

THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST MADERO

DOLORES BUTTERFIELD

IN 1910 Mexico held a presidential election, in which, for the first time in his career, Porfirio Diaz was confronted by a rival candidate. This candidate was neither a soldier nor a politician. He was a business man, whose leisure had been devoted to study and literature. Indeed, he was ridiculed as a dreamer by the party in power, and because he was a Theosophist, a vegetarian, and a few other things of which they had no comprehension, they scoffed at him as "El loco Don Pancho." Nevertheless, his political writings, though dispassionate and impartial, were so logical and fearless that the party in power paid him the compliment of suppressing them. He had the courage to accept a nomination from which Bernardo Reyes, the soldier, and several politicians, had run away.

The persecutions launched against Francisco Madero and the anti-reëlectionist party which nominated him, and the fraud resorted to in that election, would fill a volume. Madero himself and all men known to be his supporters, and indeed many who were only suspected of it, were imprisoned. The new candidate, politically unknown when he began his unprecedented campaign, became so tremendously popular that the most brutal terrorism was resorted to in a vain effort to check the growing sentiment in favor of democracy—or its manifestation, at least. The election of 1910, returning Diaz and Corral to office, and ratified by Congress in the face of documentary evidence of 150 cases of flagrant fraud submitted by the anti-reëlectionist party (which evidence was never examined even for the sake of pretence), was absolutely illegal.

The country revolted. The Government called upon its army of 30,000 men, and found that half of that army was "graft," it numbering really not more than 15,000. Volunteers were called for, but the volunteers were all going to Madero. So widespread was the revolution, so simultaneous in all parts of the country, and so wholly supported by public opinion, that the Diaz régime, undermined by its own corrup-

tion, and taken by surprise in its over-confidence, was suing for peace at the end of six months, and Diaz and Corral were forced to resign.

Francisco Leon de la Barra, a more or less neutral politician, though a conservative, well thought of by both parties, and whose honor, despite his connection with the old régime, was unquestioned, was the selection of both sides for Provisional President pending an election. Madero could have gone into the presidency at once on a wave of popular enthusiasm without parallel in the history of his country; but he wished to emphasize the fact that the revolution was not intended to put him in power, but simply to overcome the dictatorship and make an election possible; and, though even his friends criticised the sacrifice of his advantage, he insisted upon waiting six months for excitement to cool before an election was called. Even so, he was elected by an almost unanimous vote, in the midst of a popular enthusiasm bordering on delirium. He himself had no control over that election. He had disbanded and disarmed his troops, and the polls were in the hands of de la Barra, whose sympathies were known to be more with the old party than with Madero, but whose honesty was relied upon despite that fact. In the election returns de la Barra himself was defeated for the vice-presidency.

Perhaps it would not be amiss to speak here of the attempt on the part of Bernardo Reyes to launch his candidacy, since its withdrawal has been made to reflect upon the election. Reyes had been offered the popular nomination in 1910 and had refused it, adding insult to injury by saying of the Diaz methods: "That is the way to govern." That this man, whose cowardice had lost him the opportunity (his first of all) to be the great popular hero, should now return to vie for their favor against the man who had loved them enough to espouse their cause in its dark hour, so infuriated the people that Reyes was mobbed and stoned, and de la Barra had all he could do sending soldiers about to protect the would-be candidate, until he withdrew his candidacy and left the country—to start a revolution, in which his unpopularity was again so signally manifested that even he became convinced of it.

The conduct of the populace in attacking Reyes was blame-worthy, but after all not unnatural. It was the conduct of men who, after generations of despotic rule, had not yet realized the fact that they could have expressed their opinion of Reyes quite as effectively with the ballot box as by pelting him with stones, and far more creditably to themselves.

With Madero in office the people were inclined to consider the battle won, although the leaders of the anti-reëlectionist party (reorganized as the Partido Nacional Progresista) reminded them repeatedly that the hardest part of the fight was still before them, inasmuch as the enemy, so easy to worst on an honest battlefield, was far more dangerous in the field of intrigue, to which it was sure to resort.

