

Alun Chalfont

Stormy Atlantic Weather

Americans, Europeans & the Alliance

ONE OF THE MOST significant ingredients of contemporary political attitudes in Western Europe is a pervasive and often virulent anti-Americanism. The banners and placards of the bedraggled columns shuffling through the streets of our cities under the euphemistic rubric of “peace movements” proclaim a variety of messages—anarchist, communist, unilateralist, and pacifist. But the most strident voices are those which demand the removal of American bases from Europe, evidently under the impression that our cities are under threat from *Pershings* and not from *SS-20s*.

This is depressing, but not surprising. For some time it has been possible to discern, in the pronouncements of the more fashionable gurus of press, radio and television, a tendency to adopt a position of magisterial objectivity as between the free world and the totalitarian ideologies which threaten it. The confused rhetoric which characterises the debate about the nuclear arms race, *détente*, and the North-South dialogue has succeeded in anaesthetising and indoctrinating a whole generation, so that it has become incapable of distinguishing between reality and fantasy, between the fireman and the fire.

Writing of that modishly boring concept “the generation gap” (not in *Pravda* or in *The Guardian* but in *The Times*), Mr Gerald Kaufman (a prominent Labour politician, not by any means on the extreme wing of his party) says of young people that

“defence policy cannot be justified to them as essential for deterring the Russians who...

have never presented themselves to these teenagers as a direct threat to Britain’s survival. To these young people, a greater justification for an independent British nuclear capability than a theoretical Soviet threat will have to be proved...”

One is driven to ask, how then can defence policy be justified to them at all? What greater justification than the “theoretical” Soviet threat could possibly be advanced for maintaining Britain’s nuclear deterrent? The logic of Mr Kaufman’s demoralising kind of argument is that young people are not only horrified by the possible effects of a nuclear war (a reaction which they share with the more geriatric end of the human spectrum); they have apparently gone further and concluded that the only solution is unilateral disarmament for Britain—not only nuclear, but conventional as well. If that is really so, it is largely because politicians and publicists of radical persuasion have sown the seeds of the logical fallacy which lies at the heart of their reasoning.

THE NEXT STEP is predictable—indeed, inevitable. Once the “plague-on-both-of-your-houses” heresy is established in the receptive public mind, it no longer seems perverse to suggest that the threat to world peace comes not from an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union, or even from an uncontrollable military competition between two demented superpowers, but from the United States of America and its trigger-happy President. Indeed, a television critic in a national newspaper, evidently writing with the gears of his mind disengaged, recently declared that a television programme presented by the ineffable Mr Jonathan Dibleby had demonstrated that “the real threat to peace comes not from the Kremlin, but from the man in the cowboy suit.”

LORD CHALFONT was a regular columnist on military affairs for “*The Times*” before serving in Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s Cabinet as Minister for European Affairs. He now sits as an Independent in the House of Lords.

Leaving aside the psychopathology of the endless cheap jibes at President Reagan's background, it is interesting to trace the provenance of the new crusade against the Americans. Partly, of course, it springs from the instinctive hostility of the weak towards the strong, the poor towards the rich, the vacillating towards the resolute and decisive. It is interesting to remark that when President Carter was careering about like a loose cannon on a heaving deck, giving the United States a global reputation for bumbling ineptitude, anti-Americanism took a holiday.

