

THE BOOKMAN

A MAGAZINE OF LITERATURE AND LIFE

NOVEMBER, 1917

A DEMOCRATIC PEACE

BY WILLIAM FORBES COOLEY

"Let us be perfectly clear in our own minds," President Lowell of Harvard to the National Safety Council.

THE New York City Socialist Organisation has announced that it stands "absolutely with President Wilson in his contention for 'peace without victory,'" adding, "peace cannot come too soon to suit us." The prevailing opinion, however, is in strong opposition. It is expressed by the *North American Review* in its demand for Grant's historic terms at Fort Donelson, and its cry, "Away with Peace, peace when there is no peace! On with the fight for God and man!"* Even the discussion of peace upon other basis than that of victory is condemned, the usually judicially minded Taft calling upon his fellow-Unitarians to "stamp upon all proposals of peace as ill-advised or seditious." To like effect speaks Professor R. H. Dabney, in opposing Dr. Eliot's peace conference plan: "He has unintentionally given aid and comfort to the enemy of civilisation. Pro-Germans, traitors, slackers, and shallow pacifists, as well as the Germans themselves, will all rejoice that Dr. Eliot's potent voice is lifted in favour of peace without victory over Prussianism. His words will weaken the resolution of some Americans, and will strengthen the cour-

age of the enemy. All such words will prolong the war, and cost the lives of Americans. For America . . . is going to stay in the war until victory is won and genuine peace and safety are attained."†

In the face of these insistent claims we seem to have special need of being "clear in our own minds." Two questions arise: What do we mean by *victory*? And what *kind of peace movement* is referred to?

To any movement for a merely American or separate peace there are the most grave ethical objections. It would be playing the poltroon in the world tragedy, and showing treachery to the cause of mankind in its hour of most desperate need. And it is true that even serious discussion of such a thing is hurtful; that "a double-minded man is unstable in all his ways," and that no one having put hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the domain of achievement. So long as we are at war, we must wage it with all our might and with utmost concentration of purpose.

Against an *international* peace agitation, however, the same objections as-

†Cf. the words of ex-Premier Viviani in the French Chamber, after his return from America: "America has entered the war with the belief that there can be no peace without victory."

*September, 1917, p. 350.

surely do not lie. Peace of the right kind is, of course, the goal of all the warring peoples; and it cannot be ultimately harmful to any *legitimate* national interest* to inquire, on the one hand, what constitutes that right kind of peace, and, on the other, what possible steps, other than those of brute dictation, there may be for obtaining it? Rather is it morally imperative upon us to keep the field of that inquiry open, lest we be accomplices in the crime of needless human slaughter and preventable desolations of heart; lest, also, we burden the future with an unnecessary weight of international enmity. As a matter of fact, is it more than a vehement assumption that the only way out is to "attempt the Future's portal with the Past's blood-rusted key"? The favourite warrant appealed to is the course of Lincoln in 1864. Certainly no present-day pacifist longs for peace more ardently than did that "kindly earnest, brave, foreseeing man"; yet he would not consider a peace without victory. Ah, but the issue then was plainly different. In 1864 the very existence of the Southern Confederacy was involved, and necessarily so. Either the Confederacy or the Union had to go down. Is that the situation to-day as regards Germany? Most certainly not. That notion is precisely one of the false claims of Prussian militarism which we must sedulously deny and disprove; for it is a reinforcement of Kaiserism's hold upon the suffering but blind German populace, and so a factor making for ruthless prolongation of the conflict.

Over against sheer militancy's assumption is to be placed the need of making our war aims clear to all—a matter of first importance in a just cause, and a

*Chancellor Michaelis has, indeed, announced to a committee of the Reichstag that a "public statement" of the German war aims would "injure German interests" and "would contribute certainly to a prolongation of the war"; but no justification of the claim is given, and none suggests itself, except the all too probable one that what he calls "German interests" are opposed to human interests, that is, are not *legitimate*.

matter calling for broad-minded and free discussion. Mere general disavowals of sinister intent are not sufficient. Diplomacy has made insincerity almost the rule in international communications. We must declare and interpret and reiterate our war aims, if we would have the enemy peoples even entertain the possibility that they are not predatory. So different from our own is the German way of thinking in national affairs—a way modelled upon that of Frederick the Great and Treitschke—that principles which have been rooted in our national life for generations, and are supported by our best thought, are now, when brought into the world discussion, summarily dismissed by German critics as evident hypocrisy. We need the discussion, also, for ourselves, that we may keep our ideas clear and our purpose true. For human passion—and when is passion more active than in war time?—is perpetually clouding issues. We shall not think straight, if we do not pause occasionally and consider our aims and our acts with reference to world-wide interests. No mariner, having fixed his course, lashes his helm and thereafter devotes himself exclusively to sail or engine. Moreover, our aims may need to be modified with the march of events. New occasions do teach new duties. It is common for warring peoples to end with quite different aims from those with which they began, as was the case with us in 1898. Such modification of aims can be made wisely only after critical and candid discussion.