We must here consider that enemy. The corrupt party which grew up about the old dictator, and for which in his last years of rule he became merely a figurehead and shield, was called the Científico party by its opponents, it having no name of its own, and being ostensibly simply an aggregation of patriots devoting themselves perpetually to the service of their country. These men represented at once a bureaucracy and a landed aristocracy. Among them they owned practically all the land of Mexico; two or three of them would own an entire State; and as they also owned the State governorships, the courts of the nation, the portfolios of the Ministry, and the presidency and vice-presidency of the country under Diaz and Corral, it will readily be seen that they owned the country, body and soul. Their terrible system of exploitation had become with each year increasingly intolerable and undisguised; the situation of the people was desperate. The constitution of Mexico is as liberal and advanced as our own, and in some points even superior, providing for direct election of senators and of the Supreme Court; but this constitution was in actual effect entirely abrogated by the Científicos, who ruled by a mediæval feudalism combined with an incipient capitalism which spelt for the majority of the people of Mexico absolute want, ignorance and degradation, and tremendous wealth for the beneficiaries of the system.

These men, powerful and terrible in themselves, were in

reality but the representatives of a power even more vast and terrible. They were but fingers on the hands of greed and monopoly reaching out from Wall Street and the money centres of Europe. Behind Diaz was the Pearson-Morgan-Cientifico alliance, and when Diaz went down that alliance was still to be reckoned with. Madero and the Progressive leaders knew this. The ignorant masses did not know it and were largely incapable of comprehending it.

True, it has been charged that Madero himself was only the hired man of Standard Oil. Here is the truth of that charge:

Porfirio Diaz, owing to his own connection with the Pearson Oil people (the Mexican Petroleum Company, Ltd.), an English syndicate allied with the Morgan interests, had greatly discriminated against the Standard Oil, practically keeping it out of business in Mexico in the interests of the Pearson monopoly. Agents of the Standard at one time discovered some oil wells and were about to denounce them when Diaz nationalized them. This was lauded by the Cientifico salaried press as a most patriotic action; but it presently transpired that the oil wells so patriotically nationalized to save them from the maw of the Standard had quietly passed into possession of the Pearson Company. Standard Oil disliked Porfirio Diaz as heartily as the Pearson-Morgan combine rejoiced in him.

Madero must certainly have known this, for it was common knowledge. He financed his revolution with 30,000,000 pesos (\$15,000,000 U. S. currency) which was his own personal inherited fortune. He also mortgaged his personal properties in Coahuila, and gave his personal note at high interest to secure additional funds. Where was he to go for money in sufficient quantity to conduct a war if not to Wall Street? And shall we criticise his judgment if he took his securities to Standard Oil instead of to Morgan? Whether this constituted him the tool of Standard Oil or not we must leave his own conduct to show.

This Cientifico-Morgan alliance was the power Madero had to fight. To be sure, he had his choice of making peace with it, for the alliance was not so unalterably devoted to Porfirio Diaz that, for its money interests, it would not have accepted

his successor, young and modern, with a clean record and overwhelming popularity, had he consented to be a reformer only in name, and in reality to serve the alliance. He had the choice of every Latin-American President: to betray his people or fight these allied interests. Had he consented to the betrayal, he would have had all the strength of Wall Street to render his Government stable, and it would have taken a real revolution of the whole people of Mexico to overthrow him.

The fate that Francisco Madero met at the hands of this alliance is the best proof of his sincerity. It is not the false and dishonest Presidents of Latin-American republics who have anything to fear from Wall Street or foreign capital generally.

By the treaty of peace of Juarez, Madero had committed himself to respect the established Congress; which was wholly a mistake, since that Congress was not elected by the people and did not really represent the people, but the Científicos. This mistake, like such others as he made, originated in his kindness of heart, for he wished to end the revolution of 1910-11 without further bloodshed by acceding to so much of the conditions presented by Diaz. He faithfully kept that promise even after its breaking was justified by the men to whom he had made it, and in his love for democracy committed the additional error of allowing that hold-over Congress to act upon its own initiative—a privilege it had never enjoyed under Diaz. The result was the adoption by Congress of an obstructionist policy which delayed the reform measures Madero had promised. This delay was, as a matter of fact, only a slight one; but it was assiduously made use of by Científico agents to foment discontent among the ignorant on the plea that Madero was fooling the people.

Another Científico weapon was the press, owned or subsidized by them almost in its entirety, since under their régime all papers not amenable to subsidy were persecuted and suppressed. Availing itself of its new liberty, the press assailed the Administration at every point, distorting and misrepresenting its every act, circulating insidious falsehoods, exaggerating every adverse circumstance, and by sheer force of endless repetition doing its best to establish its accusations as positive facts. The capitalist press of the United States joined in depicting Madero as an

ambitious revolutionist, a corrupt politician, and a deceiver of the people.

