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# EAST & WEST

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## *Culture & the Détente*

# Shadows over Helsinki

By Leopold Labedz

CHANGES IN THE WORLD BALANCE since the end of the War cannot but affect fundamentally both the future shape of international relations and the prospects for Europe. The achievement of nuclear parity between the USA and the USSR, international recognition of the two German states, the end of American military involvement in Viet Nam, the rise of China and Japan, the emergence and enlargement of the community of West European nations—these are the main elements which form the background to the current preparations for a Conference on European Security and Co-operation (CESC). One issue in the negotiations perhaps transcends in historical importance the immediate balance-of-power considerations. The question of the “freer movement of people and information”, which is being discussed at the preparatory talks in Helsinki, goes to the roots of the problem of Europe’s historical identity and indeed of the Western cultural tradition.

The prospect of a *détente* in Europe raises different hopes and fears in the East and in the West. The very existence of negotiations on an overall European basis would seem to imply the recognition of the historical unity of Europe, but the contrasting interpretations of the issues under discussion—particularly in the question of “cultural contacts”—only emphasise the continent’s continuing division. This division is based on political systems whose chief characteristics still remain essentially unchanged. Would *détente* between East and West offer hope or bring des-

pair? Would it be a step towards an evolution of a new Europe in line with its own cultural tradition, or contribute to the demise of this tradition?

The resolution of conflicts in Europe in the past provides no parallels to the present situation. First of all, Europe is no longer an autonomous factor in world politics; its destinies depend on outside forces. Europe’s decline after World War I was politically sealed by the East-West division after World War II. Since then, there has been a slow movement towards integration in Western Europe, and there have been many manifestations of the conflict between new political régimes and old cultural traditions in Eastern Europe. In this process common European cultural standards were subject to a gradual erosion. In 18th-century Europe, as Gibbon pointed out, conflicts were restrained by the fact that it was still regarded as one “great republic” with a “common system of arts, law and manners.” This is obviously no longer the case. On the other hand ideological conflicts can no longer be assuaged by such a formula as *cuius regio eius religio* because, even if it were acceptable, it would not be workable in the age of mass cross-frontier communication. Hence the historical importance for Europe in general (and for Western Europe in particular) not only of considerations of strategic security, but also of questions concerned with “the flow of ideas and information.” The idea of freedom of thought and expression has been the cornerstone of the European cultural tradition at least since the Renaissance, if not since Hellenic times. Surely, if this tradition is to be preserved it must remain the cornerstone.

WHAT RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES present themselves in the current talks and how do they bear on this issue? The negotiations in Helsinki and the intensified campaign for ideological purity in the Soviet bloc indicate that its leaders are more anxious to reinforce the present ideological divisions than to facilitate any real lowering of political and cultural barriers in Europe. As the London *Economist* (17 February) put it, although

the Russians have shown so much enthusiasm for the Conference on European Security and Co-operation, they have also shown great reluctance to agree to anything that would actually help Europeans to feel secure or to co-operate at all closely.

The Soviet Ambassador, Viktor Maltsev, explained in Helsinki that in the proposed greater exchange of ideas “there can be no room for the dissemination of anti-culture—pornography, racism, fascism, the cult of violence, hostility among peoples and false slanderous propaganda.” This is a formula which can easily be made to exclude any and all ideas to be “exchanged.” Yuri Zhukov, the official Soviet commentator, pro-

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vided earlier (in *Pravda*, 12 January) an authoritative explanation of what Mr Brezhnev meant when he said (speech of 21 December 1972) that the acceptance of a wider exchange of ideas, information, and personal contacts in Europe must be limited by "the sovereignty, laws and customs" of each country. In Zhukov's blunter formulation, the socialist countries are not going to open their doors to "bourgeois ideological invasion", because such "ideological disarmament" would lead to the re-establishment of bourgeois society. Later on, *Pravda* added that "such impudent claims will meet a firm rebuff." Similar positions were taken by other Warsaw Pact countries, though some were more emphatic than others. But even the less emphatic were quite explicit about their basic interpretation of the idea of expanding cultural contacts. What this amounted to was that while they accept it in theory they will not accept it in practice. As Jan Szydlak, a member of the Polish Politbureau, said (*Trybuna Ludu*, 23 January):

"We are for wide cultural cooperation, for greater mutual information. We are ready for ideological confrontation . . . [but] we are for the complete supremacy of the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, for the complete supremacy of socialist ideology in our society."

"Complete" here surely means total, exclusive, unchallenged.

While Western proposals for the freer flow of ideas were rejected, Mr Brezhnev reiterated that "Peaceful Co-existence", *détente*, and "ideas of peace and good-neighbourly relations" should be promoted. Still the class struggle between the two systems in the spheres of economics, politics, "and, naturally, ideology" would continue, since they were "opposed and irreconcilable." Thus, the "free flow of ideas" is presented as an attempt to act "from Cold War positions", while the "ideological struggle" is endorsed. To point out that such an arrangement would constitute a one-way traffic is, needless to say, to risk being castigated as an opponent of *détente*.

<sup>1</sup> Compare this with the reflections about "mutual incomprehension" by Norman Davies in *The Times* (21 March):

"Citizens of the Western democracies . . . harbour memories of ancient tyrannies, and are now bound by the modern obsession of avoiding new ones. We ramble round our sunlit uplands without any clear idea of why we do it or where we are going. Our typical weakness is *claustrophobia*. Where others might feel sheltered and secure, we feel oppressed and insecure: we would fight as desperately to pull down the walls as others would fight to put them up."

Mr Leonid Zamyatin noticed with satisfaction (in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*) Mr Davies's references to the "rudeness" of the British press in its use of "loaded" language about Soviet affairs. Inexplicably, Solzhenitsyn uses it too.

UNOFFICIAL VOICES in the Soviet Union coincide with a Western stand on the issue. For instance, Academician Andrei Sakharov wrote in his *Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom* (1964) that "intellectual freedom is essential to human society—freedom to obtain and distribute information, freedom for open-minded and unfearing debate and freedom from oppression by officialdom and prejudices." Solzhenitsyn, in his Nobel Prize lecture, declared even more emphatically:

"This information blockage between the different parts of our planet is a deadly peril. Modern science is aware that information blockage leads to entropy and total collapse. Information blockage makes a mockery of international agreements and treaties; within the jammed zone it is no problem at all to reinterpret a treaty, and even simpler to suppress it as if it had never been (something that Orwell understood very well). Within the jammed zone live not so much earth-dwellers as an expeditionary force from Mars: they haven't a clue about how the rest of the earth lives and are perfectly ready to trample it underfoot in the sacred certainty that they are 'liberating' it."<sup>1</sup>

What of the rhetoric of the official view? In a recent interview published in the Warsaw weekly *Kultura* (4 February), the Soviet Minister of Culture, Ekaterina Furtseva, commented on "the problem of a wider and closer cultural co-operation between countries with different political systems" as follows:

"We want the world to learn about us and we want to learn about the world. Cultural ties serve this purpose best, because culture, art and literature present the shortest way to human hearts."

