

trade agreement implemented by Congress requires higher domestic taxes to stay within the budget plan.

The new mobility of capital has nullified the argument that “protectionism” reduces competition. Companies can set up factories nearly anywhere. Buchanan’s program would not discriminate between competing firms: “Toyotas made here would compete with Fords made here, and Toyotas made in Mexico would compete with Fords made in Mexico.” Buchanan is in accord with Daniel Webster who said, “I am looking not for a law such as will benefit capitalists—they can take care of themselves—but for a law that shall induce capitalists to invest their capital in

such a manner as to occupy and employ American labor.”

Foreign firms which develop a better product or process can still gain a competitive edge—thereby goading their American rivals to greater efforts of their own. Persuading foreign firms to locate in the United States will actually speed the dissemination of new technology faster than importing goods will—an insight other nations incorporated in their trade policies years ago. By contrast, competition based on cheap foreign labor may retard technological progress by discouraging necessary investment in research and development.

John O’Sullivan, former editor of *National Review*, has branded “post-nation-

alism” as “a religion of the New Class elites.” According to this creed, multiculturalism, transnational institutions, and the global economy have made nations and patriotism obsolete. “Republicans are tempted toward post-nationalism,” warns O’Sullivan, “because they feel dimly that it is implied by the logic of free trade.” O’Sullivan would like to break this tie, but “free trade,” embodying every flaw in the liberal doctrine, has been a central tenet of liberalism from the time of Voltaire and Kant to that of Wilson and Clinton. Buchanan addresses each of these flaws in turn and exposes them. His book is necessary reading for all those who want to conserve our sovereign United States. ◀

Utopia Incorporated by Justin Raimondo

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In *The Great Betrayal*, Pat Buchanan vividly recalls the genesis of his transformation from Reaganite free-trader to prophet of protectionism. The scene is the James River Paper Mill in New Hampshire, in the depths of the 1991 recession: presidential candidate Buchanan, arriving to shake hands with the workers, learns that new layoffs have just been announced. “As I walked the line, they said nothing. Then I extended my hand to a hard-looking worker about my own age who was staring at the plant floor. I grabbed his hand and told him who I was; he looked up, stared me in the eye, and said in an anguished voice: ‘Save our jobs!’” The incident haunted him for days, but “what could I do?” Then, like a ray of light through parted clouds, the answer came in the form of a news story in the *Manchester Union Leader* about plans being made by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to finance a new paper mill in Mexico. “What are we doing to our own people? I asked myself.”

A good question, but one having nothing to do with free trade versus protectionism. For the injustice is not that the



paper mill owner is laying off workers (one hopes that the author’s hostility to capitalism has not reached the point where he would dispute the owner’s right to hire and fire), but that American workers are being forced to subsidize their own competition. Buchanan’s anecdote points to one reason why the Ex-Im Bank should be abolished, without suggesting anything about the benefits of protectionism. Indeed, although his book ostensibly deals with economic issues, Buchanan admits that he is not concerned chiefly—or even primarily—with economics. “If there is a lesson central to this book,” he avers, “it is this: The economy is *not* the country, and the country comes first.” Forget about the accumulated insights of Bastiat, Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard; forget economic science, he bids us, and behold the Vi-

sion of the James River Paper Mill. Buchanan’s disdain for economics is one of the main themes of the book: “While an unfettered free market is the most efficient mechanism for distributing the goods of a nation,” he writes, “there are higher values than efficiency.”

If the higher good Buchanan has in mind is the national well-being, it will not be served by building a tariff wall. The imposition of tariffs will not raise productivity or increase the general wealth, since trade barriers favor only certain producing interests and their employees at the expense of the rest of us. American Company X, selling computers at \$2,000 apiece, must compete with Japanese Company Y, which sells computers of comparable quality for half that price. The lobbyist for Company X, threatening the loss of his workers’ jobs, demands a tariff. With the tariff passed, the owners of Company X are now part of a cartel enjoying monopoly prices, while its employees also are better off, for the time being at least: they are still employed, and at wage rates that compare favorably with the national average. Everyone else, however—buyers of computers in particular—is out of the \$1,000 he might have saved had the tariff not been enacted. The effect of this \$1,000 loss is dispersed and unseen, consisting of the purchases *not* made, the jobs *not* created, the resources *not* allocated to a particular economic area—these having been previously redistributed to the owners and employees of Company X. If 10,000 jobs were “saved” by the tariff, then 10,000 jobs in other areas were lost.

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But the “saving” of Company X is a visible result, whereas the corresponding loss to other areas of the economy is invisible: thus the demagogic appeal of protectionism.