In addition to the intrigue and bribery of the Científicos and the attacks of their press, there was Zapata.

Zapata had risen against Díaz, calling himself a Maderista. In a war conducted with a humanity seldom recorded in the annals of Mexican warfare, in which civilians and foreigners, and, on Madero's side, prisoners of war, were respected, the methods of Zapata were such as to be rather a detriment than a service to the cause. So much was this the case that Ambrosio Figueroa, his commander, unable to control Zapata and his numerous following of lawless men, separated from him, refusing to be identified with his campaign. The fall of Díaz made no difference to Zapata—without a break he kept on fighting against de la Barra; or rather, looting villages, which was his way of fighting. Madero, in an unofficial capacity as chief of the revolution, saw Zapata and obtained his promise to lay down his arms; but Zapata never kept that promise. After the election of Madero he still continued his depredations without pause. He called himself an "agrarian rebel," excusing himself with wrongs which really did exist, but for which Madero was in no case to blame. Whatever the promises of Madero, and whether he broke them or not, the Zapatista had no legitimate cause for complaint, since he never gave Madero a chance, but on the contrary contributed most actively to increase the difficulty of keeping those promises.

Yet despite all this, in less than four months (about February, 1912, Madero having been elected in November, 1911), the Administration began active measures for the survey and adequate appraisement for taxation of the enormous estates, previously assessed at a mere fraction of their value and containing thousands of acres which their titles did not cover. Madero had never promised, either in the Plan of San Luis Potosí or aside from it, to subdivide the lands of Mexico by violent confiscation. An adequate land tax, which would automatically take the land out of the hands of non-users and distribute it among the users, such distribution to be aided by the organization of a Government loan bank to facilitate the acquisition of

land by the poor, was the plan he advocated. Reputable engineers were sent out to survey and reappraise the lands, it being worthy of note that these operations began in the States of Chihuahua and Coahuila, where the Madero family estates are situated.

General Luis Terrazas owns 12,000,000 acres of land in Chihuahua. He and his henchmen having always been the Governors of that State until the election of Abraham Gonzalez in 1911, he was accustomed to doing exactly as he pleased about the taxation of those lands, and when he saw the reappraisement figures of the engineering corps, he was not disposed to let it go at that. Luis Terrazas is the father-in-law and close ally of Enrique C. Creel, the great banker—a part-American, variously Ambassador to the United States and Minister of Foreign Affairs under Diaz, and the most sinister of the whole Cientifico clique, in so far as any one of them may claim the honor of that distinction above the others.

Immediately following the revaluation of the Terrazas lands the garrison at Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, mutinied, proclaiming a revolution, and shortly afterward Pascual Orozco, Jr., Chief-of-Arms of the military zone of Chihuahua, joined this revolution and became its leader. It was well known at the time that Orozco, after being paid \$25,000 (U. S.) for his services in the Madero revolution, had demanded further sums of the Government and been refused. It was also perfectly transparent, and has since been proved beyond question, that the Terrazas and Creel interests fomented and financed the movement and paid Orozco for his defection. Orozco claimed that Madero had broken his promises to the people—four months after Madero's election, in the face of the fact that he was doing his best to fulfil them. He even went so far as to impute to the Plan of San Luis Potosi a dozen or more glowing promises not to be found in the original text, which Madero had ignored, but which he, if victorious, would fulfil—a deception practicable and valuable in a country of preponderant illiteracy.

The men at whose head Orozco placed himself, aside from his own troops, were for the most part ex-Maderistas of the worst character, who had failed to lay down their arms with

the other Maderistas when the revolution was won, but had turned to looting isolated ranches and committing depredations under the successive titles of Magonistas, Reyistas, Vazquistas, etc., until they finally settled into Orozquistas. These men, like the Zapatistas in the south, never gave Madero a chance and had no legitimate complaint against him; and if, like the Zapatistas, they were not wholly to blame, their absolute ignorance, extreme poverty and consequent depravity being the result of their lifelong conditions, neither was Madero to blame because he could not by a miracle transform them and their conditions from one day to another.

The only thing that ever made the Orozco revolution appear formidable was its seizure of Juarez, a port of entry, and Chihuahua, the State capital. These were not taken by courage or skill of arms, but by treacherous mutiny on the part of men to whom the cities had been intrusted; men not strong enough—so devoid were they of real popular support—to hold these cities when they had them. Orozco called his revolution a "People's revolution." Yet in 1910, when the people really rose, they easily overcame the small army of convicts and conscripts and overthrew a military dictatorship of thirty years' standing. Why then, in 1912, could not the same people overcome the same army? Obviously, because Orozco never represented the people of Mexico. His following never numbered more than five or six thousand men at most, in his most fortunate days, while on the other hand Madero was able to double the federal army with Maderista volunteers. Many labor unions volunteered in a body to augment his ranks, for that class, more perhaps than any other, literally worshipped him.

