also knew Aronson quite well. Central America policy soon became known as "the Bob and Bernie show."

The first act was in Panama in 1989, when Carter at his own initiative announced plans to head a delegation to observe elections between General Manuel Noriega's puppet presidential candidate, Carlos Duque, and opposition candidate Guillermo Endara. Rosalynn, who is deeply involved in Carter's undertakings, was against the idea, fearing that the association with Noriega might taint her easily snookered husband. "She felt Noriega was a jerk and a sleazeball. She screamed at him about it one day in front of us," said one source who witnessed the outburst. "We were really embarrassed. Carter left the room and came back a couple of minutes later and said 'Rosie will be going with us to Panama.'"

Bending the usual procedures for international observers that guarantee impartiality and objectivity, Carter and Pastor negotiated the size and composition of the group with Noriega, who was not even recognized by the United States. Members of the congressionally funded National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute were part of the delegation. "There was a lot of concern among both Democrats and Republicans about Carter negotiating our way in. We felt any deal he struck could compromise us," said one member.

When Bush's hand-picked observer group was denied visas, Baker gave his imprimatur to Carter, much to Noriega's delight. To assuage Republican concerns, Baker called former President Gerald Ford and asked him to serve as co-chairman. When a writer for *Newsweek* implied in his coverage that the initiative had been Bush's rather than Carter's, Pastor instructed staffers at the Carter Center to cut that reporter off forever.

Ford stayed in Panama for only a day, flying out two days before the Sunday balloting, thus leaving the delegation in Carter's hands. On election day, people with government and military credentials were voting more than once. Opposition people were stricken from the vote rolls. On Sunday afternoon, Endara and vice-presidential candidate Ricardo Arias Calderon read a list of irregularities, including the shooting of a foreign priest observing the balloting. Carter's only comment on the voting was, "It looks okay."

By Monday afternoon, Carter faced an open mutiny in the delegation. "Reporters started asking us 'Why does everyone but Carter see this?'" said one Carter critic. "The answer is he went to Panama to negotiate, not to observe the election. He knew of the vote rigging. We could see from our quick-count that the opposition had won. But he wouldn't say so because he thinks there's no

circumstance he can't fix. He still thought he could get through to Noriega." According to a source close to the ex-president, Carter had four separate channels into Noriega in an effort to short-circuit an official stamp on the results and lure the general into mediation. Typically, he acted on his own, keeping his fellow observers in the dark.

Carter went out on a limb for Noriega, adamantly refusing to condemn the election as invalid in the face of mounting evidence so as not to compromise his "credibility" with the regime. That is until, by happenstance, Carter wandered from his hotel across the street to the electoral counting center at about 5:45 p.m. "He could see for himself that the tally sheets marked in pencil didn't match the results that were being read out by the board," said one member of the delegation. "He went up to one of the officials and said very loudly in Spanish, 'Are you an honest man or a thief?' Then he sent word to Noriega that it was all over if he didn't hear by 6 o'clock. He never heard back."

"She felt Noriega was a jerk and a sleazeball. She screamed at him about it one day in front of us," said one source who witnessed the outburst. "We were really embarrassed. Carter left the room and came back a couple of minutes later and said, 'Rosie will be going with us to Panama.'"

Though Carter soon denounced the election as "totally fraudulent," the Carter critic in the delegation said, "There is no certainty he would have condemned it if he got into talks with Noriega. The decision to involve Carter put U.S. policy one step away from a calamity."

And not for the last time, either.

When Daniel Ortega agreed to stand for election in 1990, he followed Noriega's lead and invited Carter in on his own terms. Visas to the official Bush group were denied. So Carter's delegation, with Baker's okay, became the proxy Bush group. Before departing, Carter managed to press Baker into saying that the U.S. would honor the results of a fair election, in spite of the Sandinistas' refusal to release earmarked funds to the opposition campaign. Sanctioning a victory by the government appeared to be Carter's aim again. Republicans in Congress, however, were on to the ex-president. In an extraordinarily tense meeting in the Capitol, Carter made a personal pitch for support from Republican senators in a meeting attended by sixty-seven members. Instead, he got a severe tongue-lashing from GOP Senator John McCain of Arizona, who at one point shouted at him, "How naive can you be?"

