

OUR THREATENING WAR PROBLEMS

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CAPTAIN STICKNEY OF THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD
CONTENDS:

THAT AMERICANS ARE LULLED TO SLEEP IN DANGER.

THAT OUR SCHOOL HISTORIES HAVE LIED ABOUT THE
PAST.

THAT OUR MONROE DOCTRINE IS A BLUFF WHICH
THE WORLD WILL CHALLENGE.

THAT OUR MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN AND ARE
YET INEFFICIENT.

THAT OUR RIGHTS WILL BE RESPECTED ONLY AS
LONG AS WE CAN DEFEND THEM.

A NATION'S desire for war or peace is the composite desires of the individuals who compose it. Its willingness to submit to the political, economic or military domination of an alien race, is only the composite willingness of its citizens to submit to such domination. The viewpoint of the lawyer differs from that of the farmer; that of the farmer is different from that of the banker; that of the soldier is not that of the tradesman. Each may be admirable in its special sphere. But the statesman should be able to detach himself from these special viewpoints and gain a clear idea of the trend of events. He must be a student of the world history, and foresee the effect of a certain line of policy.

The duty of the statesman is to desire the material, mental, political and moral uplift of his country. If this is not conceded, then one might believe that peace, bought at the price of political supremacy lost, would be a noble aim. Communities might be more prosperous under the rule of a foreign invader than under that of their own race. Can there be any doubt that the fifteen millions of Mexicans, starving and despoiled by a state of anarchy, would be more prosperous under

the rule of the United States than under Mexican rule? But can this justify the belief that it is the statesman's right to consider such a political alienation as other than a catastrophe against which all his efforts should be exerted?

A subject race does not thrive under foreign domination; it retrogrades; its preservation and progress depend upon self-government. In our Republic, assimilation of closely allied races goes steadily on; the aliens of today become the Americans of tomorrow. Where two race currents meet they unite and quickly lose their racial differences; here there is no conflict. But when these same streams possess antagonistic differences which do not disappear readily, the races will not assimilate, and they can not live in intimate contact without friction. The result is domination of one race by the other, with the deterioration of the weaker race.

Who among us can conceive of a leader of any people, except such subject races as have been for generations governed by aliens, calmly and without compulsion admitting it to be best for his people to renounce their political autonomy and bow to the domination of a foreign race? The spirit of manhood, even in the humblest of human beings, cries out in emphatic denial of such a possibility.

The contest between ethics and political economy at once suggests itself. *Shall no serious effort be made to protect our nationals in their persons and property when once they enter foreign territory?* Shall no effort be made to assure ourselves an equal share in the markets of the world? If the answer is "no," then it is folly to arm. There will be no need for armaments. *If the policy of a government ought to be when buffeted to turn the other cheek, then it is a useless expenditure of money to provide a navy or an army.* But who seriously advocates such spineless policies? Whether non-resistance is felt to be God-like or not, history teaches us that *in the end the people will revolt when their vital interests are threatened.* No government can long stand in the way of the welfare of its people. Whether right or wrong ethically, let the economic life of an intelligent and virile people be attacked and they will resist. They obey the natural impulse of self-defence.

Whatever the future may hold in store for mankind, it is certain that in this age nations believe it is a virtue, born of necessity, to increase their own material welfare in all directions, even at the expense of other nations. Admittedly the rules of individual ethics do not apply, though it is claimed they should.

The fact that there are notable exceptions to the rule, such as the unselfish action of America in Cuba, cannot alter that rule. The history of our Republic is filled with examples of life and money squandered in the defence of policies adopted by the government without adequate force to sustain them. *From the American Revolution until the present day our wars have been commenced and almost wholly fought with armed mobs.* It is impossible to assume that this is due solely to indifference; it is largely attributable to ignorance of the fundamental principles of military efficiency, and a blind confidence in the superiority of our natural military ability, and the military strength of the country.

Inexcusable as this ignorance is, it cannot be said that the individuals bearing the responsibilities of those wars were at fault. It is folly to expect our Presidents or our Cabinet Secretaries to be military experts. The fault has always rested with the vicious system that victimized the country, the officials, and the unfortunate thousands whose lives were sacrificed.

