



## Column

I WONDER if anyone would easily guess the subject of the following quotation from the syndicated American column by Mr Joseph Kraft (printed in a recent issue of the *International Herald Tribune*): "He hails

from a culture considered backward by American standards and knows nothing of the relations between nations."

I offer no prize for the correct solution, which is Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom Mr Kraft also describes as "a great literary artist, with a supreme feel for human suffering." One may well ask how it is that a "backward" culture is capable of producing "a great literary artist", because after all that capacity is normally among the standards by which we judge whether a culture is backward or not. Great literary artists do not grow on gooseberry bushes; they are an integral part of the culture which produces them and help to determine its quality, and no one is more conscious of this than Solzhenitsyn himself.

But this is a puzzle which has long been familiar to anyone who takes any interest in the strange contradictions of Russian history. What one should perhaps say is that the culture which Solzhenitsyn "hails from" is Russian culture not Soviet culture. I do not know if Mr Kraft would admit this distinction, or whether, if he did, he would still claim that "considered by American standards", Russian culture is backward. If he did, I think he might provoke many people, and not only Russians, to say: so much the worse for American standards. I have no doubt that by these standards the culture of Viet Nam, or of Indo-China as a whole, is a backward one; otherwise it would not have come so easily to Americans to think of the people of Viet Nam, whether of the North or the South, as gooks. I think that Mr Kraft, and perhaps Americans as a whole, should think again when they talk of backward cultures; it might save them from many avoidable mistakes.

One might also ask whether "a supreme feel for human suffering" isn't precisely what is most wanted at the present time if one wishes to achieve an understanding of the relations between nations, of which, during my lifetime, human suffering has been the most characteristic product. I do not know from what sources Mr Kraft gets his knowledge of international relations; I imagine that they are those more or less available to all of us. But I have a feeling

that Solzhenitsyn's experiences in "The Patriotic War", together with his travels in the "Gulag Archipelago", which is a kind of pressure-cooker for all the varied peoples and races of the U.S.S.R., not to speak of other countries, has given him a rather more specialised insight into "the relations between nations" as they actually exist over a large area of the globe, more especially from the point of view of people who are, as it were, on the receiving end of them.

SUCH EXPERIENCES might have a certain value to the United States at the present time. What worries many people about the foreign policy of the United States, which is aimed at a *détente* and a relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union, is that its only practical result may be to strengthen, stabilise and perpetuate a system in which the individual human being counts for nothing; there is a danger that under certain circumstances diplomacy may become (as Nicholas Bethall has recently reminded us) an art performed like surgery without anaesthetics on the screaming bodies of the living. Among the many exceptional gifts which Dr Kissinger brings to the practice of diplomacy, a "supreme feel for human suffering" is not the most notable; things might be better if it was.

THE OCCASION which inspired Mr Kraft's dismissive comments on Solzhenitsyn as a student of foreign affairs was the dinner recently given in his honour by the American trade unions, and the long extempore speech which he delivered to the assembled guests, including Mr James Schlesinger, now reported to be occupied in organising a new and more sophisticated system of air-raid shelters, in which Americans (some of them) may hope to lead a troglodytic existence underground if the surface of the United States should be made uninhabitable by Soviet missiles.

I must confess that I envy the United States their trade unions; I'd rather have them than Mr Kraft. The invitations to the guests stated that the dinner had been organised to honour Solzhenitsyn as a fighter for human freedom, and that it was for this purpose that their presence was requested. How different from our own trade unions! When the AFL-CIO wishes to honour a foreign visitor they choose the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn; when the T.U.C. does, it invites the ex-KGB chief Alexander Shelepin.

Nothing perhaps could better illustrate the difference in the roles played by American and British trade unionism at the present time, both on the national and the international scene. On the one side, there is a clear and deep-seated conviction that there can only be a future for trade unionism within a system in which the worker is

genuinely free to defend and advance his own interests, and that therefore the defence of such a system is one of the fundamental objectives of the trade union movement; American trade unionists evidently mean it when they sing *The Union Makes You Free!*

On the other side, there is a confused belief that trade unionism can survive even if democracy goes by the board, that trade unionists could be free even if everyone else were slaves, and that somehow the cause of trade unionism could be advanced even at the expense of the only system which legally and constitutionally guarantees its continued existence. I do not say (because it would be manifestly untrue) that all, or even most, trade unionists in Britain share this belief. But there are some who do; there are others who half-heartedly yield to it; there are many who, without believing in it, go along with it, simply because today they have no leaders who can make the fundamental issue clear to them; and there are a few who quite consciously exploit this confusion of mind because they see in it a means to an end, which is to subvert the society on which trade unionism itself depends for its existence. Caught in the almost metaphysical distinctions between such delicately shaded varieties of feeling and opinion, British trade unionists have lost the clear-sightedness of their American brothers; only so it can be explained how, when they wish to welcome a fraternal delegate, they find themselves landed with comrade Shelepin.

