

International Military Tribunal that no Japanese subject would go against the will of His Majesty. This had an obvious technical significance in the court, but what it illustrated above all was the extent to which Tojo, like other totalitarians of that period, had become the prisoner of his own propaganda. Myths created by those who manipulated the Emperor-system may have very little connection with the Emperor, or none at all.

In truth, what lies behind whatever image you may have of the late Emperor, when you have also consulted the work of Professor Takeda,<sup>5</sup> and that of the established authorities, such as Professors Beasley and Storry, is an expanse of ignorance; but this is not ignorance in the sense of lack of learning: it is simply an absence of knowledge. This is one of history's empty quarters. It is not an area populated by all those whom Mr Behr would apparently wish to believe had been either seduced or bought. It is an area in which something very closely akin to the reticence of Colonel Isobé's dignity may have an honourable place.

It would not be right, however, to risk the imputation that Colonel Isobé was some kind of Sphinx. On the contrary, on

the occasion of our last meeting he was perfectly explicit. He was as eager as ever to listen for one's linguistic mistakes and solecisms, his head cocked slightly to right (promising) or left (not so good), his lips at the half-purse. His outer clothing, ranging from dark fawn to dry bracken in colour, suggested a retired infantry officer experimenting with cavalry twill and cut; and parry, too, if challenged.

Sensing that he regarded me as a graduate (if as yet not of language, then possibly now of life), I congratulated him on the achievement of his state of conservation, and enquired whether there was a secret to it, which he might be willing to share with one no longer far from needing its reassurance. Colonel Isobé looked about him cautiously. Apparently seeking cover for a special confidence, he beckoned me towards a suitably isolated clump of azaleas, by which we might be shielded in privacy briefly from the crowd gathered on the lawn.


He confided in me that the secret of healthy longevity was an inheritance. Isobé was one of the ancient names: its bearers were the people of the sea-shore, as old as the rocks among which they dwelt. "It is simple", he said. "You must walk three miles every day."

He cocked his head back, to make certain that his message had been received: and burst into a smile of encouragement. "It is very simple", he repeated.

<sup>5</sup> Professor Kiyoko Takeda, *The Dual Image of the Japanese Emperor* (Macmillan, 1988).

## The Elephant & the Chickens?

*German Dilemmas—By ROGER MORGAN*



GERMANY, in this spring and summer of 1989, has been the scene of a number of strange and striking events. 1989, we should recall, is the year that has brought the fortieth anniversaries of the Federal Republic, of the DDR, and of NATO; the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the

War which ended with Germany's downfall and partition; and—while we are at it—the hundredth anniversary of the Second Workers' International, which vainly hoped that international socialism would abolish international war. Let us even recall another event with an anniversary in 1989—the French Revolution, whose many effects included the stirring-up of European patriotisms and nationalisms to a point where "the German Question" soon assumed a prominence and a potential for trouble which have been with us ever since. It has in fact been remarkable how much German media discussion there has been this year of the impact of the French Revolution on the German nation.

In the public life of the Federal Republic, the prelude to

this year of anniversaries was an incident arising directly from yet another of them: the fiftieth anniversary, in November 1988, of the horrific pogrom of 1938 known as the *Reichskristallnacht*. Philipp Jenninger, the Speaker of the *Bundestag*, had to resign from his post after making a well-intentioned but grossly ill-presented memorial speech: a speech which, in exploring the historical reasons for German anti-Semitism, finished up by at least appearing to suggest that *tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner*. 1989 thus began with sensitive Germans particularly aware of the tense and problem-laden relationships between past, present, and future.

Other dramatic events soon followed. Within a few months, elections in West Berlin and in Frankfurt had seen the overthrow of the incumbent Christian Democratic administrations and their replacement by the Left; worse still, from Chancellor Kohl's point of view, the new Social Democratic mayors depended on the support of the radical Green Party, hitherto virtually excluded from public office (and in Berlin, the Greens or "Alternatives" took several key jobs in the new city government). Then, in the elections for the European Parliament in June, the Social Democrats lost slightly, and the Christian Democrats very heavily, both to the Greens and to a much more alarming new force on

the far Right. The Republican Party of Franz Schoenhuber, even though it formally disavowed any Nazi sympathies, won more than 7% of the national vote (and in some parts of Bavaria, a staggering 20% or more) with slogans of a nationalistic, xenophobic, and even overtly racist character which boded ill for the future.

