

Social Classes in Post-War Europe

II—The Urban Working-Classes

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THE vast urban working masses of contemporary Europe are a product of the Industrial Revolution and the correlative growth of city life. Great though their numbers and influence have become, we should not forget that they are a comparatively recent phenomenon. A trifle over a century ago the urban working-classes were an almost negligible factor in European society. During the last few decades, to be sure, their development was so rapid that to many observers it seemed that they were destined to become the dominant social group. The late war has, however, altered all perspectives, and to-day it is a moot point whether, under the changed conditions of post-war Europe, the urban working-classes are ordained to further advance or relative decline in the social scale.

The grim truth is that the fate of Europe's tens of millions of urban workers is absolutely bound up with the fate of Europe's industrial system. It was this system which called them into being and which alone permits their continued existence. Should Europe's industry decline, the urban masses will inevitably wither; should it collapse, they will quickly vanish.

The immense human tragedy involved in such possibilities was brought

home to me with poignant intensity by a trip that I made through the Ruhr at the height of the "passive-resistance" struggle against the French military occupation in the summer of 1923. The Ruhr is the industrial heart of Germany; in fact, it is one of the great industrial ganglia of the world. A veritable network of cities and towns, it is inhabited by a dense population living entirely from its mines and mills. I had passed through the Ruhr shortly before the war, and well remembered its roaring steel plants and blast-furnaces, its smoke-laden air, and its atmosphere of tense activity. I returned ten years later, and found it industrially dead. Everywhere hundreds of tall chimneys rose stark and smokeless against the sky. Everywhere hordes of working-men idled along its streets. I realized as never before how industrialized man and the industrial machine are bound together in an intimate symbiosis, or common life, which cannot be rudely dealt with save at peril to the very existence of both.

In order to appraise the present condition and future prospects of the European working-classes we must understand their past. Looking backward to the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution at the close of the

eighteenth century, we find conditions amazingly different from those of the present day. Europe was then mainly agricultural, with only about one third its present inhabitants (150,000,000 in the year 1800 as against 450,000,000 in 1914). Towns and cities were relatively few and small. London, which to-day has a population of 7,500,000, numbered in the year 1800 only about 850,000; Paris, with a present population of nearly 3,000,000, then had only 550,000; while Berlin, which now has nearly 4,000,000 inhabitants, then numbered a scant 200,000 souls.

Furthermore, such towns and cities as did exist were very different in character from the towns and cities of to-day. To-day the typical urban center is an *industrial* center, a swarming hive of great factories and giant workshops run by complicated, power-driven machinery, manned by multitudes of workers, and producing immense quantities of goods which not only supply the economic wants of the surrounding country-side, but may be exported to the uttermost ends of the earth. In the eighteenth century all this was unknown. Save in England, where the first faint foreshadowings of the Industrial Revolution had begun, there were no power-driven machines, no factories, no mass-production, and virtually no working-class as we understand the term to-day. The nearest corresponding social groups were the journeymen and apprentices of the trade-guilds. In those days industry was a series of handicrafts, carried on in small shops presided over, and usually owned by, master-workmen who were organized into guilds and who were assisted in their labors by members of their families, by journeymen (that is, hired workmen), and by ap-

prentices, young men learning the trade. Goods were produced slowly and in relatively small quantities, yet so narrow was the market that demand rarely pressed upon supply. Not only was there very little foreign trade, but even the surrounding country-side took few town manufactures save comforts and luxuries. Sundered from the towns by execrable roads prohibiting heavy transport, the country-side lived its own life, fashioning its own clothes and simple implements.

Thus restricted in their markets, the town craftsmen remained few in numbers and of scant importance. Of course, besides the organized craftsmen, there were certain groups of manual laborers, while below these again were the dregs of urban society—those pauper, vagabond, and criminal elements who form the true proletariat, so often falsely confused with the genuine working-classes. Unable or unwilling to work, these social failures constituted then, as now, the breeding-ground for vice, crime, and social disturbance.

