

cle for their personal criticism of the system should be called to task. Evidence of such ulterior motives abound in the Garland case. Consider the example of Sister Ramona, the self-disavowed archi-

tion to prove the accused's sanity. Thus, American judiciary seeks to add the presumption of insanity to the presumption of innocence.

To be sure, both presumed innocence

reluctance to assign personal guilt to a transgressor. This, in turn, springs from a refusal to acknowledge the existence of a free will, and hence the abdication of any responsibility to control the will or account for its use.

"Extracts from the interviews and the letters leave an indelible impression of a winning young man. . . . Hence they virtually compel us to adopt some sort of psychiatric understanding of his act, and, as we know from Madame de Staël, to understand is to forgive."

—Paul Robinson
The New Republic

tect of Herrin's public support, interviewed in her apartment. The text is full of what *she* wanted Herrin to feel, how *she* wanted Herrin to look, or how hurt *she* was when one of her compatriot priests left the effort to get married. Gaylin's failure to comment on the marriage of the priest, which was so clearly symptomatic of the aberrancy of the Yale Catholic leadership, strongly suggests his lack of understanding of the turmoil gripping the Catholic Church in America after a generation of liberal meddlers: the events surrounding the trial of Bonnie Garland's killer are but a tiny example of that chaos.

Just as the conduct of numerous religious people involved with the case was, finally, an error in practice, Herrin's defense rested, basically, on errors of legal principle. Gaylin persuasively demonstrates that nearly every piece of evidence introduced by the defense to show Herrin's "extreme emotional disturbance" could have been easily attributed to a responsible individual. The courts must be brought to face reality: unless confronted by an individual who acts in an incomprehensibly bizarre fashion, the defense simply cannot *prove* the accused's insanity, at least not as long as anything more than lip service is given to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" or even "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof at a trial. But therein lies the error of legal principle: The burden is *not* upon the defense to prove the accused's insanity; it is, rather, with little more than a pro forma claim by the defense of insanity, upon the *prosecu-*

tion to prove the accused's sanity. Thus, American judiciary seeks to add the presumption of insanity to the presumption of innocence. To be sure, both presumed innocence and insanity have a proper role to play in legal justice. The fact remains that officers of the state do occasionally accuse persons of crimes they did not commit, and some people really are insane. Both presumptions, and especially the latter, draw heavily from a post-Enlightenment

At his trial, Herrin was asked whether, when he entered—hammer in hand—the room where Bonnie lay sleeping, he intended to kill her. "Yes," he answered. "No," answered the jury when asked to return a verdict of guilty of murder. "Where," asks Gaylin, between these two roundly opposed statements, "is justice?" Questions of justice will always involve questions of principle and practice. Keeping these two guides in mind is an excellent way to begin the ancient search. □

The Corporation: Culture or Subculture

Terrence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy: *Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life*; Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.

by Thomas L. Ashton

Henry James said that American businessmen considered culture the concern of "women, foreigners and other impractical people." Today George Will writes that "the audience for Masterpiece Theater is unlikely to be seduced into affection for Mobil." Ultimately, both remarks mean the same thing. The prevailing voices continue to claim that people who run corporations are either boring technocrats or soulless philistines. The contrast of commerce and culture—when the one means only profit maximization and the other supposedly means aesthetic purity—makes out of business people something other than humans. Neither ideal nor ideally beautiful, they

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can't be real.

Two congruent fallacies promote the dehumanization of corporate man. The first is that MBA program graduates must have been outside of culture from the start, or that they suffered a "value lobotomy" that neutralized their humanness. The second is that culture has no effect on the uncultured—thus the cultureless corporate manager and his workplace, a chamber of white sound, robot typewriters, and always ruthless competition. The corporation is somehow far more military than the Army as softened by M*A*S*H. Television viewers know the executive as the villain of soap operas or the buffoon of the sitcoms. His stereotype isn't real because he isn't real. But one must remember that James was the perpetuator of a tradition which has kept work and working out of the novel since Dickens. Dickens's only followers have been Dreiser, Dos Passos, and that G.E. employee, Kurt Vonnegut. People in the great novel live on essentially unearned income. Paradoxically, they are more real than the people who work. Life and work are at odds, and

their partition is increasingly understood as a necessity in a world of business conglomerates. Therefore there can be no culture in work and workplace, no matter what Studs Terkel and Daniel Yankelevich find, each in his own way.

