

clique. Both are run through sprawling paperwork bureaucracies which stifle initiative and innovation. Both are rife with internal politicking and backstabbing. Both adhere to rigid hierarchy, thrive on secrecy, demand absolute internal conformity and eliminate dissenters. Both deny those within their power a bill of rights. Both put their own expansion and convenience above all moral values—indeed, self-interest and growth are their moral values. Both embrace ideologies which give their self-seeking a cosmic justification. Both pay lip service to worker rights while in fact dealing with workers as they deal with everyone else—trying to get the most for the least.

Both tend toward larger and more centralized technologies.

Both treat their organizational appendages—whether corporate subsidiaries or client states—as colonies. They prop them up or bleed them of cash and resources, as suits their convenience.

Above all, both are ruled by timid, deeply conservative men who live off the legacy of forebears more daring and remuncious than they. The current managers, both corporate and Soviet, are not buccaneer capitalists or flaming revolutionaries. Rather, they are security-maximizers whose goal in life is a steady growth curve. The faceless heads of Ford and Exxon have no more in common with Henry Ford and John D. Rockefeller than Brezhnev and Co. have in common with Trotsky and Lenin.

In sum, could it be that our bankers and corporate managers get along so well with the Communist establishment precisely because they have so much in common? Could they be, in reality, on the same side of a fundamental economic struggle of which we slowly are becoming aware?

We have all been told that we were born into a world split by a Manichean struggle between 19th century intellectual theories called "capitalism" and "communism." We have been told that these supposed opposites define, for all time, the entire spectrum of possible economic arrangements. They are the choices. They are locked in mortal combat. One or the other must prevail.

But what if that is bunk? What if the leading practitioners of these two theories—which are both premised on materialism and self-seeking as the engines of world events—are heading for the same place? What if the theories, which bear little resemblance to actual practice in either country, don't explain what is happening? What if the



emerging struggle is really between something else, something which cuts athwart the official world view on both sides. What if the struggle is between the forces of centralized economic power on the one hand (embodied by conglomerate corporations, New York banks, and Soviet-style states), and the forces of decentralized economic power on the other (represented by independent businesses, family farmers, Solidarity, at times U.S. labor unions, anti-nuke protestors, alternative energy and appropriate technology advocates, alternative presses and newspapers, and those like Ralph Nader who demand accountability of large institutions, corporate as well as governmental? What if the real struggle is between the centralizers and the decentralizers of imagination and economic power?

And what if the official version of the ideological

armageddon is in large part just a schtick that the leaders on both sides use to whip up public support for big armies and to keep their grasp on the symbols of legitimacy of their respective states?

I don't make light of the differences between the U.S. and the USSR. If the choice is between here or there, I want to live here, but the affinities between the Soviet-style states and the large banks and corporations which are controlling more and more of our economy, are real and ominous.

The events in Poland, and the way our bankers have responded to these events, are a warning. We must not merely check out our defenses. We also must ask again just what it is that we are fighting, and what it is that we are defending. We must ask who "we" are in the first place.

DAVID ARMSTRONG

Ronald Reagan's scorched earth economic policies are supposed to save Americans money. We all know that. Problem is, they don't and many of us now know that. One of the most telling examples of Reaganomics' fiscal failure is detailed in a thought-provoking report on energy conservation that shows just how the Reagan administration could save Americans billions each year, but doesn't.

The report—entitled "Accelerating the Building Sector's Sluggish Response to Rising Energy Prices"—reveals that the U.S. could cut the energy needed to heat and light this country's buildings in half by the year 2000, simply by using known conservation techniques. As the report's authors make clear, however, those techniques are not likely to be efficiently employed without government prodding of the building industry. Government is, of course, doing just the opposite.

From a standpoint of cost-effectiveness, ecological sanity and self-reliance—goals the Reagan administration says it supports—that is contradictory. Cutting the energy we use in our buildings in half could eventually save 8 million barrels of oil a day, help protect our fragile environment and lessen U.S. oil imports.

The government knows this. The report's co-author, Arthur H. Rosenfeld, a physics professor at the University of California at Berkeley, testified before two congressional committees last April and May and told them so.

Powerful elements of private industry know it, too. Last June, Rosenfeld ventured into the lion's den to deliver the report he wrote with Mark D. Levine, an analyst at Lawrence Berkeley Labora-

tory, to the Atomic Industrial Forum. That's the national trade association of the nuclear power industry. The pro-nuke moneybags were presumably not amused to hear that the vast quantities of energy they claim Americans crave can be conserved—and with no drop in the standard of living, at that.

"I should point out," writes Rosenfeld, "that we always took the position that the amenities provided by energy should remain the same or be improved. We only changed the efficiency."

