

the figures of John Prince-Smith and Otto Michelis, Raico shows how an originally anarcho-capitalist faction moved away from libertarian economics toward nationalist and unificationist positions by the mid-1860's. This *volte face*, argues Raico, was not driven by any coherent perception of capitalist interest. It took place because of despair about reforming the political climate, fear of a socialist revolution promoted by universal male suffrage, and, finally, the widespread patriotic enthusiasm that followed the achievement of German unification. But none of these motives, according to Raico, was produced by capitalist economic interest or particularly tight economic reasoning. The *Freihändler* were reacting to an historical context, and most of them had yielded to it by 1871.

Raico would not argue that the Second Empire was entirely hostile to bourgeois fortunes. In some ways, it provided an economically freer society than does contemporary public administration, which manages the lives of democratic citizens. But the Second Empire was not the preferred society of the German bourgeois capitalists of the mid-19th century or of those liberal publicists who embraced their interests and social vision. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the economic development of the United States required the vast managerial state that took form in the 20th century. American administrative consolidation occurred primarily because of the evolving connection between social planning and mass democracy. This connection was based originally on "protecting" the working class against the dislocations of capitalist cycles, and trade-union organization was fundamental for the public support on which the welfare state was built throughout the industrialized West. But these political developments were not essential for economic growth. The welfare state was a mere byproduct of economic modernization, which—for better or worse—restricted the free market. The same regime has promoted missionary enterprises—e.g., the spreading of "human rights" and the punishing of "undemocratic" governments, activities that commercial and banking interests have not opposed but have usually not taken the lead in advancing.

In *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism* (Boston: Kluwer, 1989), Hans-Hermann Hoppe presents the argument that capitalist development could have taken

place in a Western world full of small political communities. Without pushing counterfactual history too far, Hoppe offers the reasonable view that the political and territorial consolidations of the 19th century were not necessary in order for industrial economies to develop, standards of living to rise, and capital formation to proceed. Such economic changes would have been possible without a German Second Empire, a unified Italy, or the United States being held together in the 1860's by bloody force.

In books published in the 1950's and 60's, Yale political scientist Karl Deutsch insisted that regional and national loyalties were vanishing as technology and progress in communication were helping to bring about a world state. Deutsch's prognosis was given a political spin in the context of a cosmic vision of "spiritual pluralism" and an international "open society." This vision of a politically unified world shaped by "economic necessity" did not clash with Deutsch's ideological preferences. To the contrary: His predilection for Western unilateral disarmament was dressed up in the "scientific" prediction that the Soviet Union was collapsing before the same modernizing forces that were overwhelming the United States.

Industrial and agricultural revolutions were clearly conditions for Western economic development. Moreover, the rise of the bourgeoisie, as an entrepreneurial and investing class, furthered economic modernization as it occurred in the West. And the state has functioned, when it does its job, as a protector of life and property and a bearer of the sword against the violent. Without civil order, the benefits of enterprise would not have been available, nor could a class devoted to it have arisen and prospered. But neither capitalism nor the appearance of a state under law required a steadily expanding centralized public administration. That happened for other reasons, and not always in ways that have been socially beneficial. Soviet historian Robert Conquest provides this useful judgment about the effects of political centralization:

The more bureaucratic and centralized the state becomes, the more inefficient and corrupt it is. This absolutely hobbled the Soviets. Similar problems are now arising in Europe, where massive corruption in the European Union bureaucracy has just been exposed.

That's another accompaniment to modern centralization.

Conquest might just as well have been speaking of the increasingly centralized United States.

Paul Gottfried is a professor of humanities at Elizabethtown College in Pennsylvania and the author of After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State (Princeton).

TERRORISM

Thinking About the Fall of America

by Philip Jenkins

Following the terrorist attacks last September, matters have been moving much too fast for a monthly periodical to have any hope of keeping up with events. It may be that, by the time these words appear in print, world affairs will have been restored to happy equilibrium, justice will have triumphed, and the severed heads of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein will be mounted on spikes outside the headquarters of the New York City Fire Department. On the other hand, maybe the world will be more chaotic than ever, and U.S. forces will still be struggling on an increasing number of battlefields across the globe. Which ever reality we will be confronting, one fact remains unchanged: On September 11, 2001, the United States received a series of historic lessons that we all absolutely have to learn. In the space of two horrific hours, it became grimly obvious to anyone with eyes to see just how the United States could be defeated, how we could be getting a foretaste of the fall of America. This might just be the last warning we receive. And we paid far, far too heavily for the lesson for us to ignore it.

Like most baby boomers, I grew up with the knowledge that the world might indeed be destroyed, but that the thermonuclear cataclysm would simply be too universal for us to worry about any particular country. As Tom Lehrer sang, "We'll all fry together when we fry." Given that knowledge, it was absurd to imagine the United States suffering any kind

of defeat short of annihilation. This is what gave such a campy quality to those 1950's books and films about Soviet takeovers of the country, since everybody knew that a Soviet attack would inevitably lead to Mutually Assured Destruction. Either the United States stands, or everyone falls.