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YET, EVEN GRANTED the contrast between the AFL-CIO and the T.U.C., perhaps even American trade unionists may have felt that they had been given rather more than they bargained for in the speech which Solzhenitsyn delivered at the dinner held in his honour. For it was nothing less than a total condemnation of American foreign policy over a period of nearly 50 years, based upon the proposition that any form of compromise with Communism represents a surrender to the powers of evil, of which one can only expect that, very soon, the Devil will claim his own. From this point of view, even those phases of American policy which once recommended themselves to most men of good will and good faith appear as both a crime and a blunder. Solzhenitsyn denounced the American recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933; the War-time alliance against National-Socialist Germany; the Viet Nam truce of 1973, which prepared the way for America's eventual withdrawal. It goes without saying that the present policy of *détente* met with his unqualified contempt, because it at once strengthens the Soviet Union and weakens the

United States, the Western world, and whatever forms of resistance still exist within the Soviet Union itself.

In Solzhenitsyn's eyes, such things are simply successive incidents in the record of continuous defeat which constitutes the history of America's relations with the Soviet Union; he has given expression to the same point of view in an article printed in the *New York Times*, the *Paris Herald Tribune* and other newspapers. Here he states it in the novel form that, whereas since World War II everyone has been obsessed with the question of how to avoid World War III, what has actually happened is that World War III has already been fought and lost without anyone noticing.

"There is no longer any point in asking how to prevent the Third World War. We must have the courage and lucidity to stop the Fourth. Stop it we must; not fall on our knees as it approaches."

Solzhenitsyn traces step by step the process by which, in his view, the defeat of the West was accomplished.

"World War III began immediately after World War II; the seeds were planted as that war ended, and it first saw the light of day at Yalta in 1945, as the cowardly pens of Roosevelt and Churchill, anxious to celebrate their victory with a litany of concessions, signed away Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Mongolia, condemned to death or to concentration camps millions of Soviet citizens, created an ineffectual United Nations Assembly, and finally abandoned Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany."

Nor are these the only losses, actual or impending.

"The powerful Western countries that emerged victorious from the first two World Wars have been intent on courting weakness during these thirty years of peace, squandering real or potential allies, ruining their credibility, abandoning territory and populations to an implacable enemy; immense populous China, their most important ally in World War II, North Korea, Cuba, North Viet Nam and now South Viet Nam and Cambodia; Laos is about to go; Thailand, South Korea and Israel are threatened; Portugal is leaping into the same abyss. Finland and Austria await their fate with resignation, impotent to defend themselves, and clearly with no reason to expect assistance from abroad."

He concludes this formidable indictment with the words:

"Of course, no one has the right to demand that the West undertakes the defence of Malaysia, Indonesia, Formosa or the Philippines; no one can dare blame it for not wanting to do so. But those young men who refused to bear the pain and anguish of the far-away war in Viet Nam will not have passed the age of military service before they—not their sons—must fall in defence of America. But by then it will be too late."

AMONG THE MANY COMMENTATORS who have disputed Solzhenitsyn's thesis that World War III

is already over and lost is M. Raymond Aron, writing in *Le Figaro*. In fact, says M. Aron, there has been no world war since 1945 between the East and the West. What there has been is a protracted conflict, which has expressed itself in terms both of material strength and of ideas. Nor, in this conflict, have all the losses been on the side of the West or the gains on the side of the East, even though the West may be well advised to look at its present situation with a certain alarm. In particular, the end of colonialism in Asia and Africa does not, as Solzhenitsyn believes, necessarily weaken the West; rather, it has liberated the West from a burden of insoluble contradictions which had become an intolerable liability, whether considered in terms of material strength or of ideological credibility. The end of two great civil wars in Asia, both of which originated well before World War II, has, so far as one can see, neither added to the strength of the East nor detracted from that of the West; rather, it has increased the dangers to which the Soviet Union itself is exposed, and of this it has shown itself acutely conscious, more especially in its enduring conflict with the People's Republic of China.

