

may be more than anything he ever did. This was not true of Eichmann. And to spare his life without pardoning him was impossible on juridical grounds.

In conclusion, let me come to the only matter where you have not misunderstood me, and where indeed I am glad that you have raised the point. You are quite right: I changed my mind and do no longer speak of "radical evil." It is a long time since we last met, or we would perhaps have spoken about the subject before. (Incidentally, I don't see why you call my term "banality of evil" a catchword or slogan. As far as I know no one has used the term before me; but that is unimportant.) It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never "radical," that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface.

It is "thought-defying," as I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its "banality." Only the good has depth and can be radical. But this is not the place to go into these matters seriously; I intend to elaborate them further in a different context. Eichmann may very well remain the concrete model of what I have to say.

You propose to publish your letter and you ask if I have any objection. My advice would be not to recast the letter in the third person. The value of this controversy consists in its epistolary character, namely in the fact that it is informed by personal friendship. Hence, if you are prepared to publish my answer simultaneously with your letter, I have, of course, no objection.

Hannah Arendt

This Europe

"No, My Lord . . ." — by *NORA BELOFF*

NO, MY LORD, the bomb is not the way to unite Europe. This was my first reaction to Lord Gladwyn's proposal, advanced in these pages last month, for the creation of a *European Political and Military Authority*: "autonomous," as he said, "even in the nuclear sphere. . ."

Since that article appeared we have had the tragic news of the murder of President Kennedy and a shudder of uncertainty about the whole future of the Western Alliance. Without any misplaced antagonism to the new American President, it is predictable that a man with Lyndon B. Johnson's background and education will have a less European turn of mind than his remarkably Anglicised Irish-Bostonian predecessor who filled his administration with Rhodes Scholars.

It is therefore more than ever tempting to argue that, in the post-Kennedy world, Europe, including Britain, must be less reliant on the United States. This may well reinforce the case, now being privately examined by political strategists in both parties, for providing the Europeans with a nuclear arsenal of our own.

Certainly those of us who agree on the need for reviving the hopeful post-war trend towards European unity, and who accept the truism that Britain is part of Europe, should examine Lord

Gladwyn's suggestions with calm and care. Not only because, like everything he writes, they are put forward with cogency and wit, but also because his views reflect the general thinking of many of the best Europeans on both sides of the Channel. Jean Monnet and his friends have openly counselled a European deterrent as a sound way of re-launching the European unity movement. The idea found favour with many senior members of the Kennedy Administration, perhaps even with the late President himself. It was he who personally sponsored "the Grand Design"—the concept of an equal partnership between a United States of America and a United States of Europe, which might seem incompatible with an American nuclear monopoly.

The change at the White House would not invalidate Lord Gladwyn's view that the Americans are unlikely to be willing to subordinate decisions on when to use, or threaten to use, their strategic forces to a NATO executive. This leads him to the conclusion that, as you cannot have *either* a truly British *or* a truly NATO nuclear force, only a European one can avert what he calls "the system of an American Empire."

As he assumes that neither the British nor the French, even under left-wing governments,

would abandon their deterrents, he insists that "some machine" should be established which will at least co-ordinate and possibly even amalgamate the two forces within the general framework of the Western alliance." This "machine" would be a European Political and Defence Authority which would control European defences and, working on the basis of an equal partnership with the United States, would fit the results into a NATO master plan.

Like most of his compatriots, Lord Gladwyn is sceptical of the American-sponsored, mixed manned nuclear navy as a way of solving the predicament of Atlantic solidarity. "Until the question of 'the button' is satisfactorily solved it cannot be said to be anything but a specialised projection of American power." He considers, on the other hand, that if "some day," it should be made available to his "E.P.D.A.," then "it might make real sense."

It would be useless to deny that Europeans resent the sense of dependence on American protection: the distrust of American leadership might indeed be enhanced by last month's tragedy. But this surely is an emotional reaction, and it seems unfortunate that Lord Gladwyn should lend his great authority to the view that, without some counterbalancing force to the vast American military machine, "all Western European countries will become, not only strategically but politically and economically, American dependencies." Many Americans would disagree with his allegation that because 95 per cent of NATO's nuclear power is under Washington's control, the Americans can impose their views inside the NATO Council: on the major factors of "force goals" and manpower, they are, on the contrary, constantly overruled.

