

CONGRESS DEBATES:

Aid To China

THE desperate situation of the Chinese Nationalist government makes certain that one of the first concerns of the new Eighty-first Congress will be additional aid to China.

Last spring, when Congress was debating the Marshall Plan, this same problem arose. Senator Vandenberg and the State Department felt that the Chinese problem should be considered separately, and that it should not be confused with the European Recovery Act, since conditions in China were vastly different from those in the Marshall Plan countries. The Marshall Plan bill passed the Senate without any provisions for Chinese aid. The House, however, over the strenuous objections of General Marshall and Senator Vandenberg, made the Economic Cooperation Act an omnibus bill, including China, Turkey, and Greece. The representatives made it clear that unless China was included, there might be no Marshall Plan.

The Italian elections were drawing near and the deadline for European aid was at hand. To save time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recognizing the inevitable, unanimously favored aid to China. This measure provided \$363 million for relief and rehabilitation, and \$100 million which the Chinese government could use for military supplies if it so desired. This latter sum was increased in conference committee to \$125 million.

The editors of FORUM are reprinting this Senate debate because most of the arguments, pro and con, are sure to crop up again when Congress reconsiders additional Chinese aid. The main opposition came from two sides. On one side were those who were not happy to see millions in aid going to a government allegedly inefficient, corrupt, and unrepresentative. They felt that one condition for receiving aid should be a broadening of the Nationalist government. They wished some guarantee

that the money would aid the Chinese people rather than line the pockets of government officials, as seemed to have been the case with previous aid. These Senators voted for the bill reluctantly, since they recognized that the present Chinese government, with the possibilities for improvement, was better than a Communist regime.

The old-time isolationists objected to any aid to China, pointing out that the country was so vast, and the economy so disorganized, that we would only be throwing money down a rat hole. They felt that any aid short of ruining our own economy would be insufficient. They also feared that the provisions for military aid would be merely the first of a long series of involvements in the Far East, which might perhaps end with American troops following American guns. Their main objection seemed to be, "What concern is China to us, anyway?"

The main answer of the proponents of the measure was the simple, practical question: "Do we want China, with its vast area, its 457 million people, its huge natural resources, and its strategic bases, to fall under Communist control?"

Below are excerpts from the Senate debate on Chinese aid.¹

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Mr. VANDENBERG, Republican, Michigan. Mr. President, I present S. 2393, a bill to promote the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States by providing aid to China. It is recommended by a unanimous vote of the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is supported by every American instinct to sustain independent governments against aggression, and free peoples against conquest. It is sustained by the rich, historic tradition of American friendship for the Chinese people. Its advisability, at this

¹ *The Congressional Record, Senate*, Vol. 94, No. 59, pp. 2765-2799.

critical moment in the story of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is so unavoidable that I believe it unnecessary to do more than report the basic facts, and then to take the Senate's decision. . . .

China was one of the heaviest sufferers from the bludgeon blows of World War II in which she was our ever-faithful ally against the Axis—bearing the cruel brunt of Japanese attack and ruthless occupation, yet always refusing all appeasing opportunities for a separate and expedient peace. The victory against the Axis, however, did not end her grueling jeopardy. The fruits of victory turned to ashes on her lips. She has since been riven by civil war in which her government has been under constant and powerful attack by armed Chinese Communists—a major victim of that conspiracy of aggression which undermines the peace of this unhappy earth.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The accumulation of these strains—first, 8 years of war; second, long Japanese occupation; third, Communist rebellion—would have long since broken a people less devoted to their ideals, and a chief of state less grimly tenacious than Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. I pay my humble but deepest respect to the tremendous patriotic labors and to the seasoned integrity of this great and courageous leader, who has sustained his responsibility for democratic ideals, through thick and thin, against overwhelming odds. Come what may, I give him my hopes and prayers for his success in behalf of a liberated China and the progressive freedoms of a liberated Chinese people. . . .

The Chinese Nationalist Government has long been recognized by the United States. It has been recognized by every member of the United Nations where China sits as a permanent member of the Security Council. And this is important—it was specifically recognized by Soviet Russia in 1945 when the Kremlin agreed "to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be given to the National Government as the Central Government of China."

This pledge has been honored only in its breach. Instead, Soviet Russia, for example, has stripped Manchuria of vast industrial

equipment estimated at a value as high as \$2,000,000,000. It has rendered none of the moral support or material aid it promised. On the contrary, although its direct connection with the Communist civil war is debated in some quarters, it is difficult for realists to make this discrimination—in the light of known infiltration and known subversion, among other things. While the National Government has taken initial steps toward practical democracy through the promulgation of the constitution and the election of a National Assembly, the Chinese Communist rebels aim at totalitarianism; and the Chinese Communist propaganda has been bitterly anti-American and directly follows the Moscow party line regarding all American policies. Not all rebels are Communists. There is the familiar coalition with other antigovernment reformers. I underscore the word "familiar." But all Communists are rebels; and there can be no doubt as to the overriding character of this civil war. In any event it is aimed at that government in China which has shed its blood, sweat, and tears against aggression and dictatorship for more than a decade. It is aimed at that government in China which is recognized by every other power on earth, and which asks our help in its extremity. It is to this government and this people that the pending bill again proposes to extend American succor in response to prayers for aid.

If and when we respond, Mr. President, to this plea, we are serving more than the humanities—great though these be amid a people with whom we have had long and vast cultural, educational, and religious ties. We are serving more than our traditional foreign policy, which never has failed to speak up for the integrity and the independence of China ever since our first treaty in 1844—particularly remembering Secretary of State Hay in 1900 and Secretary Stimson in 1932. We are also serving, Mr. President, our own unavoidable self-interest in international peace and security in an enormous far-eastern area which peculiarly involves the welfare and the future of the United States. Certainly no bill of particulars is necessary upon that score. Congress itself has been too obviously tender and receptive to this theme in recent months to require any further argument.

This bill is our latest answer to these specifications and these demands. It puts the China program on the same timetable as the European program, taking the relative figure for 12 instead of 15 months, so that all these programs may confront simultaneous review next January. It thus authorizes an appropriation of \$463,000,000. This sum is divided two ways. First, it makes \$363,000,000 available for carefully screened relief and rehabilitation under the applicable provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, including the usual bilateral agreement with China, and under the general direction of the Administrator of that act. Second, it makes an additional \$100,000,000 available as a grant on such terms as the President may determine. This can be used at China's option for military purposes and in the purchase of urgently needed military supplies. It is believed that this can greatly facilitate the delivery of our own surplus military supplies, at China's option, in the far-eastern area.

The Committee on Foreign Relations wishes to make it unmistakably clear, in this, as in all other relief bills, that there is no implication that American aid involves any continuity of obligation beyond specific, current commitments which Congress may see fit to make. This understanding is necessary in all foreign-aid legislation, not only in elementary prudence as respects our own resources, but also in justice to those whom we assist. We do not—we cannot—underwrite the future. Events are unpredictable in this tragically fluxing age. It is a duty to underscore this reservation in the case of China because we find here many imponderables as a result of the military, economic, and social pressures which have understandably undermined her stabilities, and prevented or postponed the internal reforms which even her surest friends readily concede to be not only desirable but essential for the Chinese people and for the Nationalist Government. But reforms without survival would be a disillusioning mirage.