In the apparent belief that the Sandinistas would win the vote, Carter told an election-eve press conference that he had "strongly recommended" to the Bush administration that it should "move immediately toward reconciliation" with the Sandinistas after the balloting. But despite the irregularities, the opposition victory margin was too

big to be denied. At 4 a.m., Carter woke up Baker, who was traveling in New York. "It was the most incredible thing," said one person who was in the room with Carter during the call. "He told Baker, 'Get a piece of paper and write this down. Here is what you're going to say to the press tomorrow. There will be no Ortega-bashing. And the first thing is the contras must disband.' Carter was like a schoolteacher instructing a child. And we all laughed when Baker said just what he was told to say the next day."

These two episodes notwithstanding, the Bush administration generally kept Carter at arm's length, and rejected several pleas by the former president to be given an official mediation role. "He would call fairly often and he would write," recalls one former top-level Bush official. "He wanted to play a role in Ethiopia [where the U.S. mediated the first formal peace talks between Ethiopia and Eritrean separatist guerrillas], and he wanted to go to North Korea. We always turned him down."

Why? "Because I know him too well. I have no doubt his motives are pure. The problem is that he is not an impartial mediator. He knows what deal he wants going in. When he negotiates, he is not negotiating for you, he's negotiating for Jimmy Carter. Once you let him in, it is very difficult to control an ex-president. I've seen him operate on committees and such. He knows how he wants the final report to come out and he doesn't care what anybody else says on the way there."

That Carter would pursue his own agenda independent of official American policy was made startlingly clear when Bush officials discovered that he had written letters to members of the U.N. Security Council, including the Soviet Union, urging them to vote against the U.S. position on the Persian Gulf war. This came after Carter's public suggestion that a "respected mediator" be named to help settle the crisis fell on deaf ears.

Carter took matters into his hands in what has to be the most striking effort ever by any ex-official of the U.S. government, let alone an ex-president, to undermine American policy by direct communication with foreign governments on the eve of war. His intervention was not widely known within the highest levels of the administration or at the Carter Center. Former CIA director Robert Gates, for instance, is said to have learned of it in the recent *New York Times* interview in which Carter himself revealed his role. The former Carter Center aide told me, after a pained silence, "He has a right to communicate, but it was a mistake to admit it." (Carter himself recently said it "was perhaps not appropriate.")

Carter has often defended his free-lance diplomacy by claiming that he writes reports on all of his activities and submits them to the government; on the Gulf matter he told the *Times* that he had sent a copy of the letter to Bush so that he "wouldn't be going behind his back." According to a Carter Center spokesperson, on November 11, 1990, Carter sent a hand-delivered letter to Bush that was similar in content to the Security Council letters. But contrary to Carter's implication in the *Times*, the letter did not inform Bush that he had sent letters to Security Council members. "We knew about it, but not from him," said a top official in the Bush White House. "One of the heads of state who received a letter told us about it. We never heard a word about it from the others." (After publicly attacking the policy as troops were going into battle as "a massive, self-destructive, almost suicidal war," Carter had the audacity to complain, "I have not received one word of briefing from the White House or the State Department since the Iraqi invasion took place, which I think is not a proper

way to treat a former president.")

An official who attended the high-level war-planning meetings at the State Department put it this way: "Carter was a glimmer on the radar screen. We were vaguely aware of what he was doing. It is the difference between a competent

foreign policy team and an inept one. To us, Carter was just a nuisance."

To the Clinton crowd, Carter has been something else entirely.

IV.

Indeed, there is little doubt that Carter's recent emergence says as much about Clinton's weakness as a leader and the internal dynamics of his foreign-policy team as it does about Carter.

The Carter takeover began when Clinton turned to many Carter veterans to staff his administration. But he turned only to a certain type of Carter person; the more assertive, strategic-minded Carter NSC adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and those closely associated with him were largely overlooked in favor of skittish, paper-pushing acolytes of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, many of whom had their formative experience as political appointees or foreign service officers, when they turned against the Vietnam war. (Chief among them are State Department officials Warren Christopher, Peter Tarnoff, and Richard Holbrooke; NSC adviser Lake and his aide Morton Halperin; and Walter Slocombe, the undersecretary of defense, who is said to have actually cried when Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty.) One senior foreign policy aide has mused that Brzezinski's memoir *Power*

and Principle served as a guide on whom *not* to pick to serve Clinton.

The Jimmy Carter depicted by Brzezinski could be persuaded. (Carter became more of a knee-jerk anti-interventionist with age.) Vance, often outflanked by Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, could prevail with Carter only when the Soviets were being good. Clinton is like Carter was, in that he is not *reliably* squishy. And he is like Reagan in that he has little interest in day-to-day management of foreign policy, which gives the subcabinet more latitude, breeding intrigue and nasty turf-fights. "May the best back-stabber win," says one insider.