The Orozquistas, as an army, were soon disorganized and disrupted, only saved from entire annihilation by the mountainous topography of a sparsely-settled country affording them protection, and by the laxity of certain federal officers, now known to have been bribed, who neglected, after a certain point, to follow up actively the rigorous campaign instituted in the first place by General Fernando Trucy Aubert. These officers, like those pursuing Zapata in the south, festooned the roadside trees with looters and thieves—until Madero proclaimed an am-

nesty, sorely against their will, for they wished that campaign to militate against him with the people—but they made no real effort to capture the hired leaders who fomented the disorders.

The Orozco revolution, however, served its purpose. In conjunction with the Zapata rebellion, it constituted a most effective flank movement, and from the moment of its outbreak the Progressive Administration was not allowed a free moment in which to work. It depleted the treasury necessarily and unavoidably, while the cry went up that Madero was looting the treasury. It prevented the reorganization and reduction of taxes as a matter of course. It halted the land survey and appraisal movement, and also the subdivision of tracts already reclaimed as public lands. In a word, it went far toward halting all the reforms for which Orozco was so loudly clamoring, and made the reconstruction of the country doubly difficult, if not impossible. In its task of undermining the Progressive Administration it found most efficient aid in the Científico press of Mexico and the pro-intervention newspapers of the United States.

Still the Administration was not brought to terms. It revoked a number of monopolistic concessions granted by the Diaz régime in its last and worst years of power—among others the notorious west coast fishing concession and pearl fisheries concession. The labor unions, crushed under Diaz, under Madero extended all over Mexico, he personally assisting in the organization of many of them. Shortly after his inauguration the working-men began to strike for living wages, and the employers called upon the Government, as they were in the habit of doing, to “arbitrate.” Porfirio Diaz used to arbitrate the labor question with guns, as in Rio Blanco and Cananea, to the entire satisfaction of the capitalists. Madero refused to lend troops because there were no disorders to justify it, and the Government’s attitude obliged the employers to raise the wages of the strikers. Later, a minimum wage law was passed for the benefit of striking textile workers. It has been stated from an impartial source that under the Madero Administration the wages of working-men in some parts of Mexico actually quadrupled (from 25c. to \$1.00 per day, U. S.), though the paralyzation of

business due to the counter-revolution went far toward counter-acting these benefits.

A study of Latin-American politics abundantly proves that this kind of legislation was likely to have far more to do with the crushing of Madero than his having 150 relatives in office, real or fictitious or a little of both, or his alleged looting of the treasury, or any broken promises to the people. It was the determination to keep those promises, and not the breaking of them, that undid him.

Against the Científico-Morgan alliance the Progressive Administration had the doubtful support of Standard Oil, with whose agents it succeeded in negotiating a loan. Standard Oil demanded enormous concessions and was refused. The refusal of Madero to take his country from the Pearson-Morgan combine and make it a present to Standard Oil instead spelt the absolute cutting off of money supplies for his treasury, and the consolidation of Wall Street against him.

Now came Felix Diaz, plentifully financed, proclaiming a revolution in Vera Cruz. Felix Diaz had been chief of police in Mexico City under his uncle (nobody talked about relatives in office in those days); but he was a military graduate glorying in the title of brigadier-general, which rank he had attained at a very early age for merits not apparent to the public at large. He was chiefly known for his notorious corruption, even at a time when corruption in the Government was never spoken of above a whisper, and for his habit of firing upon unarmed demonstrators and riding them down with his mounted police. He had also pretended at one time to be an anti-Reëlectionist, and had gone about in various cities visiting the Maderistas in prison, as well as such few as were out of prison, gathering from them what incriminating evidence he could; which was not much, since despite the cloud of Científico wrath at the moment supposed to envelop him, nobody trusted him.

While in possession of Vera Cruz Felix Diaz announced that he was a patriot without personal ambitions; that he would never under any circumstances be an aspirant to the presidency of Mexico; that he desired only to bring peace to his country, and that, peace assured, the nation might have free voice in

the selection of its executive. Numerous working-men at once undertook a peaceful parade, bearing Madero banners; whereupon the Diaz troops fired upon them, killing seventeen and wounding many others, of whom five died later.