These lofty sentiments were expressed after a severe crackdown on Soviet intellectual dissenters. As Academician Sakharov noted (in a conversation with the *Newsweek* correspondent, Jay Axelbank), since President Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972 there has been a renewed drive by the authorities against intellectual and civil liberties. Since that time, he said, the Soviet authorities felt that "because of the *détente* they can now disregard Western public opinion." Press and mail censorship has been tightened, library privileges are harder to obtain. A wave of arrests among the members of nonconformist circles began in December 1971 with an attempt by the KGB to liquidate the *samizdat* journal, *Chronicle of Current Events*. Some dissenters, like Pyotr Yakir, were broken in prison. Some, like the mathematician Plyushch, were sent to "mental hospitals", suffering from "reformist mania." Some, like Vladimir Bukovsky, received a heavy prison sentence. Some, like the banned poet Yuri Galanskov, died in concentration camp because of the inhuman treatment of their illness in detention. Still others like the physicist Valery

Chalidze and the poet Yosif Brodsky were edged out of their native land, a relatively humanitarian form of punishment. The Ukrainian intellectuals suffered another wave of persecution: more than a hundred of them have been arrested since 1972, among them intellectuals active in Ukrainian *samizdat*, like Dzyuba and Chornovil, who were sentenced to ten and twelve years' deprivation of liberty respectively. Prospective Jewish emigrants to Israel were asked to pay a special new tax which rose according to the degree of their education.<sup>2</sup> The drive against the dissenters intensified still further after the appearance of No. 27 of *Chronicle of Current Events*, the publication of which the KGB assiduously tried to prevent. One member

<sup>2</sup> This has in many cases prevented their departure for Israel because of their inability to pay it, but it did not prevent them losing their jobs, in spite of the fact that the loss of their skill to the state was the ostensible reason for the introduction of the ransom-tax in the first place. It was only Senator Henry Jackson's amendment, threatening to deprive the USSR of the benefits of the proposed introduction of a "most favoured nation" clause in its trade with the US, which induced the Soviet authorities to make a gesture of suspending the operation of the "education tax" for the moment. However, several letters signed by prominent Soviet Jews promptly warned that it may be only a temporary measure to be dropped when the threat in the US legislature is over.

<sup>3</sup> An interview with Ludvik Vaculik was published in *Die Zeit* (12 January). Although carefully formulated, some of his replies were quite explicit:

"In our country also, legality, in a strictly juridical sense, is not a meaningless concept which cannot be defined. Yet to rely on it is not sufficient to dispel our fears. One can rely, of course, on legality, but it reminds me of the old story about a lady who went to the doctor and asked him for an absolutely reliable method of birth control. 'Drink a glass of cold water,' the doctor said. 'Fine,' the lady replied, 'when should I drink it, before or after?' 'Instead,' the doctor said. This is how I see my own situation. The law gives me the right to my own convictions, but in the actual situation I do not see the time and space or even limited opportunity to express such convictions. . . . Everything occurs on the basis of orders from above and of secret instructions. A man does not know what it is that ties him in knots, nor where he can go to defend himself. Preferably he should take a stick and somehow force a way. But where to? To prison or to a mental hospital, because such action would be contrary to law. . . ."

<sup>4</sup> On 1 March a new governmental decree stipulated that 40% of foreign royalties of Czechoslovak authors should be given to the so-called "Cultural Fund" (on top of the percentage taken by the official literary agency *Dilia*, which handles all foreign contracts, royalties, taxes, etc.). What is left over will now be remitted in Czech currency. For the writers who behave well the Ministry of Culture can waive these conditions, which as *Le Monde* (5 April) observed:

"will serve as an additional instrument of pressure on the writers who at present cannot publish in Czechoslovakia and are deprived of other normal means of earning their living."

of the Human Rights Committee, Mr Grigory Podyapolsky, a Moscow geophysicist, has been threatened with "psychiatric treatment" and another, Academician Sakharov—the father of the Soviet H-bomb—until now immune, has been summoned by the KGB for "interview." The renewed drive against freedom of thought went with the continuation of the policy of *détente* and with a new Potemkin "constitutionalism."

In the speech I have referred to (made on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union) Mr Brezhnev not only indicated his interpretation of *détente*, but he also announced that the Soviet Union was to have a new Constitution. Like that of its predecessor, the 1936 Constitution, this announcement comes at a time when there is greater internal oppression and simultaneously a soft line *vis-à-vis* Western countries. But of course "the situation is different." There is no Stalin; instead of the Great Purge, there is only the scrutiny of Party membership through the process of the renewal of Party cards; and it is China, not Nazi Germany, that the Soviet Union is worried about.

Other Soviet-bloc countries present the same contrast. There is at once an internal tightening of the screws and an external posture favouring a *détente à la Brezhnev*, i.e. taking note of his dictum that the new ideological struggle would "intensify to become an even sharper form of confrontation between the two societies." Yet they fear the internal effects of a *détente* in different degrees. Although they followed the same pattern, there was a notable difference in the sharpness of its application.

IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA there was a virtual pogrom of intellectuals, an attack on present-day Czechoslovak culture in the name of "normalisation." According to official information, during 1970 in Prague alone some 40,000 people lost their jobs for "political reasons." Academics, writers, journalists have had to earn their living as manual workers, hall porters or taxi-drivers. Children of "right-wing opportunists" are not allowed to complete their education at university or even at secondary school. (This happened to the son of Ludvik Vaculik,<sup>3</sup> author of the celebrated "2,000 Words" manifesto.) The Czech Writers' Union was dissolved and most of its 600 members had to find what badly-paid jobs they could. Writers with well-known by-lines are not allowed to publish at all, and 40 of them had their books withdrawn from all public libraries.<sup>4</sup> A similar situation exists in other sectors of Czechoslovak cultural life. More recently the Czech Minister of Culture, Miloslav Bruzek—

who two years ago declared that "writers and other intellectuals must first be starved in order to make them sing a different song"—has now criticised what he calls "subjectivism" and "dirigisme" in culture and declared that the process of "normalisation" had been concluded (*Mlada Fronta*, 3 January 1973). Both he and his Slovak counterpart, Miroslav Valek, hinted at a more conciliatory approach towards intellectuals in future. What it really presages is difficult to say, considering that Czechoslovakia is planning to establish "Houses of Political Education" throughout the country by 1975. A symbolic indication of what it may consist of was the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the death of the Stalinist President of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald. Unlike Stalin, whose rehabilitation in the Soviet Union proceeded by stealth, Gottwald was openly honoured on 14 March in all the Czechoslovak papers without any critical qualifications, despite the fact that he was responsible for the political arrests and trials in the 1950s (of which Husak was one of the victims).<sup>5</sup>

It is, then, a curious situation: while some of the pro-Western writers are still in prison, courting the West has become the official political line. The cultural scene is "normalised" only in the sense that not a single work of any artistic significance has been published since 1969; censorship is now even more stringent than under the notorious pre-1968 President, Novotny. A petition at the end of 1972 to President Svoboda signed by the most prominent writers, asking him to grant amnesty to Czech and Slovak intellectuals who had been sentenced to prison in political trials, has not been heeded; but the signatories were subjected to pressure to withdraw their signatures. In their various speeches, neither Party Secretary Husak, nor Prime Minister Strougal, nor the Ministers of Culture Bruzek and Valek, considered it appropriate to quote Brezhnev's words in support of the exchange of ideas and cultural contacts provided that "the sovereignty, laws and customs" of each country are

fully respected. Brezhnev himself made a reference to this question in his speech in Prague to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Communist accession to power. He said that the crocodile tears being shed in the West over the alleged decline of Czech culture and arts were no more than a recognition that it was no longer possible to poison the minds of the Czech people with decadent bourgeois culture and anti-socialist works. He then added that it was necessary "to drive the Cold War spirit from the continent forever . . ." a remark soon to be matched by Mr Harold Wilson, who declared on his visit to Czechoslovakia that "whatever happened in 1968 is now past and over."