Thus, from the outset of the Clinton administration, the name of the game for the old Vance cabal has been to control the inputs to Clinton and eliminate independent power centers. This way, Clinton would get warmed-over Carterism at its worst: the CIA is bad; never use force (updated for the nineties to include politically correct interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti); arms sales are dangerous; nuclear weapons are bad no matter who has them; the U.N. is good; China is bad; Russia is good; Syria is the key to the Middle East; and so forth.

One track has been to place like-minded people throughout the bureaucracy. Favored training grounds include places like the ACLU's Center for National Security, headed for years by Halperin, whose Defense Department nomination was defeated by Republicans in the Senate last year, but who has now emerged in an even more powerful position as an aide to Lake, who is the predominant figure in the foreign policy sphere. (Warren Christopher's attention to image over substance has made him little more than a figurehead, though his subcabinet has influence.)

Lake and Halperin resigned from government service in the Nixon administration to protest the Cambodia bombing. As director of policy planning at the Vance State Department, Lake was at the center of every policy debacle during the Carter presidency. In 1981, he moved to a farm in Massachusetts, where he remained until tapped by Clinton. Halperin's DOD nomination was opposed by some Republicans who charged that he had supported renegade CIA agent Philip Agee, who disclosed the name of a CIA station chief who was later assassinated. But the most telling thing about Halperin is that he is the author of a classic study of bureaucratic maneuvering in foreign policy.

The Arms Control Association, where as a staffer George Stephanopoulos developed his views, has also given the administration Gloria Duffy, who toiled at the association writing anti-nuclear tracts for more than a decade before finding herself in charge of nuclear security at the Pentagon. Pro-Arab ex-Ted Kennedy aide Nancy Soderberg runs Middle East policy at the NSC. State's intelligence bureau is run by Tobi Gati, a lackluster academic whose last job was heading the U.N. Association, and Jennifer Symms, a former aide to Senator John Danforth and the wife (and former student) of Robert Gallucci, assistant secretary of state for political affairs. In an example of how the adminis-

tration's few moderates have been outplayed, Gallucci was appointed a special envoy to take North Korea policy away from its rightful place in the bureaucracy under the tougher-minded assistant secretary of state for east Asia, Winston Lord.

The second track has been to force moderates out of power when they've acquired it. Lake's goal has been to make sure no Brzezinskis or Browns emerge. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, who strongly supported the Persian Gulf War, was his first victim. Having spent twenty-five years preparing to be defense secretary, Aspin was a threat because he was a close adviser of Clinton during the campaign (Clinton ran on Aspin's defense budget). As a former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, he had wide experience and his own network of contacts. Lake and Halperin, who was then at the Pentagon awaiting Senate confirmation, were able to make Aspin take the fall for the decision not to send armor to Somalia, where eighteen U.S. soldiers subsequently died in battle. In fact, Lake never took the decision to the president, and Halperin was writing Somalia policy memos to Aspin even though he was unconfirmed at the time.

Another opportunity for Lake to monopolize the field came when Colin Powell retired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. As the military saw it, front-runners for the post included Air Force General Lee Butler, a defense intellectual; Admiral Paul Miller, the innovative Atlantic Fleet commander; and the strong-willed Marine General John P. Hoar, commander of the rapid-deployment forces. Also high on the list were Admiral Charles Larson, the Pacific Fleet commander who is both a naval aviator and a submariner, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak. Under the normal rotation, McPeak would have gotten the nod.

Clinton's actual pick, announced after an unusual White House dinner for all sixteen of the candidates attended by Hillary Rodham Clinton, was Army General John Shalikashvili, the NATO commander. Shalikashvili was thought to be a long-shot candidate because of his heavy Polish accent, his father's pro-German past, his wooden manner, his unpopularity in the army, his relatively hawkish position on Bosnia, and his lack of ideas on how to reform the military in the post-Cold War era. "Not very West Point," as one Pentagon aide put it.

When the choice of Shalikashvili was announced, word among Pentagon brass was "Hillary picked the runt." Their theory was that Shalikashvili's eccentricities—including his Bosnia position—were seen as strengths by Hillary and Stephanopoulos. "Given the military's lack of confidence in Clinton, they didn't want a Colin Powell type who could go on 'Face the Nation' and say he didn't agree with the administration," the Pentagon aide said. McPeak, for instance, had slit his own throat when he criticized the Clinton defense budget in testimony to Congress.

