

## LITERATURE: THE MAKING AND RE-MAKING OF NATIONS.

WHEN the impartiality of an individual is doubted, our usual refuge is in the appointment of a committee. The authors of "THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: Vol. 7, The United States,"<sup>1</sup> may be described, in a sense, as a Committee of Thirteen. It is true that the book is not a majority report, thrashed out in debate; but, by presenting side by side the varying opinions of equally competent experts, it sets before the reader a composite picture probably more clearly representative of the truth than would have been any delineation by a single hand. For, in matters of history, the attitude of the historian itself becomes part of the data. To a foreign inquirer about the relations of North and South, for instance, it is important to know not only the facts of the struggle for the Union, but also the views which Northern and Southern historians, respectively, hold of that struggle to-day. And though there must necessarily be some sacrifice of literary effectiveness when writers of a pedestrian manner as well as of brilliant style are drawn upon for contributions, a book thus composed is everywhere kept alive by its internal divergences. Even dull talkers become interesting as soon as they begin to argue.

The catholicity of the late Lord Acton and his successors in the control of this great publication is evident in this, that, in spite of its title, only four of the thirteen contributors to the present volume are British, and only two — Miss Mary Bateson and Mr. A. G. Bradley — can be claimed by Cambridge. This is the more significant when we remember that the book, though the laws of copyright compelled its printing on this side of the Atlantic, is mainly intended for British readers, and will be accepted by them for many years to come as the standard history of America. American histories of the United States have, as a rule, made little appeal in England except to special students, for they have been planned on too large a scale and have been too fully occupied with details of purely domestic interest. The American con-

<sup>1</sup> Macmillan.

tributors to the "Cambridge Modern History" have thus had a rare opportunity of instructing and influencing the public mind of Great Britain with respect to the past development of their own country, and thus of laying a foundation for a just understanding of its present condition. They have discharged this difficult function of interpretation with remarkable success. Very rarely — as when we are told that under Lincoln "the American Government attained full perfection in its twin ideals of union and liberty" — is the scream of the eagle heard. Their sober and dignified exposition of the growth of the United States during the nineteenth century will produce abroad a much deeper impression of her attainment and possibilities than would have been made by such vociferous self-assertion as is habitual in a certain section of the press.

This volume does not begin with Columbus, for it was Lord Acton's principle of arrangement that the history of each people should be taken up at the point at which it was drawn into the main stream of human progress, as represented by the European nations. Accordingly, the foundation of the colony of Virginia is taken as the starting-point. Chapters on "The First Century of English Colonization" and "The English Colonies," by Mr. J. A. Doyle, are followed by "The French in America," by Miss Mary Bateson, and "The Conquest of Canada," by Mr. A. G. Bradley. Miss Bateson's contrast between the French and the British colonizing methods is particularly valuable. She is as warmly appreciative of the merits of the French system as a Parisian writer could be. Mr. Bradley's explanation of the failure of the British commanders in some of the campaigns against the French would provide edifying parallels if set by the side of the blue-books of the Royal Commission on the South African War.

The following chapters bring us to the period of greatest interest to the constituency which the Cambridge Modern History will especially reach. Mr. Doyle writes on "The Quarrel with Great Britain (1761–1776)," Prof. Melville M. Bigelow on "The Declaration of Independence," Mr. Doyle on "The War of Independence (1776–1783)," Prof. Bigelow on "The Constitution (1776–1789)," Prof. J. B. McMaster on "The Struggle for Commercial Independence (1783–1812)," and Mr. H. W. Wilson, an expert in military and naval history, on "The War of 1812–1815." The result of this combination of authorities is to show the immense difficulty of agreement upon controversial topics dating even as far back as a century ago. No one can read these chapters without feeling that both the English and the American writers are absolutely honest-minded and free from any conscious bias. Yet they

produce very different impressions by their versions of the same series of events. Mr. Doyle, while far from supporting the British Government — he speaks, for instance, of its “ignorance and misjudgment” and of its “harsh and unintelligent policy” — declares in the plainest terms that the colonists were not “loyal subjects goaded into rebellion by persistent ill-treatment.” In his judgment, the treatment of Lord North’s proposals by the second Continental Congress “is an effective answer to those who speak of the colonists as loyal and submissive subjects, goaded into rebellion by a ministry who turned a deaf ear to every reasonable complaint.” The reply drafted by Jefferson on that occasion was “a rhetorical onslaught on the British Government, calculated to fill with despair any one who had any real desire for compromise and peace.”

