
CONVERSATION

The Middle East: Illusions, Great & Small

By Elie Kedourie & Andrew Mango

KEDOURIE: *The situation in the Middle East is very dispiriting. There is the Lebanon, and Beirut is almost destroyed; there is war in Abadan and Khorramshahr, and now in Basra; and there are other very difficult and disagreeable situations. I think it possible to provide some kind of explanation for each and every one of these events, but one wonders whether there isn't some underlying factor which has to do with "the character of the Middle East" today. What do you think?*

MANGO: I find it hard to accept all-embracing explanations, but none the less one must try and isolate certain factors which seem to operate if not throughout the Middle East at least in most countries. One historical factor: it seems to me to be the case that "the Middle East" as a region was controlled from outside throughout most of recent history until the years following the Second World War. To be sure, the Ottoman Empire was an indigenous power; and if one includes Turkey and the Balkans in the Middle East, then control was exercised from within. but certainly as far as the Arab countries of the Middle East are concerned, they were under outside control. Istanbul lay outside the Arab world as we know it today; and what is more, the Ottoman Empire was itself under (or, to some extent, interpenetrated by) Western influences; and with the help of the West, or playing off one Western power against another, it could maintain control. Outside control gradually ceased after World War II. There were attempts thereafter to influence events, but local forces

began finding their own level. This is a bloody process. It brings destruction in its train; and it is changing both the political map, the social map, and (as we are seeing particularly in the Persian Gulf, in Khorramshahr, in Iran in Abadan, perhaps in Basra tomorrow) even the physical appearance of the cities of the Middle East. That is one factor.

KEDOURIE: *I agree. I think that the Middle East is now out of all control. There isn't any power there, whether "inside" or "outside", which can influence events in any significant way. Consider for instance the Iran-Iraq war. All the great powers are, it seems to me, either unwilling or, more likely, powerless to intervene in order to impose a solution (even assuming that they know what "solution" they would like to impose). The same thing is to be seen in the recent events in the Lebanon. Again, what is so very remarkable is that the great powers, the Superpowers as well as the "great powers of Europe", are on the sidelines. They attempt to mediate; they exhort; they make declarations; occasionally they threaten. But there is very little they are able or perhaps even willing to do. And that is a remarkable thing. It is disagreeable for the great powers and the Superpowers, but it is also disagreeable for the peoples of the region themselves. Because it seems to me that by themselves, if they are left on their own, they might easily test the Middle East system of international relations to destruction.*

MANGO: Why has this come about? I think because of an equilibrium between East and West at the end of World War II. Within that equilibrium there was almost a vacuum of power in the Middle East where the local forces managed to assert themselves. If one could make an historical parallel (perhaps not a very accurate one but none the less useful), it is rather like the beginning of the independence of ancient Israel between Assyria and Egypt. There were two states of more or less equal power or countervailing pressure, and in between a local state, a smaller regional force which could assert itself. So one can see that Western control over the Middle East broke down when President Nasser concluded his first Czech arms deal—an outside power brought in to frus-

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trate an existing system of control.

But I think one must make one exception to the general statement about outside powers and their dispositions. Turkey is outside that system now. After the First World War the West did make provisional plans for Turkey, plans which were rejected by the Turks. The Turks managed to prevail over the designs of outside powers. Western powers (Britain, France) then contented themselves basically with the Arab Middle East and North Africa. They remained in control until after the Second World War, and they left after making a number of arrangements which seemed to promise continuing stability after their departure. A constitution for the Sudan, for example; or a parliamentary monarchy for Iraq; a presidential parliamentary régime in Syria and in Lebanon where it was supplemented by the so-called "National Pact", under which the various confessional and ethnic groups of the country apportioned offices, and spheres of influence, and agreed to live together. All of which seemed reasonably solid as Britain and France left the Middle East to be replaced by a much vaguer "American umbrella." Then it all gradually broke down.