As if the appointment itself were not enough, Lake then

moved to take control of Shalikashvili's brain. The chiefs have a think-tank with wide access to raw intelligence at the National Defense University, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, which provides foreign policy advice. Lake arranged for a close associate, Hans Binnendijk, to take control of the institute and, with it, Shalikashvili's speeches and talking points for interviews. In the 1970s Binnendijk had been a staffer to Senator Charles Percy of Illinois, the Republican water-carrier for Carter's plan to pull U.S. troops out of Korea. The institute will soon complete a "Strategic Assessment" that suggests, according to those who have seen a draft of the study, that the U.S. could meet its security obligations around the world and still cut its forces *in half*. To say the least, the military isn't happy.

CIA director James Woolsey's access to Clinton has been blocked by Lake. He has cleverly used a Democratic hawk, retiring Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona, to force Woolsey out. Ed Levine, a Senate intelligence committee staffer and former Howard Metzenbaum aide, has convinced intelligence panel chairman DeConcini that Woolsey has misled him on various matters. Levine has close ties to Halperin; in the 1980s, he worked closely with Halperin to pass several bills hamstringing the CIA that Halperin was pushing from his perch at the ACLU. Metzenbaum was Halperin's strongest supporter in the confirmation battle. Lake also put out word that Woolsey had not served the president well in preparing him for the trip to Syria. The problem, it seems, was that Woolsey gave Clinton the unvarnished view that Syria is a terrorist state that can't be trusted to live up to its promises.

Former Rep. Stephen Solarz saw Lake kill his nomination to be ambassador to India (he'd already been passed over for a higher-level spot). One mark against Solarz was his history of support for aid to the Cambodian and Afghan resistance forces. When North Korea's Kim Il-Sung told Solarz "We have no nuclear weapons," the congressman responded, "That's a lie!" No Carterite, he.

Solarz's nomination was imperiled when a story surfaced about his business association with a Hong Kong entrepreneur who had a criminal record. When Solarz had originally asked the U.S. consul about the man, he hadn't been told of the man's mafia ties. Solarz was informed only several months later, when he inquired about helping the man obtain a U.S. visa. A foreign service officer in the consul's office saw to it that Tony Lake was tipped off. Lake then spun the story against Solarz, when in fact Solarz should have been fully briefed by the consul in the first place. A Justice

Department inquiry into whether Solarz had done anything illegal ended without charges, but Lake told Solarz he could never be confirmed—a dubious judgment—and his nomination therefore was being withdrawn. Lake then told reporters that Solarz had withdrawn his own name, which is how the story played.

With Solarz out of the picture, Lake, with the support of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (who had supported the coup against Aspin as well), moved to take out yet another moderate by nominating Frank Wisner, the undersecretary of defense for policy, for the New Delhi post. Wisner's mother is Georgetown socialite Polly Fritchey, who had backed Aspin years ago when he was a kid running for Congress from Wisconsin. But Aspin couldn't protect him when Wisner double-crossed Halperin and Lake during the former's confirmation battle: he sent the Senate Armed Services Committee documents showing that Halperin had improperly participated in inter-agency meetings and taken part in personnel matters while awaiting confirmation. The removal of Wisner

helped Talbott win an internal struggle over U.S. policy in Russia, with Wisner favoring more pressure for reform and more support for the independent states. Talbott's other rival on Russia policy, DOD official Graham Allison, was

also pushed out and has returned to Harvard University.

V.

This is the context in which Carter's emergence in the Clinton administration must be viewed; his own willfulness was not enough to make it happen. When splits have developed in the foreign-policy team, Carter has been brought in by alumni of his own administration to win these power struggles and box Clinton into climbing down from confrontation. At the same time, Carter has exploited the divisions to advance his campaign to rehabilitate the discredited policies of his presidency.

This is probably news to Clinton, since the source of Carter's influence comes through his former associates, not Clinton himself. Though he endorsed no candidate in the '92 Georgia primary, Carter was notably cool to Clinton. He criticized Clinton's middle-class tax cut plan and went out of his way to compliment Paul Tsongas. "It was a distinct lack of enthusiasm," said one Carter associate. "If he was going to choose someone, it would not have been Clinton."