General Chang Chun, President of the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government, frankly and courageously spoke of these necessities in a sturdy statement last January, from which I quote:

The Chinese Government fully recognizes that, in order to secure the maximum benefit

from external aid, an adequate and practicable program of domestic measures of self-help is needed. This program should at the beginning lay stress on financial and economic measures of immediate importance which will be followed or accompanied by certain other reforms in the fields of general administration and military reorganization.

General Chun then listed 10 of these vital necessities; and they are in the report which is on the desks of all Senators. They are more than ordinarily difficult of achievement in a country the size of China, comprising one-fifth of the world's population. By the same token the greater will be the glory of such efforts. The recognition of these necessities by the Nationalist Government itself is one of the stimulating and hopeful factors in this equation. The best friends of China will urge the relentless pursuit of these healing objectives. It is simple candor for us to take account of these facts as we turn again to China's assistance. But it would be a cruel distortion of paramount facts to subordinate the central purpose of this legislation to an overemphasis upon the difficulties and the handicaps which the Nationalist Government must overcome in these respects. The preservation of China's independence is prerequisite to the preservation or attainment of everything else. Liberty is prerequisite to progress.

Now I return briefly to the bill itself.

We cannot deal with the Chinese economy on an over-all basis, as we have done in the European recovery program. China is too big. The problem is too complicated. But we can serve some key needs with great effectiveness, and, in the unanimous opinion of the Foreign Relations Committee, we should and we do, under this proposed legislation. For example, we propose to help in respect to a probable food deficit of 2,000,000 tons for the coming year, having constantly in mind that China has so drained her foreign exchange that she will be hard pressed to procure essential imports needed for the continuation of her basic civilian economy. The tentative break-down of relief commodities is also shown in the revised committee report which is on the desks of all Senators. Limited appropriation, perhaps \$60,000,000, is contemplated for key reconstruction projects. All commodities will be distributed,

and all projects will proceed under the strict supervision of the Administrator of the Economic Recovery Act, and all applicable requirements of that act will be invoked; although, of course, it is clear that China cannot be tied in with the 16 European nations in this connection.

I turn now to the question of military aid. By way of background, I report the current military status in China. Because of shifting controls in disputed areas, it is impossible to be accurate. These are general estimates. The Chinese Communists control perhaps 25 per cent of the total area of China and perhaps 33 per cent of the population. The strength of the Communist armed forces is estimated at 1,150,000 regulars and 2,000,000 local militia. The Nationalist government announced 6 months ago that its armed forces numbered 3,800,000 men.

GREECE AND TURKEY

As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your Committee on Foreign Relations recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available, at China's option. For this or any other purpose, at China's option, a grant of \$100,000,000 is included in the bill. This implements a heavy program of transfers of military surplus, at nominal prices, already under way, and to be extended. Your committee believes, as a matter of elementary prudence, that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist Government. No matter what our heart's desire might be, any such implication would be impossible over so vast an area. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we prefer to leave the initiative, in respect to these particular funds, in the hands of the Nationalist Government. The current net result is no less effective. We want it to be no less effective. But we also want no mistake about the nature of our obligations. Congress must retain freedom of decision as events may recommend.

Under another law, the United States will continue to furnish military advisers to the Government of China at her request. At the present time this group consists of 572 officers and 921 enlisted men. This includes military

police and weather and air transport personnel. None of this personnel commands Chinese troops nor engages in combat. Their capacity is advisory only. Combat units of American troops definitely are not involved. Nothing in the pending bill alters these limitations on these plans in any aspect. . . .

Mr. MORSE, Republican, Oregon. On the basis of the analysis of the Wedemeyer report, would the distinguished Senator from Michigan say at this time that he believes the relief supplied by the United States to China, ever since V-J-Day, has in large measure gone to the aid of the common people of China?

Mr. VANDENBERG. An answer to the Senator's question requires a bill of particulars in respect to the question. The interest of the common people of China, in the judgment of the Senator from Michigan and, I am sure, in the judgment of the Senator from Oregon, rests first and fundamentally upon the maintenance of China's independence and the right of autonomy and self-determination. To whatever extent the aid furnished since V-J-Day has therefore either encouraged or helped sustain the Nationalist Government, I would say the answer is "yes," that it has been to the advantage of the people of China. Insofar as a break-down which would pursue the aid to specific objectives is concerned, I am afraid I cannot answer the Senator's question. . . .

Mr. MORSE. During the course of the Senator's excellent speech this afternoon he particularly emphasized the obligation resting upon the Administrator or the administration of the aid program, to see to it that the aid we now propose to give China goes to the common people of China. I think the Senator can put me right if I am wrong, but I assume that . . . the emphasis with which the Senator discussed this particular problem in his speech is probably based upon the fact that he, too, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has heard testimony, as I have heard representations made to me, that too much of our funds and too many of our supplies which have gone to China in months past have not accrued to the benefit of the common people. Does the Senator think I am wrong in that observation?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I have no doubt in the world of the almost imponderable difficulties involved in the type of relief distribution in

China which the Senator from Oregon and I both desire to see exist. Neither have I any doubt that there has been a progressive disintegration, as a result of the accumulated pressures in the last 8 years, in the adequacy of the system under which relief has been distributed. But my belief is that the clear and specific controls which are contemplated under the Economic Cooperation Act and which are contemplated to be extended to the distribution and control of supplies under this bill, will reduce to a minimum whatever hazard of the nature to which the Senator refers may exist.

Mr. MORSE. Were any representations made to the Committee on Foreign Relations by any witnesses as to the effect of black markets, corruption, bribery, pilferage, and tremendous waste which have characterized much of the distribution of relief supplies in China?

CORRUPTION

Mr. VANDENBERG. We had available to us the entire record taken by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and there can be no doubt about the complete, or almost complete, disintegration of the Chinese fiscal system. I think that perhaps as of today the American dollar is measured in the equivalent of 500,000 Chinese dollars. Under such circumstances black markets are inevitable. It would be a unique situation if China were free of black markets, when we know that the entire European area, which is struggling back to its feet, is similarly cursed with black markets. I should think that the black-market curse in China is greater than that in any other place in the world, in view of the fiscal-exchange relationships to which I have referred.

Mr. MORSE. If the Senator will permit me to make a brief comment on which I wish to base my next question, I should like to say that I have yet to interview the first American who has returned from China after extended observations in China who has not told me that in almost every part of China in which he or she traveled he or she found persons actually starving, and yet sometimes within the block, or around the corner, or two or three blocks away, there would be on the street for sale at black-market stands a good cross section of

the various supplies we have been sending to China for the aid of the common people. Such reports have been so consistent and so uniform that I think they have added much to the query which I think is being asked all over America today, namely, what assurance have the taxpayers of America that by spending more and more millions of dollars for food and supplies for relief in China they are doing anything more than again filling the pockets of the group which is today in charge of the Nationalist Government of China?

On the basis of those reports I am convinced that something must be done this time to make clear to the National Government of China that it must do everything possible to cooperate with us in ending the type of waste, graft, and corruption which these reports uniformly indicate prevail at the present time in China. We must have assurance that there shall be an improvement in the distribution of our supplies. So I ask the Senator from Michigan if I am correct in assuming that his committee's answer to the problem is to be found in the language on page 11 of the report, where it is pointed out, starting with the last word on that page, and going to the top of page 12—

The committee repeats that the Administrator is under obligation to see that this actually takes place—

Meaning, I assume, that this time we are saying to the National Government of China: "We shall insist that this relief go to the aid of the common people of China."