Enter Deal and Kennedy's *Corporate Cultures*, which does restore culture to the world of work—but it turns out to be as culture-bound as *Babbitt*. By simplifying corporate culture to human problems presented at the soap-opera level, the authors deny a human reality to the world of business organizations. A convention delegate once told Joan Didion that the Junior Chamber of Commerce had changed his life because "it saved my marriage and it built my business." The executives of *Corporate Cultures* come off no better.

The idea of a corporate culture goes at least as far back as Robert Roy's *The Cultures of Management* (1970); what Deal and Kennedy mean by the term can be found in Schwartz and Davis on "Matching Corporate Culture and Business Strategy" in a 1981 number of *Organizational Dynamics*. The problem with their approach is that culture seen in isolation is not culture. The people who choose to live through their work in the modern corporation experience as much cultural pressure from without as from within. Even if they have been raised on a steady diet of Scrooge McDuck and Monopoly, many are worried about what Daniel Bell called the cultural contradictions of capitalism. The corporate world is not a culture, but a subculture. Those familiar with the work of Michael Mac-

coby on industrial anthropology, which is conspicuous by its absence in *Corporate Cultures*, understand just how much excessive behavior reflects the tension between the two.

Maccoby, in *The Gamesman* and more recently in *The Leader*, can discuss corporate culture with authenticity and a larger social vision. Beginning with a still-quoted classic, Douglas McGregor's *The Human Side of Enterprise* (1960), Maccoby finds unchallenged its caveat: participation in the workplace means greater profit. Our reluctance to work in corporations is really a reluctance to recognize that we *do* work in them more often than not. But without participation work is a curse and the corporation is to blame. Yet Maccoby found that managers, regardless of earned respect, are not quite trusted when they push hard for social concern and humanization. But the consequences of the fact that corporations today organize more human energy of higher intellectual quality than any other American institutions did not escape Maccoby. The hope that technology designed by both social and economic criteria may generate loyalty, concern, and productivity lives on in the corporate culture. "A new type of man," concludes Maccoby, "is taking over the leadership of the most technically advanced companies in America. . . . more cooperative and less hardened than the autocratic empire builder and less dependent than the organization man, he is more detached and emotionally inaccessible than either. And he is troubled by it: the new industrial leader can recognize that his work develops his head but not his heart."

"The life of the mind in the firm," wrote Neil Chamberlain, "is hobbled and its vision is blinkered by the constraint to which the business institution is subject within the larger social system. The firm's specialized role is perhaps the greatest limitation on the role of the individual within it." This point cannot be overlooked by those wishing to write about corporate culture. The relation of individual and firm replicates the rela-

LIBERAL CULTURE

When Did He Stop Beating His Wife?

Certainly one of the most famous profiles in the history of television is the ample one of the late Alfred Hitchcock. Hitchcock was, throughout his life, on the chunky side. *Parade* magazine, the organ of reading illiterates, has divined *why* Hitch was portly:

Despite a long marriage with all the exterior trappings of success, Hitchcock lived a life of sexual frustration. . . . Whenever he lost off-set control of an actress whose life he sought to dominate—as with Bergman, Miles and Hedren, the latter two of whom he had under personal contract—he'd overeat to compensate for his frustration.

That Hitchcock employed beautiful actresses no one can deny. That Hitchcock was domineering on the sets with actresses—as well as actors, cameramen, etc.—is well known. That Hitchcock had a large girth is evident. How *Parade* knows the *real* story behind the relationship between Alfred and Alma Hitchcock is never made clear, though that is probably of little interest to the readers of