Such was the simple scheme of eighteenth-century industrial life. Then came the Industrial Revolution, disrupting the old system and bringing the new. The process began in England toward the close of the eighteenth century, but it presently spread to the Continent, and by the latter part of the nineteenth century Europe had ceased to be agricultural and had become predominantly urban—the industrial center of the world.

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Now, what was the economic and social status of these new working masses which the Industrial Revolution had thus suddenly created? At

first it was distinctly inferior to that of their predecessors. The craft artisan of the older time, despite his limited opportunities, had an assured and stable position in society. By the very nature of his calling he had to be a man of considerable skill and long training; his numbers were limited, and he was relatively difficult to replace. The new factory worker, however, enjoyed no such status. The machine made possible the employment of all sorts and conditions of people, including women and children; training and skill were not so necessary, while replacement was easy among the multitudes of potential workers. Faced by novel conditions, neither law nor public opinion could immediately comprehend or deal with them, and grave abuses sprang up from which the working-classes were the chief sufferers. As time passed, to be sure, the worst evils of the new industrial system were ameliorated by the perfecting of economic processes or by corrective legislation; nevertheless, there can be no doubt that down to the middle of the nineteenth century the industrial workers were hard pressed and did not obtain a share of society's growing wealth and prosperity commensurate with their numbers and their services.

Presently, however, the tide turned, and the working-classes everywhere rose in the social scale to points never before attained. Long before the close of the nineteenth century the lot of the urban workers throughout most of Europe was greatly in advance of that enjoyed by the artisan elements before the Industrial Revolution. The eighteenth-century artisan, despite relative economic security, possessed almost no political rights and suffered from many limitations of social and

legal status, lack of opportunities, well-nigh universal illiteracy, and, in many parts of Europe, denial of personal liberty and religious freedom. By the middle of the nineteenth century these handicaps had been almost everywhere removed. By that date, also, the general benefits of modern civilization, like rapid transportation, public-health services, and diffused education, were reaching all social strata. Furthermore, the very progress of the Industrial Revolution was automatically favoring the working-classes. The increased cheapness of commodities rendered possible by large-scale production caused an enormous expansion in the demand for goods, and with this extension of markets went a corresponding increase in the value of labor. Down to the close of the nineteenth century wages increased so rapidly that the average European workman came to enjoy a far more comfortable and pleasurable life than had his ancestors, with better food, clothing, and shelter, and with a range of opportunities and amusements of which his ancestors had never dreamed.

In this economic and social evolution the working-classes were by no means passive. On the contrary, they were extremely active, and by their conscious efforts did much to hasten their upward progress. Even in their most depressed period the working-classes possessed two important advantages—increased numbers and a growing sense of solidarity. Concentrated in great industrial centers, stimulated by closeness of contact, and drawn together by common disadvantages, like low wages, long hours, and kindred unhappy conditions, the workers were able to get acquainted with

one another, to acquire a common point of view, and to evolve means of action for the promotion of common interests.

Working-class activities have proceeded along two main lines, economic and political. The former—the movement of the organized industrial workers—has concerned itself with the organization of producers, and has concentrated upon economic matters like wages, hours of labor, and factory conditions. This is trades-unionism. The second, or political, line of labor evolution has concerned itself with the organization of voters, and has functioned like other political organizations. The expressions of this second line of development are the various socialist and labor parties.

This twofold nature of working-class evolution must always be kept clearly in mind, because the two lines, while parallel in a general sense, have rarely fused and have often kept jealously apart. Thus in virtually every European country there have been both trades-unions and labor parties with wide variations of reciprocal attitude and relative importance. In England the trades-union has, until recent years, overshadowed the political party, whereas on the Continent the party has usually overshadowed the trades-union. Germany is an interesting exception to the rule. In Germany the economic and political phases of the labor movement developed symmetrically and sympathetically, with a minimum of friction and a maximum of mutual support. The astute leaders who guided the German-labor movement saw from the start that division of function for common ends was the ideal, and did not permit themselves to stress either half at the

expense of the whole. Accordingly, in Germany the unions neither attempted to dominate the party nor the party the unions. The result was that at the outbreak of the European war Germany had at once the strongest trades-unions and the strongest Socialist-Labor party in the world.