The English historian is no less pronounced in his criticism of the Declaration of Independence. Its statement of the wrongs which the colonists had suffered from their sovereign would not be accepted, he says, by any one now as a fair historical account of what had happened. “Of the eighteen heads of indictment, each beginning ‘he has,’ there is hardly one which does not demand some modification or admit of some palliative.” This is immediately followed by thirty-five pages in which Prof. Bigelow expounds and enforces the case which was summarized in this same document — the text of which, as also of the Constitution, ought surely to have been published in an appendix — coming to such conclusions that one might easily suppose him to be referring to an entirely different state of affairs from that just recounted by Mr. Doyle. To make the perplexity of the inquiring student greater, one finds later in the book, in Prof. Barrett Wendell’s chapter on “The American Intellect,” an American writer supporting Mr. Doyle and declaring that “there was no tyranny on the part of Great Britain so galling as to account for the passionate revolt of America or to justify the blatant traditions of Fourth of July oratory.”

The foreign reader will be not a little perplexed by this conflict of authority. But he will obtain a clew by remembering that Prof. Bigelow is writing as a constitutional lawyer rather than as an historian. When such an event as the Revolution is considered from a legal point of view, stress is naturally laid upon the occasions rather than the causes of the separation. The examination of charters, acts of Parliament, etc., cannot, of course, be neglected in a complete study of the period; but one must go far deeper before the conflict becomes intelligible. The more properly historical section of this book contributes the necessary light, and shows that the popular view of the Revolution, in England

as well as in America, is much too superficial. It is commonly believed that the United States might still have been a part of the British Empire but for certain actions of George III and Lord North, and that the actual separation was caused by a quarrel in which it is necessary to suppose that one party must have been in the right and the other in the wrong. Actually, the Americans broke off from the British Government not because of the passing of the Bill for the relief of the East India Company, but because time and circumstance had brought about a divergence of national character which made it impossible for the two peoples to live together any longer in harmony. As Mr. Doyle truly says:

Almost from the hour of their foundation the colonies had been developing not only political methods, but political ideals, different from those of the mother-country. The material interests which bound them to Great Britain were real, but they were too indirect and remote to appeal readily to ordinary men.

Prof. Wendell also goes to the heart of the matter when he explains what he calls "this stupendous imperial disruption" in the following words:

Each country, in brief, had its own political traditions; and those of each were consecrated by customs which extended far beyond the range of human memory. Furthermore, the mutual misunderstandings bound to arise from such divergences were emphasized by the growing differences of national temper, due to the fact that, in general character, America had changed so little, while England had changed so much, since the early days of colonial settlement.

Whatever we may think of Mr. Wendell's specific explanation of this incompatibility, the fact that it existed gives the key to the Revolution. If we turn to the Declaration of Independence we find this theory immediately strengthened, for the Rousseauism of the preamble is as un-English as anything could well be. Many of the doctrines therein set forth would be accepted as readily by an Englishman as by an American; but the manner of their presentation, and, indeed, the very idea of prefacing the statement of a political platform by a series of philosophical generalities, are entirely alien to the English temperament.

So far, then, as the separation between England and America affords any guidance to the politician of the present day, it suggests that allegiance to the home authority is certain sooner or later to be found an irksome bond by a colony which is several thousand miles distant from the seat of government, and in which the very conditions of exploiting a new country tend to develop a type of character varying from inherited traits

and impatient of traditional methods. It further conveys the warning that no other political problems are so likely to make the colonists aware of this divergence and to transform it into open disaffection as those concerned with imperial trade and taxation. Accordingly, the first task which the Imperial Federationists of these days have to accomplish is that of preventing the young South African or Australian from being moulded by the life of the veldt or of the bush. When that has been done, it may, perhaps, be safe, provided the utmost caution is used, to talk of preferential tariffs and contributions to the defence of the empire.

When the story of the War of 1812-1815 is completed, we are only for a short time free from controverted questions. As Prof. J. B. McMaster describes the growth of the nation, we are not allowed to overlook the simultaneous increase in the intensity of the slavery difficulty. This brings us to a chapter on "State Rights," by Dr. Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton University. No section of the book is of greater value. As an example of his helpful generalizations, one may quote what Dr. Wilson says of the influence of slavery upon the leadership of the South:

She had men of leisure because she had slaves; and nowhere else in the country was there a ruling class like hers. Where men are masters, they are likely to be statesmen, to have an outlook upon affairs and an instinct and habit of leadership. Privilege and undisputed social eminence beget in them a pride, which is not wholly private, a pride which makes of them a planning and governing order. It was this advantage of always knowing her leaders, and of keeping them always thus in a school of privilege and authority, that had given the South from the first her marked preëminence in affairs. Her statesmen had led the nation in the era of the Revolution. The Union seemed largely of her making.

It is to be noted that of the Webster-Hayne debate Dr. Wilson says that, though Webster was the better statesman, Hayne was the better historian.

