

saw a man get into a machine quicker than did that gunner. I myself worked fast.

As he climbed in I opened the throttle and headed directly toward the running Germans and directly into the slight wind. Most of them stopped and worked at their rifles. It was extraordinary the speed with which they opened fire on us. As we rose from the ground the air seemed full of bullets. We were so close that the undercarriage bowled several of them over. I could hear their shouts and cries above the noise of the motor and the guns. The very boldness of the manœuvre took some of them by surprise. I remember seeing one burly fellow staring at us with open mouth. Then they dropped away from us rapidly, while we both snuggled down in the body of the bus in the mistaken idea that it meant protection.

My gunner swung around the gun and opened up on them. He told me later it was a treat to see them scurry for shelter just like gray rabbits. Then the sky sud-

denly filled with the puffs of "Archie" fire, and for a few minutes we were extremely busy. They were evidently feeling out of sorts about something. They peppered away at us with machine-guns and "Archies," and threw in a few rockets for good measure.

We shall never know what happened to the man we were to pick up. Whatever happened, he was a brave chap. It made me sick to have to report him absent, but there was nothing else to do. His name is unknown save to the inner circle, but his work has become known to many because through the information he secured it was possible to make a later advance on the Western front.

That ended my job as a ferry-boat for spies. We never went back. The Germans would watch that field for days, and our officers knew that there would n't have been the remotest chance of picking up our man, let alone of coming back alive ourselves.

## Russia: a Dissolving View

By LOTHROP STODDARD



THE present condition of Russia can be summed up in one word: dissolution. It is the most sudden and profound dissolution in all recorded history, a breakdown not merely of government, but of the whole social fabric. In a single year a mighty empire, the product of centuries of historic evolution, inhabited by 175 millions of people and occupying one sixth of the entire land surface of the globe, has disappeared into thin air, leaving behind nothing but a welter of anarchy. This is something unprecedented. Beside it the French Revolution pales into relative insignificance.

Yet we should err in dwelling exclusively upon the Russian Revolution's destructive side. It is the passing of

the outworn in order to make room for fresh forms of life. This principle certainly applies in Russia, for amid the ruins of the old order we can already discern the vigorous upshoots of the new. Precisely what the new order will be like we, of course, do not yet know. After a forest fire there springs up between the blackened stumps a riot of new growth. Much of this is weed and brush destined to ultimate extinction beneath the shade of the new forest. The one thing certain is that a new forest will one day shadow the fire-swept soil. Let us, then, emulating the woodsman, survey the revolution-scarred Russian land, striving to discern what the new growth may be.

Our survey will embrace many points of interest, for the situation is a complicated one. To begin with, the Roman-

off Empire was emphatically not a racial or cultural unit. The genuine Russians formed less than half the total population, the balance being made up of many alien peoples, retaining their ancestral languages, cultures, and faiths. Accordingly, no sooner was the czar's yoke lifted, than all these suppressed peoples asserted their long-denied claims to self-expression and free development. Such was the basis of the separatist movements in Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, and other regions.

But this is by no means the whole story. The Russian Revolution was a social even more than a political upheaval, and with the coming of the Bolsheviks to power it assumed the form of embittered class-war.

Thus the present situation in Russia is compounded of two basic factors: the one, the self-assertion of the non-Russian peoples for free development either by guaranteed autonomy or by independence; the other, the general struggle between the poorer classes and the richer and more aristocratic elements. This twofold, intersecting situation has produced the most varied results, depending in the given cases upon the relative strength of nationalistic or class considerations. Since conditions vary greatly within the different portions of the former Russian Empire, only a regional survey of the empire can yield practical results.

The logical beginning of our survey is naturally the Russians themselves; and here we almost everywhere find class interests prevailing over nationalistic considerations. The Russian, to be sure, does not lack patriotism, but this feeling has with him never attained that clear-cut precision possessed by citizens of Western nations, and to-day it seems temporarily in abeyance. On the other hand, a bad economic system had long estranged the various classes of the population; so it was inevitable that the Revolution would assume a distinctly social complexion and would thereby engender a class-struggle of the most thoroughgoing nature.