One inescapable implication of this, which the established party leaders had to face, was that if the "Greens" and "Browns" were to achieve anything like their June 1989 score in the next federal election, due in December 1990, the parties ruling in Bonn since 1949—Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Free Democrats—would almost certainly have to share power with one or other of these unpalatable outsiders. All those concerned bravely continued to reassure themselves and the world with the old slogan that, despite this alarming prospect, "Bonn is not Weimar"; but one public figure at least (the *FDP* chairman Count Lambsdorff) commented that the similarity was too close for comfort. Chancellor Kohl's *CDU* and its Bavarian branch the *CSU* embarked on an agonising and in part self-destructive appraisal of how they should respond to the "Brown" challenge from the Right; while some Social Democrats and others on the Left began to argue that the 1990 election could well oust Kohl in favour of a "traffic-light" coalition (the red *SPD*, the yellow *FDP*, and the Greens).

**W**HILE THESE domestic upheavals were in full swing, Bonn was engaged in an unprecedentedly vituperative conflict with its main allies in NATO, resisting American and British pressure for the "modernisation" of the short-range nuclear missiles based on German soil. German politicians of all parties argued that "modernisation" was in fact a euphemism for the replacement of America's obsolescent Lance missiles by weapons of much greater range and striking-power. And they were most reluctant to provoke the Soviet Union by taking this step at a moment when the successful "zero options" of 1987-88 had removed both NATO and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, leaving West Germany exposed as both the host and the potential target for almost all the shorter-range weapons remaining in Europe. Above all, German politicians from the Chancellor downwards refused to take a decision on the Lance affair until the election of 1990 was safely out of the way. (It is not hard to see that this election will become a competition in commitments *not* to "modernise".)

A fragile-looking compromise was patched up at NATO's fortieth anniversary event in Brussels in May; there would have to be a decision on the Lance issue, but only in 1991 or so, and meanwhile, East-West negotiations on short-range weapons would be brought forward—a further concession to German demands. By this time, however, the Western Alliance had seen an unparalleled assertion of German refusal to accept British or American views, and a sustained and outspoken German resentment at the idea that NATO's purpose still appeared to be, as Lord Ismay had half-seriously put it 40 years earlier, "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down". Indeed, injured

German allusions to what we might call the Ismay Doctrine have continued to reverberate all through the year.

German frustration and even indignation at being, as they saw it, "kept down", led the main opposition party, the *SPD*, to make a formal demand for the ending of the legal rights of the Allied armed forces, now regarded as an unacceptable limitation on German sovereignty 45 years after the end of the War. Some of the aspects of the Allied forces' status to which the *SPD* objected are concrete and specific: for instance, the right of these forces to carry out low-flying air exercises irrespective of German court decisions; their sovereign control of large areas of German airports; and their right to use German bases for military missions (such as the bombing of Libya in 1986) without consulting Bonn. Behind these specific grievances, however, lay a widespread German feeling that the limitations on German sovereignty which Adenauer had accepted as the price for NATO membership in the 1950s were discriminatory and insulting in the 1980s.

In any case, Germans increasingly asked, was American military protection really so necessary, now that the Soviet "threat" appeared to have declined to vanishing-point? Gorbachov's highly successful visit in June merely marked one stage in a process of growing German hopes that the "common European house" propagated by the Soviet leader would be one in which the Germans could feel safer, and could do something new about the German Question.

Quite apart from the promise of concessions from Gorbachov himself, anyone looking eastwards from Bonn in 1989 could see the Soviet bloc as a whole crumbling in ways which might well, it seemed, bring the total collapse of the *DDR* and perhaps some hitherto unthinkable new answers to the question of Germany's future. A non-Communist Prime Minister in Poland; Soviet backing for economic and political reforms everywhere; and above all the virtually open frontier between Hungary and Austria, which by September was allowing East Germans to escape westwards in tens of thousands. Honecker had indeed been received in Bonn with full state honours in 1987, but by 1989 it looked as if the state he represented might well, like its aged leader, be going into a terminal decline.

All these incidents of 1989 have occurred in a context in which German minds are more sensitive than for many decades to their country's position in the geography and the history of Europe. The *Zeitgeist* of the '80s has included a

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growing German preoccupation—an obsession, in the case of some intellectuals in West Berlin—with various forms of the ambiguous concept of *Mitteleuropa*: a Europe in which Germans would again feel at home in Riga and Budapest, as well as in Brussels and Paris, a reunited Europe in which Germany's division might also be overcome.