Am I correct in that assumption?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I think the Senator is totally correct in the very earnest dedication of the committee to that objective. I should like to comment a little further on the Senator's question, if he will permit me. I call his attention to the language of the committee report, on page 5, which frankly indicates that China's economy has deteriorated steadily since the defeat of Japan. Then I call attention particularly to the next sentence:

The destruction of communications has isolated the resources from the centers of consumption and the ports.

I think that our committee was greatly impressed by the fact that among the other major

difficulties confronted in achieving the precise result to which the Senator appropriately dedicates his hopes is the very general breakdown in communications which makes it difficult to operate the most well-meaning plan that could be devised. It is for that reason, I say to the Senator from Oregon, that among other contemplations in the pending plan is the restoration of one major railroad line of communication which will greatly, it is hoped, reduce this particular handicap.

I think that in speaking of the necessity that this relief shall accrue to the advantage of the common people of China we cannot, as realists, ignore the utter size of the problem, the almost unbelievable area involved, and, above everything else, the break-down of all the instruments of communication, so that the worthiest purpose in the world confronts high difficulty in achieving these aspirations. . . .

I can give the Senator no assurances as to net results respecting the vicissitudes of climate, and the like, in respect to native crops. I can give the Senator no assurances that the habits of a thousand years in this area are to be made over as a result of the legislation we are proposing. But I can give the Senator assurance, born of what I consider to be the very brave statement and action of General Chang Chun, president of the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, which the Senator will find set out in some detail on pages 12 and 13 of the report. I am sure that statement of itself will give the Senator substantial reassurance regarding the attitudes of the beneficiaries of the plan. I can certainly give the Senator every assurance in the world that the administrators of the program will find themselves under an irresistibly compelling obligation to undertake to the maximum degree the objective which the Senator very rightly underscores.

Mr. MORSE. I think it is the last assurance that is of most importance in this discussion.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I think it is, too.

Mr. MORSE. The other assurances about which the Senator spoke I could not expect him to give to me, but in the course of his major remarks this afternoon—and I think this bears on one of the last observations he made—he did make the point, and I paraphrase him, that we have to look, of course, to our own economic resources to see how far

we can go in our national relief program for China and other countries.

Mr. VANDENBERG. At all times.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator now points out that when we take into account the vastness of China, both from the standpoint of territory and from the standpoint of population, we cannot hope, of course, to bring to the common people of China all the aid that is going to be needed by them to eliminate the terrible economic and social conditions which exist in China.

Let me make a statement to the Senator, which I make only because I think re-emphasis of the point is important in this debate in view of the perplexity which confronts the American people today with regard to the situation in China. After V-J-Day we gave many millions of dollars' worth of war supplies, much of it consisting of food, clothing, and equipment, which could be used to sustain large numbers of the common men and women of China against the vicissitudes of the elements. Such supplies covered many acres of land in the various islands of the Pacific. And what happened? I think the American people should know some of the facts as to what happened in regard to those supplies. Many of them deteriorated and rotted, and were never moved off the islands.

A national corporation of the Chinese National government was formed, and many of those supplies, particularly heavy machinery and machinery that could be used in logging, road construction, and the like, have been sold back to American taxpayers at prices considerably higher than the prices which were charged for similar machinery by our own Surplus Property Administration. At least I have received such information and representations from several American sources. However, I want the facts about this matter, because if that is true, it needs to be looked into. . . .

The dollars obtained by the Chinese National Government from those sales of supplies should be taken into account, it seems to me, when we compute and sum up our financial relief to China. I think we have to take into account the administrative policies which have been followed by this Chinese corporation in the disposal of American surplus property. I

do not think it is fair or proper that certain political cliques or favored Chinese business groups should be allowed to make profits out of American relief supplies or American gifts to the Chinese people.

I am sure the Senator from Michigan will agree when I say there is great danger that what I say may be looked upon as an unfriendly act on my part toward the National Government of China. No one in this body, including the Senator from Michigan, has greater appreciation of and respect for the fight for freedom which the Chinese National Government waged during the Second World War than I have. However, I cannot condone what I understand have become totalitarian policies of the Chinese National Government in recent months.

In his remarks, the Senator from Michigan suggested that not all the rebels against the National Government are Communists, but that all the Communists are rebels. I agree with that observation in view of the reports I have received from China. I think it is proper to point out at this time that, at least from such reports as I am able to obtain, from people who I am satisfied are reliable, loyal Americans who have been living in China, some of whom have returned to this country, some of whom are still writing from China—there is growing resentment in China, on the part of people who are not Communists, against the practices of the National government in China. The result of growing opposition to the National government on the part of people who are not Communists is that a great many Americans are raising the question today as to whether, from the standpoint of totalitarianism, from the standpoint of governmental regimentation and dictation over and of the rights of the people, there is much difference between the policies of the Generalissimo and the policies of other totalitarians.

I do not think we can run away from this rising doubt as to what the governmental policies of the Generalissimo are with respect to the principles of freedom which we are defending the globe around. I think there is a responsibility resting on our government to make perfectly clear to leaders of governments who seek our aid that there are certain basic principles of freedom which they must support

if they hope to have our aid, and there is none greater than the guaranty of freedom of choice to the rank and file of the people of a given country. I would ask the question, not of the Senator from Michigan, but a rhetorical question, How much freedom of choice is there in China today, even under the Chinese National Government?

Mr. VANDENBERG. The Senator from Oregon supports the pending proposal, I am sure, for substantially the same reasons that actuate me in my support of it.

No member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am sure, would undertake to say that the situation in China is comparable, in respect to the terms of democracy as we understand the word, with democracy as it is understood in those areas where it has been a reality for a much longer time.

FREEDOM OF CHOICE

It seems to me, I suggest to the Senator, that our judgments have to be relative in connection with the question of practical democracy. The Senator chose a phrase, which I particularly liked, to symbolize his entire objective. His phrase was, "the preservation of the freedom of choice."

I doubt whether that freedom of choice could possibly exist, in the terms that we in America would attach to the words, in any of the nations which are just coming into their first realization of the fruits of organized democracy. I agree that every emphasis upon freedom of choice must be made in our dealings with any government which we are undertaking to assist.

But we must—and at this point the Senator from Oregon would not for an instant disagree with me; I know him much too well—look at the other alternative in respect to freedom of choice, and in the opinion of the Senator from Michigan there will be no freedom of choice left to the 400,000,000 people of China if it falls behind the iron curtain of communism.

It seems to me at the moment, since there is a Nationalist Government, doubtful as some of its characteristics may be in terms of western morality—since there is a Nationalist Government which for 20 years has carried on the inspiration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in seeking to

bring the Chinese people to a better day; since there is a Nationalist Government that has written a democratic constitution; since there is a Nationalist Government that has called free elections, and since the alternative at the moment is the total loss of any freedom of choice for any except those Communist autocrats who would control the conquest of China, I respectfully suggest that even on the basis submitted by my able friend from Oregon, those of us who are devoted to freedom of choice, those of us who are devoted to human rights and fundamental freedoms, find ourselves completely justified in supporting this effort for whatever it may be worth to encourage, under appropriate auspices, those who are struggling to preserve and promote freedom of choice for the Chinese people. . . .