KEDOURIE: *Yes, but isn't Turkey the exception which proves the rule? Turkey is not indebted for its Atatürk Constitution to foreign powers. Turkey after the First World War was, and still remains, independent of foreign influences—in the sense that there was foreign influence in the Lebanon, in Iraq, in Egypt. That never obtained in Turkey which, in a sense, could be said to be the master of its own fate under Kemal Atatürk.*

And yet look at what happens to Turkish politics. In 1950 there is a change of government; a new Democrat Party comes into power. You might say that this is the natural and genuine working of parliamentary and constitutional government. But then if you look at the record from 1950 up to now we have a coup d'état in 1960, a semi-coup d'état in 1971, and another coup d'état in 1980, brought about as a result of the failure of the politicians to work the system in reasonably orderly and satisfactory manner. If even in Turkey things do not work, where else can they?

MANGO: Very hard to think of another place where things can work. But then one might remember the strictures against Italian society by Gramsci, between the two World Wars, when he said that even in Italy there wasn't a civil society strong enough to support orderly parliamentary government. There is, of course, a philosophical problem here; the extent to which parliamentary democratic politics can keep away from demagogic practices. How are they to be regulated? In Turkey politics turned on the immediate satisfaction of the material and, to a lesser extent, cultural or spiritual desires of an electorate which seemed fairly homogeneous at first. But it was gradually seen to be more diverse. Parliamentary politics

itself gradually split up into competing groups, with politicians moving further and further along the road of demagogy. One can write into constitutions, in various forms of words, a rule that politicians are not to be demagogic. Will it work? Only if there is a degree of realism on the part of an electorate.


Now if we turn to the electorate in Turkey (just as if we turn to the people of the Middle East as a whole) I don't think we'll find that their desires are all that different from the desires of people everywhere—and particularly people in the West whom we know. The main desires I have encountered on the part of Turks of all classes are, to put it crudely, for a house with a garden, if possible, for a flat if not; for a radio (satisfied by now); for a television set (if possible, colour TV); for a motorcar; for consumer goods (as advertised); and (as urbanisation proceeds and people really do need a bit of fresh air and some contact with nature) for holidays. These—rather than a desire for a Theocratic State on the one hand, for Collectives on the other, or for national aggrandisement—these are the desires which are the motive force of politics in Turkey, and I think elsewhere in the Middle East, as they are in other regions of the world.

KEDOURIE: *These desires would appear to be the most natural in the world. There is nothing wrong with them. The question, therefore, is whether there is a "dialectic" which leads from these very natural desires to an explosive and a destructive situation. And there is.*

I think one can put it in two ways. In the first place the resources of the society and its economy are not geared to satisfaction of these desires. The desires have been aroused: by knowledge of what Western societies are like, by the promises of politicians. But these desires cannot possibly be satisfied by the system. Their satisfaction requires an efficient economy, requires a kind of rational social organisation which is not to be found in the Middle East. And, therefore, what you have is an increasing distance between what people want and what the system (the economy or the politicians) can provide. This leads to a very explosive state of affairs.

MANGO: Yes, it is a matter not only of resources but of social organisation, a matter of individual but also of social skills. After all, there has been an injection, in the case of Turkey, of outside Western financial and technical resources. An injection of Western aid produces some results in simple matters (such as the building of roads), even some infrastructure. But it also produces a state of ill-adaptation in its wake. Demagogy rushes in—to mask the inability of the society to function by itself. But "Western aid" is a small interference with organic processes as compared with the vast injection of money, the immense transfer of resources produced by the increase in oil prices, by the formation of the OPEC Cartel

Israel & Palestine: "Some Plain Truths"



New York City

MANY COMMENTATORS are pointing out that while Israel's invasion of Lebanon may have temporarily destroyed the Palestine Liberation Organization, it has brought no closer a solution of the fundamental problem: the plight of the two million or so Palestinian refugees. Moreover, it is asserted, or simply taken for granted, that any such solution is to be found in the West Bank and therefore hinges on the question of autonomy (leading to eventual statehood) for that territory.

