

tions must be within that framework. If observed behavior does not fit theory, ignore the observations.

He does not see any chance for a Soviet first strike. He accepts the notion that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are at parity in weapons. He does not cite figures, which would undermine his complacency. The Soviets have a first-strike force of 607 MIRV'd ICBM's with 4,400 warheads capable of knocking out hardened sites. They have an additional 718 ICBM's and 950 submarine-launched missiles with single warheads for use against cities. Their first-strike force is twice the size needed to destroy the 1,054 U.S. silos (two warheads per silo is deemed sufficient). Those bombers not caught on the ground will stand little chance against the massive Soviet air-defense network. That only leaves U.S. submarines, now only 33 in number, one-third to one-half of which are in port and thus vulnerable at any given time. Submarine missiles are too small for use against anything but cities, thus inviting a massive Soviet assault on the American population if Soviet cities are hit in retaliation for a first strike against military targets. The Soviets thus possess escalation dominance. Even without an attack, Soviet superiority could block American actions and act as an umbrella for aggression by conventional means.

There are three ways to provide security: preemptive strike, active defense, and deterrence. Mandelbaum dismisses out of hand preemption or any nuclear first use. Active protection is appealing, but he does not think it is feasible. He holds the position that a defense against attack would have to be "perfect" or it is a waste of money. This is nonsense. Avoiding almost any amount of nuclear damage would pay for quite a large defense force. The new technology in lasers and particle beams make a defense easier and cheaper. Mandelbaum mistakenly argues that the ABM Treaty was signed because everyone knew defense was impossible. Actually, the Soviets pushed for the treaty because they were behind in ABM technology. The U.S. signed out of a naive be-

lief that it would promote arms control in general and bolster détente. This proved wrong on both counts. The Soviets have pushed ahead with both ABM missiles and energy weapons. The reintroduction of the idea of defense by the Reagan Administration is the most important strategic event of the decade.

Like O'Keefe, Mandelbaum ends up falling back on the pure-deterrence theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD). However, MAD is a negation of thought and an exercise in irresponsibility. Either there is no war to think about because of successful deterrence or there is Armageddon, which leaves nothing to think about. Mandelbaum starts out inveighing against extremes, yet offers only extremes. The idea behind MAD, that we should not devise ways to protect ourselves or seek victory over our enemies should war come, is totally at odds with

both history and common sense. In strategic thought, the Soviets are the traditionalists and the Americans are the revolutionaries. The Soviets have been diligently attempting to find a way out of the Armageddon trap which will still allow them to pursue an expansionist foreign policy. They ask: What if deterrence fails? An answer couched in terms of mutual suicide they find to be unacceptable, so they build weapons and formulate plans to fight and win a nuclear war. There was a hope that the Reagan Administration would implement a policy of preparing for the risks of war, but opposition from both liberals and radicals has derailed the Administration, leaving its weapons program without a strategic foundation. In this debate, "respectable" liberals like O'Keefe and Mandelbaum are more dangerous than any number of street demonstrators. □

Diplomacy and Fatuity

Zbigniew Brzezinski: *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981*; Farrar, Straus & Giroux; New York.

by John Caiazza

Lately our national leaders seem to have taken it into their heads that their first obligation upon taking office is to get ready to write their memoirs once they leave it. We've had Nixon's and Johnson's, Kissinger's massive volumes, and now Vance's and Brzezinski's. (Jimmy Carter reportedly has a high-tech memoir in preparation, the entire record of his eccentric administration recorded in the memory of a word processor. These memoirs aren't just afterthoughts, hasty records thrown together to earn a few bucks or answer some critics' charges immediately after the leader has left office. Rather, these memoir writers kept

diaries and employed whole platoons of secretaries to transcribe them, to keep and record notes, reports, papers, minutes of meetings, and transcripts of phone conversations while they were in office. Shouldn't our national leaders concentrate on their immediate responsibilities rather than on just recording them for posterity? Let them *make* history, not record it.