"Personality Parade." If its suggestions about the link between sexual undernourishment and alimentary excess were correct, the planet would flip out of orbit under the weight of its population. □

tion of business and society. How we think about business governs how the corporation views itself and how the corporate person understands his function. The first constraint Chamberlain has in mind is the profit/efficiency test commonly known as "the bottom line." But his argument is equally true of the socialist approach which offers no greater hope of intellectual freedom for those within the frame of modern economic organization. Chamberlain's second constraint—specialization—may be ameliorated by the values of craftsmanship. But the profit motive implies that corporate culture is subject to the cultural definition of profit. The hope is that "if we can broaden the standards by which we judge the activity [of giant corporations], if we can free them from a test of efficiency more relevant to the past than the present, we can invigorate the intellectual climate within which the specialized role of employees is performed." This would mean falling out of love with systems analysis, in which parts are valued for their contribution to the efficiency of the whole, in favor of a system whose social values provide discretion and purpose to the parts themselves. To rise above the bottom line means to broaden it by means of cultural redefinition. The purpose of the market changes with culture. Drucker and Floyd Matson have long since reported the death of the organic cash register known as rational economic man. Business makes money, but it is a commonplace that people in business have to earn more than money. Finally, the issue of corporate culture is the issue of autonomy in work, the question of work made meaningful.

Corporate Cultures has little to offer the troubled new business leader. "The ultimate lesson, of course," write the authors, "is that managers need to be fully aware of the ritualistic element of their own culture and not allow themselves to be captured by the magic of what they do day to day." Such advice may keep the manager's eyes raised, but its blindness to economic, political, and

psychological reality is apparent in the rationale: "A strong culture enables people to feel better about what they do, so they are more likely to work harder." Everywhere, naive specifics confirm that *Corporate Cultures* is another simplistic organizational development handbook masquerading as cultural analysis. "Of course," write Deal and Kennedy, "corporate life is never quite as simple and pat as that," but they seem fully convinced that it is. This conviction ultimately tells us: "A company's culture is like a security blanket for its people. It tells them what to do and reassures them that if they do it they will not be just accepted by the people around them, but also rewarded." The blanket-bearing manager attuned to corporate culture turns out to be none other than the organization man. "The key action," as the final prescription goes, such a manager "must try is to tailor his response to the norms of the culture" of the company.

The arguments in *Corporate Cultures* are more than outdated; they are dangerously nostalgic. This makes them both fashionable and at cross purposes. Apparently "the warm, humane managers promoted by business publications today" are the wrong kind of security blanket. "The point is this," say Deal and Kennedy in the same breath, "modern managers who try to be humane may at the same time undermine the values upon which the culture of the institution rests. Modern heroes need to be hard and 'insensitive' to keep a company consistent with its goals and vision—the very elements that made it strong in the first place." How little this understands of the relationship of culture and subculture, and how much it wants to be in step, are clear when the whip appears: "The real problem with managers today is that they are not aggressive enough in trying to influence the behavior around them. . . . In today's self-conscious world, where things are supposed to be 'laid-back' and 'easy going,' few managers have the conviction to set any standards for behavior. As a result, the cultures of

today's companies ebb and flow with the changing fads of society as a whole." This puts the cart before the horse and then whips a dead cart. The myth of the laid-back corporate leader was propounded by organizational consultants in the 70's and is now attacked by the same consultants in the 80's. Business has yet to give it more than lip service.

Deal and Kennedy should know as much, for the leader who exemplifies the past they can't return to turns out to be the creator of IBM. In their words: "Thomas Watson himself confessed to learning leadership under NCR's Patterson, whom he described as 'an amalgam of St. Paul, Poor Richard, and Adolf Hitler.'" Powerful leaders like Watson "put the business in their heart and thus crowd out softer sentiments. It's a lesson today's managers should learn as an antidote to the hype on business humanness." But then: "We are not arguing for a return to authoritarianism. Rather we believe that managers have a strong potential for positive influence if they will just exercise it." This qualification is exposed in Deal and Kennedy's final choice of strong culture corporations: McDonald's, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Roman Catholic Church. Just who is who when it comes to St. Paul, Franklin, and Hitler is not clarified.

In *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville asked: "How does it happen, then, that the Americans sail their vessels at a cheaper rate than ours?" His answer: "I am of the opinion that the true cause of their superiority must not be sought for in physical advantages, but that it is wholly attributable to moral and intellectual qualities." The very same question is asked in Detroit today, but no one today has Tocqueville's answer. Today, dysfunction prevents our knowing this answer, that and the feeling that we must know more because we have more. That we have more is good. The self-actualization that will again shape a wholeness of belief and reintegrate commerce and culture is sparked not by need but by security and trust. □

Natural Dominion

William Tucker: *Progress and Privilege: America in the Age of Environmentalism*; Anchor Press/Doubleday; New York.