It is true, of course, that President Reagan's tendency to make statements which have not been passed through a series of public relations filters provides his enemies and those of his country with excellent ammunition. When he says that it is possible to envisage a "limited nuclear war" in Europe, the pacifist-neutralist industry sets up a howl of execration. Yet he is only enunciating, with imprudent clarity, the assumption upon which the defensive strategy of NATO has been based for twenty years. If the doctrine of "flexible response" or "graduated deterrence" means anything at all, it postulates a sequence of events in which the Soviet Union launches a conventional military attack on western Europe; inferior NATO conventional forces are incapable of containing it; "battlefield" or "tactical" nuclear weapons are used; whereupon the Soviet Union, convinced of the determination of the West to resist, abandons its aggression. In other words, there has been a nuclear exchange limited to the European theatre. This may not be a very convincing basis upon which to construct a defensive strategy. Indeed, it is very unlikely that a war ever *could* be limited in this way. It seems, however, perverse to vilify the President of the United States because he is indiscreet enough to identify the underlying assumption of NATO's collectively agreed defensive strategy. It is interesting, too, that in the uproar which greeted the American President's unguarded comment on the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe, one important fact seemed to go unremarked—namely, that a war of *any* kind in Europe will occur only as a result of Russian aggression; and as Russian strategists have never left any doubt that they regard nuclear weapons as legitimate instruments of war, Western concern about NATO's plans for limiting their use seems curiously misplaced.

When the President says that the gas pipe-line project will do nothing to discourage the Soviet Union from presiding over the enslavement of

Poland, while it will increase Western Europe's dependence upon Russian energy sources, the latent chauvinism of the Europeans is given full and petulant expression. Yet he is only stating a self-evident truth. Energy development, is, after all, one of the critical factors in the Soviet economy. Without the gas pipe-line project, the Soviet Union in its chronic need for hard currency might well be forced to increase its exports of oil to the West, at the expense of its heavily subsidised supplies to its East European empire. This would cause a further decline in economic growth in the Warsaw Pact countries, a prospect which must cause some alarm in the Kremlin, which is already faced with a state of rebellion in Poland. The United States, it seems, is making the quite reasonable point that it can scarcely be in the long-term interests of the Western alliance to close the Russians' own "window of vulnerability" while they are devoting so much effort to ensure that ours is kept wide open.

WE HAVE, THEREFORE, reached a most alarming state of affairs. Not only is the Western alliance blundering into a crisis; it is also persuading itself that most, if not all, of the fault lies with the Americans. It is consequently not only acceptable, but in some circles almost mandatory, to characterise Americans as naive and dangerous militarists, propping up unsavoury dictatorships, provoking and perpetuating a mindless arms race while attempting to bully their more civilised and sophisticated European allies into accepting an uncomplicated view of the world in which the only enemy is Communism and the only way to defeat it is "the Bomb." The truth is, in fact, somewhat different.

In the first place, those who direct American policy at the highest level are of a calibre to which very few European countries can aspire. Not only are Cabinet members like Caspar Weinberger and George Shultz men of prudence and intelligence; with them in the Pentagon and the State Department are influential figures like John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy, and Eugene Rostow, the Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose imaginative ability and sheer technical grasp of their subject are matched by very few of their counterparts in the whole of Western Europe. This is, to some extent, a reflection of a broader phenomenon in the defence and foreign policy establishment of the United States. Exter-

nal policies are distilled not only from official advice but from the collective intelligence of a number of independent institutions. These "think tanks", contrary to the received wisdom of radical chic, are not collections of wild-eyed maniacs calculating "megadeaths" and playing "war games" with strategic missiles; they are, for the most part, responsible and highly qualified engineers and mathematicians, chemists and physicists, applying rigorous scientific analysis to problems which in Europe are left to a handful of professionals and a small army of enthusiastic amateurs. The level of intellectual and scientific resource devoted to strategic policy formulation in the United States has virtually no parallel in Western Europe. Not only do these men and women, who are experts in the original and unpejorative sense of the word, publish politico-strategic studies of considerable importance; they also carry out highly classified work for government departments. Many of them, indeed, move in and out of government posts, depending on the complexion of the administration in power.