What of the “infant industries” argument, which holds that new industries cannot survive to maturity if left unprotected by a tariff wall? American consumers, forced to subsidize this privileged cartel, would still be out the difference between monopoly prices and free market rates. These young industries would survive, but at the price of diminished productivity and efficiency. Labor, land, and capital would be diverted away from their most efficacious uses to areas in which they are less efficient, producing in this way major structural distortions in the economy. In the end, even the owners and employees of Company X, caught up in the economic downturn, would lose out.

But this is just “theory,” Buchanan insists: experience tells a different story. Referring us to history, he claims that the greatest surges in American economic

development occurred during the protectionist era, roughly 1865 to 1914. This period, however, was also a time untroubled by war, untouched by regulators, and unfamiliar with the social pathology characteristic of modern life. The coincidence of tariffs with general prosperity proves nothing.

While Buchanan advocates tariffs low enough as not to dry up revenue, one gets the distinct impression that he opposes international trade *per se* and would be happiest if it did not exist at all, preferring “self-sufficiency”—a goal which, in the end, seems more aesthetic than practical. Having quoted with approval Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, who described trade as “a perpetual and peaceful war of wit and energy among the nations,” he opines: “in that war, free trade amounts to unilateral disarmament.” Yet trade is not combat but a voluntary contract in which values, not blows, are exchanged. It is the essence not of war but of peace; not mere theory, the giddy imaginings of “cloistered intellectuals,” but plain common sense. Consumers act in their own interest: this is axiomatic.

Consumer preferences must not be allowed to “shape the national destiny,” Buchanan declares. (Who, then, will shape that destiny: the workers at the James River Paper Mill—or its owners?) For him, consumption itself is morally questionable, a self-indulgence permissible only after a prolonged period of self-denial: “Before an athlete becomes a champion, he must exercise, train, discipline, and deny himself: No athlete ever consumed his way to an Olympic medal.” And so the Buchananite program amounts to this: the American people must hunker down, pay monopoly prices to domestic producers, and adopt a stoic asceticism.

Buchanan claims free trade to be an “alien ideology,” protectionism being “America’s own invention.” Yet Alexander Hamilton—another of the author’s protectionist heroes—did not invent the so-called American System, which was not American at all but a European import. The system of state-protected industry reached its apogee in 17th-century France during the reign of Louis XIV, under the mercantilist dictatorship of Colbert. In the name of a policy that might be described as “France First,” *Colbertisme* lowered the standard of living of the French masses and retarded

the development of French industry; under the pretext of preserving the linen, woolen, cloth, and silk industries, Colbert banned printed calicoes imported from India. To guard the privileges of the cartels and the guilds, he mobilized a centralized bureaucracy and sent it into the countryside to spy on consumers of this “alien” cotton textile. (In the next century, the development of innovative cotton textiles sparked the Industrial Revolution: Colbert’s trade blockade is one reason why England, not France, was the cradle of that revolution.)

“The classical liberal views economics from the standpoint of the individual,” writes Buchanan. “The Marxist sees things in terms of classes; the traditionalist has an organic view of society and subordinates economics to the nation.” But economics cannot be “subordinated.” The division of labor, the primacy of individuals as the *sole* economic actors, the necessity of trade (both foreign and domestic): these are not floating abstractions but economic facts rooted in natural law. To rebel against them is to be guilty of that “utopianism” Buchanan supposes to be confined to the free trade camp.

Clearly, Pat Buchanan has reached a turning point. His early challenge to conservative orthodoxy in respect of the Gulf War and the “isolationist” implications of “America First” revised the modern conservative credo without abandoning it. This latest ideological excursion, however, takes him further afield and leaves him stranded and scrambling to discover a “nationalist Republican” heritage whose major gods are Hamilton, Lincoln, and Teddy Roosevelt—a pantheon not likely to appeal to his conservative followers. Longtime readers of this magazine have been treated to sympathetic accounts of regionalist and secessionist movements, from Italy’s Northern League to the League of the South in the United States. Both are disapprovingly singled out by Buchanan as symptoms of the “deconstruction” of the modern nation-state. On the evidence of this book, the most talented and dynamic leader of the American right is in transition. Where he will go from here is hard to say. Admirers, though—and I count myself among them—ought not to despair: his next book, reportedly on American foreign policy, may yet fulfill the author’s promise as the standard-bearer of the Old Right in the new GOP.