Thoreau in the Mountains: Writings by Henry David Thoreau; Commentary by William Howarth; Farrar, Straus & Giroux; New York.

by Thomas Fleming

The most basic text on environmentalism is in Genesis: "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." The expansion of man's power to subdue the earth has, in recent years, caused a scrutiny focusing upon the use he has made of his dominion. An increasing number of Americans—and Europeans—are coming to regard technology and its fruits as inherently evil and destructive. Such a reaction to technology is not new in the world. There have always been those who rebelled against the artificial extension of man's grip on the natural world. One Taoist sage expressed contempt for a device as simple as the sweep used to raise water from a well because with it man is made servant to the machine. In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, skilled craftsmen expressed their opinion of the newly mechanized textile industry by setting fire to the equipment.

Whatever their motives, the Luddite frame-breakers represented the age-old resentment of simple conservative folk against the progressive middle and upper classes. The modern environmentalists are exactly the opposite. They are a manifestation of an equally old social force: an entrenched aristocracy struggling to maintain its position. In *Progress*

and *Privilege*, William Tucker takes a look at some of the political implications of environmentalism. His book is sure to outrage the bird-watching and backpacking elite who make up the Sierra Club. In *their* view of the matter, concern for the environment is a question of higher values, which the laboring classes cannot be expected to share. Unfortunately, as Tucker has the bad taste to point out, this is one rich man's hobby—like fox hunting in old England—which the not-so-rich are compelled to support. The cost of environmental protection—bureaucratically imposed limits to growth—are not paid for by those who have arrived (not even by the *arrivistes*) but by upwardly mobile blue-collar and white-collar workers. In this class struggle, environmental protection is synonymous with gentility:

The idea of looking on material progress and economic security as an irrelevant and vulgar nuisance cannot be picked up over night. The old saying was that it took three generations to make a gentleman, and I have the distinct impression that it now takes at least two generations to make an environmentalist.

Tucker profitably compares environmentalists with previous avatars of political snobbery: abolition, Civil Service reform, and the Progressive movement. All their proponents professed the highest imaginable ideals, while at the same time regarding ordinary working people—and their material needs—with contempt.

Tucker is certainly right about the composition of the movement: the remnant of desiccated gentility, threatened *arrivistes*, arrogant and self-assuming professionals. Unquestionably such people constitute the American social elite—whether they (or any class of Americans) are an aristocracy is another matter. But a social elite—aristocracy, if you will—cannot be condemned out of hand for

discharging its duties. One of the justifications for aristocracy used to be that it was freed from the squalid material constraints which prevent the rest of us from pursuing higher goals, aesthetic as well as social, moral as well as political. Aristocracies, almost by definition, practice inaccessible virtues. What Chivalry was in the later Middle Ages, and Art in the Victorian era, Nature is today. Like Art, a devotion to Nature is a surrogate religion—the very rich have always had trouble looking beyond the here and now. But we really must give them their due—as Tucker does not. They no longer commission great works of art (art is dead) or set the standards for polite society (society is dead). However, they do propose to preserve an important aesthetic resource—the not-quite-inexhaustible treasure of woods, lakes, and rivers.

Most people profess some sort of affection for "the great outdoors," but—according to environmentalists—not all forms of outdoor recreation are equal. These snobs wish to enjoy a wilderness unspoiled by man. Their motto is "leave no footprints." They drive in fuel-efficient automobiles to a remote parking lot and carry their 50 pounds of nitrogen-packed trail food for at least five miles before setting up their well-nigh invisible camps. They are, of course, even more dependent on technology than the laboring classes who see no reason why the woods should be so hard to get to. To simple vacationers—many of whom are only one generation off the farm—getting away from it all usually means driving in an RV to a campsite with full facilities. After unpacking the TV, stereo, and video games, the family is ready to explore the wilderness—on their trail bikes.

Tucker argues strongly for the old multiple-use doctrine. He insists that the conflict between off-road vehicles and hikers, power boats and canoes, requires a compromise. It is only, he suggests, a

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