And in this struggle, so far as Russia proper is concerned, the disinherited classes have almost everywhere been easy victors. In fact, given the social structure of Russia under the empire, it could not well have been otherwise. At one end of the social scale stood a small class of landed proprietors and officials; at the other end an enormous mass of poverty-stricken peasants and town proletarians, with virtually no middle classes to bridge the gulf between. As soon as the supporting pillar of czarism was knocked away, the whole social edifice fell in ruins, the relatively small upper class being quite unable to protect itself against the needy majority. It is true that the extreme leveling doctrines of the Bolsheviks, menacing as they do not only wealthy persons, but all those possessing any property whatsoever, is rapidly driving the thriftier peasants and town artisans into an alliance with the persecuted upper and middle classes; but so strong is the grip and so ruthless the terroristic methods of Russia's present proletarian dictators that as yet this alliance has produced no tangible results.

The only Russian-inhabited regions where real opposition has been offered to the Bolshevik régime are the Cossack territories and Siberia, and the reason for this opposition becomes clear when we discover that in both these regions the old economic order satisfied a majority of the population.

The Cossack territories, both in south-eastern European Russia and in Siberia, were originally frontier military colonies, and the czars consistently favored the Cossacks, regarding them as the Romanoffs' trustiest soldiers. It was clear that the surest way to bind the Cossacks firmly to the throne was by generous grants of land. Accordingly, so extensive were the Cossack land-grants that the average allotment to the individual Cossack family was from four to eight times that of the ordinary peasant family of European Russia. Before the Revolution the Cossacks thus stood out as a privileged caste

with valuable vested interests. Indeed, the Cossacks themselves were not sufficiently numerous to till all the soil at their disposal; so much of the land was rented out to ordinary Russian peasants. At the outbreak of the Revolution these peasants settled in the Cossack territories were almost as numerous as the Cossack caste, but enjoyed none of the Cossack privileges and occupied a very inferior economic position. In these circumstances it was inevitable that the ferment of the Revolution should stir this peasant element to demand the abolition of Cossack privileges and a redistribution of the land, while, conversely, it was equally inevitable that the leveling doctrines of the Petrograd radicals would alarm the Cossacks and tend to prejudice them against the Revolution. This is the reason for the counter-revolutionary Cossack risings of Korniloff and Kaledin. The quick failure of these risings is likewise explained by the presence in the Cossack home-land of a radical peasant element, which prevented the Cossacks from exerting their full strength against the Bolshevik government troops. At this writing the Cossack territories seem to be a prey to an obscure struggle between Cossacks and Bolsheviks, but the Cossacks must always be reckoned with as an important military factor in any future conservative combination against the latter.

As to Siberia, its economic structure rendered it less predisposed than was European Russia to a leveling social revolution. In this vast, thinly populated region, stretching from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, a land question obviously could not occur, while the country's industrial backwardness precluded the existence of exploited proletarian masses like those of Moscow and Petrograd. Of course, among the exiles from European Russia and the poorest classes in the Siberian towns many radicals of Bolshevik tendencies were to be found, but these formed a relatively small element in the total population. In fact, the great desire of the Siberians was not

so much the abolition of economic and social grievances as the improvement of their political status. Like all virgin lands, Siberia had breathed into its sons the spirit of freedom, and the outlook of the Siberian colonist had always been something quite different from the apathetic fatalism of the Old Russian muzhik. This mental attitude of the Siberians is well expressed by a Siberian popular phrase describing the country as "The Land of the Unhumiliated."