It would, thus, be appropriate for observers in Western Europe, where the record of wisdom in

international affairs is by no means a matter for uncritical admiration, to pause before dismissing the Americans as a rabble of frontiersmen and their President as a "B"-film baddie. In Britain, this particular brand of patronising hostility is especially unbecoming. When we were recently engaged in a confrontation with Argentina, which culminated in a vicious little war, the behaviour of the United States was crucial. At first, they made a series of careful attempts at mediation, based upon the justifiable calculation that America was the only nation with both the power and the credibility to bring about a peaceful solution over the Falkland Islands; and when mediation failed, they came down unequivocally on the side of their NATO ally, providing secret intelligence, logistic reinforcement and moral support on a scale which was certainly influential, if not decisive, in the eventual outcome of the war in the South Atlantic.

It is important to recognise, furthermore, that this took place against the background of a shift of emphasis in American strategic perceptions which is of decisive importance for the future of the Western alliance. For over thirty years, United States foreign policy has rested securely on the

Hate is Love (i.e. War is Peace)

YOUNG RUSSIANS are under ideological attack from the west and must be taught more intensively to hate their "class enemies" in the capitalist world.

The latest issue of *Young Communist*, the Communist Youth League journal, records the views of teachers, youth leaders, ideologists and sociologists at a discussion about the upbringing of young people.

MR A. I. GAVRIKOV, a researcher at the Soviet Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, says: "While raising young people as fighters for peace we have no right to leave out of their moral make-up an active, irreconcilable acute hatred towards class enemies.

"One thing is clear: we must be more energetic in reading class irreconcilability, class hatred of exploitation, militarism and reactionaries. This is a noble feeling, inseparable from socialist humanism. What could be more humane than the struggle against the evil which serves the cause of exploitation of man by man."

MR GAVRIKOV AND other speakers accused the Western Powers of conducting a campaign of subversion against Soviet youth, particularly through radio broadcasts.

"THE CHANNELS of influence on our children and teenagers do not end with radio propaganda," added Mr Gavrikov. "We also have consumer goods, hot music, political jokes and even toys. We can see our children playing with toys they never had before: toy soldiers in American Navy uniforms, plastic copies of Nato pistols.

"We must cultivate in our youth the ability to recognise a class enemy no matter what image it assumes.

"MANY PEOPLE do not sense an enemy in the BBC announcer who is cheerfully talking into the microphone about hit songs. They do not realise the ideological hostility of religion and they thoughtlessly pay attention to all kinds of rumours and cock and bull stories."

PROF Y. NOZHKIN, of the Academy of Social Sciences, calls for a large-scale effort to "discredit hostile propaganda."

The West is using propaganda to camouflage the military and strategic plans of the United States, he claims, and to

"undermine the moral potential of the Soviet Union and socialist countries as potential enemies in a future war."

"The enemy's designs are serious. It has even stopped trying to disguise its intentions. Reagan openly wants to finish with Communism."

Prof. Nozhkin says young people who "blindly trust this glib poison, speculation and misinformation" coming from the West "must be told precisely and categorically: there is no middle position, you cannot remain on both sides of the barricade."

Nigel Wade

in the DAILY TELEGRAPH (London)

assumption that, to use a somewhat melodramatic image, the River Elbe is one of the frontiers of the United States. In other words, there has been an almost unchallenged consensus that one of the critical areas of American security lies in Europe and the Atlantic. It is upon this foundation that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was built; it is for this reason that the United States keeps 350,000 troops in Europe, including more than 200,000 soldiers in Germany, partly as an element of conventional military defence, and partly as a "hostage force" to demonstrate the validity of the American nuclear guarantee.

IN RECENT YEARS much has happened to cast doubt upon this central set of assumptions. Many percipient observers decline to accept the credibility of "extended deterrence", and the validity of the theory of the American nuclear umbrella has always been suspect. To many Americans, however, it poses the very real danger that some day an American President might have to respond to a Russian attack on West Germany by "pressing the button" and initiating a nuclear exchange in which American cities would almost certainly be included in the list of targets. Furthermore, the Soviet threat has long since ceased to be a simple matter of the red hordes pouring through France

and Germany "down to the Channel ports." Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Yemen and Angola have demonstrated the global reach of Russian foreign policy, powerfully supported by maritime forces which have developed in thirty years to provide not only a formidable naval presence across the sea lanes of the world, but also a capacity for the distant application of military force which is unmatched by any other world power.