Why not? "Carter had the utmost respect for Bush. But not for Clinton. I think it's the moral questions. Carter has a very close personal friendship and a very, very rich relationship with his wife. If they are on a six-seater plane and she's sitting behind him, he'll reach back and they'll hold hands for half the trip."

*One senior foreign policy aide has
mused that Brzezinski's memoir Power and
Principle served as a guide on whom
not to pick to serve Clinton.*

After the election, Carter was reportedly miffed that the Clinton people were giving him the cold shoulder. The *New York Times* reported in January 1993 that "the former president couldn't repress a small grin when recalling Mr. Clinton's 'ignominious defeat' in 1980 after one term as governor, when voters in Arkansas 'brought him down a notch.'"¹

Carter's first foray during the Clinton presidency—public and private criticisms of U.S. policy in Somalia's civil war—appear to have led to a shift away from a military solution. As U.N. troops attempted to capture and arrest Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, Carter gave an interview to a Paris-based African magazine, calling the effort "regrettable." Aidid saw an opening and called on Carter to mediate the crisis.

With approval from both the U.S. and the U.N., Carter soon received a delegation representing Aidid at the Carter Center. A proposal emerged that would have created an independent U.N. commission to evaluate criminal charges against the general for the ambush against Pakistani peacekeepers. The sole purpose of this commission, evidently, was to clear Aidid of responsibility, since a U.N. investigation had already found him culpable.

Through Lake, Carter successfully lobbied for a political rather than a military solution. But Les Aspin blocked Carter's campaign to be appointed the U.S. negotiator. Former U.S. envoy to Somalia Robert Oakley was sent instead. According to a report in *USA Today*, shortly thereafter, at the Israeli-PLO ceremony at the White House in September, Carter took Clinton aside and complained. "This lack of cooperation was completely and thoroughly dis-

cussed and resolved," Carter told the newspaper. Within a few months, with both Aspin and Powell gone, Carter got his way on North Korea.

U.S. policy had been clear: North Korea must not be allowed to obtain any nuclear weapons. If the North Koreans unloaded plutonium-bearing fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and destroyed evidence of its past bomb-building, the U.S. would withdraw from talks and seek sanctions. North Korea's current nuclear program produces weapons-grade plutonium as a byproduct in the fuel rods, which can be reprocessed to produce enough plutonium for five or six nuclear bombs. The collision course was set when North Korea removed the spent fuel rods and refused international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

At the United Nations, U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright, who has frequently advocated the use of force, albeit under U.N. auspices, proposed tough economic sanctions that would have, for example, cut off the more than \$600 million a year sent home by North Koreans working in Japan. The director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Lt. Gen. Jack Sheehan, meanwhile, drafted several options to beef up U.S. military assets in the area, including dispatching squadrons of fighters and bombers—raising the prospect that the U.S. might bomb the North's fuel reprocessing facility. Also, to protect South Korea, six Patriot anti-missile batteries were scheduled for delivery.

Adamantly opposed to the confrontational U.S. stance, which he feared might lead to war, Carter decided to take Kim Il-Sung up on an invitation to visit. Carter made it clear he was going with or without the administration's okay. He received private encouragement from U.S. Ambassador to South Korea James Laney, a former president of Emory University and an ex-missionary who claims to be fluent in Korean but isn't. Laney opposed the Patriot delivery. He is also no less naive than Carter: When briefed by the outgoing U.S. Ambassador Donald Gregg, Laney had inquired of him, "How did you control the military and the CIA?"

The White House (i.e., Tony Lake) approved the visit for the same reason Kim had invited Carter: as a way of blocking U.N. and Pentagon muscle-flexing. Gallucci was dispatched to Atlanta to brief Carter. And the Patriots, which



¹ Carter's handlers were out in full force trying to play down these personal differences in the wake of the Haiti mission. Jack Nelson, the Washington bureau chief of the *Los Angeles Times* who doubles as a Democratic Party adjunct, wrote a piece in September that made the Clinton-Carter relationship out to be a mutual admiration society. But Nelson had to tailor the facts to fit the premise. He wrote that Carter's White House visit with Clinton was his first time in the White House since leaving in 1981, when in fact Carter had been back under both Reagan and Bush. Nelson also falsely reported that Carter endorsed Clinton, helping him carry Georgia.

should have been delivered by air for maximum deterrent effect, were instead sent by sea.

Carter spoke with Clinton before his departure. The understanding was that Carter would present the U.S. position, not negotiate: No face-to-face negotiations until North Korea agreed to halt all nuclear activities—surrender the fuel rods, and allow inspectors to check whether enough plutonium had been diverted in 1989 to make nuclear weapons, which the CIA suspects is the case.