True to the genre, *Power and Principle*, Zbigniew Brzezinski's memoirs of his term as head of the National Security Council, is long, detailed, and well organized, though it could have had 150 pages trimmed. Granted, Brzezinski has a lot he wants to say, and it's important, after all, to have some insight into what it was like to be the chief proponent of an aggressive American foreign policy in an administration whose outstanding characteristic was its inability to make up its mind. Yet what Brzezinski has to say in this regard is plainly said in his perspicacious title which gives the theme of the conflict in foreign-policy thinking

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within the Carter Administration: that is, the perceived conflict between guarding America's interests beyond our own borders and conducting our relations with other nations according to disinterested moral principle. The tragic effects of this conflict are chronologically described in the three major parts of Brzezinski's book: "Comprehensive Initiatives," "Major Turning Points," and "Progress and Frustration." All show that high hopes and enthusiasm met the realities of international affairs (briefly, the evidence of Soviet aggression, as in Afghanistan), and turned into disappointment and defeat. It is the working out of this unresolved conflict—as Brzezinski would say, power vs. principle—in the Carter Administration that is the real subject of this book and which has the inevitability of tragedy. As such it would have significantly benefited from the exclusion of the many details of official organization, bureaucratic infighting, and even the personality sketches that Brzezinski includes, for the tragic theme is overlaid by a camouflage of hectic enthusiasm and concentration on management techniques that both Brzezinski and Carter took with them to their tasks of conducting the nation's foreign policy. Brzezinski seems unaware of how disaster overtook him, even as he describes its stages in detail. *Power and Principle* is tragedy written by a technocrat.

What is the nature of the conflict between power and principle? On an abstract level it is a question that has exercised philosophers including Plato and Kant; on a practical level the Carter Administration's inability to answer it brought about the collapse of its foreign policy. It is a question worth answering, since neither Carter, nor Brzezinski, nor Vance were stupid or corrupt. If the failure of Carter's foreign policy is not seen as the working out of an unresolved conflict of principle, which led to hesitation and lack of consistency, then we have the impossible task of explaining how intelligent, honest, and hardworking men could fail so miserably in setting a consistent course for America's foreign policy.

The issue that flummoxed Carter was: how is it possible to protect American interests and act at the same time in a moral manner? Obviously, there are two extremes to be avoided. Presumably America could act selfishly, only on behalf of its own immediate interests in a forceful and indiscriminating manner. The projection of a macho toughness becomes the responsibility of America's statesmen in this view. At the other extreme is the possibility of America's never acting out of self-interest, but purely as a sort of moral referee deciding international issues according to its high-minded

ideals of self-determination, democracy, and human rights (in fact, liberal foreign policy is right now in the grip of a gnostic vision of virtue, Kantian in its theoretical basis and resembling the code of an English headmaster in its practical outcome).

These two extremes currently dominate America's foreign policy. In the Carter Administration, these contrary principles actually had human representatives, with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance taking the side of moralism and Brzezinski, of course, taking the side of pragmatism. Carter himself, the man who, after all, was responsible for determining and implementing foreign policy, was basically like Vance, a moralist in the area of foreign policy, but who as President was occasionally forced to take a more pragmatic view. Brzezinski's book alludes to Carter's difficulty in convincing the Soviets that the United States would stand up to them. Nor did the split on principles affect only relations with the Soviets. Early in the Iranian crisis, when the Administration suddenly realized that the Shah's government was crumbling, the issue of American aid to prop up his regime was discussed by Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski. Brzezinski advocated supporting the Shah but he quickly learned he was in the minority:

I do not know what historical assumptions guided Carter's or Vance's approach to the subject, but I assume that their assumptions were different from mine and involved a somewhat different scheme of the world. To me, principled commitment to a more decent world order did not preclude the use of power to protect our more immediate interests; to the others, it was not for America to decide what transpired within Iran.

Brzezinski obviously believes that power and principle, or pragmatism and moralism, should be combined, but he does not say how or why. The "how," of course, depends on the specific set of events that make up each separate crisis, or issue. Thus, it is impossible to say how policymakers should act except as a generality. The "why," however, can be

In the Mail

Into the Battle by Dobrica Ćosić; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; San Diego. One-fourth of a fictional tetralogy about World War I in Serbia by a former member of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party.

Writing History and Making Policy: The Cold War, Vietnam, and Revisionism by Richard A. Melanson; University Press of America; Washington, DC. History is not written in a vacuum, through certain revisionist historians detailed herein may be inhabited by one.

Aspects of Wordsworth and Whitehead: Philosophy and Certain Continuing Life Problems by Alexander P. Cappon; Philosophical Library; New York. Notes the author, "Wordsworth spent . . . a good many hours pondering society for every one he spent on poetry." Perhaps the poet had it backwards.