And what opportunities for higher purposes and greater achievements in ethical civilisation are now appearing on the horizon! It has been pointed out that rarely, if ever, has there been such an opportunity to realise the ethical radical's wish, and, in the words of Omar Khayyam, shatter "this sorry scheme of things entire" and "remould it nearer to our heart's desire." To-day not only is the unprecedented conflict, with its far-reaching readjustments of political, economic, and other social relations, clearing away "the dead wood in our social

inheritance," but at last the understanding mind is present amid the fury and the change. The social consciousness of our day is a new thing in the earth. But the understanding mind must be awake and active. "Der Tag" of mankind, that finer "life of the nations on a new basis of justice" recently prophesied by the Russian Ambassador, will not be attained, if passion, however justifiable and even needful when of the right kind, excludes the activity of critical, fair-minded thought. In the birth throes of a new civilisation much assuredly will depend upon the midwife, Reason. Nor will it do for intelligence to wait until force has determined the issue. If prejudice and partisan feeling have the field to themselves until the fighting is over, they will not then quietly yield it to reason. Ethical thought, charged with the interests of mankind, must be in the field *before* the end—alert, and ready to seize opportunity, which, as we have long been informed, has only a forelock and is bald behind. Of course, it will not do for intelligence to champion Utopias. Doctrinaire panaceas will only disgust the conservatives, increase opposition, and perhaps defeat the larger good altogether. This is the Scylla over against the Charybdis of the *fainéant* mind. No; constructive thought must keep in touch with facts. It must seek to plant and develop rather than to manufacture—to bring about new forms of organised social *life*, forms which may be expected to *grow* with the new needs and new conditions of the future.

The other question raised above was as to the meaning "victory" when insisted upon as indispensable. It is natural to understand it as a triumph of arms over the German nation—the destruction of its fighting power, so that it shall be forced to accept our terms. If that is the meaning, then to fight for victory merely, or mainly, is to fight for the very thing the Prussian junker is after, namely, tribal domination, and that is a barbarian rather than a civilised objective. Of course, victory in that sense is not our real end. At most it is

an end sought by us as the only means of attaining the finer and more ethical end lying beyond it—the larger human good, and that larger good discussion must make clear and *keep* clear. It is to be noted that the door for "peace without victory" (in this military sense) is still left open in the President's reply to the Pope, though it is true that a peremptory sentinel stands guard.

Sometimes, however—indeed, often—the victory demanded is ideal rather than military—the victory of liberty over despotism, of democracy over divine right, of self-governing peoples over a would-be master caste. In the opposition of principles involved in the statements of the late Professor Münsterberg, on the one hand, that "In the German view the state is not for the individuals, but the individuals for the state," and of Mr. Wilson, on the other, that "The American people . . . believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments,"—in this ideal conflict, it must be admitted, there can be no "peace without victory." Any settlement will be but temporary—mere truce—so long as the principles of "macht-politik" dominate sixty-seven millions of capable, aggressive men and women. But why should it be assumed that the only field for decision for these conflicting ideas and ideals is the field of battle? Is force, then, so cogent intellectually? Or is it supposed that an idea defeated in battle is thenceforth dead? How exceedingly dead in that case should the idea of liberty be! As a matter of fact, ideas which "crushed to earth . . . rise again" are not limited to what we call "truth"; and, if only bayonets and bombs are appealed to, the idea that German welfare involves German domination may well be one of these. Indubitably the court of decision for truth is the court of reason. Facts, no doubt, are needful for the adjudication, and sometimes facts which only the battle-field can supply; but the decision itself, if real, is always in the domain of mind.