Different stories are told of Diaz's capture in Vera Cruz, and it is too recent yet to know the exact and entire truth of that affair. Plots and counter-plots, bribes and counter-bribes are alleged, and just how far these allegations may be true, or how far the matter may admit of a simpler explanation, it is impossible to say. Be the truth of these stories what it may, Felix Diaz was captured and sentenced to death by a court-martial. Madero was appealed to to save the life of the condemned man, and his clemency got the better of his prudence. Diaz was confined in the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, but a plot to liberate him being discovered, he was transferred to Mexico City (without "trying to escape" on the way, be it observed) and confined in Belen prison.

On the 8th of February, 1913, cadets of the Tlalpan military college under General Ruiz, in connivance with a faction of the army, liberated Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes, the latter a prisoner since his own revolutionary effort in December, 1911. Diaz seized the arsenal, which is close to the prison, and in the first surprise attacked the national palace. In that attack General Reyes was killed, and General Ruiz was captured and summarily executed in the courtyard of the palace. The Felicistas were repulsed and forced to concentrate in the arsenal.

Then followed the terrible eleven-day bombardment of Mexico City. While it lasted Madero was assailed by lukewarm politicians and wealthy citizens (the capitalists of Mexico never did care for him), urging his resignation in the interests of peace. His refusal to resign, on the ground that he was the constitutionally elected President, and his resignation would amount to a desertion of the people who elected him, was translated to mean inordinate personal ambition, senseless obstinacy and caprice. The worthy gentlemen besieging him did not appear to think it incumbent upon them to appeal to the patriotism of Felix Diaz for a cessation of the bombardment which was wrecking Mexico City; nor did they feel called upon to de-

nounce *his* conduct as signifying personal ambition, caprice or obstinacy.

One thing is worthy of remark. In 1911, the populace of Mexico City gathered before the national palace and shouted at Porfirio Diaz to resign, so loudly that even he, deaf as he was, heard it through closed doors. Now, with shells bursting overhead and suffering on every side, it was not the populace which urged Madero to resign. To the last Madero rode freely through the streets of the city, bareheaded on his great white horse, amid cheers.

Both sides were charged with disregarding the rules of civilized warfare in that battle. The rules of civilized warfare, however, have never forbidden the bombardment of cities—or did not, at all events, when American troops shelled Vicksburg and Richmond. There is no constitutional President in the world who would not have considered it his right and his duty to defend his national capital from such rebels; no country in the world where the comfort of foreign residents, Americans or of other nationality, would have been considered paramount to the nation's life-and-death struggle between democracy and despotism.

But if it is true, as charged, that Victoriano Huerta, commander-in-chief of the army, did not betray his President at the last moment, but that his treason was a preconceived thing, and that, coming and going daily with Madero, he was all the while awaiting the moment to betray him; if it is true that he deliberately sent battalion after battalion of devoted Maderista volunteers to be mown down by the machine guns of the arsenal in a profitless assault; if it is true that he had the sights of his own guns altered so that shells aimed at the arsenal fell in the business and even the residence sections of the city; then, indeed, we must admit that Victoriano Huerta at least has violated all the rules not only of civilized warfare but of civilization.

Just how much of what has come from the City of Mexico during the past months is true and how much wild report or censored lies of the *de facto* Government, it would be impossible to say as yet. The known facts, however, are sufficiently revolting to require no embellishment and admit of no extenuation.

Madero was arrested on the 19th of February by General Aurelio Blanquet of the federal forces, and confined in the national palace, together with Pino Suarez, the Vice-President, while Gustavo Madero, the President's brother, was arrested by Victoriano Huerta, then dining with him at a restaurant. Later, a resignation purporting to be signed by Madero and Suarez was submitted to the legislature after all the loyal Maderistas in that august body had been imprisoned. Many claim that the resignation was a forgery. If genuine, the signatures to it were obtained under conditions which absolutely invalidate a signature under the Mexican law. The legislators, bribed and cowed, raised no question, but accepted it. Lascurain, Minister of Foreign Affairs, assumed the presidency, appointed Huerta to the Ministry, and at once resigned himself, Huerta becoming the Provisional President.