IN EAST GERMANY, the *détente* was tested earlier than elsewhere as a result of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*. To counteract what the GDR feared would be the disruptive potential of extensive contacts with the Federal Republic, it has developed a policy known as the *Abgrenzungspolitik* (policy of demarcation). This is designed to prevent any undesirable effects of *détente* inside the GDR by maintaining its cultural isolation from the West. The early hopes underlying the *Ostpolitik* were that political concessions would lead to international recognition of the GDR, and that this would produce a cultural *quid pro quo*. These hopes have, so far, been disappointed. Would-be refugees are still fired on at the Berlin Wall, and new "automatic shooting devices" have been installed at the frontier dividing East from West Germany. A number of strict controls have been established to prevent contacts between East Germans and the West German citizens and West Berliners visiting the GDR, or to make them as infrequent as possible. The first act of the GDR following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Great Britain was a demand to discontinue BBC broadcasts to East Germany. While there are some Western student exchanges with other Soviet-bloc countries (between 1973 and 1975 some 2,400 exchange students are to visit the Soviet Union), no such exchange programmes exist at all in East Germany and the *Abgrenzungspolitik* may prevent this even when the GDR achieves general recognition.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of West German *Ostpolitik*, East Germany has new specific agreements about "cultural contacts." It provides a disheartening portent for such agreements. The "concessions" to which it at first reluctantly agreed were very limited, and are now restricted even further in the implementation of these agreements. Apparently, about 5,000 East Germans now go over to West Germany every month under the special arrangements for those with urgent family

<sup>5</sup> This was acknowledged in the Piller Report prepared during the Prague Spring; it was later published abroad. Piller is now one of the leaders of the present régime.

<sup>6</sup> In contrast to the West Germans, the East Germans stress that there is no "unified German nation", but that "the socialist nation in the GDR stands in unbridgeable contradiction to the old capitalist nation which continues to exist in the FRG" (Kurt Hager in *Neues Deutschland*, 16 March), that "the historical tendency of *Abgrenzung* has emerged between the socialist nation in the GDR and the capitalist nation in the FRG (Albert Norden in *Neues Deutschland*, 20 March). How can the "freer flow of ideas and people" be reconciled with the restrictiveness of *Abgrenzungspolitik*?



reasons. But only the closest relatives can go. "A man can visit his dying father but he may not take his wife with him." Permission is refused on various pretexts: on the grounds that it is impossible to check the validity of "urgent family reasons", for people under 26 because they have not yet "repaid" in work for their state education, and by classifying others as possessors of secret information, a category which can include people who were once NCOs in the army or managers in a factory. As Jonathan Steele reported in *The Guardian* (9 March 1973):

"There seems to be no hurry to give visas to intellectuals (regardless of whether they are party members) who are invited to visit the West to lecture, see their plays performed, or go to previews of their exhibitions. As for general tourism to the West, even on the lines of the limited possibilities open to Poles or Hungarians, the door is still firmly closed."

As *Der Spiegel* reported, the release of prisoners to the West has been stopped and among those who did come the majority were convicted criminals and not "mainly politicals", contrary to the Bahr-Kohl agreement. (Egon Bahr himself pointed this out in an interview published in *Der Stern*.) New regulations for Western correspondents are no less at odds with the hoped-for relaxation. They were introduced on 6 March 1973, and are much stiffer than the previous ones; they include a proviso that correspondents must not "slander the German Democratic Republic" and that they will be responsible for any hostile comment published by their paper or broadcast by their radio or television station. They must also ask for permission to travel outside East Berlin and to conduct interviews. East German correspondents in West Germany are not subject to restrictions.

IN BULGARIA, the most loyal, if not perhaps the most orthodox communist country, the Second Congress of Culture (held in December 1972) adopted a new policy aimed at more efficient control of artistic activities. The chairman, Pavel Matev, declared that the ideological struggle must be directed against "political apathy and manifestations of admiration for everything that is of foreign [i.e. Western] origin." A new "resolute, systematic, irreconcilable offensive" against cultural dissidents was advocated. A somewhat ineffective, though orthodox secretary of the Bulgarian Writers' Union, Nikolay Zidarov, was replaced in February 1973 by a literary colonel from the Political Administration of the Bulgarian army, Ivan Arzhentinski. There were other signs that writers and intellectuals should not be over-optimistic about the *détente*. G. Bokov, the editor

of the official Party paper, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, wrote an article entitled "Exchange of Ideas or Legalisation of Provocation?" in which he asserted that the West's raising of the subject was an attempt "to turn the clock back to the time of the Cold War" and "to secure the right and possibility of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states."

POLAND has had a rather special role in the promotion of a "European Security Conference", ever since the then Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, proposed it in December 1964. However, if there were different nuances in the Polish as compared to the Soviet approach, they were more easily detectable in the earlier period than at present. The new Party First Secretary, Edward Gierek (who replaced Gomulka after the December 1970 riots), continued to repeat the Soviet formula on *détente*. In December 1971 he said at the Sixth Congress of the Polish Communist Party:

"The ideological struggle has in our time become the main arena of the class struggle between the socialist and the capitalist systems. . . . It is a struggle fought over the views and attitudes of people. In this struggle there never was, is, or will be any armistice. . . . Peaceful coexistence is one form of the ideological struggle and of the many-sided confrontation of socialism with imperialism on a world scale."

More recently, at the Seventh Plenum of the Party in November 1972, Gierek again stressed this point (*Trybuna Ludu*, 29 November 1972):

"Peaceful coexistence signifies a deeper, wider, and in many respects sharper ideological confrontation."

This single-minded refrain was reiterated again and again in the official press attacks on Western suggestions for a "free flow of ideas." In his article "An Unacceptable Flow" (*Sztandar Młodych*, 5 February 1973), Daniel Wasilewski explained that "the Western proposal about the 'free flow of ideas' is not acceptable to us because it implies complete freedom for the dissemination of every bourgeois idea. . . . It would amount to the abandonment of sovereignty by the [communist] state and the international legalisation of the psychological war conducted by the capitalist states."

An "ideological functionary", Jozef Sokol, wrote in the Army journal *Wojsko Ludowe* (5 May 1972) about the psychological difficulties which could result from a *détente*:

"The climate of international relations necessary for our offensive in favour of a *détente* may generate trends towards demobilisation inside the country (particularly in the ideological sphere); it may contribute to the emergence of illusions about the possibility of permanent and all-embracing agree-

ments between the two systems, about the disappearance of 'political and social differences' between them. It may make for a 'softening' of attitudes, a weakening of social vigilance *vis-à-vis* imperialism, etc. We must reckon with the possibility that this may be accompanied by a temptation to transfer the tactics of compromise to the ideological sphere. We must also reckon with the psychological pressure on certain circles in our country which have ample opportunity to shape public opinion, pressure which will be intensified by the Western apparatus of ideological diversion."

Another propagandist, Ignacy Krasicki, wrote about "those who noisily and persistently clamour for the 'free flow of ideas'", and added (*Zycie Literackie*, 18 February 1973):

"The real problem is not whose cultural and ideological values are more attractive, but what political instruments are used to promote this slogan."

The conclusion is as simple as it is obvious. To prevent "the negative influence of bourgeois ideology under the pretext of the free flow of ideas and information", it is necessary to arrive at international agreements which will stop Western radio broadcasts to "socialist countries" and to reach similar agreements about television broadcasts when transmission becomes technically possible. In short, the "flow" should not be free to flow. At least in one direction.