Ex-President Eliot—like the Social-

ists—has raised the question whether an international peace conference is not now possible, that is, whether the international discussion of conditions of peace may not be carried from the press to, say, the Peace Palace at The Hague. He would have each of the warring nations represented in such a conference by from two to four conferees, but not in any way committed to their words or acts, the appointees being entirely uninstructed. What would be the advantages of this plan over that of journalistic discussion? The disputants would apparently correspond very closely to “inspired” editorial writers. Would they be more likely to reach common ground in oral than in printed debate? When we consider the present bitterness of inter-belligerent feeling, this seems quite unlikely. It is an old observation that the tongue is “unruly,” a “fire” kindling “the course of nature,” whereas print is accounted “cold.” With unrestricted and uncontrolled conferees the chances of argument flaming into passion instead of crystallising into rational agreement seem to be seriously increased. The peace palace might become a pandemonium! And what possible advantage offsets this risk? The agreements reached—should there be any—having no binding force, would seemingly be upon the same plane as those reached on the safer arena of press discussion.

In the September issue of *THE BOOKMAN* an argument was presented by Mr. Carl H. P. Thurston for what he calls “A Legislated Peace.” He, too, would have an international conference called at once, without waiting for the victory of either side, but he would substitute *delegates* for conferees; that is, he would have the appointees empowered, under the control of their governments, to reach conclusions binding upon the nations represented. One merit in this plan is that, the appointees being legislators, their discussions might well be serious and rational. Responsibility makes strongly for sobriety in judgment and caution in word and act. Furthermore, the value of the outcome sought—

a binding international agreement—would fully justify the experiment. Perhaps, however, the most valuable feature of the scheme is the limitation of the discussions—at least in the first and most important stage—to “certain principles by which all the questions in dispute might be resolved,” principles to “be held valid for the future as well as the present.” It does seem that even now *principles* of settlement might be discussed in a responsible conference; for principles, being abstract, are not so inflammatory as concrete issues. And it is a happy thought that they should be discussed *by themselves*, that is, abstractly; for in concrete situations judgment regarding them is always more or less warped by private or partisan interest. Of course, the personal interest can never be eliminated altogether; but the chances of some measure of agreement are increased when the issues are universalised, in accordance with the recognised rule of Immanuel Kant.

I must dissent, however, when Mr. Thurston adds, that “the method of choosing delegates might profitably be left to the separate states.” Earlier in his article he has condemned the programme of a “negotiated peace” as a “sordid trading across a mahogany table”—a trading by “diplomats” in the fortunes and destinies of unrepresented peoples. But if the states consult only their own pleasure in the choice of delegates, it is evident that the Central Powers will be represented by mere government appointees, representatives of the master classes and not of the peoples themselves. In such a case, how would any conclusions agreed upon differ from those of a “negotiated peace,” except in the fact that they were confined to principles and did not cover concrete matters? And what would be the value of principles resting upon the concurrence of men who have been reared to regard diplomacy as the art of overreaching other nations? The Teutonic Powers have acceded to the Pope’s proposal of reduction of armaments and compulsory arbitration, but Entente sentiment

is very little impressed thereby. It is regarded as but another case where "the devil was sick, the devil a monk would be." The Greeks of Central Europe are distrusted even when bearing gifts, for they have shown in both diplomacy and war such facility in using professions as masques, and in side-tracking admirable principles in administration. What the world situation calls for is an intellectual coming together of the belligerent peoples themselves. As the President has said: "The test . . . of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government, on the one hand, and of a group of free peoples on the other?" Now, real negotiation between the *peoples* can be effected most speedily through a *democratically based international congress*—a body of broad-minded, responsible men *representing the popular legislative bodies of the nations concerned*, convened with the avowed purpose of determining the main principles upon which the international settlement shall be made. Whatever agreements were reached by such a congress would be so much real progress toward the restoration of reason to the throne in the affairs of mankind. Even in the case of irreconcilable differences it would be a gain to have them brought out into the light of criticism. Error is ever most mischievous and most incorrigible in the dark or in the lurid half lights of passion.