Unfortunately, these liberal aspirations were anathema to the old régime, which kept Siberia in as strict subservience to the Petrograd bureaucracy as any other part of the empire. Accordingly, when czarism fell in March, 1917, the first reaction of Siberia to the new situation was a demand for full local self-government in a liberalized federal Russia, and the subsequent triumph of the Bolsheviks awakened little enthusiasm in the mass of the Siberian people. The Bolshevik masters of Petrograd, however, were not disposed to let Siberia alone. In the first place, here, as elsewhere, they resolutely supported their adherents even against a local moderate majority, acting on the Bolshevik principle of effecting the immediate, general triumph of the social revolution and the unlimited domination of the revolutionary proletariat. In the second place, the secessionist movement in the Ukraine, of which more anon, left Siberia the one great source of food-stuffs for the feeding of the hungry masses of Petrograd and Moscow, the citadels of the Bolshevik movement. As a matter of fact, through its control of the Trans-siberian Railroad, the Bolshevik government has been able to transport sufficient revolutionary troops to keep Siberia under its authority; but the country is not Bolshevik in spirit, and Semenoff's rising, together with the successes of the Czechoslovaks, shows Siberia, like the Cossack territories, a potential center of reaction against Bolshevik rule.

So much for the situation of the Russian-inhabited portions of the former Russian Empire. We must now examine

conditions in the non-Russian regions. The empire of the czars, being largely a work of conquest, inclosed broad frontier belts inhabited by peoples differing widely from the true Russians in race, speech, culture, and creed. In examining conditions in the former Russian Empire, therefore, the basic fact to be remembered is that in the Russian-inhabited regions economic and social questions are of primary significance, whereas in the non-Russian regions such questions, however important, are complicated by nationalistic considerations. Russia was like a prison-house wherein many peoples were subjected to a tyrannous persecution in the effort to crush them into that "true Russian" mold which was the ideal of the bureaucrats of Petrograd. Accordingly, no sooner was czarism overthrown than all these oppressed peoples threw off their chains and rose clamoring for a free future either as independent states or as self-governing units in a loosely knit Russian confederation. But at the same time the increasing radicalism of the Revolution began to quicken the aspirations of the poorer classes in the non-Russian as well as in the Russian regions, thus tending to blur nationalistic lines and to substitute class cleavages. The result has been a constant shifting of the balance between these two primary factors, as will be readily seen from a consideration of recent events.

Our survey had best begin with Finland, the northermost of the belt of Russian-annexed peoples lying between old Russia and central Europe. Swedish in culture, Protestant in religion, and with a thoroughly Western outlook, Finland was absolutely non-Russian in character and had been deeply embittered by harsh Russification under the czar's régime. When the empire collapsed, therefore, the Finns naturally took advantage of the situation to proclaim, first, complete autonomy and, later, formal independence. Up to this point all Finns were in agreement, but the leaven of the Russian Revolution had been working in Finland, and thenceforth a struggle between the

classes began. The economic and social structure in Finland was far sounder than that of Russia, and of itself did not seem to invite a violent social upheaval. But here as elsewhere the Bolshevik rulers of Petrograd backed the radical working-men of the towns, and they, with the assistance of the large Russian garrisons quartered in Finland, attempted to put through the social revolution. This was the so-called "Red Guard" government of Finland that established itself in Helsingfors and other parts of Finland adjacent to the Russian border.

However, the conservative elements in Finland were too powerful to permit this ultra-radical régime long to endure. Unlike Russia, Finland possessed not only a landed aristocracy, but a large middle class and a population of sturdy yeoman farmers as well. All these elements, threatened with destruction by the Bolsheviks, banded together for resistance and formed a "White Guard" government, which immediately gained control of central Finland. The Red Guards of Helsingfors called on their Bolshevik brethren at Petrograd, but the White Guards countered by summoning German aid, and under their able leader, General Mannerheim, undertook the conquest of the Red Guard south. The struggle was a ferocious class-war, with wholesale atrocities and vast destruction of property. In the end the Red Guards were rooted out, and White Guard rule was established over all Finland. This means that, for the present at least, Finland is under a conservative régime. It also means that the attempt to establish the social revolution there has entirely failed. The unfortunate feature of the Finnish situation was that by the whole course of events the White Guard government was dependent upon Germany, and had given unequivocal proof of its dependence by the conclusion of a treaty with Germany providing for the closest Finno-German relations. Germany then began busily fanning the propaganda for a Finnish kingdom with a German prince seated upon the new throne.