The number of articles on this subject in the Polish press was far greater than in any other East European country and they all reiterated the same point: yes, we are for the free flow of ideas, provided that we can decide which ideas are to be permitted to flow. Marian Dobrosielski, the ex-ambassador in London, who became notorious in March 1968 for his role in suppressing the student movement for greater freedom, wrote exactly five years later in the official *Trybuna Ludu* (19 March 1973):

"We are quite open to such exchange of information, ideas and cultural cooperation as will serve the most profound humanist values, the cause of human dignity, freedom of thought, mutual enrichment of national cultures, mutual confidence, peace and creative competition. But we are not open to receive such 'ideas, information and people' as propagate violence and hatred, racism and chauvinism, hostility between nations, militarism and fascism, as will interfere in the internal affairs of other states through perfidious misinformation, and through psychological war based on half-truths and falsifications, on slanders and sabotage."

The same hypocrisy characterised the interventions of the Polish representative in Helsinki, Ambassador Adam Willmann. When the Dutch Ambassador in Helsinki, Walck Lucassen, criticised his double-talk, Willmann said (on 8 February 1973) he was disappointed that he had been understood to be calling for restrictive policies, but he repeated the main point:

"Poland would like to see the widest possible opportunity for the individual, in conditions of security. This means the enrichment of the individual while protecting him from bad ideas."

Internally, the cultural policy in Poland reflects the same attitude. There was some tightening of controls, but less than elsewhere (except Hungary). Permission to travel to the West is still granted relatively easily (with some individual exceptions), and the internal cultural scene still displays more loopholes in the implementation of the increasingly rigid policy than other East European countries (again with the exception of Hungary). However, the secretary of the Central Committee, Jerzy Lukaszewicz, warned that in future "only people who are close to the Party" would be employed in the press, radio and television (*Nowe Drogi*, April 1973).

FOR RUMANIA, *détente* provided another occasion to manifest its independent foreign policy line. Both before and during the preliminary talks in Helsinki, it stressed the "equality" and "sovereignty" of states. In his speech of 20 November 1972, Nicolae Ceausescu said that "the participants in the preparatory talks and in the European Conference will represent national, independent and sovereign states" whose relations must be based on "non-interference in each other's domestic affairs." The Rumanian delegates at Helsinki, Mircea Balanescu and Valentin Lipatti, stressed these points emphatically, and wanted the rules of procedure at the Conference to be based on these principles "regardless of military alliances."

However, on the question of "cultural contacts", Ceausescu has been obfuscating the issues. In an interview given to *Le Figaro* (11 October 1972) he said that the question "presupposes the free circulation of ideas and information, but also a common standpoint against certain negative phenomena in the education of people." What such "negative phenomena" are could be divined from the reference in the official Rumanian News Agency journal *Romania* (31 October 1972) to the necessity for an understanding about "the elimination of propaganda favouring racialism and anti-communist ideologies." It could be seen even more clearly in the cultural policy actually pursued in Rumania in the last year or so, a policy launched by Ceausescu in his speech of 6 July 1971, aimed at restricting artistic freedom by reintroducing the notion of socialist realism. Ceausescu said that "art must serve a single aim—socialist, communist education" and added:

"We must put an end to liberal, petty-bourgeois and anarchist concepts."

In the ideological campaign that followed (which was unofficially called Rumania's "mini-cultural revolution") there was a vigorous attempt to reimpose rigid cultural standards. Orthodox writers like Mihai Beniuc or Georgy Kovacs again called for "a militant Party-inspired literature." When the campaign encountered resistance on the part of other artists and writers, Ceausescu defended it again at the November 1971 Party plenum. He insisted on its full implementation in order to protect the Rumanian people from ideological and cultural "pollution" from "countries with a different social order." He argued at one and the same time that there would be no "return to the past", and that "we must not be afraid of talking about socialist realism." However, this label has too many Soviet connotations (not to mention its evocation of yesterday); therefore the idea of Party-guided art and literature and of "realism" as a description not of what is but of what ought to be is now referred to in Rumania as "*ideological realism*."

Ceausescu's recommendation that films, plays and books should be subject to careful scrutiny by "the Party and State" has been the main theme of the ideological campaign he launched in July 1971. The shift in Rumanian cultural policy which it marked can be seen from the fact that only a few months earlier he was advocating a quite different line. At the Ninth Congress of the Union of Communist Youth he said:

"We should never fear that an open, free confrontation of our dialectical materialist views with idealistic ones could be harmful to the upbringing of youth; on the contrary, we shall let the ideas of communism triumph in this free confrontation. . . ."  
(*Scanteia*, 19 February 1971)

And a month later he was still saying:

"In our opinion, we should have no fear that the expansion of international relations will involve the danger of the capitalist world exercising an adverse influence upon the nations which have set out along the path of building a new social order. There is an old Rumanian saying: 'He who is frightened by the wolf will also be afraid of the hare.' We have lived in the mountains for a long time and are familiar with wolves. We are not frightened of them, and even less so of hares. We are not afraid of pursuing widespread activities in the field of international cooperation."  
(*Scanteia*, 24 March 1971)

Ceausescu soon changed this position. By the time the preliminary talks in Helsinki were taking place, he was still maintaining his independent foreign policy posture but his internal cultural policy had become as harsh as the Soviet one. His own personality cult now almost rivals that of Stalin.

<sup>7</sup> See Paul Lendvai, "Yugoslavia in Crisis", *ENCOUNTER*, August 1972.

YUGOSLAVIA also took an independent foreign policy line at Helsinki, and this too coincided with a tightening of its internal cultural policy. It expressed its support for the CESC in the joint Soviet-Yugoslav communiqué issued at the end of Tito's visit to Moscow in June 1972:

"There are at present all the necessary pre-conditions for immediate preparations, on a multi-lateral basis, for holding in the near future an all-European conference of states on questions of security and cooperation so that these questions may be examined and solved in the interest of all the peoples of Europe."

But there were some differences between Yugoslav and Soviet positions *vis-à-vis* the Conference. The Yugoslavs always stressed that the European states should meet at the Conference not "as members of blocs" but as "independent and equal countries"—a formula similar to the Rumanian one which was forcefully expressed at the Moscow meeting of the Communist parties in January 1970 by the representative of the Yugoslav Party (and a member of its Presidium), Dimce Belovsky. Despite the Soviet-Yugoslav *rapprochement*, it was still the line taken by the Yugoslav delegation at Helsinki, although it was expressed in a less forceful way than the Rumanian. But, in contrast to the Rumanians, the Yugoslavs not only criticised the concept of "limited sovereignty" (i.e. the Brezhnev doctrine), but also Moscow's rather Manichean view of the ideological struggle. Belovsky took a contrary stand to the Soviet one on this subject in an article published in *Borba* (5 January 1973) in which he criticised the "ideological division" in Europe and condemned "ideological exclusiveness."