Rosenfeld and Levine's findings complement those of other analysts who studied potential energy savings in industry, transportation and utilities as part of a wide-ranging study for the Solar Energy Research Institute. All told, the analysts concluded, the U.S. could save \$50 billion of energy every year, with "savings in the building sector alone... comparable with our oil imports for all sectors."

The price tag for vigorous government action to net such savings, Rosenfeld and Levine concede, is high, but within reach. It would cost \$200 billion to renovate private homes for energy-efficiency, another \$100 billion to rework commercial buildings and \$125 billion for more efficient appliances, such as furnaces, refrigerators and low-flow shower heads. That's \$425 billion.

The way Rosenfeld and Levine figure it, however, \$50 billion in yearly savings would more than pay the bill—not to mention assure the preservation of a priceless environment that would otherwise be ravaged by nuclear, synfuel and coal-burning plants constructed to generate energy we don't need.

According to the two analysts, such large-scale conservation of greenback and green trees could be done by sending a small army of "house doctors" and retrofit contractors hither and yon. They would also have Washington speed the process "by sponsoring applied research, education, training... monitoring and evaluation of retrofit and new buildings, energy labels for appliances and homes and commercial space" and tax credits for conservation.

In the past, Rosenfeld and Levine report, the building industry has been slow to adapt to changing market conditions, such as skyrocketing energy prices. American builders have had to meet few government performance standards and little foreign competition compared to, say, automobile makers, who have been at least somewhat more efficient. Left to their own devices, Rosenfeld and Levine conclude, builders could take up to 20 years to implement changes that would benefit most Americans now. That's why they're calling for leadership from the federal government.

Unfortunately for consumers, that's not the kind of leadership Washington has in mind. Last spring, while Arthur Rosenfeld was presenting his carefully reasoned proposals to Congress, the administration was busy cutting two-thirds of the funds for the Department of Energy's Office of Buildings and Community Systems. Last fall, President Reagan proposed abolishing DOE itself.

That's one reason why your fuel bills won't be dropping with the temperatures this winter, or next, or the one after that.

SIX ARMS CONTROL MYTHS

George Breslauer

Whatever may come of President Reagan's arms control proposals in the Geneva negotiations over the coming weeks, the short history of nuclear arms limitation talks has taught us one clear lesson: Headline-grabbing proposals, such as Reagan's (or Carter's initial SALT II initiative), have little to do with the ultimate success or failure of the arms control process.

What is far more significant to the long-term prospects for arms control is how the U.S. negotiators relate to a series of hard-line myths about Soviet intentions and capabilities which have helped propel the arms race forward in recent years. Until the grip of these myths on the American psyche is reduced, meaningful arms control is not likely to be reached. What are these myths, and in what sense are they wrong?

• *You cannot trust the Soviet Union to honor treaties.*

In fact, the experience with SALT I suggests the opposite. Soviet violations were minor and did not exceed U.S. violations. Moreover, those bilateral violations were smoothed over and worked out through negotiations.

• *The Soviets engaged in a huge military build-up during the 1970s, taking advantage of the SALT process to overtake us.*

Whatever the Soviets did, they violated no treaty or formal understanding with the United States. More importantly, they did not do all that much. They kept up their previous pace of incremental defense budgeting at a time when the United States was reducing its previous pace. This reduced the relative gap in strategic capability between the two superpowers, stimulating U.S. fears that its previous margin of superiority had disappeared. Indeed it had, but that is not the same as saying that the Soviets now enjoy strategic superiority. (They do not.) We seem to forget that many things undertaken by the Soviets during the 1970s, such as modernization of strategic forces, also were undertaken by the United States and NATO. We also forget that we far exceeded the Soviets in numbers of warheads deployed during the 1970s. The Soviets did build up their strategic forces during the 1970s, and they did reduce the gap, but not nearly to the extent implied by this hard-line myth.

• *The Soviets believe nuclear war can be fought and won; they do not subscribe to U.S. conceptions of deterrence based on Mutual Assured Destruction.*

This may be the most pernicious of the six myths. It is based upon selective quotation from Soviet military doctrine or from statements by Soviet military commanders seeking bigger budgets. In fact, Soviet military doctrine basically argues that the best defense is a good offense. Anyone daring to attack the homeland must be assured in advance of his own destruction. This is far from affirming the ability of the Soviet Union to survive a nuclear war with acceptable damage. Furthermore, when we examine the content of Soviet politicians' statements to each other, we find them continually reaffirming the notion that neither side would survive a nuclear war with acceptable levels of damage. Though the phraseology is different, Soviet conceptions of deterrence are not all that different from MAD.