The great topic of "The Civil War" was intrusted to the late John G. Nicolay, whose three chapters on it amount to a hundred pages, or about one-eighth of the whole book. The naval operations of the war are discussed by Mr. H. W. Wilson. It may seem a matter for regret that the main story of the conflict should have been placed in the hands of a writer so closely associated with one side. But what competent authority could the editors have found who would have been absolutely non-partisan? It would obviously have been impracticable to commission two writers, for the reader would have been wearied by a description of the campaign twice over from different angles. And it must

not be overlooked that the State Rights controversy, being handled by a Virginian, gives readers an intelligent appreciation of the Southern view of the questions which provoked the war. Yet it seems a pity that certain gaps in the narrative of the campaign could not be filled in. Somehow it is not quite evident from Mr. Nicolay's account why it took the Union forces such a long time to overcome the rebellion, and particularly why Lee gave the Northern generals so much trouble. Possibly a Southern historian might have made this clearer. The story of the war itself is supplemented by interesting chapters on "The North during the War," by John G. Nicolay, and on "The South during the War," by Prof. J. C. Schwab, of Yale. Then come chapters on "Political Reconstruction," by Prof. T. C. Smith, "The United States as a World Power," by Prof. J. B. Moore, and "Economic Development of the United States," by Prof. H. C. Emery. These discuss difficult subjects with great skill, and deserve the most careful study. Prof. Smith's paper is especially commendable for its clear and illuminating account of a most confused period.

The final chapter is contributed by Prof. Barrett Wendell on "The American Intellect." No other in the book suffers so much from limitations of space. What can be done with one page for architecture and half a page for science? The general conclusions of this section will be already familiar to readers of Prof. Wendell's Literary History of America. As has already been mentioned, he has not yet recanted, in spite of adverse criticism, his favorite formulas that "Seventeenth-century American = Sixteenth-century Englishman," "Eighteenth-century American = Seventeenth-century Englishman," etc. Such equations are unpopular; but Prof. Wendell may, perhaps, be comforted by remembering, as Prof. McMaster reminds us, that George Washington himself was once accused of being anti-Republican and pro-British. One of the most striking passages in the whole chapter, and indeed in the whole book, is Prof. Wendell's concluding emphasis on American enthusiasm for education. He notes particularly the expenditure of vast sums on the building of schools, universities, and libraries, and the zeal shown by the hundreds of public-school teachers who two years ago crowded into the transports which were to carry them to Manila. "In short," he says, "the nation that we are trying to understand is a nation whose most prominent characteristic at this moment is its superstitious devotion to education." The last few weeks have afforded a conspicuous confirmation of his judgment, for we have seen plans being drawn up for a \$500,000 building to house a School of Journalism before ever its

programme of study has been laid out — in fact, before it has been seriously considered whether such a school, ranking with other professional schools, is even possible. And when Prof. Wendell declares that education, which elsewhere “has generally been a matter either of tradition or else of alertly intelligent reform,” tends in America to become “a matter of unintelligent formalism,” he may illustrate his generalization by pointing out that most of the teachers who went to the Philippines are eager to return at the first opportunity, and that the Government is at its wits’ end to supply their places.

The Cambridge Modern History treats with considerable fulness the institution of the American form of government; Prof. Bigelow’s chapters in particular showing the genesis and growth of such ideas as were formally embodied in the Constitution. As to the working of American political conceptions in later years, light is given only incidentally by such illustrations as happen to be supplied in the narrative of events. This gap is admirably filled by Prof. A. B. Hart’s contribution to the American Citizen Series under the title of “ACTUAL GOVERNMENT: AS APPLIED UNDER AMERICAN CONDITIONS.”<sup>1</sup> For American and English students alike it will serve excellently as a companion volume to the work just noticed. In range and treatment it naturally suggests comparisons with Mr. Bryce’s “American Commonwealth,” over which it has at least the two advantages that it does not make so great a tax upon the time of busy readers, and that it recognizes the many important changes of the last ten years. It even notes so recent an event as the creation of a general staff at the War Department. Prof. Hart is conspicuously successful in the difficult task of writing lucid and interesting summaries. He can condense into a page or two the arguments for and against some particular proposal without omitting any important ingredient and at the same time without making a tasteless pemmican of the result.

He prefaces his own study with a useful bibliography of the general question. Each chapter, as a rule, contains, first, a special bibliography; next, an historical outline of the development of the present method; and, lastly, an account of the actual present-day working of that method. Fundamental ideals in American Government are first discussed, with the attempts to express them in the use of the suffrage and the party system. State, local, and national governments in action are successively considered; and the rest of the book is concerned with

<sup>1</sup> Longmans.



the territorial, financial, and commercial functions of the Government, as well as its foreign relations and its connection with education, religion, and public order.

