WAS THE EMIN EXPEDITION PIRATICAL?

THE expedition for the rescue of Emin Pasha must always remain, so far as Mr. Stanley is concerned, one of the greatest feats of courage and endurance in the annals of adventure. No criticism of its objects or methods can dim its luster as an example of what fortitude can accomplish in the teeth of difficulties of nearly every description. It would be no small thing to make one's way across Africa on foot, without other concern than one's own capacity for supporting physical suffering and fatigue. But Mr. Stanley crossed Africa on foot at the head of a column of unwilling, half-hearted, uncivilized followers, for whom he had to supply all the necessary experience and forethought about food, and clothing, and arms, and ammunition, and health. He was the one man in his party who never could afford to be sick, or sorrowful, or discouraged, or doubtful. Whether in the presence of pestilence, or famine, or savage enemies, he had to maintain his *sang froid* many a time within what seemed a hair's breadth of ruin. No man could have passed unscathed through such an ordeal who had not the qualities, in the highest degree, of a born commander. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that no man of our time has borne with impunity such a strain on his *morale*. The reception which was given him in England on his return from his last expedition was, in truth, not beyond his deserts as a leader. His exploits touched the English imagination on the side on which it is most susceptible, for they recalled the memories of a century of English tenacity and pluck.

It seems necessary to say all this, not as a needed tribute to Mr. Stanley's fame, but to prevent possible misconception of the animus of some remarks that I am about to make as to the moral and legal aspects of the attempt to rescue Emin. Public attention would probably never have been directed to these aspects but for the quarrel between Stanley and his followers over the

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troubles of the "rear guard," as it was called. I do not purpose to enter into any discussion of that unhappy business. All discussion of it, even by the actors in it, seems unprofitable in the absence of some sort of judicial inquiry. The revelations about it in the newspapers and magazines have not only greatly diminished in the public eye, in both hemispheres, the splendor of Stanley's achievement, but have raised several questions, hitherto completely overlooked, relating to the legal status of his command, and consequently to the legality and morality of his method of rescuing Emin, or rather of searching for Emin. Many people in England are, in short, asking to-day whether the Emin expedition was not, strictly speaking, in the eye of public and municipal law, a piratical expedition.

That this question should not have been asked sooner, seems to be due to the peculiar view of central Africa which the more civilized communities have taken, time out of memory. No other portion of the globe, no matter how barbarous, seems to have been denied in the same degree the benefit of the "law of nature and of nations" under which the rest of the world began at a very early period to take shelter. It has long been set apart as the hunting ground for slave-traders, both by sea and by land. The notion of the Arab slave-dealers that Negroes are a species of *feræ naturæ*, to be captured like elephants or other large game, has found a ready acceptance for centuries in nearly all the Christian states; and the slave trade rose, under its influence, into an important branch of commerce. Although the ocean slave trade has long been abolished and is now looked on with horror, the view of the Negro on which it was based has not died out; for there is undoubtedly to-day a widely-diffused feeling that civilized men, dealing with African Negroes in Africa, are not bound by the restraints which custom or legislation has prescribed for the protection of other uncivilized tribes and communities.

For instance, the right of any traveler who can provide himself with followers enough for the purpose, to make his way through any portion of Africa he pleases, in defiance of the native chiefs or rulers, and with as much use of force as may be necessary to overcome their resistance and to compel them to meet his requisitions for supplies and transportation, has, so far as I

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know, never been questioned until now, although it has never been asserted with regard to any other region inhabited by an agricultural population. That such things should be done in Africa has seemed quite natural to Christian, as well as to Mussulman, publicists and moralists, whether the object has been scientific exploration or simple sport. Yet, from what we have been hearing from the travelers of the last twenty-five years, it would appear that the Central Africans are by no means all in the lowest stage of civilization. They have, for the most part, passed out of the nomadic state. They have settled abodes, they live in villages, and they cultivate the soil. They have made considerable progress in some of the mechanical arts, such as iron-working and carpentry. They have rulers some of whom can bring a considerable armed force into the field, and who are recognized by European powers as capable of being bound by treaties. But none of these things avail them against the general Christian assumption that their territory is no man's land, and that it is open to anybody who likes to take the necessary risks to traverse it in any direction he pleases on his private account, and to live on it after the fashion of an army on the march in an enemy's country, if he cannot live in any other way.

