

judged in reference to the Roosevelt-Kennedy legacy: only this model of Presidential leadership properly addresses the need for concentrating power in the "positive state." For the liberals, then, the Presidency is only legitimate when its occupant seeks to

carry out the programs and purposes of liberalism. Otherwise, it is a danger to the Republic. This view is the real shadow of FDR. As long as it continues to influence assessments of Presidents and the Presidency, this view will cast a pall over the nation. □

Liking Ike

Stephen E. Ambrose: *Eisenhower, Volume One: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952*; Simon & Schuster; New York.

by John C. Caiazza

Great athletes, it is said, all are so good that they make their feats look easy. The same was true of Dwight David Eisenhower, first as a career soldier, then as Supreme Allied Commander, and finally as politician and President. Stephen Ambrose traces Eisenhower's career from his birth up to election night November 1952, when Eisenhower was elected. He details Eisenhower's early years in Abilene, Kansas, the period at West Point, and his years during World War II as aide to George Marshall and as Overlord's Supreme Commander. The 20-odd years between West Point and the onset of World War II are of particular interest, for it was during this period that Eisenhower learned his trade as a soldier and officer in the United States Army.

Eisenhower was a staff officer rather than a regimental leader. His skills were those of organization, detail, supply, personnel, logistics, and accommodating the views of senior commanders, just the qualities that were required to organize American, British, French, and Canadian air, sea, and land forces in their combined assault on Hitler's *Festung Europa*. Eisenhower is often faulted for a lack of military leadership in the pre-



cise sense of being able to wield armies on the field, matching the opponent's moves, and bringing in a victory of arms. Ambrose attempts to prove that Eisenhower was just this sort of commander since he led armies in Africa, Italy, and Western Europe, but in truth Eisenhower was no MacArthur, not known for his field generalship. In a sense, however, Eisenhower's generalship was superior to that of MacArthur, Montgomery, Rommel, or even Napoleon and Caesar. His historic success was one that was only possible in the middle of the 20th century, when technology provided the ability to organize, train, supply, and move millions of men and women and their separate efforts into one objective. Eisenhower did not accomplish the destruction of Hitler's empire by personally leading armies, but by directing others (including Montgomery, Patton,

and Bradley) to do so and by coordinating overall strategy. Eisenhower's success lay in his abilities to keep thousands of tons of supplies moving each day, to keep Patton and Montgomery from each other's throats, to deal patiently with Churchill, de Gaulle, and Roosevelt, to project a sense of confidence, and to deal with the press. His were the skills of a bureaucrat. Yet it was precisely such skills that were needed to lead the combined attack on Hitler.

How good was Eisenhower at what he did? He was a general and commander of the largest invasion force ever assembled who successfully prosecuted the end of the European war and the destruction of the Nazi army. He was the last two-term President of the U.S., and the third man in American history to be both General of the Army and President, after Washington and Grant. Yet the initial question remains, for despite all of his accomplishments, there is this image of Eisenhower as a likable buffoon, stumbling over his platitudes, not quite up to the technical dimensions of his job, either as Commander or as President.

When John Kennedy sought the Presidency in 1960, he ran on the premise that nothing had happened during Eisenhower's terms and that it was time to "get this country moving again." Twenty years later, after race riots, stagflation, Watergate, Vietnam, cultural revolution at home and Soviet expansion abroad, that "nothing happened" sounds awfully good. Eisenhower's two terms in office now seem like a golden age, for we may wonder if the nation will ever again enjoy the same degree of confidence, peace, and international supremacy that it did from 1952 to 1960. This contrast between the pleasant 50's and the awful 80's has recently led historians and social critics to a re-examination of the man himself; Ambrose's volume is a part of this activity. Isn't there, they ask, some causal nexus between the kind of man Eisenhower was and the kind of times the 50's were?

Understanding organized sports is

Dr. Caiazza is an administrator at the University of Massachusetts-Boston.

CONFLUENCES

From Boring to Bootless

One of the best things about most of America's past Presidential elections is that they have really decided so little. A remarkably centrist cultural and social consensus has dictated that, despite all of the vehement campaign rhetoric, both major parties have usually agreed on a wide range of fundamental issues. This national consensus has often made for dull elections, as Paul Boller, Jr. admits in *Presidential Campaigns* (Oxford University Press; New York), a collection of rather superficial capsule histories of Presidential elections, enlivened by the inclusion of many campaign anecdotes. But dull yet free elections are greatly desirable, since they signal national harmony. Radical disharmony makes elections less dull, but far more ominous.

