

We should support  
Socialist governments

# MARSHALL PLAN STRATEGY

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THE progress of Communism in the countries East of the Stettin-Trieste line has proceeded in a sufficiently regular fashion to allow the observer to discern a pattern. An analysis of this pattern is, I believe, indispensable for an understanding of the process by which one totalitarian regime after another has been established. Without such understanding it will be impossible to devise a strategy designed to restrain the further advance of communism in Europe.

This pattern of the Communist offensives has emerged quite clearly in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Not all of these countries have completed the course and obtained the highest degree of totalitarianism. They are, as it were, in different stages of the evolution, but the sequence of the stages is identical in all of them. Two of the so-called Soviet "satellites" are missing in our list: Yugoslavia and Albania. The reason for this omission will be discussed later.

The crux of the matter is in the relationship between the Communist and the Socialist parties in the different countries. The story begins with the establishment of friendly relations between the two leftist labor parties. In the atmosphere of the liberation from the Nazis and Fascists, in the great hour of triumph of the Red Army, such friendly cooperation was almost a matter of course. Any one resisting such an understanding would have been swept off the stage of history by the fury of the masses. In one country of Eastern Europe after another, as the Red Army advanced into Hitler-Europe, a Communist-Socialist alliance was established.

With equal inevitability, the leftist alliance claimed and obtained a position within the governments established after the national liberation. Not only did the two labor parties form a substantial bloc which, even in the agricultural countries of Eastern Europe, was numerically strong enough to claim, under the laws of democracy, representation in the government; but the authority of the labor parties, Socialist and Communist, was also greatly enhanced by the defeat of the Nazis and the splendid victories of the Red Army. The presence of Communists was undoubtedly helpful in enabling a better understanding to come about between the new government and the Soviet occupation authorities, wherever such existed. A possibly apocryphal story is told of Chancellor Karl Renner of Austria on the night of the first parliamentary elections in Austria after the liberation. Until late, the election returns coming in showed an amazing weakness of the Communist Party, so much so that it was doubtful whether a single Communist deputy would be elected. Renner is reported to have prayerfully invoked the Lord's help in assuring the election of at least a few Communists, for without them, relations with the Soviet authorities would have been greatly impaired.

The alliance of the two independent labor parties is only the first step. It is followed by a Communist request for a closer understanding, usually in the form of joint electoral lists. Once these are accepted, the independence, even the mere identity, of the Socialist Party becomes doubtful. The elected members of Parliament don't know whether their election

is due to the strength of their own party or to that of the allies. The object of their loyalty becomes nebulous. This confusion prepares the ground for the next step in the Communist offensive.

### LEFT-WING SOCIALISTS

A left wing exists in most Socialist parties; it is typically a group which favors intimate co-operation with the Communists. The latter now set out to strengthen it. They offer their support to Socialist leaders of the type of Lotar Radaceanu in Rumania, Arpad Szakasits in Hungary, Zdenek Fierlinger in Czechoslovakia, Oscar Lange in Poland. If there is no left-wing, the Communists help create and develop it, for it plays a vital part in their strategy. As soon as it is strong enough, the Communists offer their support to enable the left-wing to take over the party leadership and purge the Socialist movement of recalcitrant members. The decapitation of that wing of the Socialists which defends the independence of their party is a major requisite for the success of the Communist strategy. In this they can count upon the tradition of the socialist movement which favors the unity of the working class. To present what is really the capitulation of the Socialists as an understanding of two equal partners, they must silence those who might be able to point out the difference. Hence the need for the elimination of the right-wing leaders.

Having achieved this, the united Communist-Socialist bloc is ready to claim exclusive power. The leftist group is strong enough to form the nucleus of a parliamentary majority which needs only the support of a few selected members of other political parties. This is rarely lacking for long. The leftist bloc has succeeded, in the meantime, in obtaining control of the key ministries—Interior, commanding the police; Justice, controlling the courts; and whatever pressure is needed to “make friends and influence people” can now be applied without the interference of the law. Political foes are arrested, a conspiracy and a few acts of espionage are discovered at a convenient moment; if unavoidable, a demonstrative execution like that of Nikola Petkoff in Bulgaria is arranged until the right-wing

opposition breaks down. Right-wing opposition may continue to exist, but only by the grace of the Communists.

As a final stage of the development, the two leftist parties merge leaving only one genuine political movement on the stage—the Communist-controlled Leftists. The course in five easy lessons on “How to establish a totalitarian regime” is completed.

In Yugoslavia and Albania the process was completed somewhat more rapidly, in Albania because the Socialist Party was non-existent; in Yugoslavia because the weak Serb Socialists had joined Mikhailovitch's Chetniks and were, therefore, defeated with them.

In all other countries of the Soviet sphere of influence, developments have followed the pattern outlined above. Most of them have reached the penultimate phase. The merger of the two leftist parties is impending. It has been consummated in Rumania; it will most probably have been achieved in Hungary by the time this article is printed. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria are heading for this final and crowning victory of Communist strategy.