Lord Gladwyn concedes that the Americans do not want to dominate us: "The imperial crown," he says, "would sit heavily on their weary head." But why should it sit at all? It would be quite out of character for the Americans to use their nuclear monopoly to tell their allies how to run their political and economic affairs: indeed during the period of dollar deficits, dependence has often seemed the other way round.

Besides the dread of American supremacy there is the alternative fear of which de Gaulle often reminds us, that the Americans might decide Europe was too dangerous to defend. It is a fear which has no doubt increased with recent reminders that the hundreds of thousands of Americans stationed in Europe will not be permanent fixtures. But the American interest in "containing" a Communist thrust which would catastrophically shift the world balance of power makes it extremely improbable that they would withdraw their nuclear guarantee. Any President

within the foreseeable future will feel as Kennedy did when he recently said in Frankfurt that European security was "indispensable in our interests as well as yours."

President Johnson has already made it abundantly clear that in this respect the change at the White House will make no difference.

It is true that there is, and will always be, the theoretical risk of an American return to isolationism. But it is so plainly in contradiction to the Americans' own interests that it can surely be dismissed as the most unlikely of all international contingencies. And against it we must weigh the risk of piling up an autonomous nuclear force inside Europe, increasing the already hair-raising danger that the bomb may, in fact, be used.

A safe and invulnerable transatlantic deterrent, which the Russians know is committed to defending Europe, is surely a sufficient threat to dissuade a Kremlin would-be aggressor who might develop the lunatic idea of initiating war in Europe.

BASICALLY the chief argument to Lord Gladwyn and the other advocates of a politico-military United States of Europe would be that "it provides the best, perhaps even the only valid means of harnessing firmly to the West the hopes and energies of the German nation." Let's lock the Germans in, the argument goes, otherwise they they might gang up again with the Russians and unleash another disaster.

Such an estimate assumes the post-war Germans would not choose peace and parliamentary democracy of their own freewill and that they are more likely to be tempted into aggressive alliances than ourselves or the French. Yet if they are potentially the wicked "warmongers" the Russians suggest, the case for giving them equal access to a thermonuclear force is surely preposterous. If not, then their inclusion in a block with its own nuclear armaments can hardly be defended as the only way of preventing them from acting like barbarians.

The fact surely is that neither Germans nor any other human society are immutably good or bad: they are what they are by a combination of history and circumstances. That is why those who advocate an equivalence of force between the two Transatlantic blocks, the U.S.A. and the "U.S.E." should surely stop to think what might be the effect on some of the more fragile democracies of Western Europe when they have a great "military-industrial complex" straddling the Continent. Few people will have forgotten General Eisenhower's celebrated warning to his own countrymen against "the unwarranted influence" which such a complex might exercise

in the U.S. Yet the danger would be manifestly much greater in many European countries where the tradition of civilian supremacy is much less entrenched and there are no "whizz-kids" like Robert MacNamara or Charles Hitch to slap down the generals.

IN THEIR EAGERNESS to redress the balance between West Europe and the U.S.A., some advocates of a European deterrent give very little thought to its eastward impact. A bigger share in the Western deterrent by the Germans will almost certainly frighten the Russians into tightening their grip on their satellites. The precious and precarious liberalisation, which begins to make life in Eastern Europe worth

living, would very probably be reversed. How long would it be before the Russians themselves slip back, perhaps under new leadership, into their old siege mentality? Can a Western initiative which would deepen the split down the middle of Europe qualify as a contribution to European unity?