Just south of Finland lie the Baltic Provinces, Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland. Like Finland, the Baltic Provinces are thoroughly non-Russian in character, being Germanic in culture, Protestant in religion, and with a western European point of view. The social structure, however, differs from that of Finland. Most of the land has for centuries been in the hands of German barons who have earned the hatred of the native Esth and Lett peasantry. This made the Baltic Provinces fertile ground for the seeds of Bolshevik propaganda, and the social revolution would unquestionably have been quickly established had not German armies overrun the country and reestablished the German barons in their lands and former political authority. Until November last the Baltic Provinces were under German rule, with a strongly conservative régime in control and revolutionary tendencies sternly repressed.

South of the Baltic Provinces lies Lithuania, a land inhabited by a people akin to the Baltic Province Letts, but with a history closely entwined with that of Poland, which gave Lithuania its special form of western European culture and its strong Roman Catholicism. Lithuania is an agricultural country, with few large towns and little industrial life. The soil is mainly owned by Polish landlords, who, together with the Polonized middle classes of the towns, desire the political union of Lithuania and Poland as in medieval times. On the other hand, the last half-century has witnessed a nationalistic awakening among the peasantry, aiming at a separate Lithuanian state. This political dispute has naturally deepened existing class cleavages, and Lithuania would have been susceptible to the social revolution but for the fact that the country has been under German military occupation ever since the summer of 1915.

The same holds true of Russian Poland, lying just to the south. The fact that for nearly two years previous to the Russian upheaval both Poland and Lithuania were under German military rule has kept both countries rather "out of"

the Russian Revolution. The German rulers held a tight rein and permitted no Bolshevik propaganda. No one can definitely say what would have happened if the Germans had not secured control, and we are thrown back largely on conjecture, always a risky matter. The utmost we can say is that in Poland, while on the one hand we have an unusually strong nationalistic sentiment binding together all classes of the population except the Jews in a common aspiration for a revived, independent Poland, on the other hand we have an unhealthy economic system of great landed estates, landless peasants, and exploited town proletariat, incentives to class warfare. That the Polish upper and middle classes fear the possibility of the social revolution is evident from their recent political change of front. Down to 1917 they were essentially anti-German, but the social cataclysm in Russia has given them a bad fright, while the Germans have cleverly angled for their support by posing as the arch-champions of order and private property. The result was that the Polish classes seemed increasingly inclined to abate some of their nationalistic pretensions in return for German aid in keeping the Polish masses immune from the infection of the Bolshevik movement. How the German surrender and revolution will affect this situation it is impossible to say. The present Polish situation is highly unstable and is capable of a variety of sudden modifications.

Continuing our southward survey, we next come to the lands collectively known as the Ukraine, a vast region, including most of southern Russia to the Black Sea and extending eastward as far as the River Don. The Ukrainians (also known as "Little Russians") are closely related to the true or "Great" Russians in blood and speech, the difference between the two stocks being about as great as those between Germans and Dutch. Had the czars treated the Little Russians with tactful consideration, it is virtually certain that they would to-day desire nothing better than close political union with their



Great Russian cousins to the north. Unfortunately, generations of Russification have so embittered the Ukrainians that they feel that the sole method of safeguarding their racial and cultural life lies either in a very wide autonomy or in absolute independence.