It was ironical that this external argument was not applied internally. Paradoxically, in Yugoslavia itself 1972 was a year of political and cultural purges, which started in Croatia (with the dismissal of the communist leaders Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar),<sup>7</sup> and which were then extended to other republics. During this purge not only were the more liberal political figures in the Party, Army and state administration dismissed or forced to resign, but many academics, writers, and journalists also lost their jobs. In Croatia, Dr Sime Djodan, Dr Marco Veselica, Mrs Yozo Iveic-Bakulic and Mr Zvonimir Kormarica—the leaders of the now outlawed cultural organisation, "Hrvatska Matica"—were sentenced to between two and seven years in jail. The cultural purge extended to all parts of Yugoslavia and affected *Nin* and *Politika* as well as *Praxis* and *Filozofia*. Not only were Yugoslav publications suppressed and passports withdrawn from Yugoslav citizens, but pressure was put on the universities to employ only such professors as possessed "not only scholarly and peda-

gical qualities, but moral and political qualities as well." Among those arrested, purged, or deprived of passports were Professors Mihajlo Djuric, Vojin Milic, Zaga Pesic-Golubovic, Dragoljub Micunovic, Nebojsa Popov, Miodrag Vulin, Kosta Cavoski; writers—Zlotko Tomicic, Vlado Gotovac; student leaders—Miroslav Mandic, Sandor Roza, Milan Nikolic, Pavlusko Imsirovic, Gelka Kljajic, Drazen Budisa, Ivan Zvomimir Gisak, Goran Djodig, Vlado Mijanovic and many others. The "new wave" in the Yugoslav cinema was also hit. Makavejev and Stojanovic were severely criticised for their famous works "*Mysteries of the Organism*" and "*The Plastic Jesus*" respectively. Makavejev was expelled from the League of Communists and Stojanovic was subjected to legal prosecution. The film director Aleksandar Petrovic has been expelled from the Belgrade Film Academy because he gave top marks to a student whose film was critical of Yugoslavia's social system. Finally, Milovan Djilas has been attacked in the Army journal *Front* (16 March 1973) as "a traitor and enemy of his country." A campaign against "Djilasism" developed in the Yugoslav press after Tito attacked (in the Zagreb *Vjesnik*, 8 October 1972) the decisions of the Sixth Yugoslav Party Congress, held in November 1952, which sealed ideologically the historic break between Yugoslavia and Stalin's Russia. Dr Vladimir Bakaric who, with Tito and Djilas, was one of the architects of the Sixth Congress, said in *Kommunist* (15 March 1973) that Djilas was responsible for the "imprecise formulations" which provided the way for the "incorrect interpretations of the Sixth Congress." Thus Djilas became a scapegoat for Tito's retreat from Titoism.

It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that Yugoslav reports on the Helsinki discussions have all the explicitness of a sphinx or of the Delphic oracle:

"In the area of cultural cooperation and exchange of people and ideas, differences were manifested or revived in their old and one might even say in their classic form. Although these differences reflect certain profound ideological and political contradictions, it is hard to get away from the impression that they are expressed statically and at odds with their increasingly dynamic context in a manner that could retard the positive dynamics in European trends."

(*Review of International Affairs*, 20 Feb. 1973, p. 13)

In the circumstances it is not unamusing to read the lesson given by Yugoslavia to Europe (*Review of International Affairs*, 5 February 1973, pp 5-7):

"Helsinki today is a gateway opening out on a new road. . . . For the first time the problem of European security has been raised as a continental, internal problem of the European nations. . . . It is the first time all European states have had a chance of participating on a footing of equality in the con-

struction of a new European system. . . . The truth is that the inspiration for such radical changes in the European system and in relations between the European nations cannot be found outside the principles of active coexistence and non-alignment. . . . Of all the continents, Europe is numerically the least represented in the non-aligned movement although, objectively speaking, it is searching along [the road leading to] the very principles of non-alignment. . . ."

But if Western Europe was to become non-aligned, could Yugoslavia itself remain non-aligned?

HUNGARY's official line was to support wholeheartedly the Soviet position in Helsinki. It has also warned its own writers and intellectuals not to have any illusions about this. One of the leaders of the Hungarian Party's *agitprop*, T. Palos, expressed the familiar arguments in *Nepszava* (28 January 1973):

"The socialist countries firmly oppose, and will prevent by all means in their power, attempts at ideological undermining made under cover of a 'free flow of people, ideas and information' in an effort to disrupt the unity of the socialist order and socialist collective. For 'free flow' is a fiction, because we live in a world divided into two systems and the irreconcilable differences between the two ideologies will never be 'resolved' through a free flow of ideas."

The Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister, Frigyes Puja, went further and indicated that it is the Western media which should be compelled to take a more positive attitude towards the Communist countries. "The flow of ideas" should be limited to "a truly objective exchange of information. . . . The authorities in Western countries should make every effort to see that their press, papers, periodicals and other communication media provide objective information on life in socialist countries, on world events. This would establish the basis for discussion about a reciprocal flow of information" (*Társadalmi Szemle*, September 1972). The argument is clear. What is really needed is the curtailment of freedom of expression in the West. The press and communication media there should be curbed by the authorities and made to conform to Soviet standards of "objective" information.

But although this was the official attitude, the ideological spokesman of the régime did not infer from it a need for a tightening of internal cultural policy. The deputy editor of the official *Nepszabadsag* P. Renyi, quoted (15 January 1973), the Party's Central Committee resolution which paid homage to the principle, but he stressed nevertheless that it does not have to be interpreted in a die-hard fashion:

"The correct interpretation of the party's policy of alliance at home and peaceful coexistence in international politics is very important in ideological



work and in the sphere of cultural life. In this area the Party takes action against every type of limited, sectarian illiberality. But neither cooperation between states nor political alliances between differing social forces can lead to the erosion of ideological differences or to concessions on matters of principle in the face of anti-Marxist views."

Hungary is the only country in Eastern Europe where *détente* has not led to a more rigid internal cultural policy, despite the lip-service given to the ideological struggle. However, the more die-hard elements in the Party are also pressing for the tightening of ideological controls.

ALBANIA refused to take part in the Helsinki Conference and, like its ally China, condemned it unequivocally. An article from *Czerwony Szandar*, published by some Polish Maoists in Albania (quoted on 23 March by Tirana Radio), gives the flavour of the official attitude:

"The revisionists are particularly concerned about Western pressures for liberalisation in East European countries. . . . They are concerned first and foremost because the abandonment of terror and deception towards their peoples would threaten the revisionists with a loss of power. . . . It is derisible to hear that the Soviet delegation proposed that the [Helsinki] Conference should adopt a declaration on the renunciation of force, or threat of force, on the inviolability of frontiers and on the solution of state conflicts solely by peaceful means. In the light of Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia, it is not necessary to argue about the value of Soviet revisionists' solemn declarations and obligations."

AS MY GENERAL SURVEY indicates, although the internal effects of *détente* are not uniform throughout the Soviet bloc, they are far from producing the expected relaxation necessary for "a freer flow of ideas, of information, and of people." But it is now argued that neither *Ostpolitik* nor *détente* were supposed to produce immediate results (although the Western public was led to believe that there would be improvement rather than deterioration in this respect). The optimistic view is that the positive and beneficial effects will come later. In the long run, the policies adopted (such as endorsement of the legitimacy of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, relaxation of trade and technological barriers, and even the real risks which political concessions entail for the West) would be justified. As Dr Roger Morgan has succinctly put it, "the lesson of the 1960s, now being drawn by the West, is that the best hope of changing the *status quo* lies in accepting it."

Optimism can be the basis of political dynamism or of wishful thinking, just as pessimism can lead either to realism or to despair. From an analytical viewpoint they are both irrelevant. What is important are the actual policies applied to the present situation which the West has

adopted, for better or for worse, and which may turn out to be either relatively successful or absolutely catastrophic. But, as the optimists hope and the pessimists fear, their results will only be apparent "in the long run." It would seem logical, therefore, considering the historical nature of the challenge, to approach the problems which form the subject of *détente* negotiations by adopting a long-term perspective, however difficult it may be for the usually short-sighted pragmatism of Western foreign policy. The West both lacks cohesion and fears the loss of military security, particularly in Europe. The Soviet Union, while increasing its military might, remains in many ways politically vulnerable. But the historical prospects of the challenges present in the East-West negotiations in Helsinki (and elsewhere) are not limited to the question of the immediate military and political equilibrium. Whatever the formula arrived at on the basis of these undoubtedly important considerations, it is the factors pertaining to the question of legitimacy which are decisive in the long run; and in this respect the West simply cannot afford to give up its assets. Just as the Communist countries are afraid of the political consequences of cultural relaxation, so the West would become peculiarly vulnerable if it betrayed its own cultural tradition. Hence the importance of emphasising in this context the role of cultural factors and of their long-run effect not only for the East but also for the West. If it does not defend its cultural values, if it fails to stand firm on the question of cultural freedom in general, the West will not only throw away the chance of the eventual evolution of the Communist régimes towards more civilised cultural standards, but will also gravely jeopardise the chances of survival of these standards in the West.