Mr. MORSE. The only caution I sought to indicate here today was a caution of my government—and I think it is a warranted caution—that we must make very clear to the National Government of China that there is much evidence to bear out the allegation that freedom of choice for which we are fighting and for which we are standing in the world today is not being granted to the degree that an ally of ours in a fight for liberty the world around should grant. That is the only major point I am trying to make.

I agree with the Senator from Michigan that once China falls behind the iron curtain of communism there is no liberty at all. But if she becomes a completely fascist state—and I am satisfied she is more fascist today than democratic—there will be no personal liberty for the people of China. It will be lost to the same degree under fascism as it would be lost under communism.

Mr. PEPPER, Democrat, Florida. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I yield to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. PEPPER. In view of the enlightening discussion between the able Senator from Michigan and the able Senator from Oregon, and in order that it may be made clear that we are defending principles to which our people subscribe, I wonder whether the able chairman would accept an amendment to the bill: that its provisions and benefits shall not

become available until the Secretary of State shall have found that at least the essential basic elements of democracy shall exist in the Nationalist Chinese Government?

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, the Senator knows the answer to his question before he asks it. He is laying down a rule of generalities which it would be totally impossible either to identify or to enforce.

Furthermore, the situation which we confront at the moment, in the judgment of the Senator from Michigan, is something of an emergency situation involving the far more fundamental question as to whether or not the masses of the Chinese people shall have a further chance to pursue the things which the Senator wants the Secretary of State to underwrite as having already occurred. . . .


Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, I asked the question I asked a moment ago because I think it is very vital that we make it clear that we stand for two things. First, we stand at some Armageddon and say, "Beyond this point we will not retreat." We say that to all aggressors everywhere. I think that might be a statement of one side of our policy, but we must be unmistakably clear and put equal emphasis upon our declaration that we also have certain regard for principles. We must be very sure that we do not identify ourselves with any questionable motive or any questionable group, or any questionable attitude. So long as we are certain in our consciousness that we are right, and that we are associated with those who desire only to protect and defend the right, then I have no qualms about our course. That is the reason I think it is important that we make it clear, as the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] did a moment ago, that while we do not stand with Communists, we do not stand with Fascists, either, and that we do not stand with elements which are corrupt, or with those who have denied democracy to their own people. Let us associate ourselves with the democratic element, and say, "Yes; we will stand behind you against any kind of aggression or encroachment." But when we defend people who are not easily defensible, and governments whose defense has brought embarrassment even to this distinguished committee, if the record may be taken into account of what it said in its first report, and the modification

of its report in the second instance, would we not a thousand times over strengthen our position if we were to lay down conditions which even our friends must meet if they are to receive our aid?

I distinguish the case of China from other cases. Even in Greece, where I believe the situation has not been altogether up to our standards, before we undertook to render aid we were able to point to an election which had been held, an election which had been examined by American observers as well as the observers of other countries. I have heard the able chairman declare upon this floor that that gave a degree of integrity to the Greek Government, even if it were monarchical in character, that it would not otherwise have possessed. We could say to the world that there was an election, that the people had an opportunity to vote. Our representatives scrutinized the vote, and they stated that it met moderate standards of adequacy. Consequently, we said, "Until there is a change, we will support this government."

But no sooner had we started our aid program in Greece than—I dare say due to our pressure—there was a so-called liberal government in power. It was a coalition government, but there was a displacement of the reactionary government, and there was the installation of the government of Sophoulis, who was the leader of the so-called liberal party. Today our aid is being given under this allegedly liberal government. I dare say our representatives are there to observe that there is some decent respect, at least, for the basic, fundamental principles of democracy. . . .

Can we conscientiously say that that same condition exists in China? Is Chiang Kai-shek's government the one to which we wish to attach our flag and say it is ours as well as his? I thought we had been told time after time that if we were giving the money we could impose conditions. If we are to make it impossible for communists to participate in our aid, as we do, then can we not eliminate those who are on the other side, on the extreme right, the fascist-like side, especially when before mankind there is so much question as to their integrity, let alone their philosophic acceptability?



Alexander in *The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*

WHILE OUR BACKS WERE TURNED

So it seems to me that the moral background of our whole aid program would be immeasurably strengthened if we were to lay down the condition that, while we are not going to yield to the aggression of communism, we are not going to embrace as brothers the fascists or those who have philosophies of government which are not basically and essentially democratic in character. . . .

Mr. WHERRY, Republican, Nebraska. I should like to know about China. It was my understanding then, and up until the time the E.R.P. program was passed in the Senate, that the economic approach was all that was necessary in the opinion of those who testified up to that time. I am not speaking of what has happened since. The question which I finally wish to get to is this: Has the situation changed? . . .

What has happened in China? Is the situation very different from what it was when the other legislation was proposed? Is the situation today in Europe different from what it was when the Congress passed the European recovery program legislation? All I have to do is remind the distinguished Senator from Michigan of the testimony of Secretary Royall and of the colloquy the distinguished Senator from Michigan had with him—

Mr. VANDENBERG. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. WHERRY. To make it unmistakably clear that at that time it was the economic approach, and that was all, and at that time we were given to understand that if we could provide the appropriations for the economic approach, we would not have to have the draft or we would not have to implement the program by taking steps along military lines. . . .

If I properly interpret what it is proposed to do, we are appropriating \$100 million which we know will probably be used by the Chinese Government for military purposes.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I would not withdraw any economic program simply because it might require a supplement of a different character. The situation changes from day to day. The necessity for the emphasis in our answer changes from day to day. But I think the record stands clear that it is highly desirable in the present instance, narrowing the issue to the particular issue now pending before the Senate, that this bill should pass for the sake of its contribution not only to the physical resources of our great Chinese friends, but also to their psychology in connection with a global challenge to the hopes by which free men live and the dedications for which we have fought.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator be patient enough for me to ask one more question?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I am glad to yield to the Senator.

Mr. WHERRY. I think that the China loan is related to E.R.P. if, for no other reason, that in the parliamentary situation which will come about through the passage of these bills in the Senate, which are included in the omnibus bill which will come from the House.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I am sorry, but I did everything I could to prevent that situation.

Mr. WHERRY. I understand that. For that reason, when it is considered by the conferees, I think it will be found that it is not an unrelated matter. That is one of the reasons I think the question is a proper one, not only with regard to China, but with regard to E.R.P.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Any question which

the Senator asks is a proper question, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator. Would the Senator consider that he has made up his mind that the alternative course of supplemental aid, besides economic aid, is now warranted? Does the Senator see what I mean?

Mr. VANDENBERG. No; I do not see what the Senator means. Does the Senator mean, do I favor selective service and universal military training? Is that the question?

Mr. WHERRY. The distinguished Senator used the words "an alternative which requires supplemental aid in addition to economic aid," whatever that may be, in the China aid bill.

Mr. VANDENBERG. The Senator is quite correct. That refers to the \$100 million which at the option of China can be used by her to purchase military supplies.