But, as already stated, Germany was an exception to the general rule. Elsewhere the dualism of the labor movement was pronounced. In 1914 both the trades-unions and the political labor parties had established international central organizations; the union body being the Trades-Union Federation, with offices at Berlin, Germany, while the political body was the Socialist International, with headquarters at Brussels, Belgium. The two organizations were entirely distinct in every way.

Besides its divisions of function, the labor movement has been similarly complicated by divisions of spirit. From the very beginning of the industrial period the urban working-classes have been moved by two diverse tendencies, evolution and revolution. Labor has been everywhere prone to criticize the modern industrial system; but whereas many working-class elements have accepted the system in its fundamentals and have confined their efforts to bettering labor's position within the existing social order, other elements, rejecting modern society, have planned its overthrow by revolutionary methods. These tendencies cross-cut labor's functional divisions in highly complex fashion. We frequently discover revolutionary trades-unionists and evolutionary socialists. On the whole, however, it appears that trades-unionism, with its concentration upon specific economic

objects like wages, hours, and working conditions, has tended to be evolutionary in character; whereas the political labor parties, with their more sweeping programs and more theoretical outlook, have tended toward revolution.

Another important point to remember is that the trades-union (the association of working-men for economic ends) is a distinctly modern development, quite different from the old pre-industrial trade-guilds, which were joint associations of masters and workers. On the other hand, revolutionary movements among the working-classes are not in themselves new phenomena, but are a taking over, by urban industrial labor, of aspirations always more or less consciously held by dissatisfied and rebellious social elements, especially by the proletariat—society's dregs.

Revolutionary agitation has alternately waxed and waned during the last hundred years. Broadly speaking, it can be said that the closing decades of the nineteenth century were quiet times. The growing well-being of the working-classes contented all save the least capable or the most restless elements. Even among those who theoretically condemned existing society and pinned their hopes upon a new social order, many abjured their plans of violent revolution or at least adjourned them to an indeterminate future. Such were the "evolutionary" or "Fabian" socialists who played so prominent a part in later nineteenth-century radical thought. The apostles of immediate, uncompromising, violent revolution became, for the time being, a rather discredited minority.

The opening years of the twentieth century, however, witnessed a sharp revival of revolutionary agitation.

The chronically restless and rebellious elements, losing faith in moderate leaders who counseled time and patience, turned once more to the apostles of violence. And the ranks of the extremists were continually swelled by multitudes of persons dissatisfied with the economic trend of the times. We have already seen that during the latter part of the nineteenth century wages rose fast enough to keep pace with both rising prices and higher living standards. This was particularly true of the skilled workers. The unskilled workers did not fare so well. Still, virtually all grades of labor were proportionately better off than they had been a few decades before.

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With the beginning of the present century, however, the situation altered. The advance in wages slowed down. On the other hand, living standards remained high, while prices rose in unprecedented fashion. In other words, not only did the necessities of life cost more, but the working-man had come to consider more things as necessities, irrespective of cost. The standard of living had so changed that, even if prices had remained stationary, the same amount paid in wages would by no means go so far toward the realization of the working-man's desires as it would have done a century, or even half a century, before. The working-man had come to expect, as a matter of course, that his food would be of better quality and greater variety than his grandfather's. He expected to be better housed. He expected to be better clothed. He expected more amusement and leisure. He expected his surroundings to be cleaner, more attractive, and better cared for.