Meanwhile, news had been conveyed to Felix Diaz by Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, and after some slight hesitation as to whether or not Huerta was to be trusted by any man, Diaz transferred himself to the national palace, where an interesting consultation took place between Huerta, Diaz and Henry Lane Wilson. Wilson then telegraphed the American State Department urging recognition of Huerta, in the face of the brutal murder of Gustavo Madero, Adolfo Bassó and others.

The city was under a reign of terror. Arrests occurred on all sides. Rurales rode through the streets calling upon the citizens to cheer for Diaz and Huerta. Marcos Hernandez, brother of Rafael Hernandez, Minister of the Interior, surrounded on the street by rurales and commanded so to cheer, answered "Viva Madero!" and was shot down. Cannon frowned over the city. Diaz announced that there would be an election very shortly in which he would be a candidate; but that if he were not elected he would seize the presidency by force.

There are gruesome stories told of the ultimate fate of Madero—stories that he was even tortured in prison to obtain his resignation, which some contend he never signed; which others say that he did sign, and intrusted it to Lascurain, to be presented only when he, with Pino Suarez and his Ministers, should be on board a foreign warship in Vera Cruz: stories that he was mur-

dered, with Pino Suarez, and only their dead bodies carried out in the automobiles which were to have transferred them (for their greater comfort, Huerta and Wilson said) to the penitentiary. This story would seem to be refuted by the account of an eye-witness, who claims to have seen Madero and Suarez as they entered the automobiles, and to have heard Madero say to Suarez as they separated: "Comrade, this is the end." The same eye-witness tells of following the automobiles on foot, arriving at the penitentiary just after the shooting, and seeing the dead bodies of the two prisoners carried past him, covered with blood, and Madero, who was shot in the head, unrecognizable except for his beard.

Whatever the truth, whether they were alive or dead when they were put into those automobiles, Francisco Madero and José Pino Suarez were murdered, and in the eyes of the world their murderers cannot escape the responsibility of their crimes. The official account of the matter cannot clear them. It was so lame that it was told and retold, with alterations and repairs which did not help it to stand any straighter, until the attempt to make it pass was finally abandoned.

According to this official version, the escort conducting the President and Vice-President to the penitentiary was attacked by Maderistas, who, oddly enough, injured none of the rurales surrounding the automobiles, but riddled with bullets the men they were trying to rescue. There was the further curious circumstance that, although the rurales supposedly returned the Maderista fire, none of the assailants were killed or hurt. The exclusive killing of the two prisoners looking a trifle suspicious, it was presently stated that five of the assailants had also been killed, but the corresponding five corpses never materialized. The scene of the attack was shifted from midway between the palace and the penitentiary to the rear of the penitentiary, to conform to the stories of people who had heard firing and seen the commotion at the latter point. After a few other trifling changes had been made in the official version, Henry Lane Wilson telegraphed the American State Department that he believed it, and advised that it be accepted.

One City of Mexico newspaper boldly declared that Ma-

dero and Pino Suarez had been assassinated without even the pretence of a sham attack. The next day the editor was imprisoned and the presses confiscated. Afterwards Huerta pointed to the attitude of the press (already subsidized almost in its entirety) as an indication of the popularity and stability of his Government.

A "rigorous investigation" of the death of the two statesmen was instituted, as a result of which Cardenas, the man who arrived at the penitentiary with only the dead bodies of his prisoners and a none too substantial story of how it happened, has been promoted. The army surgeon who performed the autopsy on the bodies of Madero and Suarez has also been promoted. Why? It has been said that the bullets which entered Madero's head were fired from so close beside him that his hair was burned; that Pino Suarez was strangled. What was the ghastly secret that autopsy was to conceal?

Meanwhile, what of the country in this crisis? In the awful surprise of the treason of Huerta, the bulk of its fighting men forming the volunteer element of that very federal army which Huerta commanded, Mexico was stunned. With the murder of Madero came the reaction. Even in the streets of Mexico City itself, trembling under the guns of Huerta and Diaz and terrorized by the awful butcheries and the arrest of scores, crowds gathered to tell and retell of that murder. People wept. They placed stones to mark the places where Madero and Suarez fell, and lit candles upon them. Bareheaded peons gathered at the door of the penitentiary, and when the coffin of their President was borne forth they cried "Viva Madero!"—to be dispersed with bayonets by the soldiers; but that pitiful little cry, uttered over his coffin, in the faces of his executioners, was worth more than all the loud acclaim that rang from the housetops of Mexico City for the victor of 1911.

And in the procession arranged by Felix Diaz to celebrate the return of peace (rather prematurely, it seems), cries of "Viva Madero!" were heard above the music and the other shouts. The group responsible was fired upon, and six men shot down right in the midst of the celebrants.