The explanation of this view is not difficult, but no explanation of it is necessary for my present purpose. What I wish to point out is that Africa has been an exception to the general rule. Exploring expeditions, armed with fighting and foraging power, have in all other regions been expected to have a settled and organized government behind them; while in Africa all travelers and explorers have hitherto started on their own responsibility, and have enlisted soldiers and porters for their own service. The chief peculiarity of African travel is the difficulty of employing beasts of burden. Nearly everything that the traveler needs, including ammunition, has to be carried on men's heads or shoulders. The porters who are hired for this purpose, although they engage for long distances, generally do so with a secret determination to desert whenever they get tired or hungry. A certain number of "soldiers" is necessary, to keep guard over the porters, to force a passage through hostile principalities, and to compel the sale of the needed provisions.

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Food sufficient for large bodies of men cannot, of course, be carried. The baggage of explorers is principally made up of delicacies for themselves and of articles which attract the African fancy, such as brass rods, copper bracelets, bright-colored handkerchiefs, and beads, to be used as barter for food. The soldiers carry nothing but their arms, but they are apparently as ready as the porters to desert when they get a chance. As a rule, these parties are not large. Baker, when he started from Khartoum, had 25 men. Commander Cameron, who was the first to cross the continent from east to west, set out with 35; Schweinfurth with 70; Speke and Grant with 108; Stanley, on his first expedition in search of Livingstone, with 175 porters and 23 soldiers. After a few marches from the starting point, the troubles begin. The porters desert, abandoning their loads or carrying them off; or they sicken and die; or they openly mutiny. The soldiers do the same things. If the explorers are unable to overcome insubordination or to capture the runaways, they have to apply pressure to the local chiefs in order to procure fresh carriers. These fresh carriers are generally slaves, as, indeed, the original ones are in large part, and have no more interest in their work than slaves usually have. The difficulty of keeping the carriers and soldiers to their work supplies about half the contents of nearly every book of African travel. Considering the hardships and the great loss of life attending all these exploring journeys, the wonder is that any traveler has been able to reach his destination. When Stanley found Livingstone, the English explorer had been reduced to destitution and brought to a standstill by the desertion of his carriers. When Baker began his exploration of the upper Nile, he had to deal with a mutiny of his force of 45 uniformed soldiers within a few weeks after starting from Khartoum up the Nile. "They promised," he says, "fidelity and devotion; but a greater set of scoundrels in physiognomy I never encountered." Accordingly, when they reached Gondokoro and he proposed to give one of them twenty-five lashes for "insolence," they all mutinied and he had to fight for his life; and this was only the beginning of incessant trouble of the same sort. Commander Cameron had a like experience, but as he was less of a disciplinarian than Baker and more concilia-

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tory in his temper, he fared better, and actually carried with him to the Atlantic some of the men who started with him.