But all such advantages must, somehow or other, be paid for. And, with rapidly rising prices, it became more and more difficult to pay. The upshot was that the urban working-classes found themselves less prosperous, and consequently grew dissatisfied, more critical of the existing social order, and more prone to listen to teachings of revolution. It was during the opening years of our century that there were evolved those militant doctrines, first known as Syndicalism and later as Communism or Bolshevism, which are the gospel of present-day social revolutionary unrest. The years just before the Great War were troubled times, in which strikes, violence, and bitter revolutionary agitation became more and more the order of the day.

The war instantly and dramatically changed both the political and the economic aspects of the labor situation. Politically, it virtually obliterated (for the moment, at least) revolutionary agitation. In all countries the great majority of working-men, heeding the call of patriotism, rallied to the colors and subordinated their class interests to those of their country. Only small minorities of revolutionary extremists maintained their attitude of unswerving allegiance to the "international solidarity of the workers" and their paramount interest in the "class war."

In the economic field, likewise, the war wrought great changes. Bursting into a period of stationary wages, trade depression, and unemployment, the war restored industrial prosperity by its huge demands on industry, and this in turn benefited labor. Unemployment vanished, wages rose, and the working-classes enjoyed a period

of unprecedented prosperity. Of course it was a hectic, artificial prosperity, bought by inflated currencies and mortgaged futures, and certain to be dearly paid for some day. Nevertheless, for the moment labor was prosperous, contented, and hence relatively free from social unrest.

As the war dragged on, to be sure, labor unrest reappeared. Inflated currencies caused such a prodigious rise in prices that even record wages barely sufficed to keep pace with higher living costs and inflated living standards. On top of all this the Russian Revolution sent a thrill through every radical in Europe and encouraged the most extravagant hopes of immediate, universal working-class domination. Still, down to the very close of the war, anything like an acute labor crisis, though clearly gathering, remained in abeyance.

Peace, however, soon brought this crisis to the fore. Awakened from the war-delirium, Europe faced realities in the cold gray light of "the morning after." And the sight was not a pleasant one. General impoverishment, huge debts, a mortgaged and uncertain future—such was the Great War's grim economic aftermath. A frank facing of the situation should have shown that the one way out of this terrible state of affairs was hard work, economy, and deflation. But for labor that spelled reduction of wages and abandonment of the war-time scale of living. And labor was in no mood to follow this course. Besides a natural reluctance to relinquish benefits, the psychology of the war years had excited all sorts of beatific dreams. People had been constantly told that if they would only "carry through," they would be rewarded by

"a different world after the war."

The intensity of this sentimental delusion has been well described by the English economist Shadwell. "The war," he writes, "was generally expected to lead straight into a sort of Utopia, in which the lion would lie down with the lamb and the prophecy contained in the eleventh chapter of Isaiah would be at least on the way to fulfilment. There was no substance in this sanguine vision; it was simply a nebulous hope, born of war-excitement and fed by platform phrases such as 'a land fit for heroes to live in' and the blessed word 'reconstruction.' I can remember no such prolific begetter of nonsense as this idea of reconstruction. All the socialists, visionaries, and reformers saw in it their opportunity, and interpreted it in their own way. Politicians hung their promises on it, and simple folk rose to it like trout to a fly in May. It proved an irresistible lure and was in everybody's mouth. It created a fool's paradise, in which every wish was to be gratified. Under its influence grandiose schemes were hatched and all sense of proportion was lost. The alluring prospect took a thousand forms, but the general idea was that everyone was going to have a much better time after the war than ever before. In particular, industrial conditions were to be improved out of recognition; the standard of living was to be raised; men were to work less and earn more; strife between employers and employed was to be banished; peace and prosperity were to reign; and all this immediately. The illusion was too popular to be resisted. Protest was useless."