Mr. WHERRY. Has the Senator come into possession of any facts, or have witnesses testified before his committee as to any serious facts, which justify the distinguished Senator's feeling that not only the economic approach, but the alternative approach should be used in handling the situation in Europe?

Mr. VANDENBERG. In China.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator has already explained the situation with respect to China. I am asking with reference to Europe.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I shall not undertake this afternoon to pass judgment on the question of our supplemental obligations in Europe in our own self-interest. It is beyond the wit of man to anticipate what the situation may ultimately require. I do not know the answer. It is in the lap of the gods and is dependent upon events. I shall cross that bridge when I come to it.

Mr. WHERRY. It will have to be crossed, will it not, in the conference committee? In the omnibus bill is there not aid other than economic aid?

Mr. VANDENBERG. Only in the case of Greece and Turkey, which is a continuation of the original program.

Mr. WHERRY. I wish to thank the Senator for the information he has given. I am still groping for more evidence to justify the

demands of the administration relative to the end results which are to be obtained.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I am sure that is entirely the fault of the Senator from Michigan, it being unable to meet the desire of the Senator for information, but in self-defense the Senator from Michigan will say that he never before collided with quite such an appetite.

Mr. KEM, Republican, Missouri. Mr. President, approximately a year ago, on April 22, 1947, to be exact, the Senate passed the bill authorizing a \$400 million "loan" to Greece and Turkey. This marked the initial phase of the so-called Truman doctrine to quarantine communism. The measure was opposed in this body by a number of its members. The opposition was based generally on four grounds.

OBJECTIONS

First. The plan bypassed the United Nations.

Second. The plan was in its essence a military program, although presented on a humanitarian basis.

Third. It is impossible to buy the good will of peoples with dollars.

Fourth. Our first concern should be to build a strong economy at home.

So far as the junior Senator from Missouri is concerned, each of these points is as valid today as when originally made. Nothing has occurred in the interval to cause him to think otherwise. These reasoned arguments apply equally to the second installment of \$275 million of the Greek-Turkish program approved by the Senate last week, and also to the gift to China now under consideration. . . .

The United States continues to adhere to the position that we are the sole hope of peace in this troubled world. The other members of the United Nations are in effect told that they shall have no voice in establishing peace in the Mediterranean. We shall carry on alone.

Mr. President, we are asked to direct our go-it-alone peacemaking efforts to another area in this troubled world; to vast, turbulent China, struggling in the throes of civil war. In his message to Congress on February 19, 1948, the President stated:

The United States has long recognized the importance of a stable Chinese nation to lasting peace in the Pacific and the entire world. The primary objective of the United States is to bring about throughout the world the conditions of a just and lasting peace.

Mr. President, if that be the situation, and if that be our purpose, is it not a situation in which it is logical to utilize the facilities of the United Nations in an effort to secure a solution? If the peace of the world is threatened by the China problem, as the words of the President indicate, why should we not appeal to the United Nations before attempting to effect a solution of our own? The United States, in proceeding in this fashion in an effort to solve all the problems of the world, is steadily destroying the original and fundamental concept of the United Nations, upon which the hopes and aspirations of millions of our fellow citizens are centered.

Insofar as I am aware, there has been no action on our part to utilize the policing function of the United Nations in seeking a solution of the China problem. Did we not accept the United Nations as a means of world peace and security? Why, then, should the United States take unto itself the full responsibility of deciding how world peace should be maintained when the problem had been and has been specifically assigned to the United Nations from the outset?

If the United Nations is not sufficiently strong for the task, then let us use our resources and our energy to make it strong. If the fundamental Charter of the United Nations is inadequate or ineffective, let us direct our attention to the amendment of that Charter. . . .

In the second place, Mr. President, I think it has been fully developed by the very frank and candid admissions of the senior Senator from Michigan, and by his colloquy with the able Senator from Nebraska, that the China plan is in its essence a military program, although presented, as before, as a humanitarian effort.

Some of those pressing at the last session of the Congress for the enactment of the \$400 million Greek-Turkish so-called loan made efforts to camouflage its definite military

character by presenting it primarily as a measure for economic assistance to those countries. . . .

Now we are asked to provide aid to China, in the amount of \$463 million. The committee bill states:

It is the purpose of this act to provide immediate aid to China to relieve human suffering—

The same language again, Mr. President—to assist in retarding economic deterioration, and to afford the people of China an opportunity to initiate measures of self-help necessary to rebuilding the bases for more stable economic conditions.

So far as I have been able to determine, the bill does not mention military aid. However, the bill provides for an additional \$100 million to be authorized to China through grants on such terms as the President may determine, and the report states that it may be assumed, and I think the Senator from Michigan has said that it may be assumed, that this \$100 million will be used for military purposes.

Mr. President, there is a maxim in the law: "Facit per alium facit per se"—He that acts through another acts himself.

I do not think we need delude ourselves or continue in any false paradise to believe that when we grant money to a country those against whom our money is used will not consider us their military enemies. So we are asked to quarantine communism again—this time in China.

The initial phase of the program is presented to us on a humanitarian basis, but, Mr. President, I suppose none of us will be gullible again. Indeed, in the President's recent message on aid to China we find this significant remark:

The financing of these essential commodity imports by the United States would permit the Chinese Government to devote its limited dollar resources to the most urgent of its other needs.

Of course it need not be pointed out that the most urgent of its other needs is of a military character. In other words, Mr. President, this project is war, and it is not conceived for purposes in anywise pacific.

We find the well-worn humanitarian appeal

is resorted to once again in urging us, or enticing us, to commit ourselves to a new area in the world. Just as the original Greek and Turkish loan was mere window dressing for the expansion of our military frontier on the Dardanelles, so this proposed gift to China is mere camouflage for the establishment of a military beachhead somewhere in the vast reaches of China, to be held by the blood of American young men, if necessary. As Theodore Roosevelt once said, "You cannot shake your fist and then shake your finger." Once we are committed, it is only a question of time till the American soldier will be called upon to follow the American dollar. We shall hear again, as we heard last week from the distinguished senior Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], "We cannot turn back. We have got to see it through. The prestige of the American Nation is involved." . . .

On March 12, 1948, Dr. Sun Fo, Vice President of China, expressed the apprehension of members of the Chinese Central Government over the extent of outside control that might be associated with the China-aid program. "China," said Dr. Sun Fo, "was eager to preserve her national sovereignty and self respect, and would insist upon the right to reject advice if it is not acceptable." I continue to quote from Dr. Sun Fo:

Among our people there is apprehension about too much interference in running the country.

A number of foreign observers have conceived that lifting the ban on foreign inland shipping would help solve the transportation shortage, but Dr. Sun Fo said:

We would object if we were asked to open our inland transportation system to foreign shipping.

Thus this sovereignty consciousness, creating a complication in terms of Nanking's dependence on foreign assistance, in the opinion of competent observers, is sure to prove a barrier in the way of an American effort to assist China out of its economic morass. In passing it may be said that it is almost certain to furnish a similar stumbling block in 16 countries of western Europe to which we have just voted aid.