FREEDOM is not always "indivisible", but surely compromise on cultural questions may well lead to a decline of intellectual freedom in the West. The innumerable articles on the subject in the Communist press concentrate on the danger arising out of the flow of ideas from the Western to the Communist countries. As Sh. Sanakoyev put it in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (No. 10, 1972):

"They are aiming at obtaining one-sided concessions from the socialist countries, getting rid of all barriers which stand in the way of ideological subversion by imperialism, acquiring the possibility of freely spreading the ideals of bourgeois society, smuggling bearers of these ideals into the socialist countries in unlimited numbers."

In fact, the question of what the West can or cannot do *vis-à-vis* the East cannot be separated from the question of the imposition of restrictions on freedom of expression in the West itself. The campaign against Radio Free Europe,

Radio Liberty, *Deutsche Welle*, etc. has been going on for a long time and the most insidious argument used in the West—it has been effective in the case of Senator William Fulbright—was that broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is contrary to the spirit of *détente*. (The far greater volume of communist broadcasting to the West apparently is not.) But it would scarcely be a victory for the principle of the “free flow of ideas” if Soviet *Radio Peace and Progress* ceased to exist, if Moscow and all East European capitals stopped their Western broadcasts, even if it was done in exchange for similar decisions in the West.

How can the West condone jamming, censorship, and closure of communication media as prerequisites of *détente*? If it does so, the demands would not stop there, but expand further. The BBC, *Deutschlandfunk* and other Western stations have also been under attack. Only the French radio (which is strictly censored in its broadcasts to the Communist countries) is not subject to such criticism. Possibly because the Soviet authorities are accustomed to a Gaullist radio censor doing the job of a Soviet one, there was an indignant outburst in the Soviet press when, before the elections (but after Pompidou’s visit to Minsk), the Gaullist journal *La Nation* published a series of articles critical of the Soviet Union. This can be taken as a foretaste of the Soviet authorities’ expectations of new Western editorial behaviour if the Soviet interpretation of *détente* were to be accepted. There is, of course, no reason why the West should accept it. What such a step would imply could be gauged from the Finnish-Soviet statement made on 6 April in Helsinki to mark the 25th anniversary of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty, particularly from one passage in it which noted

“that the mass information media are called upon, by showing proper responsibility and a businesslike approach, to serve the important cause of further strengthening the friendship and trust between the peoples of the USSR and Finland and not to harm the favourable development of friendly relations between the two countries.”

This is an indication of what pressures the European press and other media can expect if Soviet criteria for *détente* and for friendly relations between countries are accepted.

ATTEMPTS to extend Soviet censorship to the West are not limited to radio. At present Soviet authorities can only show long-distance political displeasure to a Paris editor whom they think should follow the example of official French radio broadcasts to the USSR, or to a German editor who is too touchy about *Ostpolitik*, or to an English or an Italian one who may be con-

cerned with renewal of a Soviet visa for his journal’s correspondent in Moscow. But recently another step has been taken affecting the “free flow of ideas.” Can there be any doubt that the signing of the Universal Copyright Convention by the Soviet Union is aimed at greater control of Soviet manuscripts abroad? The chairman of the Soviet State Committee on Publishing, Boris Stukalin, said at a press conference on 9 March that the “appropriate state organisation” would not transfer royalties from abroad unless the author had used official channels to send his work out of the country. Decree No. 138 of the Supreme Soviet, passed on 21 February, facilitates control of any such manuscripts by copyrighting not only works “first published in the USSR”, but also those “unpublished but existing on the territory of the USSR in any objective form.” Thus an “appropriate” Soviet organisation would henceforth be able to take the necessary steps if such a *samizdat* manuscript was published in the West. The decree stipulates that a Soviet author may transfer the copyright of his work to a foreign country only through a “procedure established by USSR legislation” and that according to this procedure “competent organs of the USSR may permit” a work to be translated and published abroad. Such permission can, of course, be withheld; and in the case of works by Soviet citizens first published in a foreign country, a clause granting copyright in such works to an author’s “heirs” has been altered, giving it now to “legal successors”, i.e. a Soviet publishing house or other “appropriate” Soviet organisation. Such an organisation can intimidate and force an author to proceed legally against a foreign publisher. Alternatively, Soviet authors who knowingly by-pass the official channels in sending their work abroad can be prosecuted for violating the law and/or the state monopoly of foreign trade. The new amendments to Soviet law include the possibility of “compulsory purchase” by the state of a copyright from an author or his heirs. The state can now demand the surrender of copyright for even an unpublished manuscript which it could then withhold from publication abroad. Thus, the revised Soviet copyright statute contains legal machinery which can halt the foreign publication of authors who for ideological reasons are not published in the Soviet Union (e.g. Solzhenitsyn, and others).

This extension of the long arm of Soviet censorship abroad has somehow been greeted in many Western editorial comments as “a step in the right direction”, as “a normalisation of cultural relations.” The *Christian Science Monitor* (5 March) described it as “another welcome step by the Soviet Union into the community of nations.” The Secretary of the French section of

the International PEN Club, M. Jean de Beer, said that it "would benefit Soviet authors." American and British publishers at first thought it "a very significant breakthrough." The President of the Association of American Publishers, Edward M. Korry, said: "Obviously publishers are very pleased by a major step forward in extending the role of law to intellectual property on a more universal basis" (*Washington Post*, 1 March). Roger Straus Jr., head of the New York firm which publishes Solzhenitsyn, felt that the Soviet motivation was only economic: "Stukalin is here for only one reason, to make money, and that is why they agreed to sign the copyright agreement. . ." (*Washington Post*, 1 March).

SOON CAME SECOND THOUGHTS and a more sober, critical assessment. The naïve prospect of a financial cornucopia for Western authors and publishers dissolved after a closer look at the likely consequences of the Soviet approach. Ambiguities were detected. Apart from those I have already mentioned, it was discovered that the new internal Soviet copyright law leaves many loopholes for the Russian publication of Western works without royalty payments (such as "non-profit" reproduction of Western scientific and educational material), or making token payments in roubles usable only in the Soviet Union. It was even discovered that as a result of its adherence to the Universal Copyright Convention, the Soviet Union would be able, if it so wished, to export to the United States cheap English editions of books first printed and published abroad. The original elation began to evaporate. *The New York Times* (21 March) has now reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Soviet decision was *not* "part of a broader Soviet trend toward normalisation of international relations", but an attempt "to turn Soviet tight domestic censorship into effective international censorship." It pointed out that while the Universal Copyright Convention declares that it should "facilitate a wider dissemination of works of the human mind", the Soviet scheme "is to pervert such 'wider dissemination'." Six Soviet dissidents, including Academician Sakharov, expressed similar views in an open letter to UNESCO issued on 26 March: "It should be impermissible for censorship now to acquire the possibility of operating on an international scale with the support of the Geneva Convention." They warned that if in the past Soviet censorship had been able to operate through this convention

"world culture would have been deprived of many remarkable works by Akhmatova, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, Tvardovsky, Bek and other writers. . . . In the special conditions of our country the law on

the monopoly of foreign trade can be transformed into a power that limits and even suppresses the international copyrights of Soviet citizens."