The end of all this could only be profound disappointment and disillusionment, followed by equally deep

irritation and discontent. And that, in turn, made inevitable a period of sharp antagonism between labor and capital. The matter was rendered even more serious by the general uncertainty which prevailed. Faced by the specter of falling wages in a time of rising prices, the workers strove with all their might to get as much and to give as little as possible. But they did not know precisely how much they could, or ought to, get. Therefore there was no limit to their demands and aspirations. Each group of workers tried to get as much as it could in wages, leisure, improved status, and better working conditions. And the obvious method was to proceed by experiment, charging "all that the traffic would bear." But this meant a series of demands, growing bolder as concessions were extorted from employers and creating neither satisfaction nor stability. And, conversely, labor's insatiable demands reacted to produce upon capital a stiff-necked determination to grant nothing at all. Angry, apprehensive, despairing of obtaining a lasting agreement by any possible concessions, employers got into a "fighting mood," ready to "go to the mat with labor" and settle the business first or last. The industrial life of Europe since the war has, in fact, been troubled in the extreme. No country has escaped an epidemic of strikes and lockouts, while in some countries, notably Spain, the struggle between labor and capital degenerated into a bloody vendetta carried on by mutual assassination and terrorism.

Meanwhile, inside the ranks of labor itself, a bitter conflict was being waged between evolutionists and revolutionists; between those desirous of bettering labor's lot within the present

social order and those eager to smash existing society by Bolshevism. Every trades-union, every political labor group, became a battle-ground of contending factions, the fight frequently ending in a schism, with each side outlawing the other as "traitors" to the working-class cause.

The nature of this internecine struggle is best illustrated by what has happened in labor's international aspect. We have already noted the international labor organizations which existed in 1914. The Great War dealt a shattering blow to the international solidarity of labor. Both the Federation of Trades-Unions and the Socialist International were rent asunder. Nowhere did the labor masses fail to respond to the summons of patriotism. After the first shock of war had passed, to be sure, labor leaders everywhere began thinking over such matters as peace terms, post-war industrial changes, and the restoration of labor's shattered international solidarity. National labor conferences were held in various belligerent countries, notably in England, and later on the labor groups of the western European nations met in "inter-allied" labor conferences for the formulation of common aims and policies. Indeed, some of the neutral labor groups tried to revive the international associations during the war, and both trades-union and socialist conferences were called in Switzerland and Sweden. These attempts, however, failed, the labor groups of the Allied and Central powers being unwilling to sit together.

Meanwhile the Russian Revolution and the triumph of Bolshevism in 1917 produced a new complication. We have seen that the masses of labor proved everywhere patriotic at the

outbreak of war. At the same time, we recall that there existed labor minorities which placed class consciousness above country, denounced the war as a "bourgeois trap," and demanded the continued solidarity of labor for the prosecution of the class war and the world-wide triumph of the proletariat. These ultra-revolutionary elements held "international" conferences in Switzerland during the years 1916 and 1917, and when the Bolshevik triumph gave them a solid base of operations in Russia, they transferred their center to Moscow. Here they redoubled their ultra-revolutionary activities, which were directed not merely against the existing social order, but also against the more moderate sections of the working-class movement.

The close of the war brought the question of an international labor conference once more within the bounds of practical politics. In fact, to most European labor leaders it began to look more and more like a matter of urgent necessity. To begin with, the diplomatic world was about to convene in the Versailles peace conference. At Versailles labor was not directly represented. To most labor men, therefore, it seemed highly desirable that the labor world should meet concurrently with the Versailles conference in order to formulate labor's demands and influence the conference to incorporate labor clauses in the peace settlement.