The fall of czarism in March, 1917, gave the Ukrainians an opportunity of which they were not slow to take advantage. An Ukrainian provisional government known as the Rada seated itself in the city of Kieff and received the support of the Ukrainian population throughout southern Russia. Economic questions were, to be sure, much in evidence from the first. The social structure of the Ukraine was almost identical with that of northern Russia, and the land-hunger of the Ukrainian peasants cried out insistently for the distribution of the great landed estates. But class quarrels were temporarily adjourned under the necessity of presenting a united front to the Great Russian North. Most Great Russians refused to consider a political separation of the Ukraine, regarding such a step as fatal to the continued existence of Russia as a first-class power. Not only is the Ukraine the richest portion of European Russia; it is also the gateway to Russia's chief commercial outlet, the Black Sea. The Great Russians looked at Ukrainian separatism precisely as our fathers did at the Southern Confederacy. For this reason neither the bourgeois government of Miliukoff nor the moderate socialist government of Kerensky would acknowledge the claims of the Ukrainian Rada, adopting instead a temporizing policy until an opportunity should present itself for reestablishing Great Russian authority over the Ukrainian South.

The overthrow of the Kerensky government by the Bolsheviks at the close of 1917 produced an immediate change in the Ukrainian situation. The new Bolshevik rulers of Russia cared nothing for the historic rights of the Russian state. In fact, the Bolsheviks condemned the very concept of the national state, its ideal—the confederation of soviets—being a

political nebula composed of innumerable small autonomous proletarian bodies co-operating for only the most elementary civic necessities. But the new Bolshevik government was no more inclined than its predecessors to recognize the Ukrainian Rada, because it hated the Rada as a bourgeois organization that prevented the establishment of the social revolution in southern Russia. Accordingly, the Bolshevik government did everything possible to stir up class war in the Ukraine, and its efforts were crowned with considerable success. The Rada had already made notable concessions to the Ukrainian masses, but the spectacle of the social revolution in full swing just to the northward rendered these concessions insufficient longer to satisfy the Ukrainian peasants and town proletariat. The Bolshevik government despatched troops to southern Russia to aid the local malcontents, and fierce fighting broke out at many points.

Faced by the menace of the social revolution, the Ukrainian Rada countered precisely as did the White Guard government of Finland. In other words, it called in the Germans. A peace-treaty was signed between the Ukrainian Republic and the Teutonic empires, Austro-German armies entered the Ukraine to restore order, and the Ukraine fell to a considerable extent under German military control. The dependence of the Ukrainian upper classes upon the Germans came about because class antagonisms had almost wiped out the former nationalistic solidarity, so that the withdrawal of German aid may soon result in the speedy overthrow of the upper-class Rada by a Bolshevik régime akin to that of Petrograd.

Continuing our survey, and turning eastward along the Black Sea coast, we pass by the Cossack territories of the Don region, already discussed, and approach the giant Caucasus mountain wall. Beyond that snowy rampart lies the province of Transcaucasia, the scene of perhaps the most complicated problem now vexing

the territories of the former Russian Empire. Transcaucasia, as befits a borderland between Europe and Asia, is the home of a bewildering variety of races and creeds. The main dividing-line, however, is that running between the Christian and Mohammedan populations. The chief Christian races are the Georgians and the Armenians, the former, a fine, chivalric people settled in Transcaucasia since the earliest times, the latter, mostly immigrants from the Armenian homeland lying just south of Transcaucasia in Turkish territory. The Mohammedan element in Transcaucasia consists of the large Tatar population settled in eastern Transcaucasia along the Caspian Sea, together with certain mountain tribes that have settled in the Caucasus range itself.

During the imperial régime all the races of Transcaucasia suffered under a common oppression, the Russian Government doing its best to Russify the native populations. This roused the special resentment of the Georgians and Armenians, both peoples with a keen national self-consciousness and a long cultural past. In these circumstances the fall of czarism produced the same effect in Transcaucasia as in other parts of the empire: the various races promptly asserted themselves and formed a provisional government to safeguard their interests. At first Christians and Mohammedans worked together, but harmony presently gave place to discord. The increasing weakness of Russia roused the Tatars to hope for union with Turkey and the subjection of all Transcaucasia to Moslem domination. As for the Moslem mountaineers of the Caucasus, they were not so much affected by Pan-Islamic zeal as were the Tatars. Accordingly they took up a middle ground, proclaiming the "Independent Daghestan Republic" and flocking very much by themselves. This left the Georgians and Armenians vir-

tually the sole supporters of the Transcaucasian provisional government.