The latest development in this context has been the emergence of a pattern of Communist penetration in Latin America. For many Americans, rightly or wrongly, events in Nicaragua and El Salvador are seen as the early warnings of a political transformation which might soon pose a direct threat to the security of the southern United States. The crudest reaction to this new perception is a demand, growing in insistence, for the withdrawal of American forces from Europe—a "bring-the-boys-home" movement which, however precarious may be its foundation in military logic, has a powerful emotive appeal. At a more sophisticated level the concept of "global unilateralism" is gaining in strength. In essence, this postulates an American foreign policy liberated from entangling and institutionalised alliances, free to seek its friends and allies pragmatically and to construct security policies more relevant to the pervasive and global nature of the threat. It is a modified form of traditional "isolationism" which would not necessarily exclude defence arrangements with *some* Western European countries, but which would almost certainly signal the end of the historic North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in its present form.



BEFORE ANYONE of radical persuasion begins to indicate too openly his pleasure at this prospect, it might be salutary to point out that if it happens, one of the cardinal aims of Soviet foreign policy will have been achieved. To engage in the debate about whether the Russians have a "strategic master plan" or whether their policies are governed by a "flexible opportunism" is a sterile occupation. The dangers for the free world are the same in either case.

What is clear beyond any reasonable doubt is that Russian long-term aims include a number of identifiable elements. One of these is to bring about the disintegration of NATO and the separation of Western Europe from the United States as a necessary prelude to the "Finlandisation" of

Western Europe.¹ (The Finns understandably resent the term, but perhaps they will permit its use in this context to identify in shorthand a political concept which is fully understood by the rest of the world.)

The Soviet Union, therefore, has good reason to be pleased with what is happening inside NATO. The catalogue of "misunderstandings" is endless. The United States, with the approval of most of its allies, and indeed at the express request of some, makes plans for the deployment of enhanced radiation warheads in Europe; there is, at once, an uproar against the "neutron bomb"—described by the mentally enfeebled as a "capitalist weapon" (i.e. designed to kill people but preserve property).² Next, in an attempt (however misguided) to redress the geopolitical impact of the Russian SS-20 missile, the Americans propose to station Cruise missiles in certain Western European countries. Immediately the "peace" industry begins its predictable uproar. Steel exports, the gas pipe-line, the activities of multinational corporations—all add fuel to the great bonfire of suspicion, misunderstanding, and open hostility which is being carefully kindled between the United States and its European allies. Only the weather seems to be excluded from the radical litany of American deficiencies and excesses—an omission which will undoubtedly be repaired in the fullness of time.

THE RISE OF neutralism and anti-Americanism in Western Europe has an especially piquant flavour when considered in the context of the confrontation between the world's two principal political, ideological, and economic groupings.

The Soviet Union is a police state controlled by a totalitarian dictatorship; denial of human rights is institutionalised, any sign of dissent is brutally suppressed. Its central assumption is that the human individual exists to serve the state, and not the state to serve the individual. Freedom, to generations of Russians, has been (and still is) an unreal and alien concept. These propositions may

¹ See Walter Laqueur, "The Specter of Finlandisation", *Commentary* (December 1977), and Melvin J. Lasky, "From Helsinki to Moscow", *ENCOUNTER* (August 1979).

² The "people" it is designed to kill are the tank commanders and their crews leading an invading force; the "property" it is designed to protect are the towns and cities of "the environment" so that populations could continue to live in them.

seem to be self-evident—they describe, indeed, the distinctive characteristics of any society which attempts to elevate the moral squalor and intellectual bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism into a political system. Yet it is necessary to insist upon them because the Soviet Union openly declares its desire to impose this system on the rest of the world, and has consistently demonstrated that it is prepared, if it seems necessary and feasible, to use force to do so.