The United States has poured out billions upon billions of dollars and sent them down the European rat hole without appreciable results. But in our efforts to assist China we have been confronted, and are now confronted, by no mere rat hole. It is rather a bottomless pit, or an abysmal morass. In spite of all the money the United States has poured out, conditions in China have grown more and more desperate. The inflation of the currency is completely out of hand. . . . Anarchy threatens to engulf the land. First-hand observers return with stories of corruption, waste, and incompetence from the top to the bottom of the Nationalist Government. The military situation there is equally deplorable. It has been stated that for every communist killed by the Central Government, four more are created by the unfair tax policies of the Central Government, its cruel police-state methods, and its failure to check inflation.

Our support of a regime that has grown more and more unpopular in the last year or so will reap for the United States only a last-thing harvest of hatred.

Secretary Marshall in his testimony before the House committee on February 24, 1948, stated:

For the main part, the solution of China's problems is largely one for the Chinese themselves. Local governments are often so corrupt that they are undependable for assistance in the administration of relief methods. The political control by long-entrenched groups is a great difficulty to be overcome in the restoration of China to economic stability.

Mr. President, if I correctly interpret the address of the President of the United States on this subject and the testimony of his Secretary of State in regard to it, the only thing expected from this measure is a breathing spell to help retard the present rapid rate of deterioration. No effective results are even hoped for. Yet, as in Greece and Turkey, once we have shaken our fist at the Communists in China, we shall find that we cannot then shake our finger, for economic aid admittedly will serve no useful purpose.

General Chennault has testified that substantial portions of the military equipment we have furnished to China have already fallen

into the hands of the Communists. It is only a question of time when we shall receive requests to send American boys to do the job that our economic and military aid has not succeeded in doing. Shall we then be told by able and distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee that we cannot turn back, but that we have placed our hand at the plowshare and our prestige is at stake?

American military missions, Mr. President, already are accompanying American dollars into the far reaches of the earth. They are asked to accompany them in this connection. Are we ready to follow those missions with the cream of American manhood to defend putative frontiers on the Yangtze, the Dardanelles, the Oder, and the Hellespont?

Mr. President, let us turn again before we are told once more that our prestige has been involved and that we are committed. . . .

Mr. JENNER, Republican, Indiana. I should like to ask the Senator from Missouri whether it has not always been the policy of our government to help China in an hour of need?

Mr. KEM. So far as I know we have never aided and abetted the Chinese government in any military project, in the entire history of the United States.

Mr. JENNER. Then does the Senator mean to say that this is a bill to provide military aid coupled with relief?

Mr. KEM. I mean to say it is to provide military aid to a large extent, and that the essential conception is military.

Mr. JENNER. What percentage of the appropriation for China would be applied to relief?

Mr. KEM. I think there is approximately \$350 million for relief, and \$100 million for military purposes. But it is stated in the report, perhaps very naively, that the economic aid given to the Government will enable it to turn to its more pressing necessities. So in effect, since the Chinese Government is at war, all her aid is of a military character.

Mr. JENNER. Assuming that the \$450 million were truly applied directly to relieve the suffering and famishing Chinese, does the Senator have any statistical or other basis of fact that would enable him to inform the

Senate what the appropriation would represent by way of aid per person in China?

Mr. KEM. I think, roughly, it would be \$1 a person.

Mr. JENNER. One dollar a person a year?

Mr. KEM. Yes, on this grant; and of course this is merely a start. They will be back. The Greek-Turkish program lasted a little less than a year. There is no reason, I suppose, to expect this will last longer than that.

Mr. JENNER. Then would the Senator say that the granting of \$100 million for military aid is committing us to a military program in China that in substance means that we must finance the present Chinese government until either it is successful or drives communism from its borders?

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I can only say to the Senator from Indiana, I think we may be guided by the lamp of experience. When we sent lend-lease aid to the embattled Allies of Europe we were told that it in no sense involved us in war. Yet, within only a few months, American boys were found fighting all over the world. I do not happen to recall a case of any power that aided and abetted another with money that did not sooner or later become involved with the wars of that power. It would seem to me to be an essential "chain reaction," to use the striking phrase of the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. JENNER. I thank the Senator.

Mr. KNOWLAND, Republican, California. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEM. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Perhaps the Senator is going to touch on it later in his remarks, but I was wondering if he does not recognize what the significance might be if 450 million Chinese came under the complete domination of the Communists, either Russia herself or a Communist satellite establishment of Russia in China, and if that 450 million man-power was made available to the two-hundred-and-some-odd million within the boundaries of the Soviet Union itself, plus the additional millions that have been forcibly taken behind the iron curtain. I am wondering if the Senator does not realize that that would have tremendous significance upon the ultimate security of the United States, and that while it might

not present a problem for this generation in the next year or two, for our children it might present a problem that would be far greater than the problem of the civilized world at the time of Genghis Khan.

Mr. KEM. I agree entirely with the Senator from California. I doubt, Mr. President, if there is a member of this body who has not given that very possibility hours, and I may say nights, of sleepless thought and consideration. I doubt if there is a member of this body—and I say it reverently—who has not approached it with prayerful consideration. Yet, Mr. President, I have no reason to believe from anything I have ever been able to read in recorded history that the puny efforts now proposed will prevent that result taking place if it is in the womb of time.

Mr. HAWKES, Republican, New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEM. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. HAWKES. The Senator referred to the puny efforts. That was only speaking relatively, because I know the Senator does not think of \$21 million plus \$24 million that has been given and loaned on unsound loans since the end of the war.

Mr. KEM. I was referring to the present sum of \$1 per person provided in the bill.

Mr. HAWKES. I realize what the Senator was referring to, but what I wanted to emphasize was that that need which to the world may seem puny from our national standpoint may be very enormous to us as an individual nation. Does the Senator realize that?

Mr. KEM. Yes. . . .

Mr. President, time will not permit any extensive discussion of the vacillating policies we have already pursued in China. Our inept, vacillating policy toward the Central Government in China has succeeded in completely confusing both the Chinese and the American people, together with their representatives in Congress.

At one time, in the period after Pearl Harbor, the United States extended aid to both the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists in their fight against the Japanese. In October, 1944, with the recall of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell at General Chiang Kai-shek's request, United States support was

thrown behind the Nationalist Government. At approximately the same time Mr. Patrick Hurley was appointed Ambassador to China, but a year later, on November 2, 1945, he resigned his post with fiery blasts at the State Department for sabotaging his efforts to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist Government.

In a State Department bulletin issued on November 18, 1945, we find this statement:

It is neither our purpose nor desire to become involved in the internal affairs of China. . . .

By this time full-scale civil war had begun between the Nationalists and the Communists. President Truman then sent General Marshall as a special envoy to China, with the personal rank of ambassador. His task was to bring about peace and unity by broadening the Central Government to include the representatives of the large and well-organized group who were then without any voice in the government of China.

President Truman, on December 16, 1945, stated:

The United States is cognizant that the present National Government in China is a one-party government.

He went on to say in general that peace, unity, and democratic reform in China would be furthered if the basis of the government were broadened to include other political elements in the country. He further stated:

In line with its often-expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate.

Special Envoy Marshall, however, was unsuccessful in effecting a reconciliation between the ruling party and the Communists, and on January 6, 1947, he returned to Washington to stay, being highly critical of the political and military reactionaries in the ruling party and also of the dyed-in-the-wool Communists. President Truman, in a policy statement on December 16, 1946, had acknowledged the

failure of American efforts to secure peace in China.