The section dealing with elections and party organizations contains a masterly description of "the boss." The scholarly moderation of Prof. Hart shows itself in his attitude to this phenomenon, who is studied as dispassionately as though he were a newly discovered zoological specimen. In this way, without prejudice, we reach a common account of the whole species, though "some bosses have been religious men, some unconvicted murderers." The great objection to the boss is "that he makes out of politics, which is a means of serving public interest, a private and almost a commercial enterprise; and that thereby he is demoralizing the public service." It is a pity that Prof. Hart lends his authority to a perpetuation of the misleading use of the term "Australian ballot" for the ballots used in American elections. The sample he gives opposite p. 74 — a copy of the voting paper used at the last presidential election — is no more like an Australian ballot than a coyote is like a kangaroo. It is an essential feature of the Australian system, which has been in exercise in England also for a generation, that the names of candidates shall appear on the ballot paper in alphabetical order, without the slightest indication of their political color. This system, it will be seen, does not put a premium, as in the case of that now employed in America, upon the voting of a straight ticket.

To obtain an exact and clear idea of the relation of the States to the Union is one of the most difficult problems for the political student, partly because the condition is exceptional, and partly because it is constantly changing. The situation since early days has been greatly affected by the improvements in communication, which have cut at the root of the old attachment to one particular commonwealth. In one of the autobiographies in the current "Congressional Directory" a certain senator declares himself to have been born in Tennessee and to have "emigrated" to Alabama. But this "emigration" took place seventy years ago. Nowadays it would need an especially vivid imagination to see expatriation in such a change of residence. It would have been helpful if Prof. Hart had said something of the attachment to a section which seems to have taken the place of the old-fashioned attachment to a State. There is now a solidarity in certain groups of States which is of sufficient political importance to demand careful treatment. As to the future relation of States and nation, Prof. Hart declares that "consolidation of the Union would be almost as great a misfortune as dis-



union." That may be so, but he certainly minimizes those difficulties which emphasize the necessity of greater federal control. There is, for instance, the fact that while a particular State may not declare war, it may take a course which affects foreign powers in such a way as to render war inevitable. The friction and wastefulness, from a business point of view, caused by the divergences between the laws of various States will sooner or later cause a movement toward greater unity.

Prof. Hart makes the processes of law-making at Washington easily intelligible in his section on "National Government in Action." This section is so very good that one regrets it was not made a little better. A student who came fresh to the subject would not be likely to obtain from this account a correct impression of the relative importance of the Senate and the House of Representatives. It is not only that more space is given to the House, but that no suggestion is made of the decreasing influence of that body and the growth in power of the Senate. Note should have been taken of the effect upon national government of the slow method of renewing the *personnel* of the Senate, which may make it still Republican when the country has become Democratic; of the authority which a Senator's share in patronage gives him over the Representatives from his own State; of that fearful engine for getting one's own Senatorial way against which Mr. Cannon protested so vehemently at the close of the last session; and of that confession of weakness now sometimes made by the House in letting through a measure which it does not want in the assurance that it will be thrown out at the other end of the Capitol.

As to the President, Prof. Hart, while describing his relation to Congress, does not tell us enough of his relation to his party in general. He says of the President that, having four years to carry out his policy, he is "therefore less subject than the English Prime Minister to temporary currents of public prejudice, and he is not obliged to make concessions in order to remain in office." Prof. Hart forgets that an English Prime Minister may be in power as long as seven consecutive years; that during that period he may choose any moment that seems to him most favorable for seeking a renewal of the country's confidence; and that he has not to trouble in the least about appointments to offices as affecting his chances of becoming Prime Minister for a second time.

It is not possible, nor would it be desirable, to write a book of this kind without being critical as well as expository. Accordingly, Prof. Hart does not hesitate to point out defects and suggest improvements in the present condition of things, whether in finance or education, in

military administration or the collection of taxes. In a few concise and pungent paragraphs he states, with a directness such as would amaze the facing-both-ways politician, the difficulties that have been created by the great extension of the territory of the United States since 1898. It cannot, then, be any fear of outspokenness that causes him to gloss over the vital question of the written Constitution. He says so little about it that one might be pardoned for inferring that he thinks it really insignificant as a factor in American affairs. It is, of course, unlikely that this is actually his intentional verdict. But there are many phases of the question that should have been considered in such a study, particularly the growing belief, expressed by Mr. Dooley, that "the Constitution follows the election returns." Some time ago Prof. D. H. Pingrey, writing in these pages, brought forward a number of instances to support his affirmation of "The Decadence of our Constitution."<sup>1</sup> Such evidences should have been estimated in any account of the actual working of Government. The part that has been played, and is now being played, in the affairs of this country by its written Constitution is one of great practical importance to Americans themselves, and of exceptional interest to outside students of political science. This problem, unfortunately, Prof. Hart seems to have evaded.