It can appeal only to those who believe with Lord Gladwyn that "a thaw" is likely "to encourage a great increase of Soviet influence in Western Europe." But is not the reverse true? Even the minimal exchanges so far permitted have created an intellectual effervescence in the Soviet Union and the satellites. Without the Iron Curtain, how long could the Communists hope to sustain their mythology about NATO

Life & Letters Today (I)

[The following story of an incident at a recent European Writers' Conference, held in Leningrad, appeared in *Izvestia* (Moscow), and was widely reported in the European press. We had intended to include it, without comment, in our monthly department devoted to such tit-bits. But such gossipy news-items in the Soviet press are a new and very strange form, and we had the vague suspicion that it would be best to write to H. M. Enzensberger for verification. His letter to us is appended.]

Moscow

TOO MUCH self-confidence is always painful. Earlier this year, at a meeting in Leningrad of European writers discussing problems of the contemporary novel, there suddenly appeared the figure of Evtushenko, although he had not been invited. After all, he writes poems and not novels. This young man apparently came to Leningrad in order to be slapped on the back by foreign litterateurs and thus to show everybody how famous in the world he really is. Colleagues have told me what happened when he turned up in the hotel where the French and German writers were living. There he met the well-known West German writer, Hans Enzensberger. I am not sure whether Evtushenko immediately understood why Enzensberger appeared so cool. Enzensberger said the following to Evtushenko: I respect people whose self-confidence has certain decent limits. You, Herr Evtushenko, told me in Germany that our poet, Rilke, was among your masters, that you learned from his poetry. But here in the Soviet Union I learn that hardly anything of Rilke has been translated into Russian, and that a long time ago. You, Herr Evtushenko, understand no German. How, then, could Rilke have possibly been your master?

Does one have to say anything more...?

TATYANA TESS in *Izvestia* (Moscow)

Norway

WHAT THE German press (*Die Welt* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*) published about my conversation with Evtushenko is a complete fabrication. The reports were based on an article by Tatjana Tess in *Izvestia*. Undoubtedly this article was "inspired." It was intended to harm Evtushenko in the eyes of the Soviet public and even to make him seem ridiculous. Our Establishment organs, which usually do not easily believe what *Izvestia* prints, seized upon this item; and although checking with me would only have cost them forty pfennigs postage, this was not done. It is the old collaboration of the reactionaries, ours and theirs. One kills two birds with one stone—Evtushenko appears as an ignoramus and Enzensberger, the trouble-maker, as an arrogant fool.

I have long since given up denying individually the countless lies which appear in our newspapers: that is a labour of Sisyphus. In this case, however, I did send a correction to *Izvestia*, with copies to the Soviet Writers' Union and to Evtushenko too, for I know how damaging such a ridiculous article could be to him. Naturally the correction will never be published, no more than it is likely to be in Hamburg or Frankfurt.

It is untrue that I met Evtushenko in Germany. We didn't know each other. We met, by accident, in a Leningrad hotel. I didn't greet him coolly; I was very pleased to run into him, for he was, God knows, more sympathetic than the old fools who populated the conference. We never exchanged a word on the subject of Rilke; we spoke only of cultural and political subjects, untouched on in *Izvestia*. And why should I criticise a Russian writer for not knowing German when I myself have no more than a smattering of Russian? In short: the report was entirely malicious, and those who gave it circulation did so with the deliberate intent of damaging both our reputations.

HANS MAGNUS ENZENSBERGER

being "an aggressive bloc" or about "the pauperisation of the proletariat" in capitalist society?

Democratic Western Europe is not weak and vulnerable, compared to the other side, but strong and dynamic. It is true that if there should be a *détente* the pressure for a military merger would diminish—but so would the need for it. Some of the keenest Europeans sometimes seem to think that in unity lies not only strength, but also wisdom and goodness: that was perhaps what leading liberals in the little principalities of Italy and Germany used to think while they struggled for national unity. How shocked they would have been to know their beloved fatherland, once united, would come to be identified with a Mussolini or a Hitler.

The essential problem is to make sure that any new community contributes to the well-being, security, and human freedom of the Europeans.

This is not to suggest, of course, that the Western countries should all remain in a state of suspended animation until the Russians come to terms. On the contrary, Lord Gladwyn is surely right in saying that Britain has everything to lose from sinking into introvert isolation or into the dream-world of Commonwealth solidarity. As he points out, the Western European countries, including ourselves, have a great deal, socially, politically, and economically, in common, and are therefore particularly well fitted to working out common solutions for the many problems which are intractable within the limits of national frontiers. There are still many issues, beyond those being tackled already by the existing communities, where Britain could usefully take the initiative. And joint economic action will, of course, also require political institutions to ensure democratic control.