The Great Betrayal

“Do we Americans believe in . . . a world of open borders and untrammelled trade, where nations fade away in the brilliant dawn of a new world order? Or do we hold to the grand old ideas of sovereignty and independence for which our Founding Fathers risked their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor? It’s time to choose. Nor can the decision be put off much longer, or it will be made by default. Not to decide is to decide. . . . Unless we intervene to halt this momentum and recapture our country, America will wake up like Gulliver, tied down forever, our destiny no longer ours to decide.”

—Patrick J. Buchanan on choosing our destiny.

A Good Thing Not to Do

by Edward B. Anderson

**Clone: The Road to Dolly,
and the Path Ahead**

by Gina Kolata

New York: William Morrow;
276 pp., \$23.00



The announcement in February 1997 that British scientists had cloned a sheep turned the medical world upside down. Ian Wilmut and his colleagues had taken cells from an adult sheep's udder and removed the nucleus from each. They then implanted this genetic material into a specially prepared sheep ovum from which the nucleus had been removed. Out of 277 ova, 13 developed into embryos and were implanted into surrogate mother ewes. Twelve miscarried, but one survived: Dolly.

Gina Kolata, a science writer for the *New York Times*, was the first to break the story of Dolly to the American public. To her, when the history of our age is written, "the creation of this little lamb will stand out." Comparing it to, say, the conquest of smallpox doesn't do it justice, she says, for "events that alter our very notion of what it means to be human are few and scattered over the centuries."

Kolata points out the ironic situation of those medical ethicists and theologians who began to examine the implications of cloning in the 1960's, long before it seemed feasible. Scientists told them to stop their frightening talk about human cloning, since it would never happen and since funding for medical research in general could be hurt. Many ethicists, cowed by the charge of impeding medical progress, lost the chance to make an early public case against cloning. George Annas, a Boston University law professor who favors legislation prohibiting human cloning and who testified at a Senate hearing follow-

ing the Dolly announcement, says "we know where we are going and . . . can ask—for one of the few times in history—do we want to go there?" Yet halting the process will become increasingly difficult. Scientists can manufacture moral excuses and will have the financial motivation to proceed with developing cloning technology, ban or no ban.

We have yet to see the long-term impact of human manipulation of plant and animal genetics; it could be devastating. The scientific trail to Dolly, however, is a fascinating one. It leads through experiments on frog eggs, gene transfers in mice, attempts at making the perfect cow, and, finally, to Wilmut's project of producing whole herds of identical genetically engineered sheep whose milk will produce large quantities of human insulin, blood-clotting agents, and other protein drugs. The ethical questions, however, permeate a different world: that of "advanced assisted reproductive techniques" (infertility treatments) and abortion.

Tracing the relevant histories of molecular biology, embryology, and assisted reproduction, Kolata does a brilliant job of turning highly technical research into accurate and readable prose for the general reader. Her one mention of abortion is related to the cloning variation described by an anonymous physician who proposes to develop the technology whereby a woman incapable of producing any ova has her genes inserted into a donor egg. This cloned embryo could be implanted into her body and allowed to grow, then aborted. The ovaries could be removed from the fetus to harvest the ova (genetically identical to the woman, of course, since the fetus was a clone). One of these ova could be fertilized with her husband's sperm and the resulting embryo implanted into the woman. Both parents thus get to reproduce, overcoming the small problem of the woman's complete infertility.

Although Kolata admits that this "may seem risky and futuristic" and that, "of course, abortion opponents would object," her passing reference to this "strange" proposal is telling. She, like most Americans, fails to understand that abortion-on-demand and "advanced as-

sisted reproductive techniques" such as surrogate mothers, sperm banks, and test-tube conceptions are two sides of the same theoretical coin of absolute reproductive freedom. In practice as in theory, creation and destruction are already entwined in assisted reproduction through the disposal of unwanted embryos in the lab, through "sex-selection" abortion, through "selective pregnancy reduction" to ensure that a woman only has one or two babies rather than octuplets, and through the abortion of genetically abnormal fetuses (which occur in higher numbers with assisted reproduction).

Kolata devotes ample space to the well-reasoned arguments of human cloning opponents. Narcissism, pride, the desire to manipulate one's children, the attempt somehow to escape death, the vanity of wanting to be one's own creator, the danger and immorality of creating cloned people someone hopes to mold and control—all are held up to the light. She even holds out the possibility that we as a society will choose not to clone humans. Yet the widespread and unthinking cultural and political acceptance of both advanced reproduction assistance and abortion makes human cloning inevitable, barring an insurmountable technical hurdle.

Theologian Paul Ramsey says "the good things that men do can be made complete only by the things they refuse to do." Though this is sound advice for our Brave New World, nothing seems more fruitless than a call for self-restraint.

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