A few minor oversights might deserve attention in another edition. On p. 445, the representation of the United States as firmly seated in the Caribbean Sea and about to set foot on the Isthmus seems to have been suggested by some cartoon in a comic paper. There is an unintentional touch of humor, too, in Prof. Hart's remark that in all its foreign wars the purpose of the United States has been essentially pacific, with the exception of the Mexican War. Why except the Mexican War? And why confine this proud boast to the United States? Could not every war in the history of the world justify itself as having for its "essential" object the ultimate securing of peace?

A glance over the tables of contents of these volumes will enable the most casual reader to understand how great a change has come over the conception of history and politics during the last generation or so. Not very long ago it would have been difficult to find a history of the United States, or for that matter one of any other country, which devoted a whole chapter to its economic development. But in reading Prof. Emery's admirable outline one is convinced that such an exposition is of the very essence of the story: the history of America in general

<sup>1</sup> See THE FORUM for October, 1901.

would have been unintelligible but for the history of its industrial activity. In some quite surprising ways there has been an intimate connection between business and politics. Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton-gin, for example, "determined the course of Southern development for sixty years to come, and gave a firm economic foundation to the slave system — a remarkable instance of a beneficent invention of the human mind affording the chief reason for the maintenance of an inhuman institution." But there is, indeed, scarcely any section of the book which does not emphasize the same interdependence. Questions of trade are prominent in Mr. Doyle's summary of the colonial and revolutionary periods. Prof. McMaster's account of the period from 1783 to 1812 is headed, "The Struggle for Commercial Independence." The same writer's record of the growth of the nation for the next forty years has much to say of manufactures, banks, railroads, and tariffs. The history of the Civil War concludes with an analysis of the economic causes of the overthrow of the Confederacy. When the normal course of government is resumed, we find the influence of commerce in politics, both national and international, even more direct and dominant. So, too, Prof. Hart cannot discuss "Actual Government" without dealing closely with the business side of American activity. Possibly Mr. Brooks Adams pushes theorizing to an extreme in his attempts to state all political problems in terms of markets; but such publications as these go a long way to support his general contention that markets mean more to the statesman than the statesman himself has commonly supposed.

The attention paid in these volumes to the economic side of history emphasizes the importance of such a book as Prof. R. T. Ely's "STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY."<sup>1</sup> The title is general, but, except in the first few pages, it is American industrial society in particular of which the author treats. The word "evolution" need not frighten away any reader who dislikes philosophical terminology: the book is written in a clear and simple style, and, for a treatise on economics, is exceptionally free from technicalities. A sketch is first given of the various economic stages through which civilization has passed — the hunting and fishing stage, the pastoral stage, the agricultural stage, the handicraft stage, and the industrial stage, which latter has passed, or is passing, through the three phases of universal competition, concentration, and integration. It is not in harmony with the purpose of this article to comment at length on Prof. Ely's discussion of such present-day topics as business competition, trusts, municipal ownership, prop-

<sup>1</sup> Macmillan.

erty inheritance, and industrial peace. It is enough to say of these chapters that they are both liberal and conservative, in the best sense of those words. His survey of the industrial development of the United States should be read together with Prof. Emery's summary in the Cambridge History. Prof. Emery gives the facts of this development in greater fulness, while Prof. Ely groups his phenomena in generalizations which indicate the ruling tendencies at various periods. From this past history, too, he infers the course that industrial evolution is likely to take in the future — an inference which, of course, brings one into the heart of present controversies.

If there is one lesson taught more clearly than another by the modern study of history, as illustrated by the volumes already reviewed, it is that great events are the product of causes that work slowly — often, indeed, quietly and in secret. The ingenuity of statesmen can do remarkably little, after all, except in directing some tendency that already exists in the popular mind; and even then their plans may entirely come to grief through other and stronger tendencies which they have overlooked. The two greatest events in American history are conspicuous examples of the happening of the unexpected. A few years before the Revolution, how many of those who afterward became Revolutionary leaders — to say nothing of English politicians — either anticipated or desired it? As late as 1766, so Mr. Doyle reminds us, Franklin declared emphatically before the House of Commons that he knew the whole of the colonies, and that no one, "drunk or sober," had ever talked of or contemplated independence. So, too, with the Civil War. How many of the Northerners who leaped to arms in 1861 had any idea that their work would be completed by the passing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments? Looking back at this distance over the whole field, we can see that there were forces in operation which made it inevitable both that the United States should exist as an independent nation, and that it should not exist half free and half slave. In short, "evolution" is the key-word in history as well as in biology.