But Carter did not hesitate to pursue his own solution once in Pyongyang. With Rosalynn acting as note-taker, Kim and Carter struck a deal: Kim agreed that North Korea would temporarily freeze its nuclear program if it discerned there were “good faith efforts” to settle the dispute. Yet the freeze meant nothing, since the fuel rods were too radioactive to handle for months anyway. Nor was it verifiable. And the question of whether the country already had Bomb-building capabilities—or even the Bomb itself—was not addressed.

Carter announced the deal on CNN—which had already been let into the country by Kim for the occasion—before vetting it with the administration, which had not agreed to resume talks, contrary to Carter’s assurance to Kim. The State Department was incredulous; when Kim died less than a month later, the joke was that he died laughing after negotiating with Carter. Even Lake and Gallucci, advocates of at least wrist-slapping U.N. sanctions, were dismayed; they were beginning to see that even a carefully planned hijacking can run off the tracks. When Lake tried to amend the deal, “the wording was contrary to what I had worked out, so he corrected that,” Carter later said.

Clinton was stuck either with embracing Carter’s announcement or repudiating Carter and thus his own judgment in sending him. “We want to know what they mean and if it represents a change in position,” Clinton said warily. Then, CNN reported that Carter had been overheard telling Kim Il-Sung that he had consulted with the White House and the U.S. had “stopped the sanctions activity in the U.N.” as a result of the deal. Carter was hoping to bluff Clinton into a concession, but on this point Clinton held his ground. “All I know is, what I said is the policy of the United States,” a frustrated Clinton said. Yet even after Clinton’s statement, Carter continued to slam U.S. policy in interviews from Seoul. “The declaration of sanctions by the U.N. would be regarded as an insult by them, branding it as an outlaw country. . . . It would constitute a personal insult to their so-called Great Leader,” Carter said.

The deal announced by the two sides in October followed the Carter blueprint in that it did not take Korea off

the nuclear road. North Korea’s past activities have been forgotten or forgiven, and the inspections are so limited they will do little to prevent future bomb-building. More than \$4 billion will be pumped into the repressive North Korean regime by the West. Trade restrictions will be lifted and bilateral diplomatic relations, long sought by the North, will be established.

Clearly, the policy had been set by Carter. The sanctions effort had been thwarted. Clinton—with Lake, Vice President Gore, and Stephanopoulos weighing in—accepted the phony freeze as the only pre-condition to direct dialogue with the Koreans. When Carter returned to the U.S., Clinton stiffed him; it was Lake who received him in the White House.

VI.

Oddly enough, the invasion of Haiti began as a project of the American left—the “Aristide exception” to the long proscription on using force. The ideological rationale for the invasion was first laid out by

Morton Halperin in an article in the spring 1993 issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine entitled “Guaranteeing Democracy.” Though no specific mention of Haiti was made, Halperin wrote, “When a people attempts to hold free elections and establish a constitutional democracy, the United

States and the international community should not only assist but should ‘guarantee’ the result . . . using force if necessary.” Under the Halperin theory, the U.S. would explicitly surrender the right to intervene unilaterally; thus, neither the invasions of Grenada nor Panama would have been permitted without the consent of the U.N. or the Organization of American States (both organizations approved the Clinton Haiti intervention). Meanwhile, Randall Robinson of TransAfrica lobbied his friend Tony Lake to get Clinton to take a more confrontational stance, including the imposition of tough sanctions.

By mid-September, with the administration heading toward military invasion, Carter received a letter from General Raoul Cédras’s foreign minister suggesting he mediate the crisis. While press accounts have credited the idea to Joseph Blatchford, a Washington lawyer-lobbyist with many Latin clients who in a September 13 *Los Angeles Times* op-ed suggested a role for Carter, Cédras himself had floated the idea in a little-noticed interview with CNN on August 6. Cédras had met Carter in 1990 when he was in Haiti to observe the elections; true to form, Carter predicted the result of that election wrongly, telling Aristide to prepare to accept defeat. Aristide ended up winning 67 percent of the vote, but Carter’s predisposition impressed Cédras.

Cédras telephoned him in Atlanta a few days before the

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associate, Hans Binnendijk, to take
control of the institute and, with it,
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points for interviews.*

expected invasion. Carter then contacted Colin Powell and Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, and asked if they would join him on a last-ditch Haiti mission. By this point, if Clinton rejected Carter's overture, Carter could go public with the plan and embarrass the president, who had committed himself to exhausting every diplomatic effort before invading.