But 12 years ago, a coalition of extremist factions turned George McGovern's campaign into an assault upon middle America. Voters overwhelmingly voiced their disapproval. But rather than accepting this verdict, radicals simply moved key social issues beyond the reach of the ballot and into activist courts, tendentious bureaucracies, and the irresponsible media. Ironically, many of those who loudly blamed Reagan's election in 1980 on insufficient voter participation were the very people making voting seem like a waste of time to many thoughtful citizens. Certainly, one suspects that many who once supported Reagan because of their commitment to traditional values will not bother this year after watching his largely ineffectual struggle against unelected judges, bureaucrats, and newsmen on such issues as abortion, tax-subsidized contraceptives, and school reform. This effective disenfranchisement of Americans, not voter apathy, is perhaps the most troubling recent development in national politics. □

useful for trying to understand Eisenhower. He was, he always said of himself, a team player (his favorite sport, incidentally, was football). The subordination of self to a common goal, the coordination of one's personal efforts to what the team demands are necessary in football, but even more so in a bureaucracy. Eisenhower's success as a military officer was due to the fact that he was a team player in the Army of bureaucracy.

Eisenhower had an ego and wanted to shine no less, perhaps, than Douglas MacArthur, but how can that be accomplished when one is a member of a bureaucracy? This was Eisenhower's problem. One way to shine was through knowledge; Eisenhower enjoyed the tutelage of a remarkable officer named Fox Connor under whom he served in Panama. Connor's insistence that Eisenhower study military history and replay old campaigns paid off, for when he entered the Army's Command and General Staff School, Eisenhower, known chiefly for his friendliness and enthusiasm for sports, came in at the top of the class. There comes a time to get serious about your career, he once said.

Another way to succeed as a bureaucrat is through conformity, which in the Army means following your commander's orders. For Eisenhower, as a second-in-command for a succession of brilliant officers—Connor, MacArthur, and Marshall—it meant knowing your commander's mind-set so well that you could anticipate his orders, and act as an extension of the commander. Expressing one's opinion, except in private, was one thing Eisenhower learned not to do. When he wrote an article for an Army journal advocating tank warfare, his superiors told him that it was contrary to Army doctrine (Rommell, Patton, and de Gaulle, however, were saying the same things as Eisenhower). Eisenhower never raised the issue again.

The biggest problem in any bureaucracy is getting other people to do things for you. This requires a means of persuasion, for which Eisenhower used his

tremendous personality. His friendliness and magnetism projected very well, which helped him with his superiors, subordinates, and peers, and he became a master at compromise and accommodation between strong egos and competing interests. One of the chief skills of the successful bureaucrat is never to make enemies. Richard Nixon relates how Eisenhower once called him up to give him specific instructions to savage Adlai Stevenson in response to a Stevensonian attack on Eisenhower's Administration. The net political effect, as both men knew, was that Nixon would reinforce his public image as a street fighter while Eisenhower would reinforce his as "Mr. Clean." Eisenhower rewarded Nixon by publicly stating that Nixon was well qualified to be President. One does not learn such skills on Inauguration Day. Eisenhower learned them in the Army.

Unlike John Kennedy, Eisenhower hid talents that no one suspected he had. The usual disparity between public image and private reality found in public figures applies to Eisenhower—but in his case, it works to Eisenhower's advantage. Thus it is that a generation after their respective presidencies, Kennedy's reputation has declined, while Eisenhower's has increased.

Besides the talents of a successful bureaucrat, something else lay hidden at the heart of Eisenhower's success. In one sense, the popular conviction distilled into a descriptive phrase was precise and intuitively correct. The phrase "Eisenhower morality" is usually used pejoratively by cultural relativists who wish to condemn traditional morality. But "Eisenhower morality" also explains his strength, namely that he was a moral man, a man of virtue, virtue conceived here as a strength of character, not as a code of ethics held to out of fear or conformity. And Eisenhower's successes were a result of his virtue. If the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, then the battle for Europe was won on thousands of athletic fields in the high schools and colleges of America. □

COMMENDABLES

Of Devotion and Democracy

Richard John Neuhaus: *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy*; William B. Eerdmans; Grand Rapids, MI.