A second urgent reason for a labor gathering was the growing Bolshevik propaganda for a "Red" international. Non-Bolshevik labor leaders wanted a restoration of that international organization which had gone to pieces in 1914, and which had been known as the "Second International." But the Bol-

sheviks, declaring this Second International dead beyond recall, were working for a "Third International," based on out-and-out communist principles, and uncompromisingly devoted to the class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The upshot was that the non-Bolshevik elements summoned an international socialist and labor conference at Bern, Switzerland, early in 1919. This conference, however, merely disclosed the schism between the moderate and revolutionary wings of the working-class movement. The Russian Bolsheviks refused absolutely to attend, denouncing the Bern conference in advance as illegal and futile. They stated their attitude in a violent manifesto which began by asserting that the Second International died in August, 1914, "when representatives of nearly all the socialist parties went over to the ranks of the imperialist governments," and went on to say that "the imperialist socialists" were now trying to form a new "Yellow International." "To counterbalance the traitors' and counter-revolutionaries' International," stated the Bolshevik manifesto, "formed with the open intention of creating an association against the world proletarian revolution, Communists of all countries must rapidly close their ranks around the Third Revolutionary International, which has nothing in common with the declared social imperialists, nor with the pseudo-revolutionary Socialists." The manifesto concluded: "For the conquest of power for the proletariat, let us fight an implacable fight against those who deceive us; against the pseudo-Socialist traitors!" This manifesto, issued in late December, 1918, was followed by an invitation of the

Russian Soviet Government to revolutionary labor throughout the world to attend a conference in Moscow, slated to begin on the same day as the conference at Bern.

The two conferences, when held, proved to be rival "rumps," dominated respectively by the moderate and revolutionary elements. They thus further embittered the struggle within the ranks of labor between the adherents of the Second and Third Internationals; between those demanding a larger, yet not exclusive, place in the present world order, and those proposing by violence and class warfare to seize all.

Despite the handicap of communist hostility, the moderate working-class elements of western Europe, headed by the powerful British labor group, succeeded in getting specific labor clauses written into the Versailles peace treaty. Section XIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations contains definite provisions for the establishment of a permanent International Labor Office as part of the league machinery, and also for the holding of annual international labor conferences under the league's auspices. Section XIII goes on to state that: "Nine principles of labor conditions are to be recognized, on the ground that the well-being, physical and moral, of the industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance. With exceptions necessitated by differences of climate, habits, and economic development, they include: the guiding principle that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce; right of association of employers and employees; a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life; the eight hour day or forty-eight hour week; a weekly rest of at least twenty-

four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable; abolition of child labor and assurance of the continuation of the education and proper physical development of children; equal pay for equal work as between men and women; equitable treatment of all workers, including foreigners; and a system of inspection in which women should take part."

This formal recognition of working-class interests in an international diplomatic document is a remarkable innovation, hailed by many observers as "Labor's International Magna Charta." Furthermore, the labor clauses of the Versailles treaty have not remained a mere pious aspiration. The Labor Office of the League of Nations has collected and distributed a vast amount of useful data on labor conditions throughout the world, while the annual labor conferences have resulted in much clarifying discussion and recommendation. It should be noted that these league labor conferences are made up of delegates representing governments, capital, and labor respectively, and thus provide a forum where various points of view can come together.

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Meanwhile Europe's industrial life continues to be troubled by disputes between capital and labor, to say nothing of the duel between the rival wings of the working-class movement. Nevertheless, the present trend seems to be toward evolution rather than revolution. The red tide of communism quickly reached its flood and then began to ebb. By the end of 1919, communism had ceased to control any European territory outside of Russia, its early successes in Hungary,

Finland, and Germany having been summarily crushed by combinations of the other social elements.

Furthermore, the course of events in Russia itself was undermining the prestige of communism among the working-classes. Instead of making Russia a terrestrial paradise, communism was fast turning Russia into a veritable hell on earth—a hell, moreover, whose torments afflicted the Russian workers about as cruelly as they did the rest of the population. By the end of 1920 Russia's economic life trembled on the verge of utter collapse. The factories had almost ceased to produce, the railroads did not run, and the peasants sullenly refused to plant more grain than they needed for themselves. Russia had sunk into a welter of famine, disease, and disorganization threatening downright chaos.