The objector will probably urge that whatever the advantages of such a congress, it is idle to agitate for it, because an unbeaten Germany will never participate in it. The thought of the German rulers being that the people exist only for the state, and that *L'Etat, c'est nous*, to let the people determine through their chosen representatives the terms of peace would, from their point of view, be to surrender the very principle which makes the existence of Germany worth while. Consequently a democratic congress before a decisive defeat of the Ger-

man arms is only another case of lunar politics. From this conclusion I must dissent. It cannot be an idle thing to set ourselves right with the conscience of mankind. At the least an earnest movement on the part of neutrals and the Entente Powers toward a peace democratically arranged and guaranteed would place the issue historically in such a clear light that after the war, when the heats of passion shall have subsided, the German people will hardly be able to avoid it. The fact that their rulers would not allow them a voice in matters of life and death importance to them will assuredly make them more critical of the system under which they have lived and suffered and come to disaster, and will through reaction make them more accessible to modern ethical national ideals.

But why should we assume that the democratic interest is dead in Germany? That it is obscured is evident enough; but that is due to the obsession, so diligently cultivated by Junkerism, that Germany's very existence is at stake. If there is a real, though repressed, interest in popular government in Germany, what would be more likely to dispel their delusion; what more likely to disarm the Teutonic Junkers—and Entente jingoes, withal—than an appeal to join in a democratic congress issued from some neutral source and *responded to favourably by the belligerent free peoples*? Surely it is a hard saying that a people who, in their calmer hours, are of unsurpassed mental capacity are now incapable of being brought by any evidence to a reasonable outlook upon the world. Nor is it believable that the countrymen of Luther, Schiller, and Carl Schurz are too brutish to feel the ethical appeal of human welfare.

It is evident, of course, that no Entente government could call such a congress, for the German militarists would at once construe the call as a sign of weakness, and stiffen their aggression both in the field and at the council table. Least of all could the United States issue the call, for that to these same oppo-

nents would be pleading guilty to their insistent charge that we are "bluffing,"* and do not mean to fight wholeheartedly—indeed, are incapable of doing so. But why should not the Pope make the needed advances? If it be thought that his first peace appeal indicated a leaning toward the Central Powers, it is to be remembered that at the outset such an attitude would be quite natural for him, and might well be unconscious. The Romanic Church has inherited from classic society like imperialistic assumptions and ideals to those of the aristocracies of central Europe. But Benedict is by no means a mere traditionalist, and it is greatly to be hoped that he will see the reason for the failure of his first attempt, and—this time with adequate appreciation of the deep convictions and ethical aims of the free peoples—will address himself afresh to the truly Christian task of bringing "peace upon earth." If, however, he is unable or unwilling to come into such sympathetic touch with the modern world, then one of the European neutrals—Switzerland or Holland—might well assume the honourable task.

The topics to be considered in such a congress should be outlined in advance, and *all the proceedings should be public and open to collateral discussion in the press of all nations*. The field of the diplomatic gamester should be restricted to the utmost. Moreover, the topics should be practical, and not doctrinaire, and should be requisite to the supreme issue at hand—the making of a just and stable peace. That means that they should be *prospective in their reference*, and should take account of the past only so far as that may be needful to provide for the good of men in the present and future, and not at all for the satisfaction of feelings of revenge, tribal hostility, or even traditional morality. When the sound objective of human welfare is attained, the "eternal principles of justice"—venerable phrase of

*So recently Von Tirpitz to the Hungarian representatives: "American help is, and will remain, a mere bluff."

vague import!—will doubtless be found to be in accord therewith. Nor should we and our allies enter the discussion in a dogmatic temper, assuming that our cherished ideas are necessarily the last and perfect description and programme of humanity's wellbeing. Rather must we take up the great discussion in a broad-minded ethical temper, with a readiness to make concessions and even sacrifices, when these are needful for the common good.

The geographical question will, no doubt, come first, that being its rank in the popular interest, and in the Allied statement of peace terms. "Restitution" is the latter's catchword, a term offering various interpretations. Restitution of the *status quo ante* will not suffice, for that will not be accepted by the French or the Italians. Nor yet will the boundaries of 1870 be acceptable. Indeed, the German justification of the rape of Alsace-Lorraine is that it was but a restitution of the old situation of some two hundred years before;† a justification rather staggering to Americans since it gives Great Britain an even better claim to the United States! It is evident that if the restitution idea is to result in more than a "sordid trading across a mahogany table," it must be qualified by some principle of popular referendum. No true people—one possessing a life, traditions, and ideals of its own—should be forced to accept a rule that is continuously distasteful to it, no matter what technical justification for the "restitution" the past may offer. If this principle of the rightful primacy of the popular interest could be adopted by a world congress, a hopeful beginning would be made for an equitable, and therefore stable, adjustment of conflicting national claims. But even this evidently just principle needs interpretation. Does it mean that every people desirous of independence should have it, regard-

†The German apologist conveniently overlooks the fact that for centuries prior to Louis Quatorze, Alsace was the possession of the house of Austria, and not of any member of the present German Empire.

less of whether it can maintain that independence or not, and regardless, also, of the inconvenience or danger that the independence may cause to other peoples? Sinn Feiners and many Bohemians will no doubt say, Yes, it means just that; but the answer is inconclusive. A nation which is actually dependent, politically, upon other peoples cannot justly deny all political claims on their part. Duties and rights go together. It may be that the real rights of such a people are satisfied when home rule is accorded to it.