This lesson is entirely ignored, in spite of his frequent use of the word, by Mr. John R. Dos Passos, who, in his interesting and well-written but futile book, "THE ANGLO-SAXON CENTURY,"<sup>1</sup> comes forward with a cut-and-dried scheme for altering the map of the world. His aim is the promotion of a complete and sympathetic *entente* between England and America — an aim which is wholly admirable, as would be

<sup>1</sup> Putnam.

that of promoting a similar *entente* between any other two nations. But he is not satisfied with mere peace and good-will. In this book, which is intended to be read by Englishmen and Canadians as well as by Americans, he proposes, as a working scheme, the arrangement of a treaty whose provisions shall include (1) the incorporation of Canada in the United States, (2) the creation of a common Anglo-American citizenship, (3) the establishment of free trade between England and America, with a common coinage, and (4) the provision of an arbitration tribunal. His programme is so utterly impracticable in detail—at this time of day it would be as reasonable to attempt to establish a Tammany club in the moon as to expect the English people to be willing to cede Canada—that it would hardly be worth while to notice it, but for the fact that several favorable comments in the press and the publication of a second edition of the volume within a few weeks of its first issue indicate that this amateur diplomacy is being taken seriously.

There is no reason in the world why England and America should not be, and continue to be, on amicable terms—no reason why the younger country should not learn much from the experience of the older and the older from the experiments of the younger—but the whole trend of events for the last century has been in a direction away from such a close association as Mr. Dos Passos advocates. He brings together evidences of kinship in stock, language, literature, political institutions, modes of legal procedure, religion, etc., and argues that for these reasons “the union of the Anglo-Saxon people is a natural one.” What he overlooks is the crucial fact that in each of these respects the kinship between the two countries is far less close to-day than it was a century ago, and that the dissimilarities, not only in details of method and custom, but in the larger matter of temperament and point of view, are becoming greater year by year. Even if one leaves out of the account the immense effect of so large and steady an immigration from Continental Europe, one cannot forget that the American family of English stock has all the time been subject to the influence of an un-English environment, and has accordingly fashioned for itself new ideals and tastes, and even new and independent traditions. The result is that the Englishman of to-day finds the United States more of a foreign country than Mrs. Trollope or Dickens did. For the political problem is really a mathematical one: If two men start from the same point and walk at different angles, when and where will they meet? That the United States “sprang from” England is true; but the important question is: What distance has she sprung?

It is of no use, then, to try to erect an artificial barrier against national evolution. The attempt to check it or divert it is, indeed, likely to be injurious rather than helpful to the peace of the world; for the proposal of schemes, however well-meaning, that are based on an unhistorical and unphilosophical foundation — and these epithets certainly apply to the assumptions involved in most of the present-day argument about the English-speaking peoples — may be expected to produce friction and irritation rather than to promote good feeling. And irritation will be caused whatever the scheme, whether it is proposed to cede British Columbia to the United States or to cede Alaska to Great Britain.

“America is an example of the excellent results to be obtained from putting new wine into new bottles. India illustrates the risk of putting new wine into old ones.” This comparison of the late Sir William Wilson Hunter’s in “THE INDIA OF THE QUEEN”<sup>1</sup> suggests at once the infinite difference between the task of building up a new nation on the virgin soil of a new continent and that of refashioning a vast population in “the unchanging East.” Here and there in Kipling one has caught a glimpse of what “the white man’s burden” has meant. In this volume, consisting of a collection of various lectures and articles, we have a general presentation of the significance of British rule in India, written in popular style by the greatest authority on the history of the Dependency. It leaves the conviction that not only the face of the country, but, in many respects, the very life of the inhabitants has been transformed by the British invasion. There has been going on, says Hunter, the threefold work of conquest, consolidation, and conciliation. The most striking section of the book is that in which an account is given of the positive contribution of the administration to the welfare of the people. The author imagines a Hindu of the eighteenth century revisiting the earth and travelling over his own country. When he had overcome his surprise at the turning of thousands of square miles of jungle into fertile crop-lands, at the covering of fever-smitten swamps by healthy, well-drained cities, at the piercing of the mountains by roads and railways, and at the controlling of great rivers, he would be especially surprised by the general security of life:

In provinces where every man, from the prince to the peasant, a hundred years ago, went armed, he would look round in vain for a matchlock or a sword. He would find the multitudinous native states of India, which he remembered in jealous isolation broken only by merciless wars, now trading quietly with each other, bound together by railways and roads, by the post and the telegraph. . . . He

<sup>1</sup> Longmans.



would ask what wealthy prince had reared for himself that spacious palace? He would be answered that the building was no pleasure-house for the rich, but a hospital for the poor. He would inquire, In honor of what deity is this splendid shrine? He would be told that it was no new temple to the gods, but a school for the people. Instead of bristling fortresses, he would see courts of justice; in place of a Muhammedan general in charge of each district, he would find an English magistrate; instead of a swarming soldiery, he would discover a police.