(*Russkaya Mysl*, 5 April)

Was it surprising that the dissident Soviet writers felt that the West was helping the Soviet government to stifle "the free word" in the USSR? Earlier Sakharov had already said that in the Soviet authorities' view the Western public is more concerned with expanding trade with the USSR than with the fate of the Soviet civil rights defenders. As to the Soviet copyright decision, the *Washington Post* reported that it was "a result of the Nixon administration's trade negotiations with the Soviets last year, according to US publishing and government sources. . . ."

The results may have been different from what was anticipated. After the belated realisation of the issues involved, the representatives of the American PEN, of the Authors' League of America, and of the Association of American Publishers issued a statement pledging "to take all steps which may be necessary at home or abroad to fulfill the commitments of American publishers and authors to the spirit of the Universal Copyright Convention" (*Washington Post*, 23 March). The American authors group, headed by novelist Jerome Weidman, proposed that United States law be changed to disallow claims to copyright control by any foreign government, and that a foreign author's right to his own work should be legally protected against infringement by his own government (*New York Times*, 25 March).

These were only first steps. Other measures were proposed. A famous lawyer, Alan U. Schwartz, wrote:

"If we are to keep alive the flow of free ideas from the Soviet Union . . . we must urge our Government now to make clear publicly and officially to the world that while it welcomes the 'legalization of copyright relations with the Soviet Union it will expect that Russia live up to Article I of the convention and 'provide for the adequate and effective protection of the rights of [its] authors . . . ' and that the US intends to continue its efforts to promote the free dissemination of all literature between our two countries. Our publishers, our writers' groups, our motion picture associations must also now take extraordinary steps to make public their resolve not to be intimidated, enticed or diverted from increasing their efforts to provide banned Soviet writers an outlet for expression in the West."

(*New York Times*, 10 March)

Here, again, the appearances of *détente* do not correspond to the Western concept of it. Is it then simply "a trap" for the West?

This would be a somewhat simplistic conclusion. If the Soviet Union pursues its own idea of *détente* with the West, it does so for very compelling reasons which need not be reviewed here. It is obviously facing a dilemma. It tries to avoid

it by pursuing inside the bloc a prophylactic policy of countering the possible "bad" effects of external relaxation in advance. The very fact that it does so with immense energy indicates how conscious it is of the potential risks for itself which *détente* involves. Is there any reason why Western countries should not take the same lesson to heart and realise that it is important for them to have equally consistent attitudes in pursuing policies in *détente* which are consonant with *their own* principles? Is there any reason why they should not draw that conclusion? They have nothing to fear because, as the Soviet leaders themselves realise, it is more and more difficult to translate military power into political influence. That is why they have developed the dialectical idea of "peaceful coexistence" which does not exclude "ideological struggle." But obviously they are not very confident about their own ability to stand up to a confrontation of ideas. In effect they can merely bluff and if the West has sufficient political stamina it can pursue its policies without undue concern about Soviet ideological reactions. Soviet leaders pursue their present policies because they *have* to—not because they *want* to. They cannot use their nuclear bombs, they are falling behind in the technological competition, they have a permanent Chinese nightmare; and they may in the future be facing serious internal problems. In this situation the West should surely be able to uphold its traditions and principles.

Only two factors can, in my view, undermine this prospect. One is the lack of political will in the West, and the other is the creeping *Newspeak* in the discussion of the problems involved. The very notion of "peaceful coexistence", "cultural exchange", etc. is part of the misleading language now current in the West. More and more such Orwellisms are being introduced into everyday language, confusing the issues, paralysing political perceptions and creating an atmosphere where *détente* can come to signify the acceptance of the proposition that the "free flow of ideas" is not *really* incompatible with the intensification of Soviet internal censorship and its expansion abroad. Perhaps one cannot quite believe that "slavery is freedom," but can one be sure about limited censorship? After all, is Finland not a free country?

**A**LTHOUGH at the outset the Western powers showed greater solidarity in Helsinki than might have been feared, one cannot be sure that the Soviet tactics of diplomatic erosion will not eventually meet with some measure of success at the CESC when it is eventually convened. There

was, at first, Soviet satisfaction with the campaign to induce the West to accept the idea of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation. After that the Soviet Union lost some of its enthusiasm when it faced Western resistance on cultural and other matters in Helsinki. But Soviet negotiators are still hoping that at the proposed conference the West will succumb to their blandishments about *détente* and the dialectical relationship between "peaceful coexistence" and "ideological struggle." At the third round of the preliminary talks, the Western countries modified their original stand on "the free movement of ideas and people", and insisted only that the CESC agenda should include "an open formulation" which would make it possible for them to raise this question at the Conference. Are Western negotiators, Western intellectuals and the Western public in general aware of the issues involved, of their historical importance, and of the risks and opportunities present in these negotiations? Will we soon find Western political resistance gradually wilting, or rather, being whittled down by the persistent efforts of the other side to establish their own version of "peaceful coexistence" through "ideological struggle"? Western intellectuals (and their colleagues in Communist countries) have a vital interest in preventing the possible sacrifice of real hopes of a genuine *détente* for some diplomatic compromise on matters of principle in the realm of culture and freedom. It would be useful to clarify the issues, lest the pursuit of "cultural exchanges" today should jeopardise genuine cultural relations tomorrow and lest a genuine *détente* be taken for its counterfeit "dialectical" imitation.

IT IS PERHAPS TIME to abandon the posture of defensiveness and insist more boldly on specific proposals about where and how ideas should flow. This is the sphere where the West could grasp the initiative. The support by Western intellectuals, writers, and scholars for such proposals and their concern with the authenticity of cultural contacts would be of great importance in facing the challenge I have outlined of the Soviet definition of *détente*. The preservation of Western cultural tradition is too important simply to be left to the cultural bureaucrats.<sup>8</sup> It is not merely a question of official "cultural exchanges", of Soviet circuses, Red Army choirs, and Odessa violinists to be matched in a cultural balance-sheet by *Porgy & Bess*, Western Philharmonic orchestras, and Juilliard pianists. There is not much lively cultural substance in such formal operations. But they may well become the only accepted framework of East-West cultural relations, and the hope for a

<sup>8</sup> See Eugène Ionesco's comments in his "Helsinki Notebook" (ENCOUNTER, December 1972).



"freer flow of ideas" threatens to be inverted to an expansion of Soviet censorship. Is it too pessimistic to warn that unless the West defends its own cultural values, such values may be lost not only in the East but also in the West? Is it possible that Helsinki may mark the beginning of the erosion in Western Europe of its essential cultural characteristics, a "Finlandisation"? In historical terms—is this the return trip from the Finland Station?