Neither Lincoln, nor his secretary of war, nor the generals who were instrumental in defeat after defeat in our Civil War, could be blamed for being ignorant of military strategy. *The blame lay with the unnamed many—some of whom were no better than political parasites—who refused in the halls of Congress to give the country a military organization which would make civilian muddling of military strategy impossible, who refused to listen to the counsels of experts who knew.* The evils of authority without responsibility are a curse; nowhere can the consequences be more disastrous than in the military and naval services.

How many of our national legislators to-day are ignorant of the truth as to the inefficiency of our military forces in the War of 1812?

How many know the disgraceful facts of the so-called battle of Bladensburg and the burning of Washington by the British?

Why is it that these shameful failures of our arms are not held up now as a warning?

How many know that American militia stood on American soil and watched their comrades across the river in Canada, at Queenstown Heights, being defeated by an inferior British force, and refused to cross to the aid of their brothers in arms because they were not regulars and claimed they were not legally bound to fight on foreign territory?

How many know that this refusal to obey on the part of untrained troops has been a *common occurrence* in our military history?

How many realize that until the Civil War was nearly three years old the movement of troops was continually interfered with by civilian officials in Washington; that even the Secretary of the Treasury had a hand in it?

How many know that the services of the only trained military officers in the country, the officers of the Regular Army, were largely thrown aside? That instead of those officers being utilized in training and leading the volunteers, they were allowed to waste their time and experience in their own regiments, and that each of these same regiments was allowed to dwindle in numbers until it became a mere handful, simply because the policy was to add new organizations to the army when more men were needed instead of keeping filled those regiments already in service?

It is a part of our smug conceit and self-sufficiency that the younger generations of America are allowed to grow up in ignorance of the truth of our short-comings. Our school histories conceal these unpleasant facts, and teach us that America won her independence in the Revolution by force of arms, and sustained it in the same valiant manner in the War of 1812; that we are invincible; nothing could be farther from the truth. We achieved our independence with the aid of France because England had more valuable interests elsewhere to defend. Though defeated on land in the War of 1812, in nearly every engagement, we retained our independence because England again had

more vital interests to defend in Europe. The Atlantic was then our safeguard; not so to-day.

The statesman who does not trouble himself to search the records and ascertain the truth, and who does not use every effort to place the country in a state of preparation against any possible enemy, is unworthy the name.

It is not only in the field that battles are won and lost; often victory is rendered impossible by the lack of preparation, by the meddling of non-military officials, and, in our own history, times without number, by the inexperience of officers and men (more especially the former) who were forced into action by a vicious system of unpreparedness. The almost universal defeat of our military forces in the War of 1812 can be directly charged to the complete disbanding of those forces after the Revolution. The natural consequence of this criminal neglect of the military arm was a nation ignorant of the art of self-defence.

The Russo-Japanese War was won in Tokio before a shot was fired. Japan had been robbed, by European interference, of the fruits of her victory over China. She at once commenced preparations to fight Russia, whose statesmen were too shortsighted to read the signs of the times until too late. When, at last, they awakened to the impending disaster they endeavored to reinforce their Far Eastern Fleet, and their military forces in Manchuria. Japan immediately struck, and the war was won. As she struck then she will strike again—not when her opponent is ready, but when *she* is ready. And *woe* to the country whose statesmen are too blind to see the impending danger!

It is impossible to know the exact force required to secure victory under all circumstances; this must be plain to anyone, but it cannot be urged as an excuse for any statesman to shirk his responsibility in the solution. He has no right to say that because military experts are not of one opinion the statesmen must make no preparations for defence until the experts shall all agree. When doctors disagree do we wait for them to argue their differences while the patient dies, or do we choose that one who seems the best, and direct him to proceed with the treatment?