At this point the new Bolshevik rulers of Petrograd injected a fresh complication by attempting to put through the social revolution in Transcaucasia, and when they discovered that the Transcaucasians were more interested in nationalistic than in social questions, they ordered the Russian armies quartered in Transcaucasia to revolutionize the country. The Russian soldiery, now degenerated into mere undisciplined mobs, began a carnival of disorder; but the Transcaucasian provisional government, which had by this time raised considerable military forces, rounded up the Russians and sent them home.


The Bolshevik rulers of Petrograd, however, had another disagreeable surprise in store. By the series of peace-treaties signed with the Central powers at Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks ceded to Turkey extensive districts in Transcaucasia inhabited by Armenians and Georgians. Both these peoples refused to submit to the treaty stipulations, and fighting soon began between the provisional government and the Turkish forces sent to occupy the disputed territories. A struggle began, with the Georgians and Armenians apparently putting up a stiff fight; but their situation is precarious, caught as they are between the Turkish invaders at the front and the pro-Turkish Tatars in their rear.

This ends our survey of present conditions in the former Russian Empire. Several minor situations have been omitted for lack of space, but the broad outlines have all been sketched in. The picture is certainly a bewildering and somber one, shifting with kaleidoscopic rapidity and big with momentous possibilities. The one thing certain is that any attempt at dogmatic prophecy would be worse than futile.



# "For the Duration of the War"

By H. G. MOULTON



He has enlisted for the duration of the war," to return at its conclusion, and take up once more the threads of life as he had left them at the call of Mars. There is hope in these very words, "duration of the war." The thought of the happy return to normal living at the conclusion of peace lends courage to the departing soldier; to those who must remain behind it makes existence bearable. But when one contemplates the ultimate industrial consequences of such a war as the present, the end of the conflict appears to promise almost as much of pathos as of happiness. Unless a constructive program of peace preparedness is shortly developed in this country, the termination of the war will bring in its train a series of human tragedies less terrible, perhaps, but even more pathetic than those which the war itself has ushered in.

Three main factors contribute to render demobilization at the conclusion of peace quite as intricate and quite as baffling a problem as the mobilization of our resources for the waging of effective warfare. The first is the world nature of the conflict, the second is the intensity of the struggle on the economic side, and the third is the highly specialized character of modern industrial society.

So long as there are important commercial nations not engaged in the struggle, and so long as trade relations remain open to the belligerents, a war does not seriously disarrange the industrial life of a nation. There is of course much speeding up of industry in war lines, women and children replace in appreciable numbers the men who have been drawn into the military establishment, and there are some dislocations of trade and industry; but the fundamental processes of the world of

business and the broad alignments of industry are usually but little affected. Ordinary wars are in a considerable degree waged by means of borrowed weapons; that is, imported supplies and materials: no wholesale shifting of labor and capital is required. Indeed, the industrial motto for ordinary wars might well be, "Produce such war supplies as can be conveniently produced, and borrow the rest; disarrange normal business as little as possible." But the present World War requires each group of belligerents to produce, substantially speaking, all the supplies and materials that they hope to employ in the struggle, for the reason that there is no important neutral world remaining from whom war supplies may be borrowed. As a consequence of this, wholesale dislocations of the industrial organization are unavoidable.

In the second place this war has never been approached in intensity. It has aptly been called a war which involves all the resources of each belligerent, a war in which ultimate defeat will result from national attrition. Precisely what is involved in a process of attrition is not always appreciated. To many people it would seem to indicate merely the exhausting of an existing stock of material resources. The materials required for war are, however, being continually replenished by new production, so that rather than a fund of war materials, we have a flow the size of which is determined in part by the quantity of natural resources from which they are drawn, but more by the proportion of the industrial energy—the labor power and the machine power—of a nation that is devoted to their production. The Central empires, having eliminated virtually all non-essential lines of production, have been able to produce war supplies in sufficient quan-