BUT THE ORIGINAL purpose of "supra-nationalism" was to challenge the idea of the sovereign state, and it would surely be a tragic paradox if the prospective supra-national community ended up by carving out a new Western European thermonuclear super-state, with all the attributes of sovereignty—only with longer teeth: "the better to eat you up with..."

Must we then accept that Europeans cannot bear to be deprived of some form of collective self-assertiveness and that, if they cannot any longer afford separate nation-states, they must form a conglomeration to which they can transfer their life-and-death devotions?

It has indeed been argued in the past that the whole notion of internationalism runs counter to human instinct. Man has always needed a gang: family, tribe, nation, in which to merge his identity and to compensate him for the sense of insecurity and impotence which

has dogged his life. Groups, producing group loyalties and group hatreds, had seemed an indispensable prop to human existence.

Could it now be, as certain sociologists are suggesting, that progress towards ordered civilisation is producing a new kind of individual, with sufficient self-assurance and psychological balance not to need to give way to irrational urges for collective destruction? There are, in fact, certain tentative and uncertain signs that, in modern society, this is beginning to be true. There is general acceptance of the principle (though not yet the practice) of toleration; and all Western democracies are now (with occasional aberration) in the habit of settling disputes by non-violent methods.

Among those countries which have reached maturity there should be no more glory in the collective possession of nuclear weapons for the preservation of world order than there is personal glory in wielding a policeman's baton for keeping order in the streets. The essential is for the maximum number of like-minded countries to agree on the definition of world order and to know that they have between them the necessary strength (but no more) to enforce it. This surely is what Western alliance is for.

De Gaulle has often and perhaps rightly affirmed that the *raison d'être* of a nation-state is to provide for its own defence. If so, then surely thermo-nuclear weapons, which make defence impossible, demolish the case for preserving the divisions of the world into such traditional bundles of human beings as nation-states. And this must equally apply to super-states or federal unions: even the Russians and Americans only survive, thanks to their reciprocal restraint: within the foreseeable future, there is no defence.

THE AWARENESS of this new phenomenon has perhaps percolated more easily on the left than the right. Conservatives still cling to their traditional fervour for uniform and flag. Labour M.P. Denis Healey recently remarked that for a large part of the electorate the nuclear bomb remains "their virility symbol."

The left, on the other hand, has a long, though admittedly very wobbly, internationalist cult which might make adjustment easier.

Indeed, although the present Labour leaders were singularly slow to grasp the significance of the new international processes, cracks are already visible in their anti-European armoury. Many aspects of the programme now being canvassed by the British Labour Party may, in the view of some of its principal sponsors, prove inapplicable within the narrow contours of one-and-a-half off-shore islands.

A wider monetary basis and larger markets may prove necessary for the planned expansion

of the new industries. So may joint investment programmes and more mobility for capital and labour: this in its turn may require harmonising of social services. If there is to be free trade, common action will be needed against monopolies and cartels. And if big new expenditures are required, one obvious way of economising public funds will be to impose a sensible division of labour between community countries in producing their military equipment.

Even if de Gaulle continues to bar Britain from Brussels, a new government is likely to find other ways of applying community practices with other like-minded Continental countries. Certain types of planning may require democratic socialism in "more than one country."

BASICALLY, for socialists on both sides of the Channel, the most troublesome problem will be: "Who manages the managers?" As Labour takes over the commanding heights of British economy and as new responsibilities are transferred from national to wider European authorities, the imperative and undodgeable question will be how to ensure democratic control over the ever more powerful and more numerous bureaucracies.

In this respect the Communists have demon-

strably failed and there is obviously no quick and easy solution. Western socialism will only preserve its inherent superiority over the régimes practised in the "Popular Democracies" if its protagonists collaborate unremittingly in solving the biggest of all their problems—how to reconcile welfare and freedom.