**A**GAIN, the ultra-sensitive character of Germany's recent history and its role in current politics (already manifest in the *Historikerstreit* or historians' quarrel of 1987-88 and in the Jennings affair of 1988) made the headlines once more when a leading Bonn political scientist claimed to have evidence that no less a patriot than Konrad Adenauer had secretly compromised over the issue of German reunification. In the 1950s, it was claimed, Adenauer had secretly signed a formal agreement with Bonn's Western allies, stating that in exchange for their support for the reunification of the two Germanies, the Federal Republic renounced all claims to the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line. In the climate of 1989, this suggestion that even Adenauer had been prepared formally to abandon Germany's notional right to "the frontiers of 1937"—officially still an integral part of Bonn's legal position, however unrealistic politically—was party-political dynamite. Even though Adenauer's alleged document was not brought to light, the controversy inflamed the already bitter conflict between the proponents of recognising the Oder-Neisse frontier as permanent (a gesture of German-Polish reconciliation which might have been especially effective in this anniversary year) and the hard-liners on Kohl's Right. These hard-liners, in fact, have succeeded in nailing the Bonn government to their point of view, and also in preventing either the Chancellor or the President from making a conciliatory visit to Poland, as was planned, on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1939 invasion.

What, then, are we to make of this clamour of demands for German self-assertion, German sovereignty, German demilitarisation, perhaps German neutralisation, and, for some, German reunification? An easy answer would be to say—as many observers of Germany have indeed been saying ever since the 1950s—that the endless *talk* about changing Germany's status is only a reflection of the fact that *action* in this direction is ruled out by the international consensus of East and West: as Italy's quasi-eternal Foreign Minister Andreotti memorably said of Germany's division in 1984, "They are two, and two they must remain".

Many experts continue to foresee a double future for Germany, a future bringing little if any change in the *status quo* that currently fixes each Republic in its respective bloc. The wise and experienced commentator Sebastian Haffner ends his shrewd survey, *Germany's Self-Destruction: The Reich from Bismarck to Hitler*<sup>1</sup>—of a century in which the restless

*Reich* constantly upset the balance of Europe, and finished by destroying both the balance and itself—by opining that the unified *Reich* has gone for ever, and that (contrary to Bonn's official doctrine) even the Basic Law of 1949 does not lay an obligation on West Germany to work for reunification. Bonn itself, so Haffner argues, recognised this fact 30 years after the War's end by signing the Helsinki Agreement on European security and cooperation, which "makes no mention of a possible . . . reunification of the German states, thereby finally ending the thirty-year-long death agony of the German Reich".

Haffner's postulate of territorial stability on the basis of the *status quo* is echoed by the still-widespread view that the domestic scene in the Federal Republic is also likely to remain stable and to conform to the patterns we have always known and generally liked. George McGhee, whose well-documented account of his Ambassadorship to Bonn (1963-68), *At the Creation of a New Germany*,<sup>2</sup> will form an essential source-book for specialists on German-American relations, concludes with a distinctly upbeat assessment of the Federal Republic in the mid-1980s. He argues that American perceptions of an anti-NATO trend in Germany are:

" . . . exaggerated, as demonstrated by Helmut Kohl's election in 1983 and the re-election in West Berlin in 1985 of the city's first Christian Democratic government since World War II. . . . At this writing, the openly anti-American Greens appear to have peaked. The SPD, although opposed to medium-range missiles, subsequently adopted a conciliatory, pro-NATO resolution at its May 1984 convention in Essen."

The events of the last year, as we have seen, have placed massive question-marks over Ambassador McGhee's projection of a stable, CDU-led Federal Republic (and West Berlin), as over Sebastian Haffner's picture of the two German states serenely accepting their lasting division. Pessimists—notably many French commentators on Germany—argue that the Federal Republic is falling prey to a mood of "national-neutralist pacifism", in which the revival of old-fashioned German self-interest is producing a readiness to abandon the Western Alliance and the European Community in order to conclude a new Rapallo Treaty with Moscow. Some of the pessimists find this a convincing scenario because they believe that Germany cannot be expected to tolerate its division forever (any more than France did in 1871-1918, or Poland in 1795-1918), and that national geopolitical interests, as well as dark forces in the Teutonic soul, will propel Germany in this fateful direction.