Lake and Halperin, meanwhile, were beginning to go south on their own policy once they got a glimpse of what an invasion would actually entail. Marine General Sheehan told Clinton and Lake that he wanted to take no chances with the lives of American men. Unlike in Iraq, CNN was already in Haiti. And Clinton wouldn't want Americans in body bags six weeks before the election. So the invasion plan developed by Sheehan began with a surgical option *à la* the Bay of Pigs; U.S. forces would pre-emptively kill any Haitian conceivably resisting an American landing. If successful, it would have meant between five and 100 American lives lost, but perhaps upwards of 10,000 Haitian casualties.

Powell was shaken by a private briefing from Sheehan. The two were old friends; Powell had been former secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger's military assistant at the time that Sheehan was deputy defense secretary William Taft's top aide. An emotional Powell, a Caribbean-American, would later describe the plan to Cédras at a key moment in the negotiations. When a friend spoke with Powell after the invasion had been called off, and said, "You saved American lives," Powell responded, "And Haitian lives."

Support in Congress was also collapsing. Former Nunn aide Robert Bell, an NSC staffer, had promised Lake that he could deliver Nunn's endorsement of the policy, but Nunn came out against it in a speech on the Senate floor.

Carter called Clinton on Wednesday night, shortly after speaking with Cédras. Lake sold Clinton on bringing in Carter to take the U.S. off the track of intervention, just as he had in Korea.



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
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In Lake's view, the Sheehan plan, which Clinton had signed off on, had to be stopped. And if Carter failed, at least the powerful Nunn would be neutralized.

After his Thursday night speech to the nation, Clinton called Carter and okayed the trip. Also in the room voicing approval were Vice President Gore and Stephanopoulos, the very same pair who had endorsed the purported Carter breakthrough in Korea. State was by then out of the loop; Christopher watched the Clinton speech from his Georgetown home, and Strobe Talbott is said to have learned about the Carter mission on CNN. Ironically, Christopher, not Lake, had been closer to Carter during their years in exile, frequently visiting the Carter Center. But the two had become estranged since Christopher became secretary of state and was loath to give over his portfolio to his former boss. Lake, content to operate behind the scenes, was not threatened by Carter's public profile. Indeed, he and Halperin realized the bureaucratic benefit of having a stalking horse. Lake's close connection is to Pastor, who is thanked as a teacher in the foreword to *Somoza Falling*, Lake's book on the failure of the Carter Nicaragua policy.

As in Korea, Carter's impetus was his opposition to U.S. policy, not a desire to represent the administration. The Carter delegation, Pastor in tow, arrived in Port-au-Prince on Saturday. That night, Carter sketched out a draft agreement on his personal computer. Though White House aide Larry Rossin was accompanying the delegation, Carter presented it to Cédra without White House approval. The draft didn't have a deadline for Cédra stepping down, it lifted the trade embargo, and it made no mention of Aristide's return. When Carter finally permitted Rossin to fax it to the White House 12 hours later, Clinton didn't like it. Talbott began drafting another document, but Carter told him it was too late.

By then, troops were on their way. Clinton later said that his decision to dispatch troops caused Cédra to agree to step down. But Carter, in an interview with CNN early Monday morning before he briefed the president, said that the sending of troops almost undid the deal. Carter had been met at Andrews Air Force Base early Monday morning and taken to the White House to spend the night. He later joked that he was taken to the White House so he wouldn't go on CNN. Carter rose at dawn and called CNN President Tom Johnson to arrange a live interview from Washington. In a scene reminiscent of Al Haig's "I am in control here" speech, Carter announced, "The problem last night and in a number of

places around the world causes it to be necessary for the Carter Center to act."

The Clinton and Carter statements can't both be true. Assuming that Carter had a bleary-eyed moment of candor (he later changed his story to bring it into line with Clinton's), his comment suggests that he may have sandbagged Clinton by waiting to present him with an unsatisfactory deal at the last possible moment so that Clinton's only choices would be to accept the deal as written or risk the wrath of Carter and be seen as choosing war. Clinton took the deal.