This confusion of three issues—the P.L.O., the refugees and the West Bank—is a striking example of the muddled thinking about the Middle East that seems to infect even the most thoughtful observers. So let us consider some plain truths about these issues—plain truths that mysteriously have dropped from sight.

1. The Palestinian refugees are not refugees from the West Bank. Few ever lived there. It is in no sense their "homeland." That homeland was in the part of Palestine that is now called Israel and that history has delivered to another people as their homeland.

2. The West Bank is a poor, infertile strip of land already overpopulated by 700,000 Arabs, one-third of whom make a living by working in Israel.

3. It is thus understandable that the refugees have not the faintest interest in emigrating to the West Bank and living there. This explains why they did not go there before 1967, when Jordan governed the area, and why there is no illegal immigration (not too difficult an enterprise) there today.

4. The P.L.O. is, from its viewpoint, absolutely correct in refusing to recognize the territorial integrity of Israel in exchange for the promise of an autonomous or independent Palestinian nation in the West Bank. For the P.L.O. and for most refugees, a Palestinian state there makes sense only if it is a prelude to the reconquest of its remembered homeland, Israel. In and of itself, the West Bank has no interest for them.

5. Because a P.L.O. state on the West Bank would be irredentist or nothing, neither Jordan nor Israel can tolerate the existence of such a state, which could only result in another Arab-Israeli war, with incalculable consequences.

6. Jordan, it is true, is committed on paper—in the name of Arab solidarity—to the emergence of exactly such a state. But the fact that, under two decades of Jordanian occupation, no such state was established in the West Bank speaks louder than any paper proclamations. It is also worth noting that during those decades Arab spokesmen did not even request establishment of a Palestinian state there.

7. Israel, for obvious reasons, will never agree to creation of a P.L.O. state on the West Bank. Whatever the differences within Israel on specific policies toward this territory, there are no differences on this fundamental premise.

8. It is sometimes argued that what the Palestinian refugees want is not so much an actual homeland—a goal now perceived to be unreachable—as a symbolic homeland, a national entity that would issue to them passports and with which they could emotionally identify. There is some force to this argument. Statelessness is a terrible condition for people to be in, especially in today's world. But why must the West Bank play this role? Why cannot Jordan, the majority of whose citizens are already of Palestinian origin, issue those passports and be that symbolic homeland? Jordan, after all, is no more "foreign" a country to the refugees than is the West Bank. Moreover, it has the immense advantage of already existing as a nation-state.

9. If Jordan is reluctant to play this role, it is because that would in effect ratify the legitimacy of Israel and signify the surrender of the Arab dream of reconquest. So far, only Egypt has done this, at Camp David. The other Arab states, for cultural, political and religious reasons, still find the prospect unacceptable.

10. It is for this same reason that the Arab countries (except Jordan) have stubbornly refused to grant citizenship to the refugees they shelter even though by now the overwhelming majority of these refugees were born and reared in the same countries. Such a grant of citizenship would "solve" the refugee problem overnight—but it would also mean a confessed end to Arab ambitions to eliminate Israel.

IF ONE PUTS all these elements together, three conclusions seem inescapable. First, the future of the West Bank will be settled between the two interested parties, Israel and Jordan—if it is ever to be settled at all. Second, the refugees and the West Bank constitute two different problems, and telescoping them leads only to intellectual muddle. Third, the basic obstacle to any resolution of the refugee problem remains today what it was yesterday: the refusal of the Arab states to accept Israel as a permanent, legitimate political entity in their midst.

Irving Kristol

in the NEW YORK TIMES

(again, a result of a power vacuum on a world scale). The oil-producing states are now able to exact the maximum price they can for a product which happens to be located on their territory, which was discovered by Westerners, developed by Western technology, but the proceeds of which have now got to be shared with the possessors of the oil wells (with a very generous share going to the countries where the wells are located). That is the second important factor in the Middle East. External influence has been removed, but there is also a major quantitative change introduced by an access of undreamt wealth, indeed (as the phrase goes) wealth beyond the dreams of avarice.

