
LIBERAL ARTS

Fraud and deception among society's heroes draw attention to contradictions and inconsistencies in its value systems. Because American culture applauds entrepreneurship, independence, and ambition, for example, scientists have been encouraged to develop independent imaginations and innovative research, to engage in intense competition, to strive for success. Ironically, Americans also want their whitecoated heroes to be humble and generous in success, to share credit where credit is

due, not to steal credit falsely. The discovery that a scientist has calmly and rationally cheated, lied, and deceived his colleagues and the public contradicts the common image of how scientists should act. It also creates doubt about the reliability of scientific advice—a disturbing uncertainty in a world where that advice is so pervasive.

—Marcel C. LaFollette, *"The Politics of Scientific Fraud,"*
September 1993

NATIONALISM

One of the things that has blurred the bitter, present-day realities of French society and politics has been the stupid habit of calling Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front a "right-wing" party. In strict fact, the National Front, which is now in numerical terms France's leading workers' party, is no more a "right-wing" party than was Adolf Hitler's NSDAP—the *National-Sozialistische-Deutsche-Arbeiter-Partei*—which to the very end of the Third Reich proudly advertised itself as both a "socialist" and a "workers' party" in order to emphasize its popularity with the laboring masses of Germany. The reason why French working men and women have been abandoning the traditional parties of the so-called "left" and flocking to the National Front in droves is because they are fed up with the shopworn rhetoric of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," which has no relevance today to the conditions of everyday life in their once-tranquil suburbs.

—from Curtis Cate, *"The Revolt of the French Masses: The Smoldering Fires of Immigration,"* July 1997

Patriotism grows from a sense of belonging to a particular country; it is confident rather than self-conscious; it is essentially defensive. Nationalism is self-conscious rather than confident; it is aggressive, and suspicious of all other people within the same nation who do not seem to agree with some of the popular nationalist ideology. Patriotism is traditionalist; nationalism is ideological. Patriotism is rooted to the land; nationalism to the mythical image of a people, of a community that so often is not a real community. Patriotism is not a substitute for religion, whereas nationalism often is. It may fill the emotional needs of insufficiently rooted people. It may be combined with hatred—and, as Chesterton said, it is not love (which is always personal and particular) but hatred that may unite otherwise very disparate men and women. Or, as Duff Cooper once put it, "the jingo nationalist is always the first to denounce his fellow countrymen as traitors."

—from John Lukacs, *"The Patriotic Impulse,"*
July 1992

By the end of World War II, the federal government had largely succeeded in replacing the various European-American identities with a "universal" American nationalism, and new immigrants were forced to abandon their national identity and native language and sign on to the "American way of life." Post-war American nationalism—built on democracy, capitalism, the Pledge of Allegiance, hot dogs, baseball, and Rotary—may have been sufficient to drive the Cold War, but it was insufficient to bind the nation or to act as a bulwark against alien cul-

tures. People long for roots, for a sense of belonging. An abstract conception of democracy and capitalism can only displace, not replace, the songs and stories, faith and food, language and kinship that compose a true national culture. By alienating European Americans from their national cultures in the interwar period, the federal government replaced an emerging American national identity with a false nationalism, and undermined our ability to withstand assault from Third World cultures. When Lyndon Johnson signed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, removing the national preference for European immigrants and opening the floodgates to Third World immigration, he signed the death warrant of postwar nationalism. . . .

What can be done? To say that America stands at a crossroads, with one fork leading to Europe and one to a global Third World culture, would be incorrect. America reached that crossroads in the early years of this century, and . . . our rulers chose the fork leading to the Third World. If we desire to revitalize our educational system and to reaffirm America's status as a European country, we must, like the Prodigal Son, acknowledge our error (and our bankruptcy) and return home. The standard neoconservative "solutions" advanced by Allan Bloom and Bill Bennett—"Great Books," a national core curriculum, an emphasis on assimilating immigrants—won't work; these were, in fact, among the tools used to subvert the older educational system and to place us on our current path. . . .

Multiculturalism is a fable, as is any American nationalism that tries to deny or eradicate the European and regional cultures that once made America strong. If America is to have a future as a nation, and not simply as a geographical region, then we must allow Anglo-American culture to bind Northern and Southern, Western and Central and Eastern European communities in the United States in a revitalized American civilization. It is time for the Prodigal Son to grow up, and to return home.

—from Scott P. Richert, *"The Multicultural Lie: The European Roots of American Life,"* April 1998

[Donald Warren]: You identify yourself with the intellectual roots of German conservative thought that is quite different from National Socialism . . .

[Jörg Haider]: I think it is very important to have a clear understanding of German and European history on the main question of National Socialism. It contained many different streams of thought. There were socialist streams, and many people were executed for following this commitment. If the New

Right had existed at the time of the Third Reich, these intellectuals would have been put in concentration camps, just as were German conservatives. There is a very important difference be-

tween a conservative revolution and National Socialism.