• *The Soviets will only negotiate seriously from a position of potential inferiority; we need to devel-*

op bargaining chips that will induce them to sober up.

This claim has a surface plausibility to it, for we know that Soviet motivation for serious negotiating during SALT I was strongly influenced by their fear of U.S. MIRV, Trident submarine and ABM programs. But the conclusion is misplaced. MIRV and Trident were not headed off by SALT I, yet the Soviet nonetheless negotiated seriously. ABM was perceived to be in the mutual interest of both countries to restrain.

Then there is the problem of the fate of bargaining chips. Once developed, it is rare that they are bargained away. Are we really creating bargaining chips, or just creating another spiral in the arms race? Finally, the real issue is whether we will settle for parity, or are actually seeking to restore the old margin of strategic superiority. The six myths outlined here suggest a state of mind that seeks superiority and fears parity. If those are the terms we effectively place before the Soviets, it is not likely that they will be eager to negotiate.

• *If we do not build up our strategic forces, the Soviets will use their strategic superiority to face us down in Third World crises.*

This claim is mystifying and illogical, but must be taken seriously, for it is widely believed in Washington. First of all, note that it presumes a current condition of Soviet strategic superiority, which is not the case. Secondly, it is the kind of statement that is true only if we make it true. We create for the Soviets an image of will or nerve in given crises; we can do that with or without a margin of superiority in strategic forces, for each side can, in any case, wipe out the other several times over. There is nothing in Soviet literature on the use of force in international relations to suggest that they believe a margin of strategic superiority, one that is far short of first-strike capability, will allow them to face us down in the Third World. U.S. analysts sometimes point to the Cuban missile crisis, claiming that Khrushchev backed down because of U.S. strategic superiority at the time. There is not a shred of evidence to support this. Far more likely, Khrushchev backed down due to a fear of nuclear war—of mutual destruction—and due to U.S. conventional military superiority in the Caribbean.

• *We must build up our strategic forces because of the imminent "window of vulnerability," which will tempt the Soviets to launch a first strike.*

This myth simply is preposterous. Even if the Soviets had the ability to destroy U.S. land missiles before they got off the ground, nobody claims the Soviets have, or will have, the ability to simultaneously destroy our Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and our Strategic Air Command bombers, either of which could destroy the Soviet Union as a functioning society. Moreover, the whole notion of vulnerability on this issue defies logic. Even if the Soviets had the ability to destroy our strategic capability on land, sea and in the air—an ability they never will have—how would they know they had it? This is not something that can be tested. The level of uncertainty about the capabilities and reliability of the technologies involved is so high, and the risks involved in miscalculation so high (i.e., suicide), that only the most demented madman would contemplate the effort to exploit a so-called "window of vulnerability." Soviet leaders are tough, expansionist and, at the moment, frightened; but they are not madmen. Indeed, the final irony associated with this myth is that, if they actually were demented, no measure of U.S. arms build-up would suffice to deter them, anyway.

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Apple Pie

Polar bears in northern Canada have found supermarket trashbins an excellent source of food, so much so that some stores have taken to playing loud recordings of threatening bear calls to drive off the animals.

American colleges may turn to demand-side economics to solve their financial problems. Under a program being considered by Indiana University, students enrolled in the most popular majors, such as engineering or biology, would pay more than those majoring in less popular fields such as English and the humanities. Indiana University vice president Kenneth Gros-Louis says it's just an idea, but could become a reality if the school can find a way to guarantee financial aid so students aren't frozen out of a major because of money. But Michael Berrier of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities says that no matter how hard the schools try to be fair, free market education will discriminate against poor students.

A Columbia, Connecticut, man has filed suit to force the government to reveal its plans for the official funeral of Richard Nixon. Ronald Ouellette says his action stems from a "long-time interest in Watergate," as well as a belief that taxpayers shouldn't pick up the tab when Nixon goes to his final reward. Ouellette says he only wants to find out what the government has in mind, but he won't rule out of a suit to prevent public money from being spent on Nixon's funeral.

A British jeweller rented a couple of South American tarantulas for ten bucks to patrol his recent jewelry exhibit. He's happy with their work, saved about 800 dollars a month for armed guards and said the tarantulas required only a daily supply of mealworms. He would hire the creature again: "Crooks hate things like dogs and spiders."

Teachers at the University of Missouri are trying to write a big 10-4 to a new student practice: cheating with CB radios. Assistant economics professor Donald Schilling says a colleague monitoring the airwaves overheard test answers being beamed into his classroom. He says he's "somewhat flattered" by the ruse, because it means he's been able to foil more primitive methods.

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