KEDOURIE: *WHETHER IT is the glittering riches of OPEC or the rather disastrous way in which the Turks (in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s) managed their economy, in both cases the results increased social tensions tremendously. We have seen this very clearly in Turkey. The inflation has been the consequence of all the promises made by the various politicians, and has meant a very disturbed and disorderly political life. Again, in Iran in the last years of the Shah the inflation (which he engineered as a result of his grandiose plans, economic and military) also increased social tensions to an unbearable extent. It produced the basic factor in his downfall: that is very clear.*

The economic management of these countries is just not very good. Inflation hasn't yet, so far, appeared in Saudi Arabia or in the Gulf Emirates. It might yet; no reason why it shouldn't. The same factors apply there as apply elsewhere.

But this is not the only factor. One can say that the immense disaster in the Lebanon—and I don't mean just the recent Israeli occupation but the Civil War which has been going on since 1975—has really nothing to do in any real sense with economic issues. It is, rather, that communities which managed somehow or other at the same time to maintain their separate identity and yet to coexist within the same state, suddenly found themselves mistrustful of one another, mistrustful to the extent that they were willing to bear arms against one another and to plunge their country into violence.

I think it is the consequence of a loss of control, a loss of control which arises not out of economic mismanagement and over-ambitious plans but from the fact that the political arrangements of these states are not such as to enable them to enjoy what might be called peaceable constitutional parliamentary rule, or what the Germans call a "Rechtsstaat"; a rule of law. That doesn't seem to be possible. And that is even more serious than the economic aspects.

MANGO: Those communities, like material solids, don't float in mid-air. If you go back to the history of the Lebanon you'll find that you always had tension among communities and between any two communities under the influence of a suzerain power. The Maronites and Druzes were at each other's throats in the 19th century, causing the intervention of the West. The Ottoman constitu-

tional arrangements which followed this intervention allowed them to live peacefully together. And after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire it was France which guaranteed the coexistence of communities in the Lebanon.

For a while, of course, the inertia of French arrangements continued. I don't believe one can devise any constitutional arrangements anywhere which—without outside control—will keep the conflicting forces of society from each other's throats unless there is a will to coexist.

I have already referred to the absence of a civil society on a national scale in all Middle Eastern lands. I suppose that if there were no outside influence, or great power, one would simply assume that the strongest group would eventually gain control over the whole country, eliminate its opponents, and mould the nation to its own wishes. In the Lebanon, one had an arrangement guaranteed by the French, then gradually breaking down. And the pretext—I won't say the cause—of its break-up was the arrival of Palestinian refugees. It changed the demographic balance and the balance of power in the country.

You said that this had nothing to do with "economic factors." But the great access of wealth brought about by the rise of Beirut as a great commercial centre, and then the arrival of new political money which was channelled through Beirut, must, I think, have fed local jealousies. In time you get the Israeli reprisals, the radicalisation of the Palestinians, the radicalisation of the local communities, the first civil war, a period of peace, then a second civil war. To expect communities which have been fighting each other since 1958 to settle down peaceably, miraculously, seems to me a beautiful but, I would say, a rather unrealistic proposition.