Outside the capital the country was aflame. Coahuila, Ma-

dero's native State, had already repudiated the usurpers and put an army in the field under its constitutional Governor, Venustiano Carranza. Sonora had already seceded. Now Sinaloa, Tepic, Lower California and Nuevo Leon were involved; indeed, the whole north, for Chihuahua was comparatively quiet only because, as the theatre of the Orozco revolution, it was full of federals. Abraham Gonzalez, the constitutional Governor of that State, and the only one it ever had, was arrested on a charge which was never proved, and killed on the way to Mexico City—"while trying to escape," one officer said; but this sounded crude, and a statement was issued to the effect that Gonzalez fell under the wheels of the train which was conveying him to the capital.

Something similar was the fate of Felipe Riveros, the Maderista Governor of Sinaloa, who, if reports are true, while being conveyed on shipboard from Mazatlan to Manzanillo for trial in Mexico City on a charge of sedition, "fell overboard" and was drowned. Perhaps most horrible of all was the murder of young Gabriel Hernandez, one of the real heroes of the Madero revolution—a murder perpetrated in a fit of drunkenness by Enrique Cepeda, a nephew of Huerta, occupying no less honorable a position than that of Governor of the Federal District.

In the South rose Yucatan, Pino Suarez's State, and Vera Cruz. Campeche seceded. In the interior Tlaxcala and Aguascalientes defied the usurpers. The Maderista peon and labor union volunteers in the army put up placards denouncing Huerta and proclaiming that the army had betrayed the republic. They mutinied; they deserted; many succeeded in joining the Constitutionalists; hundreds of others were butchered. When the censorship closed down, fourteen States out of twenty-seven were in open revolt, and all Mexico was seething. We may judge of the reliability of dispatches coming from Mexico since then by the fact that dispatches from the City of Mexico represent Carranza as surrendering and suing for peace on his knees, while telegrams direct from the Coahuila border have shown him still fighting—and gaining ground. We learn more or less what happens in the north; but behind the veil of the official

ensorship we catch only a glimpse now and then of events in the interior and the south. The Mexican Government owns the telegraph system, and therefore whoever has possession of the Government has entire control of news both entering and leaving the country.

This, then, is the peace of Felix Diaz: a civil war embracing all Mexico; a civil war which no amount of terrorism and bloodshed can ever stay, or do more at the very utmost than postpone for a little while. The only thing that gives Felix Diaz and Huerta any strength at all is the fact that under them the old Cientifico political and military machine, its ramifications extending all over the country, has sprung together again. But that machine could not stand before—cannot stand now—for now it is in very truth the people of Mexico rising by thousands, as they never rose for Orozco or Zapata—as they rose, indeed, only for Madero in 1910.

For all that has been said and written of the decline of Madero's popularity, it was not the people of Mexico in their entirety, as was pretended, nor in their majority, who turned against him and brought about his fall. Treachery alone established his enemies, for the popular support was his. The real working-men of Mexico worshipped him to the last, as did the better element of the peons; and if perhaps for a moment a few of the honest may have wavered, not comprehending his difficulties, they know now that he was true to them, and that he was murdered because he would not betray them; that he died, fighting for them to the last against the forces of despotism, from which he tried in vain to rescue them. In the fifteen months of his incumbency he could not accomplish the miracle of lifting the ignorant masses of Mexico, in part vicious and criminal, though through no fault of their own, into the Utopia which his enemies claimed that he had promised the people, but which, Utopian dreamer though they stigmatized him, he never had. Study of his Administration, however, shows that he did everything humanly possible in that short time to establish a democracy, to better the conditions of the working-men, to extend the educational system, and to break up the enormous land holdings; and that if he failed it was because at every turn he

was beset by the machinations of an enemy which disdained no treachery, no intrigue, no falsehood, no fraud or force to arrest his efforts, discredit him, and finally murder him. Such mistakes as he made were those of a man too generous himself to suspect treason and ingratitude in others.

The position of Orozco in this crisis sets at rest any question as to which side he was fighting for. His union with Huerta and Diaz on the plea of being quite convinced that they will hold an honest election and carry out those popular reforms which he was so patriotic about when Madero was really trying to carry them out, removes whatever shadow of doubt might have existed. The Cientificos to carry out Madero's reforms! Orozco might better confess his duplicity at once than try to shield it by feigning to believe such an absurdity.