All the travelers model their expeditions on those of the Arab slave-holders and ivory-dealers. They have the same array of soldiers and porters and the same modes of enforcing discipline, and all are generally supposed by the natives to be bent on the same errand; but of course the Europeans purchase supplies where they can, instead of always securing them by plunder. How far the Europeans go sometimes in copying the Arab ways, is curiously illustrated in Stanley's account of his expedition in search of Livingstone. The Arabs, when carrying away their booty after a raid, chain the slaves together by iron collars, as a precaution against flight. Stanley describes these chains, as seen in the first slave gang he met, as "ponderous; they might have held elephants captive." * But very soon afterward he procured a stout slave chain himself, with the usual iron collars for the neck, put it on his own deserters after they had been "well flogged," and made them march in it.† He even chained his head man, Bombay,‡ after flogging him for mutiny. When he reached Livingstone, he recommended to him the same expedients. In the last expedition, for the relief of Emin, in September, 1887, three of his men, who had deserted with their arms and ammunition, were captured and brought into his camp by a native chief. It appeared that they were all slaves, owned by people in Zanzibar and Yambuya, and therefore that they could not have had the smallest interest in the expedition, or more than a very slight sense of the immorality of desertion. But he sentenced all three to death, on successive days, and hanged one of them on the usual military plea that mercy toward deserters would endanger the success of the expedition, pardoning the other two on intercession. There was another execution of one of his own men for mutiny and desertion on the return march with Emin, after a formal trial by court-martial; and the penalty of death was constantly held, at the same period, over the heads of Emin Pasha's force as well as those of his own, as an aid to discipline and good order.

The most striking illustration, however, of the thoroughly

* "How I Found Livingstone," p. 104. † P. 318. ‡ P. 345.

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military character of Stanley's expedition, is to be found in his story of his fight with a tribe called the Baburesse, shortly before he reached Lake Albert. That these people had reached a considerable degree of civilization, his account of their territory shows. They were not simply naked savages. He says:

"Before descending into the valley of a streamlet flowing northward, we observed with wonder that the whole intervening space, as far as the mountains, was one mass of plantations indicative of a powerful population. . . . Resuming the march at 1 P.M., we entered the depths of banana plantations, marveling at the great industry evinced and the neatness of cultivated plots. The conical homesteads were large, and partitioned within, as we observed while passing through a few open doorways, by screens of cane grass. Every village was cleanly swept, as though they had been specially prepared for guests. Each banana stalk was loaded with bananas. The potato fields were extensive, and the millet fields stretched for miles away on either side, by hundreds of acres; and the many granaries that had been lately erected manifested expectations of a bountiful harvest. . . . A valley unfolded to our view as we rounded the corner of the Peak range, with a breadth of one or two miles wide, which was clothed with luxuriant sorghum ripening for the sickle. . . . To our left the ground, hidden by crops of grain, sloped gradually to a rapid branch of the East Ituri, and beyond it rose an easy slope to a broad horseshoe-shaped grassy ridge, studded with homesteads, green with millet and corn, and rich in banana groves. A sweeping view of our surroundings impressed us with the prosperity of the tribe."*

Now, this prosperous and industrious tribe, living in a country familiar by sight or hearsay with the raids of the Arab slave-traders, were naturally alarmed by the irruption of Stanley's armed band into their smiling fields, and rallied in great force to oppose his passage. They naturally refused to believe his stories of peaceable intent. His attempts to negotiate with them proved fruitless, and he then fought with them what may fairly be called a battle, killing a great many with his rifles, as they were armed only with bows and spears. From his account of the affair, it might have been one of the British fights in the Soudan. Skirmishers were thrown out, a *zereba* was formed, water was drawn and stored, and the riflemen under cover "seriously annoyed" the natives and "did execution" among them. A cow was "seized and cut up." That first night was an anxious one,

* "In Darkest Africa," vol. I., pp. 305–6.

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and Mr. Stanley read his Bible in his tent with some sinking of the heart. On the morrow Lieutenant Stairs forced the passage of the river, while Jephson "skirmished up the slope to the left and Uledi to the right." "The village was taken with a rush and the banana plantations scoured. The village was then fired, and the other settlements assaulted." "The Winchesters were worked most handsomely," but only one of Stanley's men was wounded. Finally,

"Not a hut was left standing in the valley around us to be a cover during the night. The lesson, we felt, was not completed. We should have to return by that route. In the natural course of things, if we met many tribes of this quality *en route*, we should lose many men, and if we left them in the least doubt of our ability to protect ourselves, we should have to repeat our day's work. It was therefore far more merciful to finish the affair thoroughly before leaving a tribe in unwhipped insolence in our rear." *