KEDOURIE: *If there is anything in what we've been saying, then it seems to me that one particular nostrum which is proposed by various public persons in Britain, in the United States, in the Western world generally, is really useless and infirm. I mean the notion that, somehow or another, if you "settle the Arab-Israeli conflict", then you have settled the most important and the most serious quarrel in the area, and therefore you can really sit back and do what is necessary on various other problems. This seems to me a great illusion. Somehow or other, one way or another, the Israeli-Arab conflict will be settled, in a manner of speaking, by one party emerging as the victor. Or it might be settled through the mere passage of time, with people getting tired of it, somehow the altercation becoming gradually, with the passage of the years, irrelevant. Assuming that there was some kind of a settlement (or non-settlement) with which people are happy to live, what could one expect in the Middle East? One must reckon, even when that is "settled" (or left aside), with the most explosive and most dangerous of situations. Because there isn't anything like what might be called a stable political settlement within the various countries or among the countries themselves. That is to say, the various régimes*

suffer in one way or another from a lack of legitimacy. They are in a sense irrelevant. They sit there on top of their society but they really have very little to do with what goes on down below. They impose themselves to some extent; but this imposition is accepted because it is force majeure, and once the force majeure for one reason or another disappears then the whole thing falls to pieces. And that is really a very hazardous prospect.

As regards international relations in the Middle East, there is no settled view among these various states as to what it is that they want, what they can aspire to, what they can accept. There is the notion that all the Arab states have got to "unite" in one sense or another, the idea of Pan-Arabism. But Pan-Arabism means that whatever exists in the way of frontiers is considered to be "illegitimate." And that means, therefore, that the international sub-system in the Middle East is radically infected with disorder.

Moreover, there are all kinds of situations within countries which have destabilising international implications. I have here in mind, for instance, the question of the Kurds and of the Shiites. These are now groups which are, for one reason or another, aware of themselves as groups wanting to assert themselves within their own countries. But this very attempt will have wide consequences.

MANGO: I'm not so sure that I would give the Shiites as an example. Their self-assertion is unlikely to have international consequences. I would prefer the Turkish Kurds as an example, where the wider consequences are obvious. But why do you say that the régimes are irrelevant? I would distinguish. They are, after all, born of conditions in each country; they represent the strongest effective force which could be mustered in the land. If they are basically military régimes, it depends obviously on the composition of the officer corps, which may be recruited from among the Sunnis in Iraq, or the Shiah, Nusayri, or Alawis in Syria, lower-middle-class local Egyptians in Egypt, lower-middle-class Turks in Turkey. There is some link between the régimes and societies of the countries, they are not totally irrelevant, even if they are usually not representative.

When you said that with the solution (if it ever comes) or with the passage of time which will gradually, in its own way, "solve" the Arab/Israeli problem, other problems will remain—the one that comes to my mind, before all else, is the problem caused by the immense growth of population. In Turkey we have seen the population increase from about 12 million to over 46 million. In Egypt from the turn of the century the population has risen from 10 million to 43 million. And the population of major cities has, of course, increased proportionately much more.

Istanbul (where I was born) had a population of about three-quarters of a million when I was a boy between the two wars (the population had decreased from over 1 million before the First World War). Now it is variously computed at 4 to 6 million (depending on where one draws the line divid-

ing Istanbul from the surrounding countryside). And as a result you have a number of related problems: the demands of a large population to satisfy, demands which have grown as a result of the knowledge of the living standards achieved in the outside world, mainly in the West, through the advances of mass communications; and the need to administer and control these very large groups of people. Local statecraft even where there are developed traditions, as in the case of Ottoman statecraft, never had to deal with problems of that scale. After all, the population of the entire Ottoman Empire at the time of the Russian-Turkish war of 1878 was estimated at 25 million people. And the Empire included a large part of the Balkans, what is now Turkey and the Arab Levant in the Middle East. Now you have the problems of providing services, of organising the huge concentrations of people in cities. There may be a tradition of "neighbourhoods", in some cases of "guilds of mutual help", of self-help; but certainly no tradition of running public utilities on the scale required, of providing services, of policing people, of exercising social control over great numbers. This constitutes one of the most explosive factors in at least some countries of the Middle East.