Not many would want to deny that the Western cultural tradition is of course violated in a number of non-Communist countries of Europe: in Greece, in Spain and in Portugal. For some reason their oppressive practices often attract more attention in the West than similar practices in the Communist countries. In the last two years, however, odious as these régimes are, they have had more open trials and more genuine amnesties for political prisoners than their Eastern counterparts. That is not to conclude that they are admirable, only that Andrei Amalrik or Vladimir Bukovsky would have welcomed the kind of trial—with Western observers present—which Stathis Panagoulis had. The sense of proportion should be enhanced by the fact that the Greek or Spanish régimes, though oppressive at home, do not present Europe with the same political threat that the Soviet and Soviet-sponsored régimes do. Yet the fact remains that these Western régimes are ugly spots on the map of Europe. Surely Western intellectuals have to press as much for the defence of their harassed colleagues in the cradle of Europe, Greece, as in the countries of the communist part of Europe—that is if their appeals are to be taken seriously, and not just as a facet of the contemporary "Protest Industry" in which

\* During the Conference, Spain was the only participant in the negotiations to endorse the proposal by the states of the Warsaw Pact for an all-European Committee which would give the Soviet Union an institutional lever in West European affairs. Soon enough, Mao's China also established diplomatic relations with Franco's Spain. The official Spanish Communist Party expressed its "disapproval and disgust at this action" (*Mundo Obrero*, March 1973) and it was even criticised by the Maoist Communist Party of Spain (Marxist-Leninist). The Spanish CP did not raise the question of how genuine the Polish "parliamentarians" really are, an incongruity which is rather similar in principle to *Pravda's* complaint about the "undemocratic" character of French elections. The Polish weekly *Kultura* (11 March 1973) published an interview with a Spanish left-wing playwright, Antonio Buezo Valejo, who was sentenced to death by Franco's law courts, but released from prison six years after the Civil War. He is now a member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Linguistics. In this interview Valejo spoke of the relaxed character of Spanish censorship: it must have made some of the Polish readers raise their eyebrows.

<sup>10</sup> *The Times Literary Supplement*, (15 Sept. 1972), pp. 1037-39.

attachment to pornographic permissiveness in the West is of far greater concern than political censorship in the East.

The relations of the Soviet Union, of China, and of the East European countries with the Greek Colonels have, if anything, been better than with the preceding régime. It is also interesting to note that the Spanish Communist Party protested against the recognition of the Franco régime by the German Democratic Republic, against the invitation extended by Communist Poland to a group of Spanish "parliamentarians", and against the communist régimes' acceptance of Spain in the Helsinki Conference.<sup>9</sup>

ALL THIS, I submit, provides an idea of how confused and/or dishonest the intellectual background to Helsinki is. George Orwell—who had difficulties with the publication of his *Homage to Catalonia* because the progressive *bien-pensants* of that time did not want to hear plain facts—would have recognised the pattern. He would have also provided the clearest rallying cry for those who are concerned with intellectual freedom and with the honest meaning of words continually threatened by a creeping *Newspeak*. His reflections on the freedom of thought found powerful expression in the preface to *Animal Farm* which was not published at the time because it was not considered "appropriate" in the political context of the day.<sup>10</sup> But it is surely relevant today as a statement of principles which could provide the guide-lines for the West facing the negotiations at the Conference on European Security and Co-operation—and in particular for the intellectuals who want to avoid "double-think" in approaching the problems raised by the Soviet and East European definition of *détente*. It can serve as an example of how an intellectual, in a situation where the dilemmas were far crueller than they are today, could still retain a clear view of facts and comprehend the significance of the "free flow of ideas" for the preservation of the European cultural tradition:

"I am well acquainted with all the arguments against freedom of thought and speech—the arguments that claim that it cannot exist, and the arguments which claim that it ought not to. I answer simply that they don't convince me and that our civilisation over a period of four hundred years has been founded on the opposite notice. For quite a decade past I have believed that the existing Russian régime is a mainly evil thing, and I claim the right to say so, in spite of the fact that we are allies with the USSR in a war which I want to see won. If I had to choose a text to justify myself, I should choose the line from Milton:

*By the known rules of ancient liberty*

The word *ancient* emphasises the fact that intellectual freedom is a deep-rooted tradition without which our characteristic Western culture could only doubtfully exist."

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## LETTERS

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### Robert Lowell & "The Bull-Ring"

LEWIS A. COSER writes, "Robert Lowell urged the poet to go into 'the bull-ring'" [ENCOUNTER, April: "Julien Benda, On Intellectual Treason"]. But I don't want my significance to extend beyond context; the bull-ring I wrote about was the poetry reviewers.

ROBERT LOWELL

Maidstone, Kent

### Shakespeare, Shylock & Israel

THE FIRST PART of the story from the *Daily Mail* which you quote in "Life & Letters Today" [ENCOUNTER, May, p.97 is correct, although incomplete. Along with Shaw, Miller, etc., Israel Zangwill's "Children of the Ghetto" was also included as an example of contemporary English prose.

The second part—censoring Shakespeare because of Shylock, etc.—is nonsense. This was never a consideration here. The overriding thought was the realisation that seven years of English-language learning (3-4 hours per week) have rendered a large number of high-school graduates so totally illiterate that they can hardly read the *Jerusalem Post*, much less conduct a conversation. The entire school curriculum here stinks—and is 50 years outdated—not merely English.

What amazes me is not the dismissal of Shakespeare, but the fact that teachers are not allowed freely to pick the authors they themselves like best. Rather, in the paternalistic tradition of the Central European *gymnasium* they are told what to do at every step. That they do it badly is beyond question.

But Shakespeare is the smallest part of the problem bedevilling the educational system which, though relatively new, at this moment often resembles that of an old empire.

AMOS ELON

Jerusalem

### E. M. Forster's Stories

MR ROGER SCRUTON [ENCOUNTER, January] is entitled to dislike the stories in *The Life to Come*, but not to claim that their publication (in one case by ENCOUNTER) violates Forster's own judgment.

The eight homosexual stories were indeed never offered for publication by Forster himself, and for obvious reasons: until the very end of his life they quite simply could not have been published in this country—and men in their 80s do not find it easy to abandon the very necessary precautions and reticences of a lifetime. But the destruction in the early 1960s, in consultation with Joe Ackerley, of several such

stories "thought not good enough to survive" clearly implies—and other evidence confirms—that Forster envisaged the eventual publication of the surviving homosexual stories. As for the remaining six stories, two were published during Forster's lifetime, while at least three of the other four were judged "too weak . . . to be published" not by Forster, but—before he had published a single novel—by the various magazine editors to whom he submitted them. Two of these stories, indeed, were preferred by Forster even to "The Road from Colonus" and "The Story of the Siren" (another tale rejected by the magazines) when in 1910 he made his initial selection of stories to be included in *The Celestial Omnibus*.

All this information is given in my Introduction to the volume which Mr Scruton was reviewing.

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London

### Raban Replies to Cox

MY OLD TEACHER, Professor C. B. Cox, is being silly about my book *The Society of The Poem* in his article "Who Needs Exams?" [ENCOUNTER, April]; and since he presents himself in the role of champion of the forces of truth, sweetness, and light, it may be of some wider relevance to point out that his reading of my argument is as slick, superficial and inaccurate as he claims the argument itself is. Professor Cox claims that I attack:

"the traditional university emphasis on the value of the high culture of the past . . . and argues that belief in high culture is out of touch with the 'living forces' in art today."

I do no such thing. The pages in my book which he refers to are at the beginning of Chapter 5, where I quote a poem by Allen Ginsberg in which he takes on the voice of a black junkie, and then go on to ask:

why people like Ginsberg have needed to borrow such extreme and often ill-fitting masks; why the voice of literature itself and its tradition in Western culture has been so blandly identified with the despised class of parents and policemen.

Surely a fair question; and if Professor Cox looks at my adjectives he can hardly accuse me of excessive sympathy for Ginsberg. The point I was making, and making perfectly clearly, was that a great deal of the poetry written by the young—bad and modish though it may be—is a poetry of revolt whose motives are as much social as they are aesthetic. Knocking tradition is often just another way of having a bash at Daddy.

What interested me here was the manner in which some of the official custodians of "high culture" played into the hands of the yipping young Turks. I pointed out that Dr F. R. Leavis's basic vocabulary—words like "value", "richness", "worth", "substance", "vulgar", "cultivated"—was full of metaphors drawn from the counting-house and the dinner-table. Literature is talked about, especially by Dr Leavis, as if a good poem was like a man of property. The writers I was discussing are all notable