Now this is a most pitiful story of slaughter and devastation among, it would appear, an industrious and peaceful people. But nobody can blame Mr. Stanley for fighting a battle under the circumstances. In the situation in which he found himself, there was no other mode of self-preservation. We have cited it at some length as a specimen of the kind of work in which he was engaged, at greater or less intervals, during the whole expedition. He was, in fact, conducting an organized military force through an enemy's country. He had to flog or hang his own men to maintain discipline. He had to shoot the inhabitants and to pillage and burn their villages in order to protect himself against treachery and to supply himself with provisions. As I have said, when he was fairly launched on his march, self-preservation became his first law; but the question still remains to be answered, Who sent him on his march? From whom did he get authority to begin the series of military operations that ended in depositing Emin Pasha at Zanzibar? Under whose order did he enlist troops, and exercise among the Africans the power of a general in the field? If his commission was what it ought to have been, he was really entitled under it to shoot and hang the white men of his command as well as the black ones.

Mr. Stanley gives us in his "Introductory Chapter" all the

* "In Darkest Africa," vol. I., pp. 315–16.

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answers we need to these questions. The pity excited in England by General Gordon's unhappy fate at Khartoum—pity, I am afraid, which had, among certain classes, a large mixture of hatred for Gladstone in it—ended in pity for Emin Pasha. Emin was a German doctor who was governor of the Equatorial Province under the Khédive of Egypt, and who was by the capture of Khartoum cut off from the civilized world somewhere near Lake Albert. Very little was known about him, as the result proved, or about his condition and prospects. But the British imagination, working on the Gordon legend, pictured him very soon as a hero in great distress, fighting, with a small band of faithful followers, to keep alive the lamp of civilization in darkest Africa, and likely, sooner or later, unless rescued, to share Gordon's fate. If all this had been true, the duty of rescuing him devolved on one of two powers—on Great Britain, as the assignee in the bankruptcy of the Egyptian government, charged voluntarily with administration of its finances and with the protection of its southern frontiers against the Mahdi; or on Egypt, as the employer of Emin, and the power to which he was responsible, if he was responsible to any power.

It was soon ascertained, however, that neither of them was willing to do anything in the matter. The Khédive could not move without British consent, and the British had the expedition to rescue Gordon too fresh in their memory to be willing to make or to authorize another invasion of the Soudan for any similar purpose. The alternative was to allow some one to raise a force at private cost and risk, and to give the commander either an Egyptian or a British commission. What actually came to pass, however, was the raising of £11,500 by ten private individuals, mostly philanthropists. To this amount the Royal Geographical Society added £1,000 and the Egyptian government £10,000, which, as far as this last was concerned, was certainly cheap for the rescue of a governor and his troops. These gentlemen, all unknown to fame, then formed themselves into a committee, to which they gave the name of the "Emin Relief Committee," and sent Stanley to Africa, armed with such power as they had themselves, to raise and equip troops, to invade hostile territory, and to do as much fighting as might be neces-

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sary for the rescue of Emin. I need hardly say that they had no such power themselves, and therefore that they had no power to delegate to Stanley. The general public did not take the smallest interest in the scheme, for it knew nothing about Emin, and had had enough of Soudanese warfare. The British government refused, it would appear, to have anything to do with the plan. An application made to the Admiralty for transportation to the Congo was curtly refused. The King of the Belgians, as the head of the Congo Free State, encouraged the expedition so far as to lend Stanley to head it—Stanley being already in the service of the Congo Free State—and also to lend one or two steamers on the upper Congo; but he made it a condition that the expedition should start from the western coast, instead of from Zanzibar, which compelled Stanley to change his plans.