The relationship between Communists and Socialists is thus the key to the entire development. In most countries of the Continent a close alliance of the two parties is an irresistible force which doubtlessly would attract like a magnet the few small splinters needed to give it full governmental power according to the rules of democracy. For most Socialists, this would be a decisive argument in favor of such an alliance, were it not that what has been happening so far is not an alliance, but a Socialist capitulation, not a merger of the two parties, but the submersion of the Socialists. As it is, the so-called Socialist-Communist alliance ends in the totalitarian rule of Communists and crypto-Communists.

The farther west we move in Europe, the more important is the Communist-Socialist relationship. For, if this bloc was strong enough to set up totalitarian regimes in the agricultural countries of Eastern Europe, how much more successful would it be in the factories and workshops of the industrial center and west of the Continent? There is, no doubt that in Austria, Germany, Scandinavia, France, and the Low Countries an alliance of

the leftist parties would be either in power immediately upon its conclusion, or, as in Italy, a highly powerful pretender to the throne.

### KEY TO PROBLEM

Foes of a one-party state will, therefore, have to understand that as long as a Socialist-Communist alliance is merely a tool for the establishment of a Communist one-party regime, the independence of the Socialist Party is the key to the situation. Once the Socialists have been turned by Communist strategy into submissive instruments, very little can be done to arrest the progress of the totalitarian plans. A strong Socialist Party, capable of retaining the allegiance of at least a large part of the working class, is a condition for the continued existence of a democratic regime.

Those, therefore, who like Hayek in his *Road to Serfdom*, Mises, and so many others claim that there is no real difference between Socialists and Communists are innocently furthering Communist strategy. If they are right, the European Continent, nay Europe as a whole is lost to Communist regimes and the Marshall plan is a mere waste of American resources.

This, fortunately, is not a view that corresponds to reality, nor is it universally or even widely held. It is necessary, however, to go beyond a mere affirmation of diversity between Socialists and Communists. Only if the European Socialists are strong and successfully defended.

It is perhaps useful to imagine what the consequences of a Socialist failure in Europe are likely to be.

Suppose, for instance, that the British Labor Government were to end in utter failure, not simply a minor electoral defeat, but the kind of failure which discredits a movement and an idea. In Britain, the main consequence might be simply a return of a Conservative Government with possibly a slight or even substantial increase of the Communist vote. It seems improbable that for some time to come this would seriously threaten the democratic institutions of the country. On the Continent, however, the result would be dif-

ferent in kind, not merely in quantity. For the failure, dismal and unequivocal, of the greatest democratic Socialist experiment in history would not simply mean a return of democratic capitalistic parties to power, but rather a polarization of politics at the extremes, right and left. The disappointed former electors of the Socialists would either turn to the Communists or retire into apathetic resignation. A few might support anti-democratic movements of the right. A small number only would more or less wholeheartedly adopt a democratic capitalistic program. The destruction of democratic socialism on the Continent would strengthen anti-democratic forces; primarily, I am inclined to think, the Communist.

If, therefore, capitalistic forces on the Continent were to defeat the democratic Socialist parties, it would not be the former, but rather the Communists, the Fascists and those valuable, if concealed, allies of anti-democratic forces, the skeptic and indifferent citizens, who would benefit from the failure. Particularly would this be so were the defeat of democratic progressivism on the Continent to be imposed by outside forces such as the United States.

It is perhaps no exaggeration to claim that a contradiction exists at present between capitalism and democracy in Europe, and that, in the interests of democracy, social experimentation in Europe should not be regarded as an enemy of the United States, but rather as a potential ally. Whatever views he may hold regarding the achievements and the prospects of free private enterprise in the United States, an open-minded observer would agree that all kinds of new forms of enterprise—not all of them necessarily nationalized or socialistic—are likely to exist in Europe and that the only live and real issue is that of the political regime in which they will rise and grow: democracy or some form of totalitarianism.

It would be ridiculous and futile, nevertheless, to ask the United States to support Socialist movements and Socialist experiments. After the grandiose achievements of American production during and since the war, American capitalism is far too conscious of its strength and too sure of itself to con-

sider such a policy. Indeed this is not the real problem.

What matters is, that the Congress of the United States does not declare war upon the forces of social democracy in Europe. From time to time, proposals have cropped up to refuse Marshall Plan aid to Socialist or Socialist-supported governments. A glance at a political map of Europe would show that such conditions would practically restrict American support to two of the most objectionable dictatorships in Europe, Franco-Spain and Portugal. Not only the Socialists of Europe, but all sincere democrats would regard this as evidence for the Communist claim that the United States is not out to help democracy in Europe, but rather to defend the wealthy and privileged classes against the advance of democracy. Moreover, the proponents of this policy would have to convince the State and the Defense departments in Washington that Spain and Portugal, and possibly Greece and Turkey, would be sufficiently powerful allies for the United States to offset the loss of the rest of the Old World.