The chapter on "Protection of Person and Property" is an amazing revelation of what has been done to deliver the frontiers from pillage and massacre, the sea-coast from pirates, and the country in general from banditti, from thugs, from famines, and from wild beasts. Less obvious results of British rule may be found in the development of new industries, the growth of great centres of trade, the intellectual renaissance, and the decrease of superstition. It is a great risk that England has faced — the risk of a united India, as contrasted with the divided India which was the policy of the Old East India Company. "The Queen's Government of India," says Sir William, "has preferred the dangers of popular education to the perils of popular ignorance. For the isolated hazards of heterogeneous races it has substituted the calculated risks of a vast coalition of two hundred millions of human beings, whom it is binding together by common interests."

Is it possible, then, after all, to put new wine into old bottles? Has India herself been made over again by the changes imposed upon her by the benevolent administrators from an alien race? Evidently Sir William Hunter himself took an optimistic view. His long and successful experience as an Indian Civil Servant should give great weight to his judgment. His optimism was by no means the mere self-satisfaction of the conventional Anglo-Indian, for one may find in this book such criticisms of governmental methods and pleas for reforms as would make the average official gasp. He was a champion, for example, of many of the political aspirations of that greatest bugbear of the Anglo-Indian, the National Congress. Yet knowing, as few men of his time could, the difficulties of the situation, he deliberately declared: "I am confident that as Englishmen in India mastered the perils of the past, so will they, with God's help, solve the problems of the present."

The article in which this confidence was expressed was written sixteen years ago, in the midst of the enthusiasm of Queen Victoria's Jubilee. Would the writer have been quite as confident to-day? Dr. J. E. C. Welldon, then Bishop of Calcutta, said at Oxford two years ago that he was not so sanguine as some people seemed to

be about the disposition of the natives of India toward the British Government. "When statesmen and administrators," he continued, "affirmed that our Government was an unqualified success, he could only say that such language filled him with amazement." And there has just been published, with the title of "The Failure of Lord Curzon," a powerful impeachment, by an experienced and successful Indian administrator, not so much of the personal qualities of the present Governor-General in particular as of the whole present régime, which is denounced as having alienated the classes upon whose goodwill the stability of British rule depends — namely, the agricultural population, the educated classes, and the native princes. Further, not many years ago Mr. Meredith Townsend, who was not only an influential journalist, as Hutton's colleague for so many years in editing "The Spectator," but an expert in Indian affairs, gave it, as the conclusion of his lifelong study of the whole problem, that, however beneficent British control might have been, its influence had been only superficial and temporary. What do two or three centuries amount to in the life of the immemorial East? Rome troubled her meditation for a brief period, but the interruption was only for a moment.

The East bowed low before the blast,  
In patient, deep disdain;  
She let the legions thunder past,  
Then plunged in thought again.

Not otherwise, according to Mr. Townsend, may some later writer sum up the story of that great experiment in government which appeals more strongly to the imagination than any other conquest of subject races since the days of Rome herself.

The British administration of India is an object-lesson of what can, and cannot, be accomplished in the imposition, by force of arms, of Western civilization upon an Oriental people. The remaking of Japan, which, though it has been in process for a much shorter time than that of India, has reached a more advanced stage, owes nothing to foreign domination, but much to foreign suggestion and guidance. Foreign gunboats, it is true, figure occasionally in modern Japanese history; but the use of Western methods, appliances, etc., has in the main been adopted without any military or diplomatic pressure from outside. Yet, while in this sense the recent development of the country has been independent and voluntary, there still remains a vast gulf between this type of progress and that of any truly free nationality. For Japan, like

India, has been transformed by authority, though not, like India, by the authority of an alien invader. In his "EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE,"<sup>1</sup> a work based on a long and intimate acquaintance with Japanese life, Mr. Sidney L. Gulick attributes to the national habit of obedience the rapidity with which political and social changes have been accepted. It is really, then, a survival of the feudal system that has made easy the adoption of a kind of civilization generally supposed to be democratic. In Mr. Gulick's own words:

The Occidentalized order now dominant in Japan was adopted, not by the people, but by the rulers, and imposed by them on the people; these had no idea of resisting the new order, but accepted it loyally as the decision of their emperor, and this spirit of unquestioning obedience to the powers that be is, I am persuaded, one of the causes of the prevalent opinion respecting Japanese imitativeness as well as of the fact itself.