On September 11, that simple equation was proved false. We learned a lot of things on that day—not least that civilian airliners potentially make terrifyingly effective guided missiles—but high on the list of lessons was that the United States does not have a functioning intelligence system. It has no agencies able to warn of mortal dangers to the republic, or even to identify those who might be mounting such threats. Although the massive terrorist operation must have been known to hundreds of participants and sympathizers beforehand, the United States picked up not a single leak. That is terrifying. Just read some of the threat analyses published in the months before September 11 by some of the highest counterterrorism officials in both the first Bush administration and the appalling Clinton regime. They demonstrate that they did not have a clue about the seriousness of the threat, who the groups are, or what states are backing them. Reading these merrily ignorant pieces, we can see that September 11 was destined to happen, sooner or later.

Much as I hate to say this, in light of the dreadful carnage at the World Trade Center, we got off much more lightly on that day than we had any right to expect. If matters had worked out only a little differently, we might also have lost the U.S. Capitol, an act of symbolic destruction that would have dramatically and irrevocably damaged the nation's status around the globe—not to mention causing hundreds or thousands of additional deaths. The fact that this national icon still stands is due to the sheer dumb luck that one hijacked United Airlines aircraft, Flight 93, chanced to have on board some brave and determined passengers who were not going down without a fight. Say their names with awe and gratitude: Tom Burnett, Jeremy Glick, Mark Bingham, and Todd Beamer; and don't forget the unnamed others whose deeds will never be known.

If matters had been slightly different, America could have lost much more that day, because we were totally unprotected. If the terrorists had wanted, they might have taken not just four airliners

but ten or twenty, and caused even more mayhem. Had they decided to, they could have combined the aerial assault with a chemical attack, as they originally intended to do during the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. By noon that day, we might have been living in a country without a functioning representative government, with the numbers of dead running into the hundreds of thousands, and with the military struggling to keep order. If you want to see the chasm between the real threat posed by terrorism and the official perception, consider the aircraft carrier that the government sailed into New York Harbor shortly after the attack, notionally to protect the city. Think of all that firepower, all those state-of-the-art fighters, all that nuclear arsenal—and nothing for the ship to do except help transport corpses. The futility of U.S. military technology, when shorn of effective intelligence, has never been more tragically symbolized.

One attack, even on this scale, cannot cripple the United States, but I do not know how many other defeats it would take before social, economic, and political life really began to collapse. Don't think this idea has not occurred to our enemies, however new its implications obviously are for our masters. As an all-too-plausible scenario for the fall of America, I offer a science-fiction novel published in 1972, which now reads like a highly relevant prophecy. In his book *The Sheep Look Up*, British author John Brunner portrays an America under siege by international terrorists—in this instance, based in Latin America rather than the Middle East. They organize aerial suicide attacks against U.S. targets, while simultaneously attacking on several other fronts. They release pests that destroy America's crops; they unleash smallpox; and they poison the reservoirs of great cities with sinister hallucinogens that drive citizens to homicidal outbreaks.

As disaster approaches, the president declares a state of emergency in phrases that would have seemed hysterically alarmist right up until late 2001. He announces that

We have been attacked with the most cowardly, the most monstrous and the most evil weapons ever devised by wicked men. We are the victims of a combined chemical and biological attack. . . . One of the great cities of our nation today

writes in agony because the water supply, the precious diamond stream that nourishes our lives, has been poisoned. . . . Our enemies have succeeded in reducing our stocks of food to the point where we must share and share alike.

Ultimately, even these desperate measures fail. In the book's final scene, a woman overseas complains of a ghastly burning smell, only to be told: "It's from America. The wind's blowing that way." This could, just possibly, be the way the world ends—or to be more precise, the way America ends.

If this seems to resemble apocalyptic ranting on my part, well and good. The difference between us and our sworn enemies is that they are speaking the language of apocalypse and we are not, and this fact might give them a massive advantage. They know what the stakes are in this conflict, and it is high time that we learned. On that September day, many of us found out, for the first time, that millions of people around the world not only loathe us as Americans but rejoice when we are slaughtered. To understand this mentality, you might read the deranged public statements of Osama and his ilk, but you can also turn to liberal and leftist voices within our own society. Look at all the post-attack statements from American universities (and other areas bereft of sanity) saying more or less overtly what a salutary thing it was that the attacks had inflicted such a defeat on the Western civilization that they loathe. Or, as a true exercise in abnormal psychology, read Brunner's *The Sheep Look Up* and realize that the apocalypse he is describing is his conception of a happy ending. As one character declares while America burns, "We can just about restore the balance of the ecology, the biosphere . . . if we exterminate the two hundred million most extravagant and wasteful of our species." (That's us, by the way.)

The main practical lesson of recent events can be summarized starkly. For half a century, we have believed that the United States could be neither destroyed nor defeated, barring a nuclear holocaust. We were wrong. We face a deadly danger, and it is vitally necessary that we confront it. The difficulty is that most of us do not have the first idea of the revolutionary social and legal changes needed if we are to survive.