A related question is that of the rights of peoples who are backward in development. We Americans in the past have nominally dealt with our Indian tribes as foreign nations, nations sovereign and independent, with territories which were their exclusive possession. The system has worked ill, ill for the American good name and worse for the welfare of the aborigines. It is to be doubted if it has worked better in Africa or the British East Indies. Indeed, it would be hard to instance a case the earth around where this doctrinaire principle has worked to the advantage of backward peoples when thrown into contact with those which are advanced. The idea that the rights of all peoples, regardless of their ability to maintain them, or use them, or perhaps even understand them, are identical is all that gives colour to the long-cherished charge of the Germans against the British of "crushing" weaker peoples. Certainly the "crushed" peoples have in the past three years shown a singular readiness to stand up for their alleged oppressors. It is the idea, too, which furnishes American critics of our Philippine policy with most of their arguments. The best examples of really helpful relations between advanced and backward peoples—Egypt, for instance—have been those cases where the *duties* of the stronger nation to the weaker have been honourably recognised, and the *rights* of supervision which go with such duties have been frankly exercised. Is it not time that international principle and

policy should discard the misleading analogy covered by the words "nation" and "people," and should recognise explicitly that the rights of a people in the sisterhood of nations are limited to such a degree and kind of self-government as it can maintain effectively and serviceably to itself and mankind, *together with all such conditions of national and racial development toward complete parity with its neighbours* as international co-operation can provide?

Connected with the geographical question is the important matter of the enlargement of the sphere of international control. The "freedom of the seas" appears to have been mostly a phrase for partisan declamation,* yet the principle bears upon the peace settlement in two important ways. One of these is the familiar, but not fully established, doctrine of the "open door" in all non-self-governing over-seas possessions. Any nation exercising control over portions of the earth not mainly inhabited by its own citizens should be required to do so as the representative of the collective interests of mankind, and the guardian of equal commercial rights *with itself* for all nations. Secondly, neither the Central nor the Entente Powers can afford to have the Turkish straits controlled after the war by their present enemies; and a "dictated peace" which left the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles so controlled would contain fertile seed of future conflict. International control is evidently the true solution. This, of course, would be a serious check to Germany's eastern ambitions; and, if obliged to concede it, she may confidently be expected to demand that the artificial straits of Suez and Panama should be internationalised likewise. And, indeed, why not? It is hard to see other than partisan reasons to the contrary, and partisan interests insisted upon to the detriment of other peoples will surely breed future trouble. Why should it

*Reduced to its lowest terms the German demand seems to be that the indispensable naval defences which Great Britain has erected against a foreign attack should be removed by international agreement!

not be established as an international principle, in the interest of world-wide human good, that all water-ways, whether natural or artificial, the use of which is requisite to the welfare of two or more peoples shall, upon the demand of one of these, be put under international control?

The Entente call for "reparation" will probably be the one most hotly contested by Germany; yet it appears to spring from a sound principle. The new democracy of Russia has declared for "no indemnities," and the Pope has suggested that both sides drop the claim for reparation. This might well be good counsel, if only economic interests were at stake; for the Entente Powers could afford better to repair the desolations of Belgium, France, and Serbia themselves than to continue the war for a year or two longer. But it is not so; political and ethical interests are involved. Successful national depredation is an evil virus in the world. Germany would not have prepared for and executed her *Jingis Khan* undertaking of 1914, if it had not been for her predatory success in 1870. Moreover, among the needful "guarantees" of peace in future must be placed an adequate realisation on the part of the German people of the iniquity of the policy of "*schrecklichkeit*." To seek that realisation by retaliation in kind would be too great an injury to civilisation and the moral sentiment of the world; it would be to take a long stride backward toward barbarism. What more equitable way, then, is there of safeguarding the future morally than that of bringing home to an erring people the evils of a barbarian policy by making them pay its judicially determined damages?