Kinship and Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses edited by Daniel J. Elazar; University Press of America/Center for Jewish Community Studies; Washington, DC. Millennia of tradition are not profitably ignored.

answered: Not only do policies protecting America's interests not have to contradict a moral approach to foreign policy but they are frequently the most moral thing we can do. The best evidence supporting this proposition is the results of America's loss of influence in an area, i.e., what happens when we leave. In Vietnam, Cambodia, and Iran, the answer is the same—chaos, destabilization, civil war, the replacement of an authoritarian government with a totalitarian one, death and refugee status for millions of people. The further American influence is withdrawn from an area, the worse the situation becomes. When the Shah's government collapsed, the usual chorus of left-wing critics sang that the U.S. was only getting what it deserved for having supported a repressive regime out of exaggerated fear of the Russians. Now that the Shah and his associates are gone and the evil faces of Khomeini and his minions are exposed, it's clear that the present state of the Iranian people is worse than it was under the Shah. No critic now grumbles about the role of the CIA and Kermit Roosevelt in setting up the Shah, for Khomeini has made the Shah look like Pericles. The same will no doubt happen in Central America, for again we hear the same themes: the nobility of the revolutionary regime, the sins of the U.S., the greed of capitalists, the treachery of Ronald Reagan, and always, always, our "inordinate fear of Communism," to use Carter's own phrase.

In the end, the morality of our foreign policy cannot be separated from protecting the immediate concerns and interests of the U.S. Hence the artificiality of "human rights" as a criterion for America's support of noncommunist governments, which under the Carter Administration was completely detached from any sense of how much a policy could help or hurt us. The first requirement, after all, of a foreign policy is to relate our nation to other nations; the morality or immorality of our foreign policy depends on how we carry out our relations with other nations. Neces-

sarily, relating to other nations includes promoting our own interests, representing our views, defending our integrity as a nation; otherwise we have no foreign policy at all.

The ethical question of how far we should go in protecting or extending America's interests overseas—whether we should take part in war, assassinations, subversion, spying, blockades, propaganda, disinformation, trade embargoes—depends in large part on how real the Soviet threat is. A greater threat allows for a wider range of ethical actions.

The Soviet danger is very real, and we have not only a right in terms of self-defense to oppose it, but an obligation as well. To be consistent, however, we must

fight not only communism abroad, but also the materialism, atheism, and apathy in the face of human suffering in our own society. The sense of danger is mitigated by the fact that we do not have to defeat the Soviet Union militarily, but only fight a holding action until, by a law of Imperial Degradation, the Russians' empire collapses for the same reasons that those of the British and the Romans did. In the meantime, we do not need to violate our own principles, but we must be prepared to get our hands dirty. Above all, we must not confuse morality with not defending our own interests overseas. To paraphrase Charles Wilson: What's good for America is good for the world, and vice versa. □

Strange Gods

Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza: *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins*; Crossroad; New York.

Rosemary Radford Ruether: *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology*; Beacon Press; Boston.

by Bryce Christensen

For most modern Westerners, the word *idolatry* conjures images of distant lands or times: saffron-clothed Oriental monks prostrate before golden Buddhas, ancient Aztec priests plunging their daggers into helpless virgins atop monumental temples, or iniquitous Israelites cavorting before Aaron's golden calf in the Sinai. Certainly, the cultural dominance of Judeo-Christianity has made these types of blatant and unsophisticated idolatry rare in the Occidental world. Indeed, the silversmiths who manufactured idols in the Apostle Paul's day presciently recognized that their trade could not long survive if his

message prevailed. But their efforts to protect their livelihood by inciting the heathen population to riot against the Christian missionaries were in vain. The proud cries of "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" gave way to humble prayer to the transcendent Father of lights, and the fashioners of gods perforce found other employment.

But in the 20th century neoidolatry is alive and well as various craftsmen shape the "isms" of modernity into attractive icons suitable for fashionable devotion. And now, instead of putting the modern idolaters out of business, contemporary Christianity seems only too happy to subsidize the labors of god-makers, even permitting them to use their seminaries and classrooms as workshops. Rosemary Ruether and Elisabeth Fiorenza, for example, are busily constructing the trendy goddess Militant Feminism in *Sexism and God-Talk* and *In Memory of Her*, exhorting all to forsake the God of Scripture by bending the knee to their creature; yet, miraculously, the dustcovers of their anti-Christian polemics identify Ms. Ruether as professor of applied theology at Garrett-Evangelical Seminary and Ms. Fiorenza as professor of New Testa-

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