Above all, this means fundamentally

reshaping our concept of intelligence and counterterrorism. And no, I am not talking about the wave of new security powers that have occupied center stage in the government's response to the disasters. Improving airport security is a useful contribution, as is strengthening the defenses of nuclear power plants, reservoirs, and other points of vulnerability. Yet even placing an armored division at every one of these points would be useless, since there will always be too many places to defend: We live in, by far, the most target-rich environment on the planet. If we do not know when and where the threats are coming, we cannot possibly defeat them. Worse, seeing all those uniforms and firepower provides a false sense of security, overawing everyone except the terrorists. Other "security" nostrums like national identity cards have as little merit. And lifting restrictions on bugging and eavesdropping is worse than futile, since these new powers encourage security agencies to rely on electronic surveillance technologies of the sort that proved worthless in defending the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

There are four issues that we need to think very hard about in developing a functioning response to terrorism as we face it today. None of these is a pleasant prospect, but they all have to be considered urgently and implemented within months, not years. Based on the historical experience of many counterterrorist wars over the last half-century, I offer these propositions as a basis for debate.

First: No terrorist campaign has ever been defeated or prevented without aggressive interrogation techniques of a kind that are almost certainly illegal in the United States. Whether these methods amount to torture is a matter of semantics, but at the least, we are talking about something like the old third degree.

Second: No terrorist campaign has ever been defeated without the massive official use of moles, infiltrators, and provocateurs, including the use of dubious characters who are probably guilty themselves of criminal and terrorist acts, including murder. Together with the methods mentioned in the first point, this is the only way to obtain "human intelligence" from within groups, above all about a group's future choice of targets.

Third: No campaign has ever been carried on while terrorist suspects have the panoply of legal protections currently

available in the United States, protections that include access to lawyers, limits on police powers of detention, a right to bail, and so on.

Fourth: All successful antiterrorist campaigns—and there have been many—have, at some stage, involved the extralegal assassination of suspected leaders, either inside the state under attack or overseas.

America either needs a massive change in its antiterrorist laws or, at least temporarily, the courts must be prevented from intervening in the antiterrorist war. We don't need to become a police state to save ourselves, but we have to consider how far other democracies have gone in order to preserve functioning societies. If we are not prepared to take (to some extent) the same path as Israel, France, Spain, and Great Britain, then we have no right to complain the next time terrorists massacre thousands more of our citizens. The last time I read the Declaration of Independence, it said that the first basic right of citizens was life and its preservation; and if a state fails to protect that right, then it simply has no right to continue.

Philip Jenkins is the author, most recently, of Hidden Gospels: How the Search for Jesus Lost Its Way (Oxford University Press).

BIOGRAPHY

Hollywood and the Convent

by Jeffrey Meyers

Biographers do much of their work in the study and the library, but they also get to some out-of-the-way places. I've interviewed people in bars, nursing homes, and insane asylums, chased down wealthy informants in country houses and elegant apartments, poor ones in drafty cottages and cluttered flats. Some welcomed me with a hefty drink, others couldn't wait to get rid of me. I am always passed on from one to the other by surviving family and friends. They seem to enjoy participating, however reluctantly at first, in the search for one of life's eternal puzzles: the heart and mind of another person. They can't help having

partial views of their own, and they sometimes promote a barely disguised agenda. The biographer, positioned uncomfortably as judge and appraiser of an important or even great man or woman, who must nevertheless have been fallibly human, finds himself balancing contradictory views of his subject. When I was writing the life of Gary Cooper, his daughter Maria, an ardent Roman Catholic, suggested I accompany her on a visit to a Benedictine convent.

Though I could not guess how this would further my research, it was an offer I couldn't refuse. I knew some jolly Irish priests in Montana and had once spent the night in a monk's cell at St. John's University in Minnesota, but my knowledge of conventual life was confined to the lurid and mysterious: the cruelty and suffering of enforced seclusion in Diderot's *La Religieuse*, sexual hysteria in Huxley's *The Devils of Loudon*, sacrificial austerities in Kathryn Hume's *A Nun's Story*. I remembered the bold, jaunty description of Byron's *Don Juan*: "He learned the arts of riding, fencing, gunnery, / And how to scale a fortress—or a nunnery." I could imagine Cooper doing just that in some romantic drama of the 1940's.

Maria helped manage the musical career of her pianist-husband, Byron Janis, and looked in frequently on her mother, Rocky, now bedridden from the effects of a stroke. But she had been helping me for several weeks in New York. She had showed me her files and scrapbooks, videotapes and photographs, and introduced me to her mother and to many of her father's friends and family. She was glad to get away to a place she often visited and where she had many friends, and I looked forward to getting her to talk to me at length about her adored father. On a sparkling fall day in November 1996, the leaves still yellow and gold, we drove from Park Avenue to the Abbey of Regina Laudis in Bethlehem, Connecticut.

A reticent, shy, and modest man, Cooper was universally liked. In life, he was charming, with the gift of simplicity; on the screen, he was heroic yet tender and vulnerable. He had lived in two worlds, with his professional life in California (where he had numerous affairs) and, through Rocky, his social life among wealthy sophisticates in New York, Southampton, and Europe (where he played the role of the devoted husband). I had interviewed many actors who