This question of guarantees for the

future, professedly desired by both sides, is evidently one of great difficulty. Mere treaties are broken reeds for safety—"scraps of paper" in the hour of stress. On national *interests*, not on mere promises, must reliance be placed. In some way the peoples must be brought to see, what happily is the truth, that their real interests lie in co-operation and friendly rivalry in the arts of peace, not in overreaching and robbery. Now, the recognition of this truth, and the establishment of national attitudes which shall put it into effect, seem to be possible (as in civil life) only under the protective guarantee of some international organisation equipped with power; that is, something in the nature of Mr. Taft's "League to Enforce Peace." No people—not even the American—can properly allow the question of its safety to become secondary with it, can reasonably pass beyond the sword and revolver stage of development, unless that safety is sufficiently provided for, at least as regards sudden exigencies, by a world society. It is not enough to agree and proclaim, as should be agreed and proclaimed, that it is an international crime for a people to arise, thrust aside all judicial inquiry, and, on the plea that it has private information that its neighbour is plotting its hurt, forthwith assail that neighbour and devastate her lands and cities. It is not enough, because too many peoples (like too many individuals) are still liable to criminal or crazy impulses. A democratic Peace Congress which shall meet the real world needs must, therefore, commit the peoples it represents to the principle of a duly equipped peace league, a league which shall at least secure to each nation the protection of an arbitratment of reason before an appeal to arms is permitted.

THE ADVANCE OF ENGLISH POETRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

BY WILLIAM LYON PHELPS

PART II

Stephen Phillips—his immediate success—influence of Stratford-on-Avon—his plays—a traditional poet—his realism.—William Watson—his unpromising start—his lament on the coldness of the age toward poetry—his Epigrams—"Wordsworth's Grave"—his eminence as a critic in verse—his anti-imperialism—his Song of Hate—his Byronic wit—his contempt for the "new" poetry.—Alfred Noyes—both literary and rhetorical—an orthodox poet—a singer—his democracy—his childlike imagination—his sea-poems—"Drake"—his optimism—his religious faith.—A. E. Housman—his paganism and pessimism—his modernity—his originality—his lyrical power—war poems—Ludlow.

I

THE genius of Stephen Phillips was immediately recognised by London critics. When the thin volume, *Poems*, containing "Marpessa," "Christ in Hades," and some lyrical pieces, appeared in 1897, it was greeted by a loud chorus of approval, ceremoniously ratified by the bestowal of the First Prize from the British Academy. Some of the more distinguished among his admirers asserted that the nobility, splendour, and beauty of his verse merited the adjective Miltonic. I remember that we Americans thought that the English critics had lost their heads, and we queried what they would say if we praised a new poet in the United States in any such fashion. But that was before we had seen the book; when we had once read it for ourselves, we felt no alarm for the safety of Milton, but we knew that English Literature had been enriched. Stephen Phillips is among the English poets.

His career extended over the space of twenty-five years, from the first publication of "Marpessa," in 1890, to his death on December 9, 1915. He was born near the city of Oxford, July 28, 1868. His father, the Rev. Dr. Stephen Phillips, still living, is Precentor of Peterborough Cathedral; his mother was related to Wordsworth. He

was exposed to poetry germs at the age of eight, for in 1876 his father became Chaplain and Sub-Vicar at Stratford-on-Avon, and the boy attended the Grammar School. Later he spent a year at Queens College, Cambridge, enough to give him the right to be enrolled in the long list of Cambridge poets. He went on the stage as a member of Frank Benson's company, and in his time played many parts, receiving on one occasion a curtain call as the Ghost in *Hamlet*. This experience—with the early Stratford inspiration—probably fired his ambition to become a dramatist. George Alexander produced *Paolo and Francesca*; *Herod* was acted in London by Beerbohm Tree, and in America by William Faversham. Neither of these plays was a failure, but it is regrettable that he wrote for the stage at all. His genius was not adapted for drama, and the quality of his verse was not improved by the experiment, although all of his half-dozen pieces have occasional passages of rare loveliness. His best play, *Paolo and Francesca*, suffers when compared either with Boker's or D'Annunzio's treatment of the old story. It lacks the stage-craft of the former, and the virility of the latter.

Phillips was no pioneer: he followed the main tradition of English poetry, and must be counted among the legiti-