Duty demands that the statesman accept the world as it is

with its imperfections, not as he thinks it should be; that he should study the needs and desires of his country, placing these in contrast with the needs and desires of every other nation, with a view to determining to what extent they will conflict. From our earliest national history we have believed that our destiny would best be worked out by avoiding alliances, especially European alliances, lest they should draw us into quarrels in which we naturally had no concern. This line of conduct seems likely never to lead to war, hence its effect on military preparations might be regarded as negative. But it is well to remember that its logical tendency will deprive us of allies in any war into which we may be forced.

The Monroe Doctrine, elastic and often misinterpreted, originally a measure of self-protection, aimed against the Holy Alliance, was, *and is* even more so to-day, *one of the most gigantic bluffs ever sustained in the face of the whole world.* It never has had any standing in international law. We all know it served notice on European nations that we stood ready to bid defiance to them in any attempt to extend their systems to any part of this continent. At the close of the Civil War we were in possession of such military strength, ashore and afloat, as to be able to sustain this policy. Without hesitation we prepared to drive France out of Mexico. The show of intentions to uphold the Monroe Doctrine on that occasion was enough. The fighting strength of the nation, colossal then in comparison to that of our probable enemies, determined the question without a shot.

Why did England, France, and Spain go into Mexico, and openly challenge the Monroe Doctrine? Is it not plain that it was because America was in the midst of a civil conflict which threatened to disrupt the nation itself? It was force, and force alone, which sustained our position as clearly as if campaigns had been fought. May we assume that this policy will not again be challenged, whenever the game is considered worth the candle? If we admit that its challenge is possible, does it not become the imperative duty of the statesman to determine upon one of two courses: either frankly to abandon the Doctrine, or place the country in a position of preparedness to make its challenge practically impossible? Is it not a vicious system that

permits the country to remain as it has remained for years, unable successfully to sustain it?

Without regard to the expediency of the Monroe Doctrine, does anyone doubt that if it were seriously threatened this country would rise and insist that the government sustain it? The political party in power refusing to sustain it would go out of existence. How may it be sustained? This is the statesman's problem; and it remains unsolved until he has provided a sufficient military force successfully to cope with our probable enemy, and a military system of handling these forces that will insure freedom from civilian meddling in matters affecting the military efficiency of the fleet and the army. Then, and not until then, may the country expect its policies to prevail.

To-day the Monroe Doctrine is as dear to the hearts of the American people as any principle ever entertained by them. Whether it is a vital policy or not is immaterial. There it stands, a challenge to the strongest nations on earth! What will happen when the challenge is accepted? Let our statesmen study that question until they feel competent to answer it. Have they a right calmly to watch and wait, trusting blindly in Providence that the blow will not fall? Common sense denies them this right.

Another principle that has come to be recognized as of vast importance to our wage earners is that of Asiatic Exclusion. How long may we expect that Japan will consent—we know already she is not content—to remain outside the family of nations having full rights of naturalization in America? Her desire to extend her influence over China may keep her occupied for a time, but the statesman who believes that we shall not, one day, be obliged to accord to Japan the same rights as are granted to the most favored nations, or to fight, is trusting to luck rather than the teachings of history. The proximity to her shores of our far eastern possessions obliges us to consider what shall be our line of conduct. Japan's crowded and rapidly multiplying population must have room to expand; her economic interests demand it; the question is not, will conflict come, but rather *when* will it come? The Philippines are a source of military weakness to us. Shall we give them up as a matter of

policy? If so, to whom and in what way? It does not appear to suit the ideals of either of the political parties in America to allow these people to become the subjects of any other nation. It can hardly be believed that public opinion in America would tolerate this. What then? Independence? What well-informed man can doubt that independence, complete and without qualification, would quickly see that country plunged into revolution after revolution, with almost certain intervention and subjugation by other foreign nations? We do not believe the American public is yet ready to slink out of the responsibility assumed when we took the Philippines from Spain seventeen years ago. The only other alternative is qualified independence, guaranteed in some manner. In this event shall we fulfil our obligations as the sole guarantor, or perhaps as one of the several or not?

There is yet another principle to be considered: The Open Door in the Far East and the Integrity of China. If much thought has already been given to the necessity for greater markets in which to sell the products of America, what will be the importance attached to this question fifty years hence? The statesman is not at liberty to provide simply for the present; his policies must look far into the future; he must consider the welfare of unborn generations. When he ceases to do this and works only for the present, he becomes a mere time-server.