But in trying to create a new community, freed from the bondages of national frontiers, passports, and customs inspectors, we surely need not venture into the military field or try to create a United States of Europe aiming to be "the equivalent of America."

Let us be modest. This beloved Europe of ours, with its splendid cultural and scientific heritage and abnormally dynamic and inventive genius, has a discreditable international record for dragging the rest of the world into war. We have plenty to do to create a better and less menacing society. European unity is essential for the purpose of creating a Europe fit for Europeans to live in—and for non-Europeans to live with. But as far as nuclear matters are concerned, now that, since Cuba, the Americans and Russians have looked down the barrels of each others' guns and recoiled, perhaps the best Europeans can do is to remember that: "They also serve who only stand and wait."



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BOOKS & WRITERS

Lest We Forget

“*Oh What an Unlovely War . . .*” — By MICHAEL HOWARD

ON AUGUST 4TH next we shall be commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the British Empire's entry into the First World War. Publishers and editors are presumably laying their plans for an appropriate celebration, but the public is likely to approach the occasion with a jaded appetite. There is a limit to the amount it can take, and it has taken a lot already. There is also a limit to the number of books which can be put together by scissors-and-paste compilation from secondary sources; and so far as the Western Front is concerned this must have very nearly been reached. But if no enterprising publisher has yet commissioned a book on the Mesopotamian campaign it is high time that one did. Justice has never been done in this country to the Italian front, where two years of savage fighting preceded the collapse at Caporetto which is the only battle in that campaign of which most Englishmen have heard. There is a wonderful book to be written about Salonica, that tragical-comical-politico-military farce. There are the huge battles which swirled round the northern and eastern frontiers of Austria-Hungary. There are in fact still a number of glittering prizes to be won by young writers with high hearts and sharp pens and a willingness to master one or two of the major European languages. Our best hope is that during the next few years publishers and authors will adopt an Eastern strategy; not go on pounding France and Flanders into shapeless mud.

AFTER THAT it will be up to the scholars working through the archives, publishing meticulous monographs supplementing and correcting the official histories, establishing a firm record which will be the basis on which historians of future generations will base their studies. The archives are not likely to reveal anything new; as Mr. A. J. P. Taylor is fond of remarking,

they contain few if any secrets.¹ But they will enable us to answer questions which the official historians have passed over as unimportant, or irrelevant to their own work; to tackle the mountain peak by climbing unfamiliar faces instead of trudging up the tourist route; and thereby learning more, not only about the mountain, but about the entire landscape in which it stands. It is for work of this kind that the academics should be preparing themselves, and American and German scholars are already showing us the way. Meanwhile, the tourist route is not to be scorned. The achievement of the men who first climbed it—Captain Liddell Hart in 1930, C. R. M. F. Cruttwell in 1934—was magnificent. And Mr. Taylor's new book² shows that even on this well-trodden ground a real professional still can achieve a *tour de force*.

We know now what to expect from Mr. Taylor, and it is all here. Wide reading in many languages; a knowledge of recondite sources betrayed only in a word or the shaping of a phrase; brilliant lucidity of exposition; the priceless capacity to reduce, in a few sentences, a morass of apparently irrelevant or irreconcilable material to order; and with it all, the self-destructive itch to wreck his reputation, to keep himself out of the fell grasp of the Establishment, by the regular enunciation of petulant and silly *bêtises*. This book has its full share of these last. Smuts was “the great operator of fraudulent idealism.” Haig “preferred an unsuccessful offensive under his own command to a successful one elsewhere under someone else's.” “In the last resort, the United States went to war so that America could remain prosperous and rich Americans could grow richer.” In particular, the captions to the excellent photographs are largely written in this vein. The maddening thing about these pronouncements is not that they are untrue: it is that they are so obviously made in order to annoy people. Annoying people is often a good way of teaching them—often the only way. But in an otherwise serious and sensible study, this kind of

¹ *Keeping It Dark*, ENCOUNTER, August, 1959.

² *The First World War: an Illustrated History*. By A. J. P. TAYLOR (Hamish Hamilton, 35s.).