When Stanley reached Egypt, all he obtained from the Khédive's government, besides the subscription of £10,000, was permission to use the Egyptian flag, and a letter of credence to Emin Pasha, requiring the Pasha to come home with Stanley, if he should come at all, but allowing him to stay where he was if he chose. Nubar Pasha, the prime minister, being of a frugal mind, stipulated also that in case Emin had any ivory—and it was rumored that he had a great deal—the Egyptian government was to have a share of it, in consideration of the advance of £10,000. The expedition was thus, in all respects, a private enterprise. There was not a shadow of authority in the hands of any one connected with it, to raise troops, to inflict capital or other corporal punishment on persons in its service, to make war on foreign soil, to levy supplies by force, or to purchase, hold, or employ slaves; yet all these things were done by Stanley or by some of his subordinates.

Of his thoroughly military relations to these subordinates, he gave a curiously frank account in an interview with the correspondent of the London "Times," in New York City on November 6, 1890. Speaking of the censure that he had passed on the officers of the rear guard, he said:

"It is absolutely immaterial to me what view the people take of this censure, as I had enlisted all these men as my officers, and it was only to me that they owed loyalty and obedience according to their contracts. I alone am justified in reserving the right to condemn or to award praise."

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The contract with Tippu Tib to supply 600 carriers for the rear guard, which Tippu failed to carry out, was, as a matter of fact, a contract with the greatest slave-trader in western Africa. The carriers that Tippu did eventually furnish were undoubtedly slaves. A Belgian army officer, Lieutenant Albert Baert, a friend of Major Barttelot, testifying in his behalf, says that he met the Major at Stanley Falls, whither he had come from his camp at Yambuya, to try "to procure chains for the deserters he might capture, being very much annoyed at the numerous desertions among his porters." These chains were, of course, the slave chains with iron collars of which I have already spoken, and they were seldom or never put on a deserter without giving him a flogging. Part of the payment to Tippu Tib, too, was "fifty cases of gunpowder" and "as many cases of fixed ammunition, Remington rifles, elephant guns, and revolvers," * which, it was well known, he would use in his slave-hunting expeditions.

In his final interview with Emin at Zanzibar, in December, 1889, Mr. Stanley put down the loss of life in his own force up to that date at 300. It is certainly not an exaggeration to estimate the loss he inflicted on hostile natives in his various encounters at double that number, or 600. Taking everything into account, I have no doubt that the total cost of the expedition in human life was 1,000; and the destruction of native property, through forced contributions and military marauding and devastation, must have been enormous, although there are no means of estimating it. Bonny, one of Stanley's officers, admits that he captured women and children to compel the tribe to which they belonged to supply the party with food. When Stanley reached Emin Pasha he found Emin uncertain whether he wished to leave Equatoria or not, and by no means grateful for the sacrifices made on his behalf; and found his officers and men to be the very dregs of the old Egyptian army, treacherous, cowardly, insubordinate, and guilty of a conspiracy to rob and murder the rescuing force on the way home. But these facts do not prove anything to the discredit of the expedition. The worthlessness of Emin's men does not show that the efforts made on their behalf were illegitimate or ill-judged, but it does show

* "In Darkest Africa," vol. II., p. 477.

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that the enterprise was begun with a culpably small amount of information about the matter in hand. There can be no question, judging from Mr. Stanley's account of Emin and his men, that had even half of what he found out about them been known in London three months, or even two months, before he started, the "Emin Relief Committee" would never have been organized, and Emin and his ragamuffin army would have been left to get out of their scrape as best they could. What prevented preliminary inquiry was undoubtedly the Gordon legend, which surrounded with an heroic halo every European shut up in the Soudan.

Of the illegality of the enterprise under the municipal law of England, there can be little question. To that law Mr. Stanley, as an American citizen, is not amenable; but his subordinates have undoubtedly, in the absence of commissions from an established government, exposed themselves to prosecution under what is known as the "Slave-trading Act,"* which makes the owning of slaves or the dealing in them a felony in a British subject; and also under the act† which makes punishable in England "any murder or manslaughter committed by a British subject on land on any person anywhere outside the Queen's dominions." It is difficult to see why the executions carried out by the officers of the rear guard are not justiciable under this statute, and why it does not even cover the case of the natives killed "in action" when defending their homes. If so, the expedition was distinctly piratical. The connivance of the English and Egyptian governments may of course be pleaded in palliation, and so may the earlier promoters' ignorance of the shape the expedition would finally take. Their blunder as to its military character is one of the most curious features of the affair.