Knowing the traditional policy of America in the Far East, can any modern American statesman fail to realize the necessity for supporting this policy with at least the appearance of force? Is the policy desirable? Then is it wise to advertise by non-preparedness the fact that we will not insist upon our rights?

We are committed to maintain the neutrality of the Panama Canal. Should this affect our state of preparedness for war? Who can suppose, with the Great European War before us, that the neutrality of this new water route will be respected in war one day longer than the necessities of one of the belligerents, plus the unreadiness of America to sustain neutrality, shall appeal to her as the easiest way to victory? If it is violated, what shall be the rôle of America? Shall we follow the example of Belgium, or, being even less prepared than that unhappy country was in August, 1914, shall we supinely submit to a violation of

our neutrality, forsaking the solemn obligations assumed by us when we undertook to build the Canal?

It has been said that the Monroe Doctrine is no stronger than the American Navy can make it. The Panama Canal is likewise secure to America only so long as the American Navy is able to protect it.

Another important principle, inherent in our Constitution, and which must hamper us in our foreign relations, is the theory of states' rights, which places in the hands of the people of any state the power to violate treaties made with foreign powers, while withholding from the federal government the power to remove the cause of friction.

How can we be sure that at any time our Pacific Coast states will not enact legislation still more injurious to the Asiatic races resident there? Then, in our impotence to remove the cause, the Coast states being supported by the labor element throughout the country, we shall find ourselves plunged into a conflict. Our statesmen who have been pleased to see in Japan's economical difficulties an effectual bar to war with that country should not neglect the present movement whereby this bar will very soon be removed. Japan, in becoming the dominating power over China, at one master stroke, has taken possession of untold wealth and resources. How long before we shall see these resources converted into military strength and preparedness?

It is no simple matter to demonstrate that it is wrong for a nation to encroach upon the commercial rights of another. Once we attempt this, we are confronted by the necessity for a standard of right and wrong as applied to nations. The attempt to apply any code of ethics to any particular act of a nation must resolve itself into attempting to determine what has been the custom between nations in similar circumstances. Self-defence is a recognized right of man; likewise of nations. But shall it be limited to defence solely against armed aggression? A race might be as effectually injured by a slow process of economic starvation as by the quicker methods of warfare. And it may be that the process of starvation is not so readily discernible as to awaken public opinion, yet it is there. What rights has a nation in such a case?

Natural economic forces and racial antipathies, acting and reacting between the different nations, tend to bring on conflicts; the world has not yet learned how to prevent these conflicting interests and passions developing into open war. This fact cannot be altered by those who are advocating disarmament, all-inclusive arbitration treaties, etc. More than a hundred years ago in Europe learned men were saying that governments had reached such a stage of permanence, right-dealing and stability, that war between the more civilized states was unthinkable and might be considered a thing of the past!

The ultra-pacifists of to-day have discovered no new virtues, no sure plan on which to build world peace. Even the proposed world league with an international force to compel obedience to the mandates of the international court, even if it obtains a hearing among the nations, must contend against odds vastly greater than the forces which threatened to permanently rend asunder our republic in the Civil War.

In a new and sparsely settled country like ours, internal policies are generally of paramount importance. Foreign affairs concern the people little. As the country develops and begins to produce more than it consumes, the need of markets is felt, commercial relations with the outside world multiply, and foreign policies become of importance to the people. In spite of this, in spite of the vast wealth and opportunities in America, we have not been free from foreign wars. Shall we be more so in the future, as the necessity for our expansion increases? In the United States this movement, which is a form of expansion, has already gathered headway, and in the years to come must make more necessary than heretofore a well-considered policy governing the extent to which our merchants shall be protected abroad in their commercial and personal rights.

Abstention from war is not the first consideration for a people; rather it should be the welfare and progress of the nation in so far as consistent with righteousness. Peace based on righteousness is a virtuous aim; peace regardless of the price may be base and ignoble.