In another part of his book, Mr. Gulick sets the modernizing of Japan over against that of India as an example of a natural evolution, "due absolutely to the free choice of a versatile people." From the passage quoted above it appears, however, that this choice has been so seriously limited that it can scarcely be called voluntary. One is therefore tempted to ask whether this explanation of the rapidity of the country's transformation does not involve a serious risk to the permanence of the new order. A nation that becomes progressive by the fiat of a ruler may as easily become reactionary if the edict is revised. Suppose the next Mikado should be a man of fanatical conservatism, regarding it as a sacred duty to restore the abandoned traditions of his race: where would the habit of obedience lead the people then? Practically, however, the danger is not serious. No doubt, for many years to come there will be brief periods of reaction, as there are in the most liberal of Western nations; but the flowing tide is with the innovators. The modern civilization, though it may originally have been accepted because the Emperor so decreed, has inspired ideas which, if the test came, would be found fatal to the old autocracy. The feudal system may persist in matters of ceremonial, but it is impossible that the Western learning can have spread among the leaders of the people as it has done without cutting the ground from under the absolutism of a generation ago. The friends of Japan may be sure that, in any time of trial, the new civilization, at first imposed by imperial authority, would now be ardently preserved for its own sake.

An additional reason for confidence is suggested by another of Mr.

<sup>1</sup> R vell.

Gulick's chapters. Can it be that the difference between the Eastern and the Western mind has been exaggerated? We often argue as though the two were incompatible: Mr. Gulick maintains that the differences between them are infinitesimal as compared with the likenesses. From his careful discussion of the whole subject, one striking piece of evidence may be selected:

For thousands of years certainly the Japanese and Anglo-Saxon races have had no ancestry in common. Yet so similar is the entire structure and working of their minds that the psychological text-books of the Anglo-Saxon are adopted and perfectly understood by competent psychological students among the Japanese. I once asked a professor of psychology in the Matsuyama normal school if he had no difficulty in teaching his classes the psychological system of Anglo-Saxon thinkers, if there were not peculiarities of the Anglo-Saxon mind which a Japanese could not understand, and if there were not psychological phenomena of the Japanese mind which were ignored in Anglo-Saxon psychological text-books. The very questions surprised him; to each he gave a negative reply.

The generalizations of Prof. Le Bon, Mr. Percival Lowell, and other Western writers respecting the alleged essential differences between the Oriental and Occidental psychic natures are acutely criticised by Mr. Gulick, who contends that the so-called racial characteristics are sociological, not biological. The fundamental social idea of the East is communalism; that of the West, individualism. As the social order of the country changes and Japan adopts little by little the individualism of the West, her national characteristics will be modified in detail.

This theory is put forward by Mr. Gulick as applying not to Japan only, but to the East in general. If it be valid, the future history of India also will be contrary to Mr. Townsend's prediction, for there, too, the new social order will act as a solvent of venerable tradition. Fortunately, it is not necessary to suppose that the modernizing of those ancient lands will involve the destruction of those elements in their life which possess a peculiar charm. Japan, to quote Mr. Gulick's words, "has a social heredity that will always and inevitably modify every Occidental custom and conception that may be brought to this land. Although in time Japan may completely individualize her social order, it will never be identical with that of the West." That is to say: Tokio will never become a duplicate of New York, nor will the citizen of Chicago ever be in danger of mistaking Osaka for his own home.

HERBERT W. HORWILL.

## SOCIOLOGICAL QUESTIONS.

CERTAIN sociological questions have a greater theoretical and practical interest for the United States than for any other nation. Attention is drawn to them by American conditions. American society offers the greatest variety of material for an inductive investigation of them. True scientific answers to them, if such can be obtained, will be a prophecy of our destinies as a people.

Before I enumerate these questions, or try to show their significance, or indicate the methods by which they should be studied, let me explain the sense in which I use the word "sociological."

After all that has been said on this subject by men like Herbert Spencer, John Fiske, and Lester F. Ward, who have written in the English tongue, not to mention such gifted Frenchmen as Fouillée, Guyau, and Tarde, or such Germans as Gumpłowicz and Simmel, it should be unnecessary to remind intelligent readers that sociology is neither political economy nor political science, that it is neither the investigation of tenement-house families by social settlement workers nor the study of hobo hang-outs by amateur tramps. Sociology is the study of the physical and mental conditions which determine the groupings of human beings; which govern their communication and association; which create unity of feeling, public opinion, and the public conscience; which give rise to common purposes and coöperative efforts to achieve them; and which determine the form and the character that coöperative relations assume. Sociology is, in short, a study of those fundamental social facts which all other branches of social science take for granted. There are no business activities, commercial or industrial, and no quarrels between labor and capital, except in society. Apart from society there are no customs, no laws, no governments. Only in society are there tenement-house populations and settlement workers. Only in society are there criminals, degenerates, and hoboes. What, then, is society? How does it come into existence? What are the natural processes and limitations of its evolution? To these ultimate questions all strictly sociological inquiries are scientifically related.