One of the gravest objections even to expeditions which, though technically piratical, are morally excusable, lies in the fact that the chief, whoever he may be, is responsible to nobody, and therefore reports to nobody; so that when a dispute arises over the conduct of any of the actors, there is no proper way of ascertaining the truth or of distributing the blame. Every lawful military enterprise has a government behind it to which the officers are accountable, to which they are obliged to make care-

* 5 and 6 George IV., chapter 113. †24 and 25 Victoria, chapter 100.

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ful reports, and by which they are punishable in case of negligence, disobedience, or of the violation of any of the usages of civilized warfare. The fact that Stanley has no one to report to, except himself, and that no judicial machinery now exists for the investigation of the charges which he brings against his officers of the rear guard, in truth goes far to fix the character of his operations in central Africa. Both he and some of his subordinates have sold reports to the book-publishers and to magazines, each giving his own version of the occurrences in which he participated; but these reports should have been made to some competent authority. Under these circumstances it seems extremely difficult to get at the truth. At a meeting in London the other day, of the Aborigines Protection Society, to consider this matter, the chairman proposed that Stanley should bring a libel suit against somebody in order to secure a judicial inquiry; but Mr. Stanley has apparently no intention of doing anything of the kind, and there is no way to compel him. Mr. Frederic Harrison, who was present, suggested, as a first step, that a legal opinion should be obtained on the question whether the Stanley expedition was not "an illegal military expedition against a friendly people, and an illegal assumption of military authority.' He further held that the members of it had brought themselves within the purview of the Slave-trading Act, and were indictable. That this question would be answered in the affirmative by competent legal authority, is most likely, and if it were, it is difficult to see how the British government could, in the interest of its own dignity, if not in that of humanity, avoid taking some steps to bring the offenders to justice. Neither philanthropists nor explorers ought to be allowed to engage in military ventures, no matter how laudable the object, without far greater care than marked the inception of the Emin expedition, particularly when such ventures are likely to be attended with loss of life, damage to property, and the presentation of civilization and Christianity to barbarians in an odious or fearful light.

E. L. GODKIN.

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THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF MIND.

THE birth and resurrection of the founder of the Christian religion were miracles so entirely contrary to the order of nature, as it had been known before his coming, as it was known then to the observation of all save a few witnesses of them, and as it has been known since through all the world, that they stand apart from all other events—unique, transcendent, supernatural. Belonging to a separate and special order of things, they need and exact a separate and special way of belief; their appeal is to other faculties than those faculties of observation and reason which serve for all other human knowledge, but which they contradict absolutely. They do not enter the mind through the understanding as natural truths, but through the heart as divine truths. Since they are matters of faith and feeling, reason is impotent to conclude anything in respect of them; they are to it foolishness; its true function there is to disavow its function. He who would attain the right mood of heart and mind to believe firmly, must resolutely curb the pride of intellect and coerce reason even to its stultification. So by being a fool in wisdom, he will be wise in faith in those things which were hidden from the wise and revealed unto babes; which were scorned by scribes, lawyers, and Pharisees, but received gladly by a few poor fishermen drawn from the dregs of the people.

The two distinct ways of belief have nowhere been set forth with more lucid precision, with more thorough comprehension, or with firmer logic, than by the illustrious Pascal, whose main principles have been adopted and followed by Cardinal Newman in his subtile and elaborate "Grammar of Assent." With these great writers there is no confused compromise or warring struggle of reason and faith in matters of revelation; no half-thought principles and timid shrinkings from logical conclusions; no dim and vague region of thought in which one person or one sect of persons may, according to particular prejudice,

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