Faced by this appalling situation, the communist rulers of Russia were compelled to proclaim their famous "New Economic Policy," colloquially known as the NEP. Of course the Soviet Government loudly asserted that this was a mere "strategic retirement," a temporary concession to adverse circumstances in order better to assure ultimate victory. As a matter of fact, the NEP was an abandonment of genuine communism. Not only were the peasants confirmed in the ownership of their lands, but a large degree of trade and commerce was legally permitted to private initiative. As for the "nationalized" industries, they were henceforth run by high-salaried experts and managed along traditional capitalist lines, the chief difference being that the workers were forbidden to quit their jobs and were held under stricter discipline and

often compelled to work longer hours than in pre-revolutionary days.

The news of all this gradually leaked out of Russia and produced a most disillusioning effect upon the working-classes everywhere. What, men asked, was the use of making a violent revolution and suffering the horrors of social war if in the end the economic results were so bad that they could be alleviated only by a partial return to capitalism? The result of these sobering reflections was a rapid thinning of the communist ranks all over Europe. Of course communism is still a factor to be reckoned with. The Russian Bolsheviks have not given up their hopes of a world revolution, in which alone they see a prospect of their own survival, and Russian money is poured out lavishly to support the communist faction in every part of Europe, indeed, in every part of the world. However, these communist groups no longer have either the numbers or the prestige that they had immediately after the war. To-day they are composed of a small nucleus of fanatics and visionaries impervious to facts, surrounded by a motley following of self-seeking agitators, shady adventurers, criminals, and the most improvident or reckless working-class elements. But for the constant stream of Russian money and Russian agents, it is probable that most of the communist groups in Europe would soon sink into insignificance.

Certain it is that the moderate working-class elements in western and central Europe have reformed their ranks and have achieved something like their pre-war solidarity. For a while many important labor groups sat on the fence, affiliating neither with the moderate Second nor the Red Third

International. By 1923, however, virtually all these waverers had entered the moderate camp, thus lining up the great bulk of European working-classes on the side of evolution as against revolution.

The fact is that the stern pressure of the post-war economic situation and the fierce struggle with communism have alike compelled intelligent working-men to think harder and more fundamentally than ever before. The result seems to be a decided drift away from revolutionary schemes toward evolutionary projects for constructive reform within the limits of the present social order. An American student of Europe's problems, Mr. Frank Vanderlip, well summarizes this evolutionary trend when he states: "Before the war, European labor tended to be revolutionary. To-day union labor in Europe is no longer revolutionary in its attitude toward capital. I can say on the authority of its greatest leaders that union labor has renounced its faith in Communism and is ready to go forward under the capitalist system. These labor leaders say that the fault at present is not so much the treatment of labor by capital as capital's blundering mistakes. They say they want a larger voice in the direction of industry, and they believe they can contribute something besides sweat and muscle. The leaders of labor have come to realize that cutting down production is disastrous to both capital and labor. They dream of a better organization of the capitalistic world in which there will be fewer mistakes and greater output. Capital in Europe now says that wages must be brought back to production. Union labor says, 'bring your production up to wages.' I don't know whether anything will

come out of this attitude of labor, but I do think it indicates that Europe is in no present danger of Bolshevism."

The lines just quoted suggest the paramount problem which confronts Europe's industrial life—the problem of restoring its pre-war industrial prosperity. Down to 1914, Europe was the industrial center of the world. The war shook Europe's industrial system to its foundations and left her economically so handicapped that it is doubtful whether she can recover her industrial primacy; whether, on the contrary, Europe has not permanently lost much of her industry to keen, ambitious rivals like America and Japan. But if this latter alternative be true, Europe is in a bad way, because her present population is far in excess of what can be supported under such relatively unfavorable conditions. In other words, unless Europe's industrial life recovers something like its pre-war prosperity and efficiency, many millions of her population will be forced to emigrate, go back to the land, or starve.