I believe war is the result of greed, ambition and racial antipathies coupled with the legitimate needs and desires of races

and peoples; as the people and their needs increase they will inevitably clash until these causes have been eradicated. That they will some day be eradicated we may logically hope; but I believe that to abolish war by any means that would cause deterioration in manhood or honor, by cowardly policies, would be worse than to abolish prisons and the death penalty by permitting crime to flourish unchecked. Christianity may rightly accomplish it; nothing else *can* do so.

I cannot avoid the belief that preparation for war is a necessity. If it is true that a country may at some time be tempted to make war on another, if prepared, under circumstances where she would not if unprepared, we must accept the responsibility of this, in the hope that our own country will be among the leaders in national righteousness and justice, and the last to use our strength in an evil cause. Even if we are not confident that this will always be true, we, at least, have the right to obey the natural instinct of self-preservation and provide for self-defence against the evil aggressions of others. If a statesman is ready individually to sacrifice his own welfare and life, rather than strike a blow in his own defence, he has not the moral right to sacrifice the welfare of his countrymen; when they are in his keeping he must fulfil his duty as their servant and leader. *What virtue can there be in abstaining from war solely for the fear of being defeated?* It might certainly be *expedient* to do so, but never right. Yet this is the position in which our advocates of disarmament would place us! And if we cannot trust ourselves armed to follow a righteous course of conduct, why trust our rivals armed and ourselves at their mercy?

There has never been more false and silly reasoning than that used by those who cry that preparedness causes war. That the *relative* state of preparedness and military strength of possible foes should have a powerful effect is natural; but that multiplying the strength of the armaments and resources of the same rivals by two or by twenty tends to bring on war, is the merest nonsense unless in some special case where a conflict is inevitable sooner or later. Reducing armaments does not reduce the military resources of any country nor its economic strength. Do not confound military resources with military strength and

preparedness. With Germany and France totally unarmed it would be quite as easy to start a conflict as with both armed to the teeth. A great agricultural country with few factories as opposed to a much smaller nation of manufacturers, both totally unarmed, would be at great disadvantage if war broke out. The nation with factories could quickly provide war material and crush the farmers and their unarmed mob.

As time goes on the policies upheld by America tend more and more to conflict with the desires of foreign nations. The Monroe Doctrine has meant comparatively little to Europeans heretofore. With England controlling the sea and in possession of more colonies than she will need economically for generations to come, she could have no incentive to challenge it; what other nation could do so? The moment some other nation succeeds in the control of the seas, should this reversal occur, there will be every reason for her to attempt to obtain a foothold in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal. Shall we then abandon the Monroe Doctrine?

Unpleasant as the thought is, we are obliged to believe that America is far from being awakened to the dangers of her position. She has never met real disasters. We pride ourselves upon never having been defeated, intensely ignorant of the reasons for our victories, self-satisfied and self-complacent.

Shall we remain unprepared and suffer defeat, or shall we arm?

WITH THE ZIONISTS IN GALLIPOLI

LIEUT.-COL. J. H. PATTERSON

I

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FROM the days of my youth I have always been a keen student of the Jewish people, their history, laws and customs. It was strange, therefore, that I, so imbued with Jewish traditions, should have been drawn to the land where the Pharaohs had kept the Children of Israel in bondage for over four hundred years; and it was still more strange that I should have arrived in Egypt just at the psychological moment when General Sir John Maxwell, the Commander-in-Chief, should have been looking out for a suitable officer to raise and command a Jewish unit.

Now, such a thing as a Jewish unit had been unknown in the annals of the world for some two thousand years, since the days of the Maccabees, those heroic Sons of Israel who fought so valiantly, and for a time so successfully, to wrest Jerusalem from the grasp of the Roman legions.

It had happened that there had come down to Egypt out of Palestine many hundreds of people who had fled from thence to escape the wrath of the Turks. These people were of Russian nationality but of Jewish faith, and many of them strongly desired to band themselves together into a fighting host and place their lives at the disposal of England, whom the Jews have recognized as their friend and protector from time immemorial. Indeed, by many it is held that the British people are none other than some of the lost tribes; moreover, we have taken so much of Jewish national life for our own, mainly owing