The worst thing about the wonderful but secondary and nonsalvific blessings of Christianity is that once those who enjoy the divine bestowals have forgotten their source, these blessings are set up as objects of new and destructive forms of worship. The Scientific Revolution, for instance, could never have occurred without the Christian understanding of an ordered, beneficent creation performed by a transcendent Deity. Yet during the last century and a half naturalistic scientism has been one of the strongest foes of the faith that made science possible. Similarly, modern liberal democracy would have been impossible without the scriptural concepts of the sacred worth of the individual and the strict impartiality of divine justice. But in recent decades some political leaders and commentators have attacked religion, especially public religion, as incompatible with the kind of democracy to which it gave birth. In disingenuous and finally futile response to atheistic scientists or secularist democrats, some try to defend scriptural faith by making it look like the child, not the parent, of science and democracy: this way lies both "scientific creationism" and "liberation theology." True friends of theocentric faith, as well as science and democracy, must frankly admit that religion is larger than and, in significant

ways, different from, its terrestrial progeny. It is not essentially scientific, nor is it at heart democratic. As Hans Kindt, a Latter-day-Saint preacher, once put it: "God is not some celestial politician seeking your vote. God is to be found, and God is to be obeyed."

God's stubborn refusal to stand for office every four years, or to submit the Ten Commandments or Sermon on the Mount to popular referendum, has made Him a prime target for radical egalitarians bent upon making America "more democratic." *The Naked Public Square*, written by leading Lutheran pastor Richard John

"civil war" of unprincipled interest groups. In these profane circumstances, democracy does not seem worth defending, and consequently power-hungry revolutionaries find it easy to turn the state itself into the new church and themselves into the totalitarian new gods.

Pastor Neuhaus is heartened to find "a deep and widespread uneasiness" about America's increasingly naked public square among millions of "incorrigibly religious" Americans. But he is not optimistic as he scans the contemporary scene for a credible religious leadership for these millions. Whereas formerly the main-line Protestant denominations provided such leadership, they have now lost their sense of the "miraculous and transcendent" and become merely "a haven for refugees from radicalisms past." The assertive religious right, in Neuhaus's view, is too individualistic in its theology and too undemocratic and unsophisti-

suppose middle America to be as religious as it has ever been. But even if the new "Church militant" called for by Pastor Neuhaus requires different generals and more active recruitment of privates than he envisions, his study makes clear that only the public emergence of such an army can prevent antidemocratic and irreligious troops from seizing power. (BC) □

Of Bullets & Ballots

Morris Janowitz: *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness*; University of Chicago Press; Chicago.

In some ways nothing seems more un-American than military life. The hierarchic authority, the strict discipline, the regimentation of appearance and manner all appear antithetical to the modern American notion of individual rights. However, in *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* Morris Janowitz reminds us that democracy, including American democracy, requires not only a sense of citizen rights, but also a commitment to citizen obligations. For inculcating such a commitment, military service is well suited. Indeed, Professor Janowitz shows that the American democracy would probably have been impossible had not the colonists effected "a break with the format of monarchical armies in Europe" during the Revolution by developing the new concept of "the citizen soldier." Moreover, until the end of World War II the armed forces continued to function as a powerful institution of "civic education," serving both to "incorporate the citizen soldier into the larger society" and to imbue him with a feeling of patriotic duty.

An upcoming issue of Chronicles of Culture will feature an extended treatment of Pastor Neuhaus's book.

Neuhaus, director of The Rockefeller Institute's Center on Religion & Society in New York, offers a cogent demonstration, however, that without public acknowledgment of the unelected King of kings, America's liberal democracy could not have been born and cannot now survive. In prose that combines rigor and wit, Pastor Neuhaus argues that the moral legitimacy of democratic government is evident only beneath the "sacred canopy" of suprademocratic religious beliefs. In the absence of such a canopy, the strictly secular, "naked" public square speedily becomes a battlefield in the

cated in its cultural orientation to show the way for the country. His hope, hardly an ebullient one, is that somehow an ecumenical union of Lutherans and Catholics can fill the leadership void.

Of course, many American Christians skeptical of ecumenicalism (or Catholicism or Lutheranism) will find reasons for finding fault with Pastor Neuhaus's ecclesiology and his plans for shoring up the American democracy. Given the unprecedented incidence of adultery, divorce, child abuse, pornography, and abortion, many may further wonder if it is not naive to