Alliance "Adrift"

London



THERE has been a striking reversal in the British public's view of the "Atlantic Alliance." In June they saw Britain and America tending to draw closer together. Now a majority see the two countries drifting apart.

That was before last week's announcement by the United States that it would vote for the Argentine-Latin American UN resolution on the Falklands. Not only is the relationship in the doldrums but so is the British view of President Reagan, with only one in four seeing him as a good president.

These are some of the main findings of a recent Gallup Poll.

IT WOULD APPEAR that the support given to Britain by America in the Falklands crisis engendered the feeling that the two countries were drawing closer together (50%). The controversy over the Russian pipeline has reversed this feeling (23%).

Given this background it is not surprising that the British public have little general confidence in either America or its President, though past Gallup readings have shown that the British have more confidence in the American people than is true of most European nations.

Replies to the question: "How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems—very great, considerable, little or very little?" were

	Today	June
Very great	3	6
Considerable	22	26
Little	31	27
Very little	25	25
None at all	13	13
Don't know	6	3


This latest Gallup Poll was carried out among a nationally representative quota sample of 943 electors in more than 95 districts in Great Britain, between October 27 and November 1.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

It may come as something of a surprise to a generation brought up on a diet of cynical and carefully orchestrated disinformation to learn that the United States is, on the other hand, the original model of modern democracy. Its political system is constructed upon a liberal compromise between the demands of freedom and order; its government is open, and its press sometimes embarrassingly independent. Its society has none of the residual class preoccupations of many Western European countries, and although its people are refreshingly non-deferential there is a broad and powerful base of national pride and patriotism. One of the constant surprises for the European visitor is the sight of 30,000 people in a football or tennis stadium standing in silence for the national anthem—a spectacle which would attract the derisive contempt of the rabble which turns European football grounds into battle-grounds, and which greets its national anthem with jeers and obscenities.

THERE IS, as far as I am aware, no evidence that the United States plan to use military force to expand their influence or to impose their political system upon the rest of the world. The military alliance of which America is the leader and the central power is entirely defensive—a proposition demonstrable by its nature, its strategic doctrines and its deployment. Simply to write these sentences is to be conscious that they are statements of the obvious; yet it is clearly necessary to go on writing them as long as there are people in the free world who are, at best, unable to make moral distinctions between the two conflicting systems and, at worst, disposed to vilify and blackguard the country upon which we depend, ultimately, for the preservation of our own liberties. For this is the simple fact. If the Western alliance continues to disintegrate; and if the United States retreats into its carapace of “global unilateralism”, withdrawing its military presence from Europe and engaging a bilateral relationship with the Soviet

The Soviet Navy



SHORTLY after this summer's abortive coup in the Seychelles Islands, strategically located astride the vital oil and trade routes of the Indian Ocean, three Russian warships slipped quietly into harbour at Victoria, the capital, and dropped anchor. By all accounts they remained irreproachably neutral while the

left-wing government of President Albert René crushed the rebellion with the help of 100 Tanzanian troops flown over from the African mainland.

Ten days later, in early September, according to Western intelligence reports, the Soviet flotilla—a destroyer, a Krivak class guided-missile frigate and an auxiliary vessel—sailed out of Victoria to rejoin the battle group now permanently on station in the area.

THIS WAS THE SECOND occasion in less than a year that the Russians had used peaceful gunboat diplomacy in the Seychelles. Last November a cruiser and a frigate docked at Victoria, ostensibly to provide “anti-aircraft protection” when a ragged group of South African mercenaries tried and failed to oust President René.

FOR WESTERN military planners, worried by spreading Soviet influence in an arc stretching from the east coast of Africa through the Gulf to the Pacific, the repeated presence of Russian gunboats in the Seychelles archipelago underlines two important developments:

1. The first is that the Soviet Navy is today deployed worldwide, far from its home ports in the Baltic and the Sea of Japan, and is a major instrument of the Krem-

lin's diplomacy. 2. The second is that an area of vital economic, strategic and political importance to the West—where first British and now US prestige was predominant—is increasingly coming under pressure from Moscow.