I mentioned Turkey and Egypt. One must add Iran. In the case of the other countries, the populations of Iraq, Syria or Saudi Arabia may be considered reasonable when compared with the total area; but we still have the problem of very large cities like Baghdad and Damascus, and soon Aleppo. In the case of the Arabian Peninsula, of course, the problems of providing services are masked by the existence of wealth: by both money and the Western economic and technical expertise which that money can buy. You can have foreign specialists or foreign managers running utilities, designing, building roads or whatever. As long as the money flows the increase in population in the so-called oil-rich countries may not become a grave problem. But in the three lands I mentioned—Iran, Turkey, and Egypt—it is possibly the greatest threat to stability, the most immediate

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problem facing the rulers. There was one Turkish politician who said, "Three-quarters of the problems of Turkey are the problems of Istanbul. . . ."

KEDOURIE: ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, considering the politics and the economics, we can say fairly that this is an area which is in crisis. The native political abilities available are just not adequate to the crisis. That is bad enough for the Middle Eastern peoples immediately concerned; but there is another aspect to this; namely that the Middle East does not exist "on its own." It is, for the West, a very important strategic area in its relations with the Soviet Union. It is also a reservoir of oil which for the time being (and for a very long time to come) is essential, if not for the United States, certainly for Western Europe and for Japan. So that what goes on there is of profound interest to the outside world, to the West as a whole.

Now, the grotesque fact is that vital and important as it is, there is very little in the way of information from this area which is available to Western peoples at large. This reminds me of that almost proverbial statement by Neville Chamberlain when he had to deal with the Sudeten crisis, that Czechoslovakia was "a faraway country of which we know nothing." Of course, he was trying to defend his own policy and its merits are not here in question. But whether his policy was good or bad, the fact is that he was telling the truth and a large number of people would have acquiesced in what he was saying. Czechoslovakia was indeed a faraway country of which they knew nothing. Has the situation changed in any significant way now?

The Middle East is far away; people really know very little, have no reason to involve themselves in the details of Middle Eastern politics or economics. And yet people would not quite be willing now to accept the full Chamberlain disclaimer in relation to the Middle East (or indeed in relation to any other foreign country) because now they have the illusion that they *do* know.

Where does this illusion come from? It comes from the electronic media which have a very powerful impact. To see a picture on television is to have the illusion—it is no more than an illusion really—that you apprehend and comprehend what is going on. A skyscraper is demolished by a high explosive—well, there it *is*, and what could be more vivid than such a picture in living colour, what could be, in a sense, more self-explanatory than such a scene on our screen. What an illusion! To see pictures of destruction in Beirut or in Khorramshahr, or anywhere else, *explains* nothing. It only induces the illusion that you understand; and, much more, it induces in democratic countries all kinds of very partisan feelings and passions which have their effect on the conduct of public men. A case in point is the way in which American television had this decisive effect on US policy in Viet Nam. All this adds to the difficulty and the dangers.

MANGO: Yes, I agree; a little knowledge is always a dangerous thing. To be sure, much more knowledge is also being transmitted now through the means of mass communications. There is a large number of journalists, specialists, statisticians, consultants involved, producing and transmitting a vast amount of information. It is not, of course, all available to the general public, certainly not to the ordinary television viewer. After all, the media

have got a basic job to do which is to establish and communicate important basic facts. It is a difficult job; it is never easy to establish "fact." It is difficult also because of the old cynical view of news values: the dictum that a dog dead on your doorstep is worth as much space as a man who is killed two streets away, as ten men killed in another town, a hundred in another country, or a thousand in China. There is always a distortion introduced by the presumed interests of the audience, of "the public", into any story.

Having said all this, I think that the main danger of the media is not the communication of more facts; they have got to be communicated. It is the further illusion which journalists share with members of the public: that scandals, replete with outrageous facts and tragic details, have easy solutions. You referred to pictures of destruction. I thought of documentaries I've seen about the horrors of life in the slums of Cairo: moving, beautifully photographed. And one's first reaction is: "Can't something be done about it?" Why is it that people have got to live in dirt and poverty with diseased children, flies crawling over sores, and all that? Isn't it simple reaction to the communication of accurate facts which presents a danger rather than the communication of the facts themselves?