The optimists, on the other hand—and these include many British observers of the German scene—have tended to argue that despite all the sound and fury to be heard from the "Green" and "Brown" ends of the political spectrum, the West Germans are fundamentally committed to moderation, to the political centre, and to policies of caution. Their electoral system is virtually guaranteed to produce coalition governments in which any possible "extreme" tendencies of either the SPD or the CDU/CSU are countered by the FDP. Neither the SPD in the 1960s nor the CDU/CSU in the 1980s was able to gain power until it had adopted the essential elements of its predecessor's policies; the Greens now holding

<sup>1</sup> *Germany's Self-Destruction: The Reich from Bismarck to Hitler*. By SEBASTIAN HAFFNER. Simon & Schuster, \$19.95, £13.95.

<sup>2</sup> *At the Creation of a New Germany: From Adenauer to Brandt: An Ambassador's Account*. By GEORGE MCGHEE. Yale University Press, \$25.00, £20.00.



office in Berlin are no exception to this rule. The 1990 election, in sum, is likely to produce a Bonn administration, whatever its nominal colours may be, which will not give the Western Alliance, or the world in general, more trouble—or at least not *much* more trouble—than its predecessors in the last 40 years.

**E**ACH SIDE can produce considerable evidence for its view. The pessimists are no doubt right to underline the fact that Germany's situation lays Bonn open to strong and manifold temptations, at a time when East-West relations seem to be in a state less of flux than of flood. There is no doubt that Gorbachov's hazy but alluring visions of a new future for Europe have encouraged Bonn to persist in the role it has usually played in the last twenty years, that of being the most optimistic and the most risk-inclined member of NATO, as far as *détente* is concerned. The Western Alliance is likely to see several re-enactments of variants of the Lance missile argument of early 1989, in which a general NATO desire for some form of military strengthening, modernisation, or whatever, collides head-on with a German preference for East-West negotiation and the pursuit of *détente*.

And yet the pessimists surely go too far in their fantasy of a Germany bolting from the Western camp, abandoning NATO and the European Community for the sake of a united future for the German nation. The optimists' reading of recent history, sketched above, contains a lot of truth, and a West German government—*any* West German government—will always have powerful reasons, in the end, for continuing to give priority to Bonn's links with the West.

The intricate nature of these links, and the often contradictory entanglements of the Federal Republic with the outside world, are explored with deep insight and splendid clarity in Professor Wolfram Hanrieder's excellent (and beautifully-written) study of the 40-year history of Bonn's foreign relations, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy*.<sup>3</sup> The author, who has kept closely in touch with German affairs from his post at the University of California, has over the last twenty years produced several outstanding works on Germany and on Europe in general. In this monumental synthesis, he skilfully sets out the combination of dangers and opportunities, of problems and challenges, which the outside world has presented to the Federal Republic and its leaders, from Adenauer to Kohl. Hanrieder's mastery of the detail is deeply impressive, whether he is writing about the intricacies of Arms Control problems from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the INF agreement, or about the issues of trade and finance accompanying Germany's "economic miracle" and its growing impact on a world system characterised, *inter alia*, by the decline of the economic hegemony of the United States.

As Hanrieder makes clear, the fundamental problem

which underlies every aspect of Germany's interaction with its European and global environment is that the Federal Republic, for all its economic power and political clout, has not been able to achieve the two basic political aims it set itself at the beginning. Indeed, these two aims—the disappearance of the Bonn Republic into a reunited Germany on the one hand, and its absorption into a federated United States of (Western) Europe on the other—were perhaps incompatible. The story of the Federal Republic's foreign relations (not all "foreign" either, in the crucial case of *Deutschlandpolitik*) is the story of a political entity whose leaders seriously worked to bring its existing form to an end, in favour of either a united Germany or a united Europe, or perhaps both.

For nearly 40 years, progress towards these goals was painfully, excruciatingly slow. The global situation, sometimes one of Cold War, sometimes one of East-West *détente*, did over time allow *some* progress towards a coming-together of the German nation (though emphatically not an end to its division into two hostile states). Meanwhile, the European Community, to be sure, made *some* kind of progress towards political union in the 30 years separating the Treaty of Rome (1957) from the Single European Act (1987). But in many essential ways Europe remained a Europe of national units (as de Gaulle and then Thatcher insisted it always must be), and not surprisingly the economic giant, the Federal Republic, emerged as something like an elephant among a flock of chickens.