Furthermore, a permanent decline of Europe's industrial life would threaten not merely the urban working-classes, but also the other elements of the population (middle classes and employers) who are dependent upon industry. Hitherto only the thinking minority in these various groups seems to have sensed the full import of the peril which overhangs them all. Here, again, the full tragedy of such ominous possibilities can be appreciated only by those who with their own eyes have seen great and formerly flourishing cities like Berlin and Vienna shabby and down at the heel; cities where all classes save a handful of profiteers are pinched, worried, and oppressed by

grim forebodings; where the workers suffer from chronic undernourishment, while the intellectual and middle classes stand on the brink of ruin. The psychological atmosphere of such cities is so depressing that it weighs upon even the casual visitor like a leaden weight.

Of course the foreign observer is apt to view conditions more broadly and objectively than can the inhabitants themselves. The average inhabitant, immersed in his own troubles, is likely to envy his less unfortunate fellows rather than to regard them as co-sufferers in a bad situation curable by joint action and sympathetic endeavor. That is the reason why class hatreds and rivalries tend to increase in acute economic crises, each group snatching desperately at what remains. Only the strong-willed and thinking minority can so master the blind instinct of self-preservation as to realize that in such circumstances social discipline and intelligent planning can alone avert panic and a scramble which would disrupt the social structure and make matters worse than before.

Fortunately, the social controls have thus far held even in the most critical moments and seem likely to hold in the immediate future, because Europe's industrial problem, while far from solved, shows signs of being on the road to a solution. Almost everywhere in Europe industrial conditions are at least superficially better than they were a year or two ago. Meanwhile, the thinking minorities of all the threatened classes are pondering the problem and are taking counsel together. Whether they will succeed in adjusting their differences by mutual compromise and constructive coöperation remains to be seen.

In the Lobby

BY ZONA GALE

"THIS whole love thing is n't enough," said Bruce. "I tell you, it is n't enough."

He stared down the lobby and saw himself on a winter afternoon, fourteen years before, in the street with his two children, and he helpless, so to say, to stem them. When Lois ran ahead, he had quickened his loping step, stooped, and dabbed at her shoulder, apparently unaware that she was unaware of him. He had whirled and threatened, "Come, now!" when little Larry fell behind. One passing could have detected that finding himself alone with these two, Bruce lost his own finished creaturehood, died, rose as their attendant, and existed as an amateur.

One, passing, spoke to her chauffeur and drew to the curb—a dove-like woman, already in a ripening youth, who looked on the children with the look which was intended for Bruce. She said:

"You've not forgotten to-night?"

He had. But remembering, he vowed his remembrance. And Miss Anna Wild, with her brooding way of attention to the children, to him, drove on, with his negative, unconcerned eyes tormenting her, like a positive.

He had gone up one step to his habitable white house, and worked the children into the passage. The passage was right, paneled, discreetly

mirrored; the nurse-maid was right, by her voice, her eyelids, her quiet a genius at servitude. When Larry bellowed, "See you to-night, Father," and Lois hit Larry in the head to gain the balustrade side of the stair, this maid had n't a rebuke; she had: "Only fancy what 's for tea." All three vanished.

Bruce had gone into the room where his tea-table stood. This room also was right, it rested him as could the cherishing brightness of something happy to think about. But there had been nothing happy to think about, and the very charm of the room had beaten at him like a desire. The whole house had charm; the children, too. But Fanny was n't there any more, and he was only thirty-six years old.

Overcome by this climax, he had stood staring at his tea-table. In a little while Mrs. Beryl would come in and pour. Her cousin would come too, and probably Cory. Cory would hate that hour, and so would he himself. The women would perhaps hate it; only, he thought, they would n't know that they did, having known hatred of so much for so long that pretense had now taken its place, unconsidered. But Fanny had loved the tea-hour. Had she? Certainly she had. Little thing, in her delicate clothes, living for his love and without