I cannot see, myself, how one can parry that danger—apart from gradually educating media men in the complexities of life. A friend of mine who teaches political science at an English provincial university says that the main purpose of his courses is to teach his students that "things aren't as simple as all that", that there are "no simple solutions." I think that this is particularly true of the Middle East, because so much of the Middle East in its external aspects—the developed parts, whether they be the modern apartment blocks of Beirut, or bits of Kuwait, or bits of Istanbul and Ankara—is *so much* like the West, like a Western city. The external appearance misleads us into thinking that what applies in our own countries should also apply there. Obviously one has somehow to warn people against falling prey to that terrible illusion.


KEDOURIE: But there is also this other aspect: namely that journalists, certain kinds of the species (and this is not said necessarily to their discredit at all), think that they can take the place of policy-makers and of historians. They consider that their business is not simply to report what is happening under their eyes, but also to provide some kind of commentary: to give advice, to exhort, or to explain that this-is-good and that-is-bad. There is a great temptation to commitment in this kind of journalism; and commitment, I feel, is at the very opposite pole from good journalism.

MANGO: Yes, shouldn't the only commitment required of a good journalist be a commitment to the facts?

EAST & WEST

Holding a Bear by the Tail

The Polish Crisis—By CASIMIR GARNYSZ



THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY of the *Solidarity* Union provides us with hardly any cause for celebration, nor does the approaching first anniversary of martial law. But they are eminently fitting occasions for examining the Polish crisis.

In arguing for or against a more decisive Western involvement, Western analysts as a rule refer either to the moral obligation of the free world ("guilty of Yalta", i.e. of letting the East European nations fall under unwelcome Soviet domination), or to the principle of *Realpolitik* whereby those same agreements by the super-powers in Yalta are still considered binding and consequently, for the sake of peaceful global relations, Poland should be left alone. In these debates one extremely important consideration is usually left out. Structural changes have been occurring in East European societies since World War II, and the situation of East Central Europe, as we have known it since 1945, is already in the process of disintegration. Poland is the demonstration of that.

There has been no shortage of commentaries on the Polish situation in the Western media. But regardless of their assessment of events, most Western analysts perceive only four factors on the

Polish scene: the Army, the Communist Party, the *Solidarity* movement, and the Church—and they see each of them as monolithic. True, in the days when *Solidarity* existed in the open and particularly in the last months before the imposition of martial law, the Western media repeatedly referred to the "radical" and "moderate" wings within the *Solidarity* movement; more recently there has been talk about internal struggle between the "moderate" and the "hard-line" factions within the leadership of the Polish Communist Party. However, there has been little substantive public discussion of the all-important constellation of forces within each of the major groups. Let me therefore scrutinise the main groups observable in the Polish crisis with special attention to their various components.

1. The General Commands

THE FIRST PLAYER in the Polish game is General Jaruzelski, who controls the Army and has as close allies a group in the leadership of the Communist Party—the so-called "moderates." This group consists of people who have a vested interest in gaining or retaining positions which guarantee material security, power, and public visibility. These "enlightened mandarins" seek to take advantage of the system and, being pragmatic and educated, see the impracticability of a return to hardline orthodoxy. The members of this group include *inter alia* Mieczysław Rakowski (Editor of the weekly *Polityka*, member of the Politburo and Vice-Prime Minister); Jerzy Urban (journalist, and government press spokesman); some heads of the regional party committees; the editorial staff of *Trybuna Ludu* (the leading Party paper) and the staff of provincial Party publications; the intellectuals supporting the Communist establishment, for example Hieronim Kubiak, a sociologist who is also a member of the Politburo; Jerzy Wiatr, a sociologist who has served one ruling group after another (advisor to the Central Committee, Director of the Party Institute of Marxism-Leninism).

CASIMIR GARNYSZ is a young Polish social scientist who, for the usual depressing reasons, prefers to write under a pseudonym.