Neither Carter nor Clinton was entirely happy in the end, a sign that the relationship will remain tricky in the months to come. Though one job applicant at the Carter Center in 1988 was told that the center expected seven more years of Carter's active life, he shows no signs of slowing down or ending his efforts toward redeeming his presidency by promoting accommodation at any price. On his return from Haiti, Carter made it clear that he had been "ashamed" of

"Carter had the utmost respect for Bush. But not for Clinton. I think it's the moral questions. Carter has a very close personal friendship and a very, very rich relationship with his wife. If they are on a six-seater plane and she's sitting behind him, he'll reach back and they'll hold hands for half the trip."

Bill Clinton's aggressive stance—he told one interviewer that he had told Cédra this as well, but later denied saying it to the Haitian leader—and for good measure he tweaked Clinton by revealing that he had been holding secret talks with Fidel Castro since July.

Though evidently too weak to control his own foreign policy, Clinton is quite capable of exacting modest, and less public, revenge. When Bob Pastor's nomination to be ambassador to Panama came before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after the Haiti mission, Senator Jesse Helms, still steamed about Pastor's role in the Panama Canal Treaties and in conspiring to mislead Congress about the role of the Sandinistas in exporting terrorism, led Republican opposition to it. Republicans were also concerned about Pastor's role as Carter's aide-de-camp in Haiti while awaiting Senate confirmation. When the *Washington Post's* Al Kamen wrote up the controversy, Pastor, in his inimitable style, called and accused him of being "a shill for Jesse Helms."

Carter pulled out all the stops. He got Sam Nunn to call Helms and ask him to relent. Pastor went to see GOP Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming and persuaded him to appeal to Helms. Colin Powell, at Carter's request, called Minority Leader Bob Dole and asked him to intervene. And Carter personally called Helms, opening the conversation with this ice-breaker: "You thought I was bad, how do you like Clinton?"

The Pastor nomination died in October, never coming to the floor for a vote. The White House, I'm told, didn't lift a finger to help. □

An Open Letter to Readers of The American Spectator



Books for Christmas

Our annual list of holiday gift suggestions from distinguished readers and writers.



Fred Barnes

I recommend two political books for different reasons. One is, at once, the best book I've read on President Clinton, the best piece of reporting in recent years, and the best page-turner in non-fiction: *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House*. Bob Woodward insists he's not a liberal, and this book strengthens his case. He's got Clinton and his aides pegged. No, the problem isn't staff. No, it's not the chaos that sometimes strikes White House operations. The problem is the chaos inside Clinton's head. He can't make decisions, thus leaving himself vulnerable to whoever pressures him most intensely, usually liberals.

The other is *Dead Right*, by David Frum. He dislikes that new breed, the "big government conservative." He gives me credit for coining the phrase. Thanks a lot. I wish I'd never heard of it. My idea wasn't big spenders, but those who'd rather slow the growth of spending than break their pick in search of spending cuts in Social Security, Medicare, etc., that never materialize. Frum argues, from a libertarian argument, for breaking your pick. It's an interesting argument, one conservatives need to hear, then reject.

I read few novels, but I grabbed a paperback my 12-year-old nephew left behind. It was *Killer Angels* by Michael Shaara. The subject is Gettysburg, and Shaara sides with Longstreet against Lee. Absolutely riveting, the best (though maybe the only) historical novel I've read since I went through those books by Kenneth Roberts as a teenager.

Fred Barnes is a senior editor of the New Republic.



L. D. Brown

Not being one to miss anything related to Bill Clinton, however remote, I recommend *Life of the Party: The Biography of Pamela Digby Churchill Hayward Harriman* by Christopher Ogden. Biographer Ogden takes hours of conversations with Harriman, who at the time was collaborating with him on a memoir of her life, and transforms it into a hefty volume exposing her remarkable life for all to see. When Harriman got cold feet on the project and bailed out, Ogden continued on and produced a timely exposé of her life from her childhood through her celebrated marriages

to Randolph Churchill, Leland Hayward, and Averell Harriman and on to being the real "first lady of the Democratic party."

Having met Mrs. Harriman while in Washington, D.C. with then-Governor Bill Clinton, I think Ogden has truly captured the real Pamela Harriman, who reveals her thoughts at the time on the man who would eventually reward her with the ambassadorship to France.

I'll not miss the opportunity in this space to suggest you reread William Manchester's *One Brief Shining Moment*, a recollection of John Kennedy's presidency. Commissioned by the late Jackie Kennedy Onassis, it will be interesting to see if Bill Clinton can commission someone to write such a glowing tome after he leaves office. Even the master Manchester may not be able to pull this one off.

L. D. Brown is an Arkansas State Trooper.