One interpretation of the current ferment in Germany would be to say that the world has changed in ways which at last make progress towards Germany's long-cherished goals at least a thinkable possibility, and that Germans inevitably find this prospect deeply unsettling. As regards the prospect westwards from Bonn, the Single European Act and the dynamism of the drive towards the open market of 1992 have breathed at least a degree of new substance into the old vision of a united Western Europe. Of course, the Community will not easily become what Willy Brandt in 1973 called "a rational form of government for Europe" (and the *Bundesbank*, for sure, will not abdicate to a European Central Bank in a hurry), but at least German firms, banks, trade unions and *Land* governments are already busily engaged in shaping a West European structure which will be

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<sup>3</sup> *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy*. By WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER. Yale University Press, \$29.95, £19.95.

more like a system of collective governance than anything we have seen so far.

Looking eastwards, the Germans can see prospects for action—in this case, action directed towards improving the lot of the German nation—which offer an even stronger contrast to the frustrations of the last 40 years. As real challenges loom up—the challenge of accommodating hundreds of thousands more Germans in the crowded Federal Republic, or of granting the *DDR* massive economic aid (perhaps in return for political concessions which might undermine its viability as a system?)—it is not surprising that the Bonn government, deeply uncertain what to do, should above all stress its determination not to destabilise the precarious balance of power in Europe. This means in other words, at least for the moment, not to reach out for a chance to carry out the policy of reunification which has been the Federal Republic's official *Staatsräson* (a term meaning, confusingly, something more like *raison d'être* than *raison d'état*) for 40 years. . . .

A policy of calculated restraint on Bonn's part will preserve the confidence of the international community (as on so many occasions in the last 40 years), but the big question is whether such a policy will be acceptable to the impatient

voters within West Germany. Whichever party they vote for—in the federal election of December 1990, or in the crucial *Land* elections in the earlier months of that year—not many are likely to accept without question the mixture as before: small steps, and small steps only, in the building of the European Community, in the maintenance of NATO, and in the development of relations with the East.

By the time NATO makes its much-heralded decision about the Lance missiles in 1991 (if it does), or the European Community achieves whatever degree of integration it does achieve in 1992, the friends and partners of Germany will no doubt have seen further dramatic events there, and heard further noisy arguments. All three of the books reviewed here will help their readers to make sense of what is going on: Haffner's, by its reminder of an earlier period when Germany and Europe interacted in quite different ways—fortunately for us—from those of the present; McGhee's, by its vivid reconstruction (based heavily on contemporary official documents) of a stage in Bonn's international development when military, economic, and political issues all seemed to become hyperactive at the same time; and Hanrieder's, for its superbly balanced, penetrating, and thought-provoking survey of the entire 40-year record.

## Islam on the Move?

*The Will to Power—By P. J. VATIKIOTIS*



RECENTLY a Home Office Minister was reported as having written to leaders of the Muslim community in Britain, urging them to cooperate by assimilating in the life and culture of the country where they had chosen to settle. His plea was apparently prompted by the trouble occasioned by Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*, the furore it caused, and the death threat issued by

the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran against its author for having insulted Islam and Muslims, and for being an apostate.

The hapless Minister was obviously unaware that Muslims, on the whole, are not interested in any cooperation that may lead to assimilation, and for very good reason. For they are enjoined by Allah through His revelation to His Prophet Muhammad in the Holy Koran that power belongs to God, His apostle, and the believers who must make every effort to realise His divine pattern for the world; that is, make His revealed word (which is also the Sacred Law) supreme on earth until the whole world is governed by it.

Even more recently, Robert Kilroy-Silk in a feature article in *The Times* wondered why Christians (read: the Western powers) were not making a stand against the excesses of Muslim fanaticism, especially in Lebanon. These two incidents may suggest that there are at last some in the West who are beginning to appreciate the significance of the Muslims' own distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim, and to place in perspective the militant Muslims' campaign not simply to reject modernity—a product of Western culture and a characteristic of Western civilisation—but also to rid all Muslim lands of Western influence and presence (as, for instance, Khomeini in Iran, the radical Shia fundamentalists in Lebanon and elsewhere, and the stirring Central Asian Muslims in the Soviet Union).

Are we then witnessing a renewed clash of cultures, a hostile confrontation between the worlds of Islam and Christendom; or a new kind of East-West (North-South) Cold War?

The widely held belief in an Islamic resurgence has been partly forced on observers because of events in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It is helpful, though, to remember that the invocation of Islam by Muslim communities in times of crisis is not new. Islam has always served as the basis of identity and social cohesion for the majority of Muslims; it also serves as a handy mobilising and unifying agent in the hands of rulers in times of crisis. Even though, over the last 150 years or so, Islam (the faith and the