In the second place, the United States must recognize that its own national interest requires the success of the British Labor Government, or at least the avoidance of an economic breakdown in Great Britain. The United States needs Great Britain if Europe is to be preserved; American soldiers have

fought in Europe to prevent any Continental power from subduing Great Britain, and doubtless would have to do so again. A crisis in Britain or any development which would weaken the country would, at the same time, strengthen the forces of aggression and thus hasten the day when American troops might have to land again in Europe. No less important is our understanding of the way in which a failure of the Labor Government would strengthen the Communist parties all over Europe. American democracy would lose allies which it can ill afford to abandon.

Lastly, the United States may have to choose among the large number of those who offer themselves as allies and friends. Being the most powerful and wealthiest nation on earth, the United States is being courted by a great many, not all of whom can at the same time enjoy the friendship of American democracy. In particular, the United States could not give support to Fascists, Nazis, and former collaborators without running the risk of losing the sympathy of a large part of the European workers and democrats. Their support, however, is indispensable for the maintenance of democracy in Europe. And without democracy in Central and Western Europe, the defense of the United States itself would become increasingly difficult and ever more incompatible with the existence of free institutions in this country.

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Following Benjamin Franklin's discovery of electricity a scoffer caustically inquired: "Of what use is that type of knowledge?"

To which Franklin replied: "Of what use is a child? He may grow into a man."

—*Christian Science Monitor*

In a mid-western court a man was suing the local traction company for injuries allegedly received in a street-car accident. The truth of the matter was that he had actually received his bruises when his auto collided with a telephone post. And this had happened a full mile from the street-car line.

The plaintiff's witnesses swore to the facts of the accident, and things were going nicely for him, when one of their number was suddenly beset with an attack of conscience and during a recess went to the judge's chambers and confessed to the frame-up.

The judge rushed back into the court room with fire in his eye, determined to make an immediate public revelation of the perjurers. But he was brought up short in his resolution when the traction company's attorney produced three witnesses prepared to swear that the plaintiff was drunk when he boarded the street-car.

—*Wall Street Journal*



# CHEP MORRISON— MAYOR

By RALPH WALLACE

AMERICA'S most amazing political paradox is the rocket-like rise of 36-year-old deLesseps (Chep) Morrison as Mayor of New Orleans. For generations that city had ranked as the country's most amiably wicked. Yet two years ago, as a reform candidate in a town which has always abhorred reformers, Morrison won a smashing victory with a promise to clean up New Orleans—and keep it clean. He has made that promise good with a thunderous array of achievements.

Against an entrenched underworld army of some 8,000—cutthroat gamblers, slot-machine czars, plain prostitutes and thugs and touts—Morrison unleashed a jet-propelled attack. Within a few weeks gambling dens which had milked an estimated \$30,000,000 annually from the people of New Orleans were slammed shut, while 4,800 slot machines went out of business. B. C. (Before Chep), taxi drivers boasted openly to tourists of 60 "houses" and a gamey battalion of 1,000 ladies of the evening. Today ladies and houses have disappeared as completely as though vaporized. As one local newspaperman summed it up, "New Orleans is still the best good-time town in America, but it's no longer a super clip joint for racketeers." Strip-teasers still strip, although more sedately, in the colorful French Quarter; and bars do a roaring business 24 hours a day.

Morrison's accomplishments have reached far beyond delousing the city of underworld parasites. He drove through a \$50,000,000 public-works program and bond issue which will provide a new union station, a new civic center, new express highways and streets—and incidentally eliminate 144 dangerous grade crossings. His administration lopped

off deadheads, reducing city payrolls by 600; established the first real pension fund for city employees; saved the municipality \$500,000 annually by centralizing purchasing, and—miracle of miracles in boss-ridden New Orleans—inaugurated open meetings of the city council where municipal business is transacted at announced times each week in front of any citizen who wants to watch. An overdraft of \$1,000,000, inherited from his predecessor, Robert S. Maestri, has been wiped out and a \$1,500,000 surplus rolled up.

Naturally such a volcanic house-cleaning has resulted in a strident anti-Morrison campaign from those who formerly batted on graft. But it is safe to say a majority of New Orleanians have remained behind the Mayor—if for no other reason than his dramatic drive on juvenile delinquency. "Let the kids blow off steam and they won't later blow safes," Chep rapped, and opened 56 new playgrounds and youth centers, teaching everything from handicraft to handball. With juvenile crime waves on a frightening upsurge in most of the nation's big cities, delinquency rates in New Orleans have been shaved by 24 per cent.

Morrison's own personality lends the proper debonair touch to this spruce-up of the South's greatest and gaudiest metropolis. Chep has the snapping brown eyes and taut yet mobile features of a Hollywood leading man. He also boasts the erect and jaunty carriage of a military officer—he was a thrice-decorated Army colonel in Europe. Yet even these personal vote-getting qualifications have not proved half so important as his incorruptibility. Living on his \$10,000 salary as Mayor, Morrison was approached shortly