—from Donald Warren, "Letter From Austria, Pt. II: A New European Identity," October 1992

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

... [T]he central issue in American politics at the end of the century is what might be described as "The National Question"—whether America is that interlacing of ethnicity and culture we call a nation and whether the American nation-state, the political expression of that nation, is going to survive. It's a problem that's difficult even to discuss because of a peculiar semantic accident. American editors are convinced that readers will confuse the word "state," used in the rest of the English-speaking world to mean a sovereign political entity, as in the French *état* or the German *staat*, with the component parts of the United States, like California or Illinois. So they make writers here use "nation" instead. And this has undermined people's defenses against a heresy that has recently raised its head: that America is in essence a purely political construct, with no specific ethnic or cultural content at all.

—from Peter Brimelow, "The National Question," June 1993

... [P]eople are adamant about globalism. They say the world is getting smaller, nobody stays in one place anymore or even one country, the times are changing and we have to change with them. Certainly the way technology and telecommunications have affected our personal and working lives is astonishing. But people who say these things want us to believe that we have little or no power to shape our lives, that we must bow to fate in the form of international trade agreements and transatlantic telecommunications. And really, that is globaloney. ...

We do not live in the "world." Mostly we live, eat, sleep, shop, go to school, go to church, hang out at the mall, all within a radius of a few square miles. There is no such thing as a global village; that is a phrase with no meaning. A village is a few hundred people living together, not a few billion. In a village you can know everybody. We could not take in all the

names and faces and personalities and problems in the world even if we wanted to.

—from Katherine Dalton, "Homegrown," September 1997

If it's wrong to wipe a house or a neighborhood from the map, imagine all the homes and neighborhoods that would be lost if an entire nation were erased. In 1973, the Kinks were invited to play a special "Fanfare for Europe" concert honoring the United Kingdom's entry into the Common Market. And since Ray [Davies], as he put it in *The Storyteller*, "could give a toss for the Common Market," the band performed a selection of songs from their 1968 album *The Village Green Preservation Society* and their then-forthcoming rock opera *Preservation*. ...

By the 1980's, the band was increasingly concerned that, in Dave Davies' words, "there's no England now." With 1989 came the anti-Thatcher, anti-E.C. *U.K. Jive*, an angry album bearing a burning Union Jack on its cover. ... ("... Down All the Days to 1992" was adopted by some irony-challenged E.C. bureaucrats as the European Commission's unofficial theme song.) In 1992 itself, the Kinks performed at Fete d'Humanité, a communist-sponsored anti-European festival in Paris. By this time, Ray was also writing *X-Ray*, half memoir and half science fiction, a book that posits a totalitarian world in which all nations have merged into a single corporation, in which "a country called England" is only a fading memory. ...

A man like Davies, able to discern beauty even in a dirty, crowded train station, need never search long for small signs of vitality. "They're trying to build a computerized community," he sang in "Muswell Hillbilly." "But they'll never make a zombie out of me." So far, he's right.

—from Jesse Walker, "The Muswell Hillbilly," March 1997

OF THE LOBBY, BY THE LOBBY, AND FOR THE LOBBY

Many who leave Main Street, U.S.A., to do good in Washington, D.C., remain on to do well for themselves. Since the beginnings of the American Republic, thousands of former congressmen, staff assistants, and senior officials in the executive branch have trod that familiar career path. The bright and ambitious, as well as the foolish and indolent, discover gold along the banks of the Potomac River and succumb to "Potomac fever." In the process, these incipient power-brokers and mercenaries shed local attachments and forget the common people who first selected them to serve. Over the last 20 years, however, this pattern has changed in one significant respect. Previously, officials departed government to extract gold from domestic employers—banks, oil companies, railroads, manufacturers, and even some labor unions. Now, former bigwigs pimp and pluck for alien interests.

—from Alfred E. Eckes, "Selling Out—Past and Present," May 1993

What is most tiresome about the lobbying culture of Washington are the self-serving contortions its practitioners go through in describing their daily activities. Most lobbyists, of course, maintain that they do not really lobby—saying the "I" word publicly is a subtle indiscretion. Euphemisms such as "advise" or "consult" or "suggest," etc., are uttered instead. When making boastful proposals to prospective clients, lobbyists promise everything but the keys to the Oval Office. When criticism (an occupational hazard but a relatively infrequent inconvenience) occasionally arises in the press over the heavy-handed, strong-arm tactics used by lobbyists, the "Who, me?" modesty act is strutted out—"All we do is provide information." Most facilitators seem by nature to be perpetually auditioning to star in *The Invisible Man* and to prefer that their handiwork go unnoticed and undetected.

—from Charles Lewis, "Fixers for a Fee," May 1993