After what has been described as General Marshall's first failure, the tempo of American withdrawal from China was accelerated. Perhaps one of the factors that may have hastened the United States decision to quit China was the obvious and unabated hostility of the Chinese people to the American forces then in China. Thus our vacillating policy at the beginning of 1947 reflected a hands-off attitude toward the Chinese situation, and the administration directed our attention to the Greek-Turkish problem, leaving the Chinese primarily to look after themselves.

Then, in July, 1947, the President sent General Wedemeyer to China as his personal representative to survey the situation. The general completed his mission in September, and returned to this country. He submitted a confidential report of his findings to the President and the Secretary of State. That report has never been released to the public or to the Congress. It has been described as too hot to handle from the State Department point of view. At any rate, it was suppressed.

It would seem, Mr. President, that before the Congress embarks on such a dangerous program as is called for by the China plan, the least we can do is to place ourselves in possession of all the available facts. We ought to have all the available facts before we reach a decision. Clearly our judgment can be no better than our information. . . .

Mr. LUCAS, Democrat, Illinois. As I understand, the Senator is against the measure now pending before the Senate?

Mr. KEM. The perspicacity of the Senator from Illinois is quite remarkable.

Mr. LUCAS. Of course, I did not think the Senator from Missouri would go into the question of the perspicacity of the Senator from Illinois, but if he wants to debate that subject, we will go into it later.

Mr. KEM. I shall be glad to discuss it with the Senator later.

Mr. LUCAS. Yes; we can do that.

Assuming to be true what the Senator from Missouri has said about our foreign policy in China, what does the Senator suggest we do, if anything, with respect to China?

Mr. KEM. If the Senator from Illinois will

bear with me, I shall reach that point in the remarks I have to make, and I think the Senator, with the perspicacity he has demonstrated, will have no difficulty in determining exactly what I think we ought to do.

Mr. LUCAS. The only reason I propound the inquiry now is that I am afraid perhaps the Senator will not finish this afternoon. I am not going to be here tomorrow, and I wanted to find out exactly what the Senator had in mind with respect to what we ought to do, if anything, in regard to China. It is a perfectly proper question, and I am really interested, because I agree, to a certain extent, with some of the things the Senator has said. I know that our policy in China has not been a total success; but I should like to find out from the brilliant Senator from Missouri exactly what we can do, if anything, with respect to China. That is the point.

Mr. KEM. In case my remarks carry over until tomorrow, and in case the able and brilliant Senator from Illinois is not present in the Chamber, I shall obtain his address from the Secretary to the minority and send him a copy of the *Congressional Record* by air mail.

Mr. LUCAS. That is exactly the way many Senators do when they are asked a real question which gets to the meat of the situation, and when they are asked what they would do. They tell us that they will send us a copy of the speech the following day. Now is the time for the Senator from Missouri to tell the country what he would do with respect to our foreign policy in China, and not wait until tomorrow.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, I prefer to develop my argument in my own way. I am unable to accept the well-meant suggestions of the able Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. It is always easy, Mr. President, to tear down a house. Many men who can tear down a house cannot build one. I should like to have the Senator tell us about a policy for China.

Mr. KEM. I have already told the Senator that I expect to suggest a policy which will be so definite and clear-cut that even the Senator from Illinois will have no difficulty in understanding it.

Mr. LUCAS. I doubt it. . . .

Mr. KEM. Perhaps some Senators will say

that the Senator from Missouri does not appreciate the significance of this One World in which we live. Perhaps it will be said that the Senator from Missouri is lacking in appreciation of the atomic age. Perhaps I shall be reminded by Senators that modern means of communication have brought Europe and America and the rest of the world close together. But it seems to me that the new American policy, developed and implemented and put into action in the light of these developments in the world of the physical sciences, has had a rather thorough test. We have fought two world wars. We have spilled a tremendous amount of American blood. As a minor matter, we have spilled a great deal of money and natural resources. We destroyed the Kaiser, only to raise up Hitler. We destroyed Hitler, only to raise up Stalin. . . .

The China-aid plan now under consideration is diametrically and utterly opposed to the teachings of the Father of His Country. I hope we shall not lightly disregard those teachings. I hope we shall apply them without fear or favor.

Now I come to the plan which I have to suggest. There is nothing new or novel about it. The fact of the matter is that I have previously presented it on the floor of the Senate. I regret greatly that the able and distinguished Senator from Illinois, who pressed me for my plan just a few moments ago, is not now present, but I hope he will read in the *Congressional Record* what I have to say at this time, and I hope he will consider it for what it may be worth.

I have three proposals, and I urge them again for the careful consideration of the Senate and our fellow Americans:

First, let us stop meddling in the internal, governmental affairs of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Second, let us drive the Communists and fellow travelers from employment under the government of the United States and make it as difficult as possible for them to return.

Third, while we still have strong resources, let us spend as much as may be needed to build a national defense so strong that neither Russia nor any other aggressor nation will dare attack us.

Mr. President, for those reasons I shall vote against the pending bill. . . .

Mr. LANGER, Republican, North Dakota. Mr. President, what is proposed to be given by the bill now pending is not the only money China will have received. I have here the record. Communism has been fought in China very hard, if the amount of money China has been given is any criterion. . . .

How much would any Senator suppose has been given to the Chinese—not to our veterans, not to our farmers, not to our teachers, not to our aged, but to the Chinese in China? Aside from the amount they will receive under the bill now being considered, under United States post-war foreign assistance there has been given since the war \$1,099,000,000, not counting what is proposed to be given to China today. . . .

Let us consider another angle. I would gladly follow the Foreign Relations Committee and I would gladly follow the State Department, but the trouble is that they are wrong practically all the time. One event following another event proves them to be wrong. Only yesterday the head of the Flying Tigers, General Chennault, said that the entire Chinese situation could have been cleaned up several years ago. . . .

The total shows that to date we have given to China \$2,905,800,000, or five times the assessed value of every acre of land and every piece of property in five states the size of North Dakota. I make the prediction that a year from now they will be back asking for a billion dollars more. . . .

Mr. CONNALLY, Democrat, Texas. Conditions in China have been, as is well known, greatly disturbed. For 8 years she was at war with Japan, invaded and subjugated, and she is now involved in an internecine civil war which has brought great suffering to her people and has placed upon the Central Government of China great burdens and difficulties which it is hardly able to bear.

The sum which is involved is not, I grant, sufficient to solve all the problems of China. It will be only an incentive, a rather substantial one, in a way, and an encouragement to China to know that the great Republic across the seas is her friend and wants to see her re-

habilitated and reinstated in her ancient power. . . .

Most of the sum of money to be authorized is for the actual necessities of life for the teeming millions of China. There is an item of \$100 million which is not earmarked, for good and substantial reasons. We cannot, in a program of this nature, anticipate every need or necessity which may arise. We cannot tie the hands of the Administrator by requiring that he must furnish this, that, and the other, and nothing else. It is in the nature of an outright grant to China for her use, under her own responsibility, for whatever great and critical need may arise.

There is not a word in the bill regarding military supplies or military aid. It is, of course, entirely probable that the \$100 million grant may, if the exigency should arise, be utilized by the Central Government in China for the purchase of munitions, equipment, and arms. It is as important to protect China against invasion and subjugation as it is to protect the bodies of her people by providing the food which is to be sent to her under other provisions of the bill.