Rear-Admiral Sumner Shapiro, the US's Director of Naval Intelligence, maintains that the Russians have taken to heart Oliver Cromwell's axiom that “a man-of-war is the best ambassador” and that its rapidly expanding fleet not only provides a “flexible and convincing instrument of state policy” but also presents a “real and growing threat” to the West.

NOWHERE IS THIS more true than off the Asian land masses. The build-up of Soviet naval facilities—from Petropavlosk, a major Russian base north of Japan, through Vietnam to Aden and Ethiopia—poses a direct threat to the sea lanes which carry 90% of Japan's imported oil, 60% of Europe's and 20% of the US's. Defence experts in the US argue that the Russians now have the ability to threaten the free flow of western trade.

WESTERN CONCERN over what to do about the rise of Russian forces east of Suez was underlined late last month when India, the largest and most influential Indian Ocean state, joined a chorus calling for the major US-British military base on the tiny island of Diego Garcia to be dismantled and the island returned to Mauritius which, for the first time in 22 years, is under the control of a left-wing government. Diego Garcia was part of Mauritius in British colonial days and is leased to the US as an air force base now capable of taking strategic nuclear bombers. It was from there that President Carter launched the ill-starred mission to rescue the hostages in Iran. The base

Union, the countries of Western Europe will have some hard choices to make—and they are not difficult to identify.

One of them has recently been given an airing in a pamphlet written by Mr Robert Jackson, a British Conservative member of the European Parliament in Strasbourg. In it he writes

“with America on the ebb, Britain faces once again . . . the fact that her central interests are in Europe. A Europe which is forming an identity that in many respects runs counter to American views and short-term interests.”

Mr Jackson's description of America “on the ebb” reads strangely against the background of the consensus of informed economic opinion, which, on the evidence of most significant indicators, forecasts a higher growth rate and a lower inflation rate in the 1980s for the United States than for most Western European countries. He is, however, the spokesman for a point of view which is

being heard increasingly throughout the European Community and not only on the Left of the political spectrum. Its dream is of some kind of *Festung Europa*, a Europe built in conflict with the United States, but in some mysterious way compatible with the wider community of the West. The concept is disturbingly fragile. There has been no evidence so far that Western Europe is capable even of harmonising and coordinating its foreign policies, much less of forming a political grouping capable of ensuring its own security against military attack.

THERE IS, OF COURSE, another option open to the countries of Western Europe. It is, put in its crudest form, to exchange dependence on the United States for dependence on the Soviet Union—for this, as the Finnish position demonstrates, is one of the risks of neutrality. For those convinced of the pacific intentions of the Soviet Union this

Reaches Out

is regarded as the pivot of Western military power in the Indian Ocean area.

TODAY roughly one-third of the Soviet Union's total land, air and sea forces are assigned to the country's eastern military regions. The Soviet army in the Far East now comprises 500,000 soldiers, 12,000 tanks, 12,500 armoured fighting vehicles, and 5,000 pieces of artillery. The Soviet Pacific fleet, directed by the architect of the Kremlin's policy of global gunboat diplomacy, Admiral Sergei Gorchkov, now deploys 120 attack submarines, 80 surface combat vessels and 300 fighter aircraft. The Russians are also deploying an increasing number of nuclear missiles in the Far East as well as having 1,200 Air Force aircraft.

The most recent and perhaps most worrying development for the US is the increasing use made by the Soviet Union of former American facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Complementing similar facilities in Ethiopia and Aden, Moscow now deploys up to 10 or 11 ships out of Cam Ranh Bay, including one attack cruise-missile submarine, three surface combatants and an intelligence gatherer.

