

THIS BRINGS ME back at the end to considering again Eliot's idea that the progress of an artist is "continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality," with its rider that "to escape from these things" one must "have personality and emotions." On one level all he is doing here is oppose the kind of self-expression found in the poetry of Rupert Brooke, and upon which Owen's poetry is dependent, with the truism that the artist has to draw upon techniques and traditions which are objective and greater than himself, to surrender himself to the past. But there is also a hint of something else: that the artist has to fight against attitudes in his personality which distort his vision, with hatred, with unhappiness even. These attitudes of intense personal feeling we find in writers who agreed with Eliot's kind of classicism: in Ezra Pound and Wyndham Lewis, for instance. The problem of objectivisation now becomes more complex and difficult. A programme of extinguishing the personality seems inadequate. For to achieve the kind of objectivity where the writer's view is not distorted by his personal emotions of

suffering, rejection, and so on, means that he must develop as it were a personality beyond even the impersonality. And here by tracing the progression of the sensibility which calls itself "I" in Eliot's poetry one is able to follow the development from the projected *persona*—the mask of Prufrock and the other "I" characters in the early poetry—to the "Issues from the hand of God, the simple soul," "I" thrown back upon itself, seeking redemption, of the Ariel poems and of *Ash Wednesday*; to the impersonal representative wartime air-raid warden and church-warden "I" of the *Four Quartets*; and finally to the Oedipus-at-Colonus "I" in whom there is a hint of the reconciliation of body and soul, of the marriage of heaven and hell in a person beyond both personality and impersonality.

In Eliot's personal life, one can rejoice that during the last ten years, the synthesis was achieved, the reconciliation was complete. This fulfilment was hinted at but not realised in his poetry. Somehow, one knew all along that it could not be, that he would hymn no Yeatsian triumph of old age.

### Some Place

I resolved it, I  
found in my life a  
centre and secured it.

It is the house,  
trees beyond, a term  
of view encasing it.

The weather  
reaches only as some  
wind, a little

deadened sighing. And  
if the life weren't?  
when was something to

happen, had I secured  
that—had I, *had*  
I, insistent.

There is nothing I am,  
nothing not. A place  
between, I am. I am

more than thought, less  
than thought. A house  
with winds, but a distance

—something loose in the wind,  
feeling weather as that life,  
walks toward the lights he left.

*Robert Creeley*

Z. K. Brzezinski

# Peaceful Engagement

## *A Plan For Europe's Future*

THE COLD WAR in Europe has lost its old meaning. It had vitality and passion as long as either side had reason to believe that it could prevail and felt genuinely threatened by the other. Neither condition truly exists today. The West feels that it cannot remove the Communist régimes in East Europe, re-unify Germany, or, most important of all, eliminate the Soviet presence on the banks of the Elbe by direct political action. The Communists, and particularly the Soviet leaders, now privately discount the likelihood of Communist revolutions in the West. The two Soviet rebuffs suffered in Berlin—in 1948–49 and again in 1958–62—have had much the same effect on Communist expectations as the passivity of the West during the East German uprising of 1953 and during the Hungarian revolution of 1956 had on Western hopes.

Yet the *status quo* in Europe is far from satisfactory. The division of Europe on the Elbe

is unnatural, unhistorical, and contrary to present trends favouring not only European economic and then political unification, but also the rapidly spreading psychological sense of European unity. Hardly anyone in Europe, on either side of the river Elbe, is willing to argue that the division is in the interest of Europeans, and this includes even the Russians. It certainly is not in the interest of peace.

Yet policies derived from past illusions, fears, and aspirations freeze both sides on the dividing line. Meanwhile, the danger mounts that the East, frustrated ideologically, torn by internal divisions, will turn against itself, with the possibility of bitter political explosions. The West at the same time becomes increasingly divided. Its former unity of purpose, born largely out of fear of Russian aggression, is dissipated in a destructive feud over priorities, objectives, and interests. Western spasms of resolve reinforce Soviet insecurity while Western irresolution reawakens Soviet offensive hopes. Both postures serve to perpetuate artificially and pointlessly the European partition.

THE READER of the two comprehensive articles by Richard Lowenthal on "Has the Revolution a Future?" (ENCOUNTER, January and February) could scarcely help putting a question—in view of these radical changes in the present political situation what, then, can and must be done? With this new study of the tragic East-West partition, we offer for discussion a bold and dramatic plan for the future of Europe. Professor Brzezinski, a well-known member of Columbia University, has been travelling extensively in Eastern and Western Europe. His most recent books are *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Pall Mall, London), and *Political Power: USA/USSR* (Chatto & Windus and Viking); his article on "How to Control a Deviation" appeared in the September 1963 ENCOUNTER.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE is still wedded to the expectation that West Europe will fragment, and accordingly Soviet policy in Europe still makes the achievement of that fragmentation its principal objective. German policy, influenced by narrow national perspectives, remains committed to the pursuit of basically contradictory goals, "reunification" and (formally, at least) frontier revision, with the latter having the effect of stimulating Polish and Czech support for the division of Germany. The French envisage a "Europe to the Urals," but by seeking simultaneously to exclude America from Europe,