The committee unanimously reported the bill. There is wide sentiment throughout the country in favor of furnishing aid to China. This measure is the best plan or device we could bring about in the committee to extend aid to China, without making hard and fast commitments which we did not feel it was wise to make.

I am sure we all read in the newspapers recently that Chiang Kai-shek issued a public statement appealing for the aid of the peoples of the world, stating that China was at the very door of destruction, on the brink of disaster. We have heard his appeal and are responding to it. We are extending aid, not in the proportions that many persons would desire, but aid of a very substantial character which, in an hour of crisis, of danger, and of need may be of great assistance to China, because in every issue there is always a point at which an inconsiderable force is sufficient to balance the scale in favor of one side or the other.

So, Mr. President, I hope the Senate will, by a resounding vote, support this measure and give government sanction to trying to aid

a great people of a great nation which has been our traditional friend, and to which we have extended generous aid in the past. We hope this aid will be of substantial assistance in furthering the ambitions of China for democracy and free government, and in rehabilitating her economy, so that she may be put in such a position that she may, through her own resources and by her own devices, regain the place in the economy and the civilization of the world to which her history entitles her. . . .

Mr. PEPPER. What has troubled me regarding this particular case more than has any other thing is the matter of those with whom we are required to be associated in the assistance we give, and whether the very fact that the people we are expected to assist are themselves vulnerable subjects us to a criticism which we do not and should not deserve. I feel with all my heart that the only solution of the problems of China ultimately is an effective working democracy in that country.

I feel that the effective answer to communism is an effective democracy, and I know of no place in the world where that is more true than in China.

I am not going to dispute the allegation that, in some parts of the world there appears to be, by the overwhelming weight of the evidence, an element of force behind the persuasion of communism. Wherever force appears there can be no question, of course, about the necessity of interposing a counterforce of equal power to prevent aggression, and "to preserve the freedom of choice," words used this morning in the debate, for the people under assault.

I think we must in fairness say that the evidence has not been such with respect to China as it has been with respect to Greece. There has been a constant assertion that in Greece aid was given across the border by a neighboring country. That fact has been supported by the testimony of a duly accredited mission of the United Nations. So far as I know, there has been no similar United Nations commission which has made a study of the situation in north China and made a comparable report. I do not know of a United Nations recommendation which today demands the kind of support which we are asked

to give to the Nationalist Government in China.

If the aid from across the border, which we are told exists in Greece, is not being given today in China, I would not of course wish to interpose military force, and I am glad that the committee has made it clear that we are not, legislatively, at least, adding military to the economic aid we provide in the measure before us.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PEPPER. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. Anything which supports human beings in the way of food and the like in a measure is military aid, if the people are in the field fighting.

Mr. PEPPER. I was distinguishing military from economic assistance.

Mr. CONNALLY. Very well.

Mr. PEPPER. What I want to say is that I have noted particularly in the pending measure the authority provided for American administrators to see to it that the aid given is properly distributed. I was very much gratified to observe that. In fact, I notice in the recommendation of the committee that the Administrator, who has the same authority with respect to the other Marshall plan countries, shall have the power, and I presume the final say-so, as to the distribution of the aid. I feel very much better about it after observing that recommendation of the committee, and the interpretation of the bill, that it will finally be up to an American Administrator to see to it that what we give by way of aid is properly distributed to the Chinese people, and is not subject to exploitation by those who would even be willing to accentuate the grief of their fellow countrymen to assuage their own appetites for greed and avarice. I am concerned about our going further than that. . . .

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and read the third time.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is, Shall the bill pass?

The bill S. 2393 was passed.

INDEX FOR JULY-DECEMBER, 1948

Volume CX, Numbers 1-6

SUBJECTS

Biography:

Between East and West, I. Edward Benes, July, 6;
Between East and West, II. Saragat, Sept., 129;
Ex-God of Japan, Sept., 135;
Between East and West, III. Léon Jouhaux, Oct., 193;
Between East and West, IV. Karl Renner, Nov., 257.

Books in Brief:

July, 24; Aug., 93; Sept., 156; Oct., 220; Nov., 283; Dec., 346.

Congress Debates:

The Draft, July, 38;
Reciprocal Trade, Aug., 105;
Fiscal Policy, Sept., 172;
Housing, Oct., 236;
Investigating Powers, Nov., 302;
Aid to China, Dec., 363.

Economics:

Private Pension Plans, July, 13;
Fiscal Policy, Aug., 67;
Money Magic in America, Aug., 72;
Full Employment: Pitfalls, Aug., 77;
What is Inflation?, Aug., 80;
The Dollar Shortage, Aug., 85;
Forum: Are Prices Too High?, Aug., 96;
Congress Debates: Reciprocal Trade, Aug., 105;
Inflation Control, I. The 1947 Act, Sept., 139;
Insurance and Security, Sept., 143;
Congress Debates: Fiscal Policy, Sept., 172;
Our Invisible Tariff, Oct., 215;
Inflation Control, II. Voluntary Agreements, Nov., 271.

Forum:

Should Germany Be Unified Now?, July, 28;
Are Prices Too High?, Aug., 96;
Is Our Convention System Undemocratic?, Sept., 160;
Is Censorship Justifiable in a Democracy?, Oct., 228;
Must We Join a Western European Alliance?, Nov., 292;
Should We Re-establish Relations With Spain?, Dec., 356.

Forum Features:

Oct., 256; Nov., 320.

Informal Essays:

Country Comment, Sept., 167; Oct., 218; Nov., 291; Dec., 350.

Literary Essays:

The Goats on the Left, July, 17.

More Than Fifty Years of Forum:

July, 27; Sept., 166; Oct., 235; Nov., 301; Dec., 345.

Poetry:

July, 23; Aug., 104; Sept., 151; Oct., 219; Nov., 286; Dec., 355.

Politics:

International:

The Three Crucial Issues of the Peace, III. Democracy, July, 1;
Between East and West, I. Edward Benes, July, 6;
Forum: Should Germany Be Unified Now?, July, 28;
Yokosuka: Pilot Plant of Democracy, July, 34;
Between East and West, II. Saragat, Sept., 129;
Ex-God of Japan, Sept., 135;
Between East and West, III. Léon Jouhaux, Oct., 193;
Germany's Social Structure, Oct., 199;
Lessons of the Berlin Crisis, Oct., 206;
The Italians at War, Nov., 264;
Rommel's Last Days, Nov., 279;
The Italians at War, II. Realities, Dec., 321;
Germany Revisited, Dec., 335.

The United States:

Congress Debates: The Draft, July, 38;
Fiscal Policy, Aug., 67;
Money Magic in America, Aug., 72;
Full Employment: Pitfalls, Aug., 77;
Congress Debates: Reciprocal Trade, Aug., 105;
Inflation Control, I. The 1947 Act, Sept., 139;
Let's Get Out of Japan, Sept., 148;
Forum: Is Our Convention System Undemocratic?, Sept., 160;
Taft Answers Truman, Sept., 168;
Congress Debates: Fiscal Policy, Sept., 172;
Our Invisible Tariff, Oct., 215;
Congress Debates: Housing, Oct., 236;
The Turnip Day Congress, Nov., 276;
Forum: Must We Join a Western European Alliance?, Nov., 292;