In a number of cases, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Aden and Ethiopia, these military arrangements are backed up by wide-ranging friendship treaties providing for military co-operation, “For the first time our dominance in the area is being challenged” said a US intelligence official. Vietnamese officials recently hinted that, failing a satisfactory outcome to negotiations with its non-Communist neighbours over the status of Kampuchea, Hanoi may be forced to give the Soviet Union, which has an effective strangle-hold over the Vietnamese economy, full base facilities. “That would be a big blow”, admitted one British intelligence officer.

IN THE PHILIPPINES the deteriorating health of President Ferdinand Marcos and the threat of instability after he leaves the scene must raise doubts in Washington about the permanence of this crucial naval arrangement.

In Australia, would the Labour Party, if elected, close Australian ports and harbours to US nuclear-armed ships? There are doubts over the solidity of the ANZUS defence pact, which groups the US, New Zealand and Australia, at a time when American forces are under greater pressure to cover the approaches to the Gulf and the oilfields of the Middle East and are looking for relief in the Pacific.

The Reagan administration's analysts argue that the Russians have four main aims:

Neutralising Japan in any conflict.

Placing themselves in a position to cut off Western oil supplies from the Gulf.

Intimidating ASEAN through the projection of Soviet power, thus influencing political events, such as talks over Kampuchea.

Attempting to limit, and if possible prevent, the strengthening of strategic links between the West and China.

WHY the Russians are building their forces in Asia can only be a matter of speculation. What is no longer in doubt is that they are now a power to be reckoned with in the area and every conceivable Western response to this new challenge can only be limited and unsatisfactory.

Alain Cass

Asian Editor,

in the FINANCIAL TIMES

option holds no terrors; but there should be no doubt that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation disintegrates into a collection of "neutralist" nation-states, denuded of credible deterrence or effective defence (and this is the logical conclusion of the policies advocated by the "peace" movements), their survival as free and independent societies will depend upon the whim of the Soviet Union. It is a course which has little attraction for those who are disposed to take the words and actions of the Russian leadership at their face value.

There is, in fact, *no* real choice for Western Europe. The inescapable necessity is to bend the efforts of foreign policy to repairing the cracks which are appearing in the Western alliance; to recognise that there are long-term strategic concerns which override short- and medium-term conflicts of economic interests, for the simple reason that they are not matters only of stability and prosperity but of survival.

IT IS ESSENTIAL as a first step to reassert a collective commitment to the objectives of the Alliance, and to avoid becoming enmeshed in debilitating arguments about the short-term means by which they are to be achieved. The principal aim must continue to be to preserve the security of the West through effectively deterring

the potential enemy from exercising his military option.

It is arguable that this should now be done with less dependence on nuclear weapons and more on strong conventional forces. It does not, however, mean giving hostages to fortune in the form of "nuclear-free zones" and "no first use" declarations. Within the context of effective deterrence it should be possible to reduce dangerous tensions by means of a continuing dialogue between East and West, and specifically by the negotiation of verifiable arms control agreements. Within the framework of a revived consensus on these basic objectives, one of the cardinal aims of all Western European foreign policy must be to ensure that the United States remains fully engaged in the security of the free world.

An essential prerequisite is to counter the insidious anti-Americanism which is, to the delight of our enemies, beginning to poison the mainstream of the Western alliance. This is not to suggest that uncritical adulation of everything American is in order; merely that everything American is not by definition simple-minded or ill-intentioned. Nor is it meant to suggest a slavish dependence on the United States—we do not, as an efficiently indoctrinated young delegate remarked recently at a political party conference, want to become "another Hawaii." If it were, however, the only alternative (and it is not) it might be preferable to becoming another Hungary.

Drive us back to Zahlé

Please measure my neck.
I want it for a suit.
O.K. wrap it please.

You must have time for fun.
I will show you an excellent kind.
Drive us back to Zahlé.

But the sea is rough.
Do you want me to cut it short for you?
Do you want it in the first or second floor?

Please, send me the chambermaid.
Anything forbidden?
Anything contrabanded?

B. C. Leale