Where the balance has tipped decisively to the disadvantage of the West has been in Europe, where the loss of historic provinces which were once an integral part of her civilisation has weakened her irredeemably. Even here, however, history has not worked entirely to the advantage of the Soviet Union, for the means and the methods by which she has imposed and maintained her domination over hitherto free and independent nations have been such as to destroy almost totally the credibility of her claim to represent the cause of the oppressed peoples of the earth.

Professor Aron is right, I think, to say that a global review of profit and loss would not show the kind of decisive balance in favour of the Soviet Union from which Solzhenitsyn draws such pessimistic and apocalyptic assertions. Yet this in no way refutes his assertions that the changes which have taken place since World War II have involved, and continue to involve, an

appalling cost in human misery; and that this cost has been paid by the victims of Soviet brutality, both within the Soviet Union and in the unfortunate countries which have fallen beneath her domination. In Solzhenitsyn's eyes, the West has bought peace at the expense of the suffering of millions of victims, and a peace bought at such a price is morally unjustifiable and will in the end involve its own punishment in the form of a loss of nerve which will paralyse any effort by the West to defend itself against its "implacable enemy."

SUCH A VIEW of international relations is a highly unfashionable one today, especially in the United States, where Dr Kissinger has made *Realpolitik* all the rage, even if it has lost something of its bloom recently. It is sometimes forgotten, however, that *Realpolitik* requires nerve and will no less than a policy dictated by "a supreme feel for human suffering"—perhaps even more, because *Realpolitik* is always at the mercy of events, while morality is to a certain extent self-sustaining in the sense that clear principles consistently applied provide as good a guide to action as we are likely to find in a highly imperfect world.

It is Solzhenitsyn's contention that the West, as the result of a long series of compromises and concessions, of flirting with forms of *Realpolitik* which it is very imperfectly adapted to apply consistently, of betraying the moral principles which in a democracy form the only firm basis for policy, has lost the will and capacity for effective action. He presents this thesis in the form of an historical analysis with which one may well quarrel both in general and in detail, while at the same time accepting that fundamentally he is right. For it is not really a political, but an ethical and a psychological truth which he wishes to impress on us; and that truth is, essentially, that in the realm of freedom, to which the West aspires, however imperfectly it embodies it, morality and action are inseparable. It is only in the realm of determinism that they can be distinguished, but that is only because there they have both lost their meaning.

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# Types of Mind

By F. A. Hayek



ACCIDENT had early drawn my attention to the contrast between two types of scientific thinking which I have since again and again been watching with growing fascination. I have long wished to describe the difference but have been deterred by the egotistic character such an account is bound to assume. My interest in it is largely due to the fact that I myself represent a rather extreme instance of the more unconventional type, and that to describe it inevitably means largely talking about myself and must appear like an apology for not conforming to a recognised standard. I have now come to the conclusion, however, that the recognition of the contribution students of this type can make may have important consequences for policy in higher education, and that for this reason such an account may serve a useful purpose.

THERE EXISTS A STEREOTYPE of the great scientist which, though overdrawn, is not entirely wrong. He is seen, above all, as the perfect master of his subject, the man who has at his ready command the whole theory and all the important facts of

his discipline and is prepared to answer at a moment's notice all important questions relating to his field. Even if such paragons do not really exist, I have certainly encountered scientists who closely approach this ideal. And many more, I believe, feel that this is the standard at which they ought to aim, and often suffer from a feeling of inadequacy because they fail to satisfy it. It is also the type we learn to admire because we can watch him in operation. Most of the brilliant expositors, the most successful teachers, writers and speakers on science, the sparkling conversationalists belong to this class. Their lucid accounts spring from a complete conspectus of the whole of their subject which comprehends not only their own conceptions but equally the theories of others, past and present. No doubt these recognised masters of the existing state of knowledge include also some of the most creative minds, but what I am not certain is whether this particular capacity really helps creativity.

Some of my closest colleagues and best friends have belonged to this type and owe their well deserved reputations to accomplishments I could never try to emulate. In almost any question about the state of our science I regard them as more competent to provide information than a person of my own sort. They certainly can give a more intelligible account of the subject to an outsider or young student than I could, and are of much greater help to the future practitioner. What I am going to plead is that there is a case in the various institutions for a few specimens of minds of a different type.

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IN MY PRIVATE LANGUAGE I used to describe the recognised standard type of scientists as the memory type. But this is somewhat unfair because their ability is due to a particular kind of memory, and there are also other kinds. I shall therefore here call this type simply the "master of his subject." It is the kind of mind who can retain the particular things he has read or heard, often the particular words in which an