Rojas, Salazar, Cheche Campos, and the other leaders of the Orozquista faction are imitating their leader and barefacedly joining forces with what, if it prevails, will be the most frightful despotism Mexico has known, more shamefully established than any in her history. The Orozco patriots, however, being in the pay of the same element behind Diaz and Huerta, are but joining their own and receiving their final rewards in the way of divers governorships, etc. That their men will be unanimous in following them is to be doubted; as witness the conduct of some of Cheche Campo's men, who, when ordered by him to incorporate with the Huerta forces, fired upon him and his officers, and betook themselves to the Constitutionalists. What few honest men there were among the Orozquistas, misled in their ignorance to believe that Madero was deceiving them and had allied himself with the Cientificos, see now who the real allies of the Cientificos were, and the trap into which those allies led them.

The "pacification" of the Orozco leaders, therefore, means nothing in the way of peace to the country. The spurious and reactionary Orozco revolution will simply be replaced by a real one. As a matter of fact there could not possibly be a union between the Orozquista leaders of yesterday and the Constitutionalists of to-day. The Constitutionalists know that Orozco and his fellows are part of the conspiracy against the Progress-

sive Administration; they sapped its strength and its resources until the way was clear for the military revolt of Diaz and the treason of Huerta finally to accomplish its overthrow.

By that conspiracy, availing themselves of the absolute ignorance and extreme poverty, and the consequent vice of a large portion of the masses—ills for which thirty years of peace under Porfirio Diaz offered no remedy—the Dictatorship and the Cientifico-Wall Street alliance have returned to power, under a new Diaz—for Huerta is but a convenient tool to clean up the dirty work and be made the scapegoat in favor of Diaz in due time: a new Diaz, as ruthless as his uncle, infinitely more corrupt, and without one spark of his uncle's genius to relieve the evils of the system for which he stands. The revolution of 1910 is lost, its victory betrayed, its heroes sacrificed in vain—unless the Mexican nation can redeem it.

There will never be real or stable peace in Mexico while either Huerta or Diaz rules. The country hungers for peace, it is true, but the peace of a Diaz cannot allure her—she has tasted it to the dregs. It will be war to the death, war without quarter. The Cientifico forces have shown and will show no humanity, and we can hardly expect the Constitutionals to be the same generous Maderistas they were in 1911, after seeing their generosity so shamefully repaid. Though many of them will never dishonor themselves with the enemies' methods of warfare, others may descend to savage retaliations; but in no case can they cease to be just. They are not rebels—the rebels are enthroned to-day in the national palace. The men whom Huerta calls rebels are the defenders of the Constitution of Mexico, fought for through thirty years of civil war, and written in the very heart's blood of the martyrs of the *Reforma*. They are the defenders of the Republic which Huerta, Diaz and Orozco have betrayed.

ARE THE JAPANESE UNFRIENDLY?

HAROLD C. RIDGELY

FOR centuries the Japanese Government has steadfastly refused to permit foreigners to own land in its territory, and yet when one of our States makes a law even slightly restricting alien ownership, strong and repeated protests are made at Washington. The Japanese do not want to fight, they say. Certainly not; they want to secure land without fighting. They are crowded on a large island having an area less than that of many a single State in this country, and have a population about half as large as ours; whence the need for expansion.

The method pursued by the Japanese in their purchase of lands is usually the indirect one, by means of agents. Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones and Mr. Anderson buy adjoining farms, and it is not until later that Mr. Hashihashi is found to be the real owner. Then the rents are raised, or the occupants are requested to move and are supplanted by a yellow man's colony. Where Mr. Hashihashi obtains his funds is uncertain, but it is a well-known fact that his Government does not hesitate to enter upon a good business venture.

Such was the method pursued in the case of Korea. First, a small colony secured a foothold, then another and another, much larger. The profound friendship and affection which the Japanese bore towards the Koreans were widely proclaimed and advertised. The native inhabitants were lulled into a state of somnolence. Gradually arms were smuggled into the country, and too late Korea awoke to the fact that the Japanese colonies were a body of trained soldiers, an army of invasion.

The Japanese do not want the Hawaiian Islands, they say. They already have them; they have overrun the islands. It is a crime against civilization to let more get in there. The position is the most strategic in the Pacific, and Pearl Harbor is the best harbor. There is none like it within a two thousand mile radius. These islands should be owned, controlled and peopled by citizens of the United States. We should be